- 29 6月, 2016 2 次提交
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由 FdaSilvaYY 提交于
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1264)
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由 FdaSilvaYY 提交于
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1264)
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- 27 6月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
In some situations (such as when we receive a fragment of an alert) we try to get the next packet but did not mark the current one as read, meaning that we got the same record back again - leading to an infinite loop. Found using the BoringSSL test suite. Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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- 23 6月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 FdaSilvaYY 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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- 22 6月, 2016 2 次提交
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由 FdaSilvaYY 提交于
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1245)
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由 David Benjamin 提交于
Using RSA_PKCS1_PADDING with RSA_private_decrypt is inherently unsafe. The API requires writing output on success and touching the error queue on error. Thus, although the padding check itself is constant-time as of 294d1e36, and the logic after the decryption in the SSL code is constant-time as of adb46dbc, the API boundary in the middle still leaks whether the padding check succeeded, giving us our much-loved Bleichenbacher padding oracle. Instead, PKCS#1 padding must be handled by the caller which uses RSA_NO_PADDING, in timing-sensitive code integrated with the Bleichenbacher mitigation. Removing PKCS#1 padding in constant time is actually much simpler when the expected length is a constant (and if it's not a constant, avoiding a padding oracle seems unlikely), so just do it inline. Signed-off-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1222
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- 19 6月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 FdaSilvaYY 提交于
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1168)
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- 16 6月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Richard Levitte 提交于
Reviewed-by: NStephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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- 15 6月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Kurt Roeckx 提交于
ssl_session_hash() always looks at the first 4 bytes, regardless of the length. A client can send a session id that's shorter, and the callback could also generate one that's shorter. So we make sure that the rest of the buffer is initliazed to 0 so that we always calculate the same hash. Found by tis-interpreter, also previously reported as RT #2871 Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> MR: #2911
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- 14 6月, 2016 3 次提交
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Fix a comment following commit c2c49969. RT2388 Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Some misc return value checks Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
SSL_clear() and SSL_free() will remove a session from the cache if it is considered "bad". However SSL_set_session() does not do this for the session it is replacing. SSL_clear() clears an SSL object ready for reuse. It does not clear the session though. This means that: SSL_clear(s) SSL_set_session(s, sess); and SSL_set_session(s, sess); SSL_clear(s); do not do the same thing, although logically you would expect that they would. The failure of SSL_set_session() to remove bad sessions from the cache should be considered a bug, so this commit fixes it. RT#597 Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- 11 6月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Kurt Roeckx 提交于
Found by tis-interpreter Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1173
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- 10 6月, 2016 2 次提交
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由 Laszlo Kovacs 提交于
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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由 Todd Short 提交于
When session tickets are used, it's possible that SNI might swtich the SSL_CTX on an SSL. Normally, this is not a problem, because the initial_ctx/session_ctx are used for all session ticket/id processes. However, when the SNI callback occurs, it's possible that the callback may update the options in the SSL from the SSL_CTX, and this could cause SSL_OP_NO_TICKET to be set. If this occurs, then two bad things can happen: 1. The session ticket TLSEXT may not be written when the ticket expected flag is set. The state machine transistions to writing the ticket, and the client responds with an error as its not expecting a ticket. 2. When creating the session ticket, if the ticket key cb returns 0 the crypto/hmac contexts are not initialized, and the code crashes when trying to encrypt the session ticket. To fix 1, if the ticket TLSEXT is not written out, clear the expected ticket flag. To fix 2, consider a return of 0 from the ticket key cb a recoverable error, and write a 0 length ticket and continue. The client-side code can explicitly handle this case. Fix these two cases, and add unit test code to validate ticket behavior. Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1098)
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- 08 6月, 2016 7 次提交
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由 Rich Salz 提交于
GH1098: Add X509_get_pathlen() (and a test) GH1097: Add SSL_is_dtls() function. Documented. Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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由 Todd Short 提交于
Sessions are stored on the session_ctx, which doesn't change after SSL_set_SSL_CTX(). Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Previously if we received an empty record we just threw it away and ignored it. Really though if we get an empty record of a different content type to what we are expecting then that should be an error, i.e. we should reject out of context empty records. This commit makes the necessary changes to achieve that. RT#4395 Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
The number of read pipelines should be reset in the event of reuse of an SSL object. Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Alessandro Ghedini 提交于
