1. 26 5月, 2023 1 次提交
  2. 12 4月, 2023 2 次提交
  3. 01 7月, 2022 1 次提交
  4. 10 8月, 2021 1 次提交
  5. 27 2月, 2020 1 次提交
  6. 01 7月, 2019 1 次提交
  7. 08 4月, 2019 1 次提交
  8. 20 2月, 2019 1 次提交
  9. 15 2月, 2019 1 次提交
    • M
      Fix -verify_return_error in s_client · 9c931841
      Matt Caswell 提交于
      The "verify_return_error" option in s_client is documented as:
      
       Return verification errors instead of continuing. This will typically
       abort the handshake with a fatal error.
      
      In practice this option was ignored unless also accompanied with the
      "-verify" option. It's unclear what the original intention was. One fix
      could have been to change the documentation to match the actual behaviour.
      However it seems unecessarily complex and unexpected that you should need
      to have both options. Instead the fix implemented here is make the option
      match the documentation so that "-verify" is not also required.
      
      Note that s_server has a similar option where "-verify" (or "-Verify") is
      still required. This makes more sense because those options additionally
      request a certificate from the client. Without a certificate there is no
      possibility of a verification failing, and so "-verify_return_error" doing
      nothing seems ok.
      
      Fixes #8079
      Reviewed-by: NNicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
      (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8080)
      
      (cherry picked from commit 78021171dbcb05ddab1b5daffbfc62504ea709a4)
      9c931841
  10. 01 2月, 2019 1 次提交
  11. 27 1月, 2019 1 次提交
  12. 20 8月, 2018 1 次提交
  13. 26 6月, 2018 1 次提交
  14. 31 5月, 2018 1 次提交
  15. 23 5月, 2018 1 次提交
    • K
      Enable SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY by default · 693cf80c
      Kurt Roeckx 提交于
      Because TLS 1.3 sends more non-application data records some clients run
      into problems because they don't expect SSL_read() to return and set
      SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ after processing it.
      
      This can cause problems for clients that use blocking I/O and use
      select() to see if data is available. It can be cleared using
      SSL_CTX_clear_mode().
      Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
      GH: #6260
      693cf80c
  16. 20 5月, 2018 1 次提交
  17. 08 5月, 2018 1 次提交
  18. 25 4月, 2018 1 次提交
  19. 08 4月, 2018 1 次提交
  20. 22 3月, 2018 1 次提交
  21. 20 3月, 2018 1 次提交
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  25. 02 2月, 2018 1 次提交
    • T
      Add TLSv1.3 post-handshake authentication (PHA) · 9d75dce3
      Todd Short 提交于
      Add SSL_verify_client_post_handshake() for servers to initiate PHA
      
      Add SSL_force_post_handshake_auth() for clients that don't have certificates
      initially configured, but use a certificate callback.
      
      Update SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() mode:
      
      * Add SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to postpone client authentication until after
      the initial handshake.
      
      * Update SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE now only sends out one CertRequest regardless
      of when the certificate authentication takes place; either initial handshake,
      re-negotiation, or post-handshake authentication.
      
      Add 'RequestPostHandshake' and 'RequirePostHandshake' SSL_CONF options that
      add the SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to the 'Request' and 'Require' options
      
      Add support to s_client:
      * Enabled automatically when cert is configured
      * Can be forced enabled via -force_pha
      
      Add support to s_server:
      * Use 'c' to invoke PHA in s_server
      * Remove some dead code
      
      Update documentation
      
      Update unit tests:
      * Illegal use of PHA extension
      * TLSv1.3 certificate tests
      
      DTLS and TLS behave ever-so-slightly differently. So, when DTLS1.3 is
      implemented, it's PHA support state machine may need to be different.
      Add a TODO and a #error
      
      Update handshake context to deal with PHA.
      
      The handshake context for TLSv1.3 post-handshake auth is up through the
      ClientFinish message, plus the CertificateRequest message. Subsequent
      Certificate, CertificateVerify, and Finish messages are based on this
      handshake context (not the Certificate message per se, but it's included
      after the hash). KeyUpdate, NewSessionTicket, and prior Certificate
      Request messages are not included in post-handshake authentication.
      
      After the ClientFinished message is processed, save off the digest state
      for future post-handshake authentication. When post-handshake auth occurs,
      copy over the saved handshake context into the "main" handshake digest.
      This effectively discards the any KeyUpdate or NewSessionTicket messages
      and any prior post-handshake authentication.
      
      This, of course, assumes that the ID-22 did not mean to include any
      previous post-handshake authentication into the new handshake transcript.
      This is implied by section 4.4.1 that lists messages only up to the
      first ClientFinished.
      Reviewed-by: NBen Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
      Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
      (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4964)
      9d75dce3
  26. 01 2月, 2018 1 次提交
  27. 19 1月, 2018 1 次提交
  28. 15 1月, 2018 2 次提交
  29. 22 11月, 2017 1 次提交
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  37. 31 8月, 2017 2 次提交