Rename EVP_PKEY_new_private_key()/EVP_PKEY_new_public_key()

Renamed to EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key()/EVP_new_raw_public_key() as per
feedback.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5520)

apps/dgst.c

@@ -277,8 +277,8 @@ int dgst_main(int argc, char **argv)
     }
 
     if (hmac_key != NULL) {
-        sigkey = EVP_PKEY_new_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, impl,
-                                          (unsigned char *)hmac_key, -1);
+        sigkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, impl,
+                                              (unsigned char *)hmac_key, -1);
         if (sigkey == NULL)
             goto end;
     }

crypto/err/openssl.txt

@@ -704,8 +704,8 @@ EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_KEYGEN:146:EVP_PKEY_keygen
 EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_KEYGEN_INIT:147:EVP_PKEY_keygen_init
 EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_NEW:106:EVP_PKEY_new
 EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_NEW_CMAC_KEY:193:EVP_PKEY_new_CMAC_key
-EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_NEW_PRIVATE_KEY:191:EVP_PKEY_new_private_key
-EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_NEW_PUBLIC_KEY:192:EVP_PKEY_new_public_key
+EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_NEW_RAW_PRIVATE_KEY:191:EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key
+EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_NEW_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY:192:EVP_PKEY_new_raw_public_key
 EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_PARAMGEN:148:EVP_PKEY_paramgen
 EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_PARAMGEN_INIT:149:EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init
 EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_PARAM_CHECK:189:EVP_PKEY_param_check

crypto/evp/evp_err.c

@@ -95,10 +95,10 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA EVP_str_functs[] = {
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_NEW, 0), "EVP_PKEY_new"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_NEW_CMAC_KEY, 0),
      "EVP_PKEY_new_CMAC_key"},
-    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_NEW_PRIVATE_KEY, 0),
-     "EVP_PKEY_new_private_key"},
-    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_NEW_PUBLIC_KEY, 0),
-     "EVP_PKEY_new_public_key"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_NEW_RAW_PRIVATE_KEY, 0),
+     "EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_NEW_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY, 0),
+     "EVP_PKEY_new_raw_public_key"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_PARAMGEN, 0), "EVP_PKEY_paramgen"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_PARAMGEN_INIT, 0),
      "EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init"},

crypto/evp/p_lib.c

@@ -220,9 +220,9 @@ static int pkey_set_type(EVP_PKEY *pkey, ENGINE *e, int type, const char *str,
     return 1;
 }
 
-EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new_private_key(int type, ENGINE *e,
-                                   const unsigned char *priv,
-                                   size_t len)
+EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(int type, ENGINE *e,
+                                       const unsigned char *priv,
+                                       size_t len)
 {
     EVP_PKEY *ret = EVP_PKEY_new();
 
@@ -233,13 +233,13 @@ EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new_private_key(int type, ENGINE *e,
     }
 
     if (ret->ameth->set_priv_key == NULL) {
-        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_NEW_PRIVATE_KEY,
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_NEW_RAW_PRIVATE_KEY,
                EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
         goto err;
     }
 
     if (!ret->ameth->set_priv_key(ret, priv, len)) {
-        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_NEW_PRIVATE_KEY, EVP_R_KEY_SETUP_FAILED);
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_NEW_RAW_PRIVATE_KEY, EVP_R_KEY_SETUP_FAILED);
         goto err;
     }
 
@@ -250,9 +250,9 @@ EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new_private_key(int type, ENGINE *e,
     return NULL;
 }
 
-EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new_public_key(int type, ENGINE *e,
-                                  const unsigned char *pub,
-                                  size_t len)
+EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new_raw_public_key(int type, ENGINE *e,
+                                      const unsigned char *pub,
+                                      size_t len)
 {
     EVP_PKEY *ret = EVP_PKEY_new();
 
@@ -263,13 +263,13 @@ EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new_public_key(int type, ENGINE *e,
     }
 
     if (ret->ameth->set_pub_key == NULL) {
-        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_NEW_PUBLIC_KEY,
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_NEW_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY,
                EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
         goto err;
     }
 
     if (!ret->ameth->set_pub_key(ret, pub, len)) {
-        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_NEW_PUBLIC_KEY, EVP_R_KEY_SETUP_FAILED);
+        EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_NEW_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY, EVP_R_KEY_SETUP_FAILED);
         goto err;
     }
 

crypto/kdf/tls1_prf.c

@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ static int tls1_prf_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md,
     if (ctx == NULL || ctx_tmp == NULL || ctx_init == NULL)
         goto err;
     EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(ctx_init, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
-    mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, sec, sec_len);
+    mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, sec, sec_len);
     if (mac_key == NULL)
         goto err;
     if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(ctx_init, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key))

doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD.pod

@@ -345,8 +345,8 @@ L<EVP_PKEY_param_check(3)> respectively.
 