The tlsext_status_type field in SSL is used by e.g. OpenResty to determine if the client requested the certificate status, but SSL is now opaque. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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- 04 6月, 2016 2 次提交
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由 Rich Salz 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
The ssl3_init_finished_mac() function can fail, in which case we need to propagate the error up through the stack. RT#3198 Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- 01 6月, 2016 2 次提交
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由 TJ Saunders 提交于
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1135)
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由 TJ Saunders 提交于
accompanying documentation. Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1135)
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- 31 5月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Reviewed-by: NViktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
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- 28 5月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Todd Short 提交于
When setting the certificate chain, if a certificate doesn't pass security checks, then chain may point to a freed STACK_OF(X509) Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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- 27 5月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Windows was complaining about a unary minus operator being applied to an unsigned type. It did seem to go on and do the right thing anyway, but the code does look a little suspect. This fixes it. Reviewed-by: NViktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
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- 26 5月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
The ssl3_digest_cached_records() function was failing to handle errors that might be returned from EVP_DigestSignInit() and EVP_DigestSignUpdate(). RT#4180 Reviewed-by: NStephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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- 24 5月, 2016 2 次提交
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由 Rich Salz 提交于
Add script to find unused err/reason codes Remove unused reason codes. Remove entries for unused functions Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- 23 5月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 FdaSilvaYY 提交于
from BoringSSL 306ece31bcaaed49e0240a2e5555f8901ebb2d45 Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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- 20 5月, 2016 4 次提交
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由 Rich Salz 提交于
Rename sk_xxx to OPENSSL_sk_xxx and _STACK to OPENSSL_STACK Rename lh_xxx API to OPENSSL_LH_xxx and LHASH_NODE to OPENSSL_LH_NODE Make lhash stuff opaque. Use typedefs for function pointers; makes the code simpler. Remove CHECKED_xxx macros. Add documentation; remove old X509-oriented doc. Add API-compat names for entire old API Reviewed-by: NDr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
In the new state machine if using nbio and we get the header of a handshake message is one record with the body in the next, with an nbio event in the middle, then the connection was failing. This is because s->init_num was getting reset. We should only reset it after we have read the whole message. RT#4394 Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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由 David Benjamin 提交于
ChangeCipherSpec messages have a defined value. They also may not occur in the middle of a handshake message. The current logic will accept a ChangeCipherSpec with value 2. It also would accept up to three bytes of handshake data before the ChangeCipherSpec which it would discard (because s->init_num gets reset). Instead, require that s->init_num is 0 when a ChangeCipherSpec comes in. RT#4391 Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
The write BIO for handshake messages is bufferred so that we only write out to the network when we have a complete flight. There was some complexity in the buffering logic so that we switched buffering on and off at various points through out the handshake. The only real reason to do this was historically it complicated the state machine when you wanted to flush because you had to traverse through the "flush" state (in order to cope with NBIO). Where we knew up front that there was only going to be one message in the flight we switched off buffering to avoid that. In the new state machine there is no longer a need for a flush state so it is simpler just to have buffering on for the whole handshake. This also gives us the added benefit that we can simply call flush after every flight even if it only has one message in it. This means that BIO authors can implement their own buffering strategies and not have to be aware of the state of the SSL object (previously they would have to switch off their own buffering during the handshake because they could not rely on a flush being received when they really needed to write data out). This last point addresses GitHub Issue #322. Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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- 19 5月, 2016 2 次提交
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由 Viktor Dukhovni 提交于
Since with SSL_VERIFY_NONE, the connection may continue and the session may even be cached, we should save some evidence that the chain was not sufficiently verified and would have been rejected with SSL_VERIFY_PEER. To that end when a CT callback returs failure we set the verify result to X509_V_ERR_NO_VALID_SCTS. Note: We only run the CT callback in the first place if the verify result is still X509_V_OK prior to start of the callback. RT #4502 Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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由 Viktor Dukhovni 提交于
Set ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM when verificaiton cannot continue due to malloc failure. Also, when X509_verify_cert() returns <= 0 make sure that the verification status does not remain X509_V_OK, as a last resort set it it to X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED, just in case some code path returns an error without setting an appropriate value of ctx->error. Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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- 18 5月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Rich Salz 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
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