Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

It is never valid to call ssl3_read_bytes with
type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, and in fact we check for valid values
for type near the beginning of the function. Therefore this check will never
be true and can be removed.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

The variable assignment c1 is never read before it is overwritten.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

RT#4625
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

RT#4625
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Addition was not preserving inputs' property of being fully reduced.

Thanks to Brian Smith for reporting this.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Addition was not preserving inputs' property of being fully reduced.

Thanks to Brian Smith for reporting this.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Thanks to David Benjamin for reporting this.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

The declaration of bio_type_lock is independent of no-sock so should not be
inside OPENSSL_NO_SOCK guards.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

If a ticket callback changes the HMAC digest to SHA512 the existing
sanity checks are not sufficient and an attacker could perform a DoS
attack with a malformed ticket. Add additional checks based on
HMAC size.

Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this bug.

CVE-2016-6302
Reviewed-by: NViktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>

Test doesn't work on Windows with non-Greek locale, because of
Win32 perl[!] limitation, not OpenSSL. For example it passes on
Cygwin and MSYS...
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

The bound on log(2)/3 on the second line is incorrect and has an extra
zero compared to the divisions in the third line. log(2)/3 = 0.10034...
which is bounded by 0.101 and not 0.1001. The divisions actually
correspond to 0.101 which is fine. The third line also dropped a factor
of three.

The actual code appears to be fine. Just the comments are wrong.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

This makes it consistent with all of the other SCT setters.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

They may return if an SCT_signature struct is added in the future that
allows them to be refactored to conform to the i2d/d2i function signature
conventions.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Previously, if ct_v1_log_id_from_pkey failed, public_key would be freed by
CTLOG_free at the end of the function, and then again by the caller (who
would assume ownership was not transferred when CTLOG_new returned NULL).
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

SCT_verify is impossible to call through the public API (SCT_CTX_new() is
not part of the public API), so rename it to SCT_CTX_verify and move it
out of the public API.

SCT_verify_v1 is redundant, since SCT_validate does the same verification
(by calling SCT_verify) and more. The API is less confusing with a single
verification function (SCT_validate).
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

This is a new minimal corpus with the following changes:
- asn1: files: 1135 (+474), tuples: 27236 (+7496)
- asn1parse: files: 305 (-3), tuples: 8758 (+11)
- bignum: files: 370 (-1), tuples: 9547 (+10)
- bndiv: files: 160 (+0), tuples: 2416 (+6)
- cms: files: 155 (-1), tuples: 3408 (+0)
- conf: files: 231 (-11), tuples: 4668 (+3)
- crl: files: 905 (+188), tuples: 22876 (+4096)
- ct: files: 117 (+35), tuples: 3557 (+908)
- x509: files: 920, tuples: 28334

Note that tuple count depends on the binary and is random.
Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

 ASN1_buf_print, asn1_print_*, X509_NAME_oneline, X509_NAME_print
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

remove useless cast to call ASN1_STRING_set
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

... add a static keyword.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

There was a block of code at the start that used the Camellia cipher. The
original idea behind this was to fill the buffer with non-zero data so that
oversteps can be detected. However this block failed when using no-camellia.
This has been replaced with a RAND_bytes() call.

I also updated the the CTR test section, since it seems to be using a CBC
cipher instead of a CTR cipher.
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

The assignment to ret is dead, because ret is assigned again later.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

If it's negative don't try and malloc it.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Otherwise we try to malloc a -1 size.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Ensure BN_CTX_get() has been successful
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

The mem pointed to by cAB can be leaked on an error path.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

The mem pointed to by cAB can be leaked on an error path.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

The mem pointed to by tmp can be leaked on an error path.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Sometimes it is called with a NULL pointer
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Don't leak pke_ctx on error.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
GH: #1472

Signed-off-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

GH: #1471