 The set_priv_key() and set_pub_key() methods are used to set the raw private and
 public key data for an EVP_PKEY. They MUST return 0 on error, or 1 on success.
-They are called by L<EVP_PKEY_new_private_key(3)>, and
-L<EVP_PKEY_new_public_key(3)> respectively.
+They are called by L<EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(3)>, and
+L<EVP_PKEY_new_raw_public_key(3)> respectively.
 
 =head2 Functions
 

doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod

@@ -88,10 +88,10 @@ allow private key data to be set explicitly using the EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_mac_key()
 macro. In this case key generation is simply the process of setting up the
 parameters for the key and then setting the raw key data to the value explicitly
 provided by that macro. Normally applications would call
-L<EVP_PKEY_new_private_key(3)> or similar functions instead of this macro.
+L<EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(3)> or similar functions instead of this macro.
 
 The EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_mac_key() macro can be used with any of the algorithms
-supported by the L<EVP_PKEY_new_private_key(3)> function.
+supported by the L<EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(3)> function.
 
 The macro EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding() sets the RSA padding mode for B<ctx>.
 The B<pad> parameter can take the value RSA_PKCS1_PADDING for PKCS#1 padding,

doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_new.pod

@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@
 EVP_PKEY_new,
 EVP_PKEY_up_ref,
 EVP_PKEY_free,
-EVP_PKEY_new_private_key,
-EVP_PKEY_new_public_key,
+EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key,
+EVP_PKEY_new_raw_public_key,
 EVP_PKEY_new_CMAC_key,
 EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key
 - public/private key allocation functions
@@ -19,10 +19,10 @@ EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key
  int EVP_PKEY_up_ref(EVP_PKEY *key);
  void EVP_PKEY_free(EVP_PKEY *key);
 
- EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new_private_key(int type, ENGINE *e,
-                                    const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen);
- EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new_public_key(int type, ENGINE *e,
-                                   const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen);
+ EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(int type, ENGINE *e,
+                                        const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen);
+ EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new_raw_public_key(int type, ENGINE *e,
+                                       const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen);
  EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new_CMAC_key(ENGINE *e, const unsigned char *priv,
                                  size_t len, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher);
  EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(int type, ENGINE *e, const unsigned char *key,
@@ -38,10 +38,10 @@ EVP_PKEY_up_ref() increments the reference count of B<key>.
 EVP_PKEY_free() decrements the reference count of B<key> and, if the reference
 count is zero, frees it up. If B<key> is NULL, nothing is done.
 
-EVP_PKEY_new_private_key() allocates a new B<EVP_PKEY>. If B<e> is non-NULL then
-the new B<EVP_PKEY> structure is associated with the engine B<e>. The B<type>
-argument indicates what kind of key this is. The value should be a NID for a
-public key algorithm that supports raw private keys, i.e. one of
+EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key() allocates a new B<EVP_PKEY>. If B<e> is non-NULL
+then the new B<EVP_PKEY> structure is associated with the engine B<e>. The
+B<type> argument indicates what kind of key this is. The value should be a NID
+for a public key algorithm that supports raw private keys, i.e. one of
 B<EVP_PKEY_HMAC>, B<EVP_PKEY_POLY1305>, B<EVP_PKEY_SIPHASH>, B<EVP_PKEY_X25519>,
 B<EVP_PKEY_ED25519>, B<EVP_PKEY_X448> or B<EVP_PKEY_ED448>. B<key> points to the
 raw private key data for this B<EVP_PKEY> which should be of length B<keylen>.
@@ -49,19 +49,19 @@ The length should be appropriate for the type of the key. The public key data
 will be automatically derived from the given private key data (if appropriate
 for the algorithm type).
 
-EVP_PKEY_new_public_key() works in the same way as EVP_PKEY_new_private_key()
-except that B<key> points to the raw public key data. The B<EVP_PKEY> structure
-will be initialised without any private key information. Algorithm types that
-support raw public keys are B<EVP_PKEY_X25519>, B<EVP_PKEY_ED25519>,
-B<EVP_PKEY_X448> or B<EVP_PKEY_ED448>.
+EVP_PKEY_new_raw_public_key() works in the same way as
+EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key() except that B<key> points to the raw public key
+data. The B<EVP_PKEY> structure will be initialised without any private key
+information. Algorithm types that support raw public keys are
+B<EVP_PKEY_X25519>, B<EVP_PKEY_ED25519>, B<EVP_PKEY_X448> or B<EVP_PKEY_ED448>.
 
