1. 12 1月, 2015 1 次提交
  2. 05 1月, 2015 1 次提交
    • D
      Fix various certificate fingerprint issues. · 684400ce
      Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
      By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
      certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
      Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
      this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
      certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
      
      1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
      
      If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
      the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
      
      2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
      
      Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
      certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
      errors for some broken certificates.
      
      3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
      
      Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
      signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
      
      This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
      (thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
      program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
      (negative or with leading zeroes).
      
      CVE-2014-8275
      Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
      684400ce
  3. 31 12月, 2014 1 次提交
  4. 19 12月, 2014 1 次提交
  5. 08 12月, 2014 4 次提交
  6. 29 11月, 2014 1 次提交
  7. 12 9月, 2014 1 次提交
  8. 19 8月, 2014 1 次提交
  9. 01 7月, 2014 1 次提交
  10. 20 2月, 2014 1 次提交
  11. 18 9月, 2013 1 次提交
  12. 19 7月, 2013 1 次提交
    • D
      Make ecdsatest work with nonces. · 584ac221
      Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
      Update ecdsatest to use ECDSA_sign_setup and ECDSA_sign_ex, this
      avoids the nonce generation which would otherwise break the test.
      
      Reinstate ecdsatest.
      584ac221
  13. 18 7月, 2013 1 次提交
  14. 15 7月, 2013 1 次提交
    • A
      Make `safe' (EC)DSA nonces the default. · 190c615d
      Adam Langley 提交于
      This change updates 8a99cb29 to make the generation of (EC)DSA nonces
      using the message digest the default. It also reverts the changes to
      (EC)DSA_METHOD structure.
      
      In addition to making it the default, removing the flag from EC_KEY
      means that FIPS modules will no longer have an ABI mismatch.
      190c615d
  15. 14 6月, 2013 1 次提交
    • A
      Add secure DSA nonce flag. · 8a99cb29
      Adam Langley 提交于
      This change adds the option to calculate (EC)DSA nonces by hashing the
      message and private key along with entropy to avoid leaking the private
      key if the PRNG fails.
      8a99cb29
  16. 06 10月, 2012 1 次提交
  17. 10 1月, 2012 1 次提交
  18. 07 12月, 2011 1 次提交
  19. 02 12月, 2011 1 次提交
  20. 14 11月, 2011 1 次提交
  21. 05 11月, 2011 1 次提交
  22. 23 10月, 2011 1 次提交
  23. 05 9月, 2011 1 次提交
  24. 01 9月, 2011 1 次提交
  25. 08 6月, 2011 1 次提交
  26. 25 5月, 2011 1 次提交
  27. 24 4月, 2011 1 次提交
  28. 07 4月, 2011 2 次提交
  29. 25 3月, 2011 1 次提交
  30. 13 3月, 2011 1 次提交
  31. 22 2月, 2011 1 次提交
  32. 15 2月, 2011 1 次提交
  33. 13 2月, 2011 1 次提交
  34. 27 1月, 2011 1 次提交
  35. 12 6月, 2010 1 次提交
  36. 02 12月, 2009 1 次提交
    • D
      PR: 1432 · 606c46fb
      Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
      Submitted by: "Andrzej Chmielowiec" <achmielowiec@enigma.com.pl>, steve@openssl.org
      Approved by: steve@openssl.org
      
      Truncate hash if it is too large: as required by FIPS 186-3.
      606c46fb