提交 fe3066ee 编写于 作者: M Matt Caswell

Extend PSS signature support to TLSv1.2

TLSv1.3 introduces PSS based sigalgs. Offering these in a TLSv1.3 client
implies that the client is prepared to accept these sigalgs even in
TLSv1.2.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2157)
上级 16abbd11
......@@ -1703,6 +1703,11 @@ typedef enum tlsext_index_en {
#define TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512 0xefef
#define TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411 0xeded
#define SIGID_IS_PSS(sigid) ((sigid) == TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha256 \
|| (sigid) == TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha384 \
|| (sigid) == TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha512)
/* A dummy signature value not valid for TLSv1.2 signature algs */
#define TLSEXT_signature_rsa_pss 0x0101
......@@ -2147,7 +2152,7 @@ __owur int tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
__owur int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s);
__owur int tls12_get_sigandhash(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
const EVP_MD *md);
const EVP_MD *md, int *ispss);
__owur const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(int hash_nid);
void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op);
......
......@@ -1824,9 +1824,11 @@ static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
int al = -1;
int al = -1, ispss = 0;
long alg_k;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
PACKET save_param_start, signature;
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
......@@ -1865,7 +1867,6 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
PACKET params;
int maxsig;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx;
/*
* |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
......@@ -1896,6 +1897,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto err;
}
ispss = SIGID_IS_PSS(sigalg);
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
......@@ -1936,29 +1938,39 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
goto err;
}
if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
|| EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
|| EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
|| EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&params),
PACKET_remaining(&params)) <= 0) {
EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (ispss) {
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
/* -1 here means set saltlen to the digest len */
|| EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, -1) <= 0) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&params),
PACKET_remaining(&params)) <= 0) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
/* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
if (EVP_VerifyFinal(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
(unsigned int)PACKET_remaining(&signature),
pkey) <= 0) {
if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
PACKET_remaining(&signature)) <= 0) {
/* bad signature */
EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto err;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
md_ctx = NULL;
} else {
/* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
......@@ -1986,6 +1998,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
if (al != -1)
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
......
......@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
void *hdata;
unsigned char *sig = NULL;
unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
int pktype;
int pktype, ispss = 0;
if (s->server) {
/* Only happens in TLSv1.3 */
......@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
goto err;
}
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !tls12_get_sigandhash(s, pkt, pkey, md)) {
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !tls12_get_sigandhash(s, pkt, pkey, md, &ispss)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
......@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
goto err;
}
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && pktype == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
if (ispss) {
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
/* -1 here means set saltlen to the digest len */
|| EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, -1) <= 0) {
......@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
unsigned char *gost_data = NULL;
#endif
int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
int type = 0, j, pktype;
int type = 0, j, pktype, ispss = 0;
unsigned int len;
X509 *peer;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
......@@ -297,6 +297,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
ispss = SIGID_IS_PSS(sigalg);
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
......@@ -358,7 +359,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
}
#endif
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && pktype == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
if (ispss) {
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
/* -1 here means set saltlen to the digest len */
|| EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, -1) <= 0) {
......
......@@ -1956,6 +1956,7 @@ int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
unsigned long type;
const BIGNUM *r[4];
EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &paramoffset)) {
......@@ -2212,7 +2213,8 @@ int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
*/
if (md) {
unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2;
unsigned int siglen;
size_t siglen;
int ispss = 0;
/* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &paramlen)) {
......@@ -2222,7 +2224,7 @@ int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
}
/* send signature algorithm */
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(s, pkt, pkey, md)) {
if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(s, pkt, pkey, md, &ispss)) {
/* Should never happen */
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
......@@ -2240,14 +2242,29 @@ int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
*/
if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, EVP_PKEY_size(pkey),
&sigbytes1)
|| EVP_SignInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
|| EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
|| EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
|| EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
paramlen) <= 0
|| EVP_SignFinal(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, pkey) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
if (ispss) {
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx,
RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
/* -1 here means set saltlen to the digest len */
|| EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, -1) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto f_err;
}
}
if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx,
s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
paramlen) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestSignFinal(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen) <= 0
|| !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
|| sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
......
