- 21 10月, 2013 9 次提交
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由 Nick Mathewson 提交于
Instead, send random bytes, unless SSL_SEND_{CLIENT,SERVER}RANDOM_MODE is set. This is a forward-port of commits: 4af793036f6ef4f0a1078e5d7155426a98d50e37 f4c93b46edb51da71f09eda99e83eaf193a33c08 3da721dac9382c48812c8eba455528fd59af2eef 2583270191a8b27eed303c03ece1da97b9b69fd3 While the gmt_unix_time record was added in an ostensible attempt to mitigate the dangers of a bad RNG, its presence leaks the host's view of the current time in the clear. This minor leak can help fingerprint TLS instances across networks and protocols... and what's worse, it's doubtful thet the gmt_unix_time record does any good at all for its intended purpose, since: * It's quite possible to open two TLS connections in one second. * If the PRNG output is prone to repeat itself, ephemeral handshakes (and who knows what else besides) are broken.
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
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由 Steve Marquess 提交于
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Extend SSL_CONF to return command value types. Add certificate and key options. Update documentation.
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
The function gettimeofday() is not supported on all platforms. Use more portable versions. Adapted from FIPS code.
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Removing RSA+MD5 from the default signature algorithm list prevents its use by default. If a broken implementation attempts to use RSA+MD5 anyway the sanity checking of signature algorithms will cause a fatal alert.
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- 20 10月, 2013 1 次提交
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由 Ben Laurie 提交于
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- 16 10月, 2013 1 次提交
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由 Andy Polyakov 提交于
Suggested by: Anton Blanchard
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- 15 10月, 2013 7 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
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由 Andy Polyakov 提交于
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由 Andy Polyakov 提交于
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- 14 10月, 2013 1 次提交
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由 Andy Polyakov 提交于
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- 13 10月, 2013 3 次提交
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由 Andy Polyakov 提交于
Latest MIPS ISA specification declared 'branch likely' instructions obsolete. To makes code future-proof replace them with equivalent.
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由 Andy Polyakov 提交于
Excessive fragmentation put additional burden (of addtional MAC calculations) on the other size and limiting fragments it to 1KB limits the overhead to ~6%.
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由 Andy Polyakov 提交于
PR: 3139
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- 11 10月, 2013 1 次提交
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由 Andy Polyakov 提交于
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- 09 10月, 2013 6 次提交
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由 Andy Polyakov 提交于
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由 Andy Polyakov 提交于
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由 Andy Polyakov 提交于
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由 Andy Polyakov 提交于
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由 Andy Polyakov 提交于
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由 Andy Polyakov 提交于
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- 07 10月, 2013 1 次提交
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由 Ben Laurie 提交于
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- 04 10月, 2013 1 次提交
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由 Andy Polyakov 提交于
Improve decrypt performance by 10-20% depending on platform. Thanks to Jussi Kivilinna for providing valuable hint. Also thanks to Ard Biesheuvel.
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- 03 10月, 2013 9 次提交
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由 Ben Laurie 提交于
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由 Andy Polyakov 提交于
Submitted by: Yuriy Kaminskiy
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由 Andy Polyakov 提交于
PR: 3130
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由 Andy Polyakov 提交于
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由 Andy Polyakov 提交于
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由 Andy Polyakov 提交于
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由 Andy Polyakov 提交于
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由 Andy Polyakov 提交于
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由 Andy Polyakov 提交于
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