-EVP_PKEY_new_CMAC_key() works in the same way as EVP_PKEY_new_private_key()
+EVP_PKEY_new_CMAC_key() works in the same way as EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key()
 except it is only for the B<EVP_PKEY_CMAC> algorithm type. In addition to the
 raw private key data, it also takes a cipher algorithm to be used during
 creation of a CMAC in the B<cipher> argument.
 
-EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key() works in the same way as EVP_PKEY_new_private_key(). New
-applications should use EVP_PKEY_new_private_key() instead.
+EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key() works in the same way as EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key().
+New applications should use EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key() instead.
 
 =head1 NOTES
 
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ used.
 
 =head1 RETURN VALUES
 
-EVP_PKEY_new(), EVP_PKEY_new_private_key(), EVP_PKEY_new_public_key(),
+EVP_PKEY_new(), EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(), EVP_PKEY_new_raw_public_key(),
 EVP_PKEY_new_CMAC_key() and EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key() return either the newly
 allocated B<EVP_PKEY> structure or B<NULL> if an error occurred.
 
@@ -88,9 +88,9 @@ L<EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(3)>
 
 EVP_PKEY_new() and EVP_PKEY_free() exist in all versions of OpenSSL.
 
-EVP_PKEY_up_ref() was first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0. EVP_PKEY_new_private_key(),
-EVP_PKEY_new_public_key() and EVP_PKEY_new_CMAC_key() were first added to
-OpenSSL 1.1.1.
+EVP_PKEY_up_ref() was first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0.
+EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(), EVP_PKEY_new_raw_public_key() and
+EVP_PKEY_new_CMAC_key() were first added to OpenSSL 1.1.1.
 
 =head1 COPYRIGHT
 

doc/man7/Ed25519.pod

@@ -40,14 +40,14 @@ For the B<Ed448> algorithm a context can be obtained by calling:
  EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_ED448, NULL);
 
 Ed25519 or Ed448 private keys can be set directly using
-L<EVP_PKEY_new_private_key(3)> or loaded from a PKCS#8 private key file using
-L<PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(3)> (or similar function). Completely new keys can
-also be generated (see the example below). Setting a private key also sets the
-associated public key.
+L<EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(3)> or loaded from a PKCS#8 private key file
+using L<PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(3)> (or similar function). Completely new keys
+can also be generated (see the example below). Setting a private key also sets
+the associated public key.
 
 Ed25519 or Ed448 public keys can be set directly using
-L<EVP_PKEY_new_public_key(3)> or loaded from a SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure
-in a PEM file using L<PEM_read_bio_PUBKEY(3)> (or similar function).
+L<EVP_PKEY_new_raw_public_key(3)> or loaded from a SubjectPublicKeyInfo
+structure in a PEM file using L<PEM_read_bio_PUBKEY(3)> (or similar function).
 
 =head1 EXAMPLE
 

doc/man7/X25519.pod

@@ -28,14 +28,14 @@ For the B<X448> algorithm a context can be obtained by calling:
  EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_X448, NULL);
 
 X25519 or X448 private keys can be set directly using
-L<EVP_PKEY_new_private_key(3)> or loaded from a PKCS#8 private key file using
-L<PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(3)> (or similar function). Completely new keys can
-also be generated (see the example below). Setting a private key also sets the
-associated public key.
+L<EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(3)> or loaded from a PKCS#8 private key file
+using L<PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(3)> (or similar function). Completely new keys
+can also be generated (see the example below). Setting a private key also sets
+the associated public key.
 
 X25519 or X448 public keys can be set directly using
-L<EVP_PKEY_new_public_key(3)> or loaded from a SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure
-in a PEM file using L<PEM_read_bio_PUBKEY(3)> (or similar function).
+L<EVP_PKEY_new_raw_public_key(3)> or loaded from a SubjectPublicKeyInfo
+structure in a PEM file using L<PEM_read_bio_PUBKEY(3)> (or similar function).
 
 =head1 EXAMPLE
 

include/openssl/evp.h

@@ -1347,12 +1347,12 @@ void EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_keygen_info(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int *dat, int datlen);
 
 EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(int type, ENGINE *e,
                                const unsigned char *key, int keylen);
-EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new_private_key(int type, ENGINE *e,
-                                   const unsigned char *priv,
-                                   size_t len);
-EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new_public_key(int type, ENGINE *e,
-                                  const unsigned char *pub,
-                                  size_t len);
+EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(int type, ENGINE *e,
+                                       const unsigned char *priv,
+                                       size_t len);
+EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new_raw_public_key(int type, ENGINE *e,
+                                      const unsigned char *pub,
+                                      size_t len);
 EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new_CMAC_key(ENGINE *e, const unsigned char *priv,
                                 size_t len, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher);
 

include/openssl/evperr.h

@@ -79,8 +79,8 @@ int ERR_load_EVP_strings(void);
 # define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_KEYGEN_INIT                       147
 # define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_NEW                               106
 # define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_NEW_CMAC_KEY                      193
-# define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_NEW_PRIVATE_KEY                   191
-# define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_NEW_PUBLIC_KEY                    192
+# define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_NEW_RAW_PRIVATE_KEY               191
+# define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_NEW_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY                192
 # define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_PARAMGEN                          148
 # define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_PARAMGEN_INIT                     149
 # define EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_PARAM_CHECK                       189

ssl/statem/extensions.c

@@ -1559,8 +1559,8 @@ int tls_psk_do_binder(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *msgstart,
         goto err;
     }
 
