- 20 9月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- 18 9月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 FdaSilvaYY 提交于
Reviewed-by: NViktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1594)
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- 13 9月, 2016 2 次提交
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由 Viktor Szakats 提交于
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1520)
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- 26 8月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Richard Levitte 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- 25 8月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Viktor Dukhovni 提交于
It should not have been removed. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- 24 8月, 2016 6 次提交
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由 Rob Percival 提交于
Ownership semantics and function names have changed. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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由 Rob Percival 提交于
CTLOG_new_null() has been removed from the code, so it has also been removed from this POD. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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由 Rob Percival 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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由 Rob Percival 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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由 Rob Percival 提交于
They may return if an SCT_signature struct is added in the future that allows them to be refactored to conform to the i2d/d2i function signature conventions. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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由 Rob Percival 提交于
SCT_verify is impossible to call through the public API (SCT_CTX_new() is not part of the public API), so rename it to SCT_CTX_verify and move it out of the public API. SCT_verify_v1 is redundant, since SCT_validate does the same verification (by calling SCT_verify) and more. The API is less confusing with a single verification function (SCT_validate). Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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- 23 8月, 2016 5 次提交
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由 FdaSilvaYY 提交于
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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由 FdaSilvaYY 提交于
ASN1_buf_print, asn1_print_*, X509_NAME_oneline, X509_NAME_print Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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由 FdaSilvaYY 提交于
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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由 FdaSilvaYY 提交于
remove useless cast to call ASN1_STRING_set Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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由 FdaSilvaYY 提交于
... add a static keyword. Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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- 22 8月, 2016 6 次提交
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由 Kazuki Yamaguchi 提交于
Declare EC{PK,}PARAMETERS_{new,free} functions in public headers. The free functions are necessary because EC_GROUP_get_ec{pk,}parameters() was made public by commit 60b350a3 ("RT3676: Expose ECgroup i2d functions"). Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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由 Andy Polyakov 提交于
Originally PKCS#12 subroutines treated password strings as ASCII. It worked as long as they were pure ASCII, but if there were some none-ASCII characters result was non-interoperable. But fixing it poses problem accessing data protected with broken password. In order to make asscess to old data possible add retry with old-style password. Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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由 Andy Polyakov 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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由 Andy Polyakov 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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由 Rich Salz 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Add mutable versions of X509_get0_notBefore and X509_get0_notAfter. Rename X509_SIG_get0_mutable to X509_SIG_getm. Reviewed-by: NViktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
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- 21 8月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 FdaSilvaYY 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1475)
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- 20 8月, 2016 2 次提交
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由 Rich Salz 提交于
Reviewed-by: NDr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Update certificate and CRL time routines to match new standard. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- 19 8月, 2016 7 次提交
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NStephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
A function error code needed updating due to merge issues. Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
The DTLS implementation provides some protection against replay attacks in accordance with RFC6347 section 4.1.2.6. A sliding "window" of valid record sequence numbers is maintained with the "right" hand edge of the window set to the highest sequence number we have received so far. Records that arrive that are off the "left" hand edge of the window are rejected. Records within the window are checked against a list of records received so far. If we already received it then we also reject the new record. If we have not already received the record, or the sequence number is off the right hand edge of the window then we verify the MAC of the record. If MAC verification fails then we discard the record. Otherwise we mark the record as received. If the sequence number was off the right hand edge of the window, then we slide the window along so that the right hand edge is in line with the newly received sequence number. Records may arrive for future epochs, i.e. a record from after a CCS being sent, can arrive before the CCS does if the packets get re-ordered. As we have not yet received the CCS we are not yet in a position to decrypt or validate the MAC of those records. OpenSSL places those records on an unprocessed records queue. It additionally updates the window immediately, even though we have not yet verified the MAC. This will only occur if currently in a handshake/renegotiation. This could be exploited by an attacker by sending a record for the next epoch (which does not have to decrypt or have a valid MAC), with a very large sequence number. This means the right hand edge of the window is moved very far to the right, and all subsequent legitimate packets are dropped causing a denial of service. A similar effect can be achieved during the initial handshake. In this case there is no MAC key negotiated yet. Therefore an attacker can send a message for the current epoch with a very large sequence number. The code will process the record as normal. If the hanshake message sequence number (as opposed to the record sequence number that we have been talking about so far) is in the future then the injected message is bufferred to be handled later, but the window is still updated. Therefore all subsequent legitimate handshake records are dropped. This aspect is not considered a security issue because there are many ways for an attacker to disrupt the initial handshake and prevent it from completing successfully (e.g. injection of a handshake message will cause the Finished MAC to fail and the handshake to be aborted). This issue comes about as a result of trying to do replay protection, but having no integrity mechanism in place yet. Does it even make sense to have replay protection in epoch 0? That issue isn't addressed here though. This addressed an OCAP Audit issue. CVE-2016-2181 Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- 18 8月, 2016 3 次提交
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NStephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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由 Richard Levitte 提交于
Since dasync isn't installed, and is only ever used as a dynamic engine, there's no reason to consider it for initialization when building static engines. Reviewed-by: NBen Laurie <ben@openssl.org>
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Constify X509_SIG_get0() and order arguments to mactch new standard. Add X509_SIG_get0_mutable() to support modification or initialisation of an X509_SIG structure. Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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- 17 8月, 2016 4 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NStephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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