Fix a bunch of typo's and speling (sic) errors in the CHANGES file.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@cryptsoft.com>

Reviewed-by: NDr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

group_order_tests (ectest.c).  Also fix the EC_POINTs_mul documentation (ec.h).

Reviewed-by: emilia@openssl.org

In Makefile, when build manpages, put the current directory
at the start of the podpath so that cross-refs find the
local directory first.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@cryptosoft.com>

In two OpenSSL manual pages, in the NAME section, the last word of the
name list is followed by a stray trailing comma. While this may seem
minor, it is worth fixing because it may confuse some makewhatis(8)
implementations.

While here, also add the missing word "size" to the one line
description in SSL_CTX_set_max_cert_list(3).

Reviewed by: Dr Stephen Henson <shenson@drh-consultancy.co.uk>

If subcommand fails, just die.
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>

If subcommand fails, just die.
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>

Update the dgst.pod page to include SHA224...512 algorithms.
Update apps/progs.pl to add them to the digest command table.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@cryptosoft.com>

This reverts commit 691edc99.

The x509_extensions should be req_extensions in the
config example in req.pod

Reviewed-by: tjh@cryptsoft.com

Fully remove old error, per drH
Reviewed-by: rsalz

Add darwin-*-cc as one of the systems for case-insensitive
filenames.  Fixes the manpage install so it doesn't create
looping symlinks.

Not approved; mistakenly pushed commit that added README.md

Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper

Many of these were already fixed, this catches the last
few that were missed.

Many of these were already fixed, this catches the last
few that were missed.

A small markdown README for GitHub users; points them to
the right README and the website and RT tracker.

The addition of SRP authentication needs to be checked in various places
to work properly. Specifically:

A certificate is not sent.
A certificate request must not be sent.
Server key exchange message must not contain a signature.
If appropriate SRP authentication ciphersuites should be chosen.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Undo unapproved commit that removed DJGPP and WATT32

The "unsigned char *d" should be const.
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>

Use SSL3_AL_FATAL instead of the literal constant "2"
Every bit of cleanup helps.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

DJGPP is no longer a supported platform.  Remove all #ifdef, etc.,
cases that refer to it.  DJGPP also #define'd WATT32, so that
is now removed as well.

Check SRP parameters when they are received so we can send back an
appropriate alert.
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>

Invalid parameters passed to the SRP code can be overrun an internal
buffer. Add sanity check that g, A, B < N to SRP code.

Thanks to Sean Devlin and Watson Ladd of Cryptography Services, NCC
Group for reporting this issue.

If a client attempted to use an SRP ciphersuite and it had not been
set up correctly it would crash with a null pointer read. A malicious
server could exploit this in a DoS attack.

Thanks to Joonas Kuorilehto and Riku Hietamäki from Codenomicon
for reporting this issue.

CVE-2014-2970
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

CVE-2014-3509
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NDr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

- Upon parsing, reject OIDs with invalid base-128 encoding.
- Always NUL-terminate the destination buffer in OBJ_obj2txt printing function.

CVE-2014-3508
Reviewed-by: NDr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

CVE-2014-3510
Reviewed-by: NDr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

CVE-2014-3511
Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NBodo Möller <bodo@openssl.org>

In a couple of functions, a sequence number would be calculated twice.

Additionally, in |dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message|, we know that
|frag_len| <= |msg_hdr->msg_len| so the later tests for |frag_len <
msg_hdr->msg_len| can be more clearly written as |frag_len !=
msg_hdr->msg_len|, since that's the only remaining case.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Applying same fix as in dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message. A truncated DTLS fragment would cause *ok to be clear, but the return value would still be the number of bytes read.

Problem identified by Emilia Käsper, based on previous issue/patch by Adam
Langley.
Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Previously, a truncated DTLS fragment in
|dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message| would cause *ok to be cleared, but
the return value would still be the number of bytes read. This would
cause |dtls1_get_message| not to consider it an error and it would
continue processing as normal until the calling function noticed that
*ok was zero.

I can't see an exploit here because |dtls1_get_message| uses
|s->init_num| as the length, which will always be zero from what I can
see.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

The |pqueue_insert| function can fail if one attempts to insert a
duplicate sequence number. When handling a fragment of an out of
sequence message, |dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message| would not call
|dtls1_reassemble_fragment| if the fragment's length was zero. It would
then allocate a fresh fragment and attempt to insert it, but ignore the
return value, leaking the fragment.

This allows an attacker to exhaust the memory of a DTLS peer.

Fixes CVE-2014-3507
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

In |dtls1_reassemble_fragment|, the value of
|msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len| was being checked against the maximum
handshake message size, but then |msg_len| bytes were allocated for the
fragment buffer. This means that so long as the fragment was within the
allowed size, the pending handshake message could consume 16MB + 2MB
(for the reassembly bitmap). Approx 10 outstanding handshake messages
are allowed, meaning that an attacker could consume ~180MB per DTLS
connection.

In the non-fragmented path (in |dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message|), no
check was applied.

Fixes CVE-2014-3506

Wholly based on patch by Adam Langley with one minor amendment.
Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

The |item| variable, in both of these cases, may contain a pointer to a
|pitem| structure within |s->d1->buffered_messages|. It was being freed
in the error case while still being in |buffered_messages|. When the
error later caused the |SSL*| to be destroyed, the item would be double
freed.

Thanks to Wah-Teh Chang for spotting that the fix in 1632ef74 was
inconsistent with the other error paths (but correct).

Fixes CVE-2014-3505
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

(If a change is already present in 1.0.1f or 1.0.1h,
don't list it again under changes between 1.0.1h and 1.0.2.)