The logic testing whether a CKE message is allowed or not was a little
difficult to follow. This tries to clean it up.
Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Having received a ClientKeyExchange message instead of a Certificate we
know that we are not going to receive a CertificateVerify message. This
means we can free up the handshake_buffer. However we better call
ssl3_digest_cached_records() instead of just freeing it up, otherwise we
later try and use it anyway and a core dump results. This could happen,
for example, in SSLv3 where we send a CertificateRequest but the client
sends no Certificate message at all. This is valid in SSLv3 (in TLS
clients are required to send an empty Certificate message).

Found using the BoringSSL test suite.
Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

In TLS if the server sends a CertificateRequest and the client does not
provide one, if the server cannot continue it should send a
HandshakeFailure alert. In SSLv3 the same should happen, but instead we
were sending an UnexpectedMessage alert. This is incorrect - the message
isn't unexpected - it is valid for the client not to send one - its just
that we cannot continue without one.
Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

We calculate the size required for the ServerKeyExchange message and then
call BUF_MEM_grow_clean() on the buffer. However we fail to take account of
2 bytes required for the signature algorithm and 2 bytes for the signature
length, i.e. we could overflow by 4 bytes. In reality this won't happen
because the buffer is pre-allocated to a large size that means it should be
big enough anyway.

Addresses an OCAP Audit issue.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Using RSA_PKCS1_PADDING with RSA_private_decrypt is inherently unsafe.
The API requires writing output on success and touching the error queue
on error. Thus, although the padding check itself is constant-time as of
294d1e36, and the logic after the
decryption in the SSL code is constant-time as of
adb46dbc, the API boundary in the middle
still leaks whether the padding check succeeded, giving us our
much-loved Bleichenbacher padding oracle.

Instead, PKCS#1 padding must be handled by the caller which uses
RSA_NO_PADDING, in timing-sensitive code integrated with the
Bleichenbacher mitigation. Removing PKCS#1 padding in constant time is
actually much simpler when the expected length is a constant (and if
it's not a constant, avoiding a padding oracle seems unlikely), so just
do it inline.
Signed-off-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

GH: #1222

Reviewed-by: NStephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

When session tickets are used, it's possible that SNI might swtich the
SSL_CTX on an SSL. Normally, this is not a problem, because the
initial_ctx/session_ctx are used for all session ticket/id processes.

However, when the SNI callback occurs, it's possible that the callback
may update the options in the SSL from the SSL_CTX, and this could
cause SSL_OP_NO_TICKET to be set. If this occurs, then two bad things
can happen:

1. The session ticket TLSEXT may not be written when the ticket expected
flag is set. The state machine transistions to writing the ticket, and
the client responds with an error as its not expecting a ticket.
2. When creating the session ticket, if the ticket key cb returns 0
the crypto/hmac contexts are not initialized, and the code crashes when
trying to encrypt the session ticket.

To fix 1, if the ticket TLSEXT is not written out, clear the expected
ticket flag.
To fix 2, consider a return of 0 from the ticket key cb a recoverable
error, and write a 0 length ticket and continue. The client-side code
can explicitly handle this case.

Fix these two cases, and add unit test code to validate ticket behavior.
Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1098)

The ssl3_init_finished_mac() function can fail, in which case we need to
propagate the error up through the stack.

RT#3198
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>

Fix various references to s3_clnt.c and s3_srvr.c which don't exist
any more.

GitHub Issue #765
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

MR: #2153

This involves providing more session ticket key data, for both the cipher and
the digest
Signed-off-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

GH: #515, MR: #2153

Signed-off-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

GH: #515, MR: #2153

The current limit of 2^14 bytes is too low (e.g. RFC 5246 specifies the
maximum size of just the extensions field to be 2^16-1), and may cause
bogus failures.

RT#4063
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/413)

Reviewed-by: NStephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

The V2ClientHello code creates an empty compression list, but the
compression list must explicitly contain the null compression (and later
code enforces this).

RT#4387
Reviewed-by: NStephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/952)

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Move the dh_st structure into an internal header file and provide
relevant accessors for the internal fields.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

This reverts commit 2b0bcfaf.
It wasn't reviewed.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Session resumption involves a version check, so version negotiation must
happen first. Currently, the DTLS implementation cannot do session
resumption in DTLS 1.0 because the ssl_version check always checks
against 1.2.

Switching the order also removes the need to fixup ssl_version in DTLS
version negotiation.
Signed-off-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: NViktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>

RT: #4392, MR: #2452

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Don't have #error statements in header files, but instead wrap
the contents of that file in #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_xxx
This means it is now always safe to include the header file.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Signed-off-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Add -DBIO_DEBUG to --strict-warnings.
Remove comments about outdated debugging ifdef guards.
Remove md_rand ifdef guarding an assert; it doesn't seem used.
Remove the conf guards in conf_api since we use OPENSSL_assert, not assert.
For pkcs12 stuff put OPENSSL_ in front of the macro name.
Merge TLS_DEBUG into SSL_DEBUG.
Various things just turned on/off asserts, mainly for checking non-NULL
arguments, which is now removed: camellia, bn_ctx, crypto/modes.
Remove some old debug code, that basically just printed things to stderr:
  DEBUG_PRINT_UNKNOWN_CIPHERSUITES, DEBUG_ZLIB, OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG,
  RL_DEBUG, RSA_DEBUG, SCRYPT_DEBUG.
Remove OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

PR#4303
Reviewed-by: NViktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>

Remove support for static ECDH ciphersuites. They require ECDH keys
in certificates and don't support forward secrecy.
Reviewed-by: NViktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>

PACKET contents should be read-only. To achieve this, also
- constify two user callbacks
- constify BUF_reverse.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

This was done by the following
        find . -name '*.[ch]' | /tmp/pl
where /tmp/pl is the following three-line script:
        print unless $. == 1 && m@/\* .*\.[ch] \*/@;
        close ARGV if eof; # Close file to reset $.

And then some hand-editing of other files.
Reviewed-by: NViktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

RT#4080
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

The protocol selection code is now consolidated in a few consecutive
short functions in a single file and is table driven.  Protocol-specific
constraints that influence negotiation are moved into the flags
field of the method structure.  The same protocol version constraints
are now applied in all code paths.  It is now much easier to add
new protocol versions without reworking the protocol selection
logic.

In the presence of "holes" in the list of enabled client protocols
we no longer select client protocols below the hole based on a
subset of the constraints and then fail shortly after when it is
found that these don't meet the remaining constraints (suiteb, FIPS,
security level, ...).  Ideally, with the new min/max controls users
will be less likely to create "holes" in the first place.
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NViktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>