1. 28 1月, 2015 1 次提交
  2. 27 1月, 2015 1 次提交
    • R
      OPENSSL_NO_xxx cleanup: many removals · a00ae6c4
      Rich Salz 提交于
      The following compile options (#ifdef's) are removed:
          OPENSSL_NO_BIO OPENSSL_NO_BUFFER OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
          OPENSSL_NO_EVP OPENSSL_NO_FIPS_ERR OPENSSL_NO_HASH_COMP
          OPENSSL_NO_LHASH OPENSSL_NO_OBJECT OPENSSL_NO_SPEED OPENSSL_NO_STACK
          OPENSSL_NO_X509 OPENSSL_NO_X509_VERIFY
      
      This diff is big because of updating the indents on preprocessor lines.
      Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
      a00ae6c4
  3. 22 1月, 2015 4 次提交
  4. 31 12月, 2014 1 次提交
  5. 07 7月, 2014 1 次提交
  6. 05 7月, 2014 1 次提交
  7. 23 6月, 2014 1 次提交
  8. 21 5月, 2014 1 次提交
    • V
      Fixes to host checking. · 397a8e74
      Viktor Dukhovni 提交于
      Fixes to host checking wild card support and add support for
      setting host checking flags when verifying a certificate
      chain.
      397a8e74
  9. 13 12月, 2013 1 次提交
    • D
      Add opaque ID structure. · 4a253652
      Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
      Move the IP, email and host checking fields from the public
      X509_VERIFY_PARAM structure into an opaque X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID
      structure. By doing this the structure can be modified in future
      without risk of breaking any applications.
      (cherry picked from commit adc6bd73e3bd10ce6e76867482e8d137071298d7)
      
      Conflicts:
      
      	crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c
      4a253652
  10. 14 12月, 2012 1 次提交
  11. 06 12月, 2012 1 次提交
  12. 28 11月, 2012 1 次提交
  13. 03 8月, 2012 1 次提交
  14. 26 12月, 2010 1 次提交
  15. 25 2月, 2010 2 次提交
  16. 01 11月, 2009 1 次提交
  17. 18 10月, 2009 1 次提交
  18. 26 6月, 2009 1 次提交
  19. 01 9月, 2008 1 次提交
  20. 29 8月, 2008 1 次提交
  21. 14 8月, 2008 1 次提交
  22. 08 8月, 2008 1 次提交
  23. 27 11月, 2006 1 次提交
  24. 18 9月, 2006 1 次提交
  25. 15 9月, 2006 1 次提交
  26. 11 9月, 2006 1 次提交
  27. 10 9月, 2006 1 次提交
  28. 03 9月, 2005 1 次提交
  29. 10 4月, 2005 1 次提交
  30. 28 12月, 2004 1 次提交
  31. 29 11月, 2004 1 次提交
    • R
      Make an explicit check during certificate validation to see that the · 30b415b0
      Richard Levitte 提交于
      CA setting in each certificate on the chain is correct.  As a side-
      effect always do the following basic checks on extensions, not just
      when there's an associated purpose to the check:
      - if there is an unhandled critical extension (unless the user has
        chosen to ignore this fault)
      - if the path length has been exceeded (if one is set at all)
      - that certain extensions fit the associated purpose (if one has been
        given)
      30b415b0
  32. 01 10月, 2004 1 次提交
  33. 18 9月, 2004 1 次提交
  34. 07 9月, 2004 1 次提交
  35. 20 5月, 2004 1 次提交
  36. 19 5月, 2004 1 次提交