Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
GH: #6794

Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
GH: #6787

The old numbers where all generated for an 80 bit security level. But
the number should depend on security level you want to reach. For bigger
primes we want a higher security level and so need to do more tests.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
GH: #6075
Fixes: #6012

This changes the security level from 100 to 128 bit.
We only have 1 define, this sets it to the highest level supported for
DSA, and needed for keys larger than 3072 bit.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
GH: #6075

Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: NMatthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6778)

Thanks to Jiecheng Wu, Zuxing Gu for the report.
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6791)

Problem was that Windows threads that were terminating before libcrypto
was initialized were referencing uninitialized or possibly even
unrelated thread local storage index.
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6752)

Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6752)

Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6752)

Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6752)

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6773)

|ctx| recently became unconditionally non-NULL and is already dereferenced
earlier.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

This is done by calling die again, just make sure to reset the __DIE__
handler first.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6776)

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6776)

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6776)

A number intended to treat the base as secret should not be branching on
whether it is zero. Test-wise, this is covered by existing tests in bnmod.txt.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6733)

On the same note, change the 'NASM not found' message to give specific
advice on how to handle the failure.

Fixes #6765
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6771)

asn1_encode : x, y  =>    0 | x，0 | y
(because of DER encoding rules when x and y have high bit set)

CLA: Trivial
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6694)

If there's anything in the |biosk| stack, the first element is always
the input BIO.  It should never be freed in this function, so we must
take careful steps not to do so inadvertently when freeing the stack.
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6769)

Build jobs keep timing out initializing...
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>

The result is that we don't have to produce different names on
different platforms, and we won't have confusion on Windows depending
on if the script was built with mingw or with MSVC.

Partial fix for #3254
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6764)

In some circumstances it is possible for a client to have a session
reporting a max early data value that is greater than the server will
support. In such cases the client could encounter an aborted connection.

Fixes #6735
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6740)

ecp_nistz256_set_from_affine is called when application attempts to use
custom generator, i.e. rarely. Even though it was wrong, it didn't
affect point operations, they were just not as fast as expected.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6738)

The ecp_nistz256_scatter_w7 function is called when application
attempts to use custom generator, i.e. rarely. Even though non-x86_64
versions were wrong, it didn't affect point operations, they were just
not as fast as expected.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6738)

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6738)

Reviewed-by: NMatthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6758)

Fixes #6755
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6759)

As per RFC 7292.

Fixes #6665
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6708)

The API used to set what SNI value to send in the ClientHello
can also be used on server SSL objects, with undocumented and
un-useful behavior.  Unfortunately, when generic SSL_METHODs
are used, s->server is still set, prior to the start of the
handshake, so we cannot prevent this nonsensical usage at the
present time.  Leave a note to revisit this when ABI-breaking
changes are permitted.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6378)

In particular, adhere to the rule that we must not modify any
property of an SSL_SESSION object once it is (or might be) in
a session cache.  Such modifications are thread-unsafe and have
been observed to cause crashes at runtime.

To effect this change, standardize on the property that
SSL_SESSION->ext.hostname is set only when that SNI value
has been negotiated by both parties for use with that session.
For session resumption this is trivially the case, so only new
handshakes are affected.

On the client, the new semantics are that the SSL->ext.hostname is
for storing the value configured by the caller, and this value is
used when constructing the ClientHello.  On the server, SSL->ext.hostname
is used to hold the value received from the client.  Only if the
SNI negotiation is successful will the hostname be stored into the
session object; the server can do this after it sends the ServerHello,
and the client after it has received and processed the ServerHello.

This obviates the need to remove the hostname from the session object
in case of failed negotiation (a change that was introduced in commit
9fb6cb81 in order to allow TLS 1.3
early data when SNI was present in the ClientHello but not the session
being resumed), which was modifying cached sessions in certain cases.
(In TLS 1.3 we always produce a new SSL_SESSION object for new
connections, even in the case of resumption, so no TLS 1.3 handshakes
were affected.)
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6378)

These tiny functions only read from the input SSL, and we are
about to use them from functions that only have a const SSL* available,
so propagate const a bit further.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6378)

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6745)

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6745)

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6745)

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6745)

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6745)

The spec says that a client MUST set legacy_version to TLSv1.2, and
requires servers to verify that it isn't SSLv3.

Fixes #6600
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6747)

Use the latest version of the test vectors available in:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-vectors-06Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6746)