......@@ -751,32 +751,31 @@ typedef struct sigalg_lookup_st {
unsigned int sigalg;
int hash;
int sig;
int notls12;
} SIGALG_LOOKUP;
SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl[] = {
{TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256, NID_sha256, EVP_PKEY_EC, 0},
{TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384, NID_sha384, EVP_PKEY_EC, 0},
{TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512, NID_sha512, EVP_PKEY_EC, 0},
{TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1, NID_sha1, EVP_PKEY_EC, 0},
{TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256, NID_sha256, EVP_PKEY_EC},
{TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384, NID_sha384, EVP_PKEY_EC},
{TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512, NID_sha512, EVP_PKEY_EC},
{TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1, NID_sha1, EVP_PKEY_EC},
/*
* PSS must appear before PKCS1 so that we prefer that when signing where
* possible
*/
{TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha256, NID_sha256, EVP_PKEY_RSA, 1},
{TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha384, NID_sha384, EVP_PKEY_RSA, 1},
{TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha512, NID_sha512, EVP_PKEY_RSA, 1},
{TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256, NID_sha256, EVP_PKEY_RSA, 0},
{TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384, NID_sha384, EVP_PKEY_RSA, 0},
{TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512, NID_sha512, EVP_PKEY_RSA, 0},
{TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, NID_sha1, EVP_PKEY_RSA, 0},
{TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256, NID_sha256, EVP_PKEY_DSA, 0},
{TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384, NID_sha384, EVP_PKEY_DSA, 0},
{TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512, NID_sha512, EVP_PKEY_DSA, 0},
{TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1, NID_sha1, EVP_PKEY_DSA, 0},
{TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, 0},
{TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, 0},
{TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411, NID_id_GostR3411_94, NID_id_GostR3410_2001, 0}
{TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha256, NID_sha256, EVP_PKEY_RSA},
{TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha384, NID_sha384, EVP_PKEY_RSA},
{TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha512, NID_sha512, EVP_PKEY_RSA},
{TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256, NID_sha256, EVP_PKEY_RSA},
{TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384, NID_sha384, EVP_PKEY_RSA},
{TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512, NID_sha512, EVP_PKEY_RSA},
{TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, NID_sha1, EVP_PKEY_RSA},
{TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256, NID_sha256, EVP_PKEY_DSA},
{TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384, NID_sha384, EVP_PKEY_DSA},
{TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512, NID_sha512, EVP_PKEY_DSA},
{TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1, NID_sha1, EVP_PKEY_DSA},
{TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256},
{TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512},
{TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411, NID_id_GostR3411_94, NID_id_GostR3410_2001}
};
static int tls_sigalg_get_hash(unsigned int sigalg)
......@@ -861,7 +860,7 @@ int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s, unsigned int sig,
return 0;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
/* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
......@@ -1288,9 +1287,9 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
}
int tls12_get_sigandhash(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
const EVP_MD *md)
const EVP_MD *md, int *ispss)
{
int md_id, sig_id;
int md_id, sig_id, tmpispss = 0;
size_t i;
SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
......@@ -1303,10 +1302,27 @@ int tls12_get_sigandhash(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
for (i = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
i++, curr++) {
if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id
&& (!curr->notls12 || SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) {
if (sig_id == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
tmpispss = SIGID_IS_PSS(curr->sigalg);
if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && tmpispss) {
size_t j;
/*
* Check peer actually sent a PSS sig id - it could have
* been a PKCS1 sig id instead.
*/
for (j = 0; j < s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; j++)
if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs[j].rsigalg == curr->sigalg)
break;
if (j == s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
continue;
}
}
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, curr->sigalg))
return 0;
*ispss = tmpispss;
return 1;
}
}
......@@ -1814,7 +1830,10 @@ int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
for (j = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; j < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
j++, curr++) {
if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id && !curr->notls12) {
/* Skip setting PSS so we get PKCS1 by default */
if (SIGID_IS_PSS(curr->sigalg))
continue;
if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) {
*sptr++ = curr->sigalg;
break;
}
......
......@@ -146,12 +146,12 @@ SKIP: {
$proxy->start();
ok(TLSProxy::Message->success, "No PSS TLSv1.2 sigalgs");
#Test 13: Sending only TLSv1.3 PSS sig algs in TLSv1.2 should fail
#Test 13: Sending only TLSv1.3 PSS sig algs in TLSv1.2 should succeed
$proxy->clear();
$testtype = PSS_ONLY_SIG_ALGS;
$proxy->clientflags("-no_tls1_3");
$proxy->serverflags("-no_tls1_3");
$proxy->start();
ok(TLSProxy::Message->fail, "PSS only sigalgs in TLSv1.2");
ok(TLSProxy::Message->success, "PSS only sigalgs in TLSv1.2");
#Test 14: Sending a valid sig algs list but not including a sig type that
# matches the certificate should fail in TLSv1.2
......
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