-    mackey = EVP_PKEY_new_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, finishedkey,
-                                      hashsize);
+    mackey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, finishedkey,
+                                          hashsize);
     if (mackey == NULL) {
         SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER,
                  ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);

ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c

@@ -752,9 +752,10 @@ int tls_parse_ctos_cookie(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
 
     /* Verify the HMAC of the cookie */
     hctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
-    pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL,
-                                    s->session_ctx->ext.cookie_hmac_key,
-                                    sizeof(s->session_ctx->ext.cookie_hmac_key));
+    pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL,
+                                        s->session_ctx->ext.cookie_hmac_key,
+                                        sizeof(s->session_ctx->ext
+                                               .cookie_hmac_key));
     if (hctx == NULL || pkey == NULL) {
         EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx);
         EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
@@ -1762,9 +1763,10 @@ EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_cookie(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
 
     /* HMAC the cookie */
     hctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
-    pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL,
-                                    s->session_ctx->ext.cookie_hmac_key,
-                                    sizeof(s->session_ctx->ext.cookie_hmac_key));
+    pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL,
+                                        s->session_ctx->ext.cookie_hmac_key,
+                                        sizeof(s->session_ctx->ext
+                                               .cookie_hmac_key));
     if (hctx == NULL || pkey == NULL) {
         SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
                  ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);

ssl/t1_enc.c

@@ -257,8 +257,8 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
 
     if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(c) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) {
         /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
-        mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_private_key(mac_type, NULL,
-                                           mac_secret, (int)*mac_secret_size);
+        mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(mac_type, NULL, mac_secret,
+                                               (int)*mac_secret_size);
         if (mac_key == NULL
             || EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx, NULL, m, NULL, mac_key) <= 0) {
             EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);

ssl/tls13_enc.c

@@ -248,11 +248,11 @@ size_t tls13_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, size_t slen,
     }
 
     if (str == s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label)
-        key = EVP_PKEY_new_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL,
-                                   s->server_finished_secret, hashlen);
+        key = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL,
+                                           s->server_finished_secret, hashlen);
     else
-        key = EVP_PKEY_new_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL,
-                                   s->client_finished_secret, hashlen);
+        key = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL,
+                                           s->client_finished_secret, hashlen);
 
     if (key == NULL
             || ctx == NULL

test/evp_test.c

@@ -915,8 +915,8 @@ static int mac_test_run(EVP_TEST *t)
         key = EVP_PKEY_new_CMAC_key(NULL, expected->key, expected->key_len,
                                     EVP_get_cipherbyname(expected->alg));
     else
-        key = EVP_PKEY_new_private_key(expected->type, NULL, expected->key,
-                                       expected->key_len);
+        key = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(expected->type, NULL, expected->key,
+                                           expected->key_len);
     if (key == NULL) {
         t->err = "MAC_KEY_CREATE_ERROR";
         goto err;
@@ -2486,9 +2486,9 @@ top:
             return 0;
         }
         if (klist == &private_keys)
-            pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_private_key(nid, NULL, keybin, keylen);
+            pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(nid, NULL, keybin, keylen);
         else
-            pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_public_key(nid, NULL, keybin, keylen);
+            pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_public_key(nid, NULL, keybin, keylen);
         if (pkey == NULL) {
             TEST_info("Can't read %s data", pp->key);
             OPENSSL_free(keybin);

util/libcrypto.num

@@ -4522,8 +4522,8 @@ OSSL_STORE_LOADER_set_find              4463	1_1_1	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 OSSL_STORE_SEARCH_free                  4464	1_1_1	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 OSSL_STORE_SEARCH_get0_digest           4465	1_1_1	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_defaults           4466	1_1_1	EXIST::FUNCTION:
-EVP_PKEY_new_private_key                4467	1_1_1	EXIST::FUNCTION:
-EVP_PKEY_new_public_key                 4468	1_1_1	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key            4467	1_1_1	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_new_raw_public_key             4468	1_1_1	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 EVP_PKEY_new_CMAC_key                   4469	1_1_1	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_set_priv_key          4470	1_1_1	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_set_pub_key           4471	1_1_1	EXIST::FUNCTION: