提交 f4bbb37c 编写于 作者: M Matt Caswell

Provide a key_share extension finaliser

This mops up various edge cases with key_shares and makes sure we still
generate the handshake secret if we haven't been provided with one but we
have a PSK.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2259)
上级 4ff65f77
......@@ -2097,6 +2097,7 @@ int ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
# define SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY 386
# define SSL_F_FINAL_EC_PT_FORMATS 485
# define SSL_F_FINAL_EMS 486
# define SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE 503
# define SSL_F_FINAL_RENEGOTIATE 483
# define SSL_F_FINAL_SIG_ALGS 497
# define SSL_F_NSS_KEYLOG_INT 500
......
......@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_functs[] = {
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY), "dtls_process_hello_verify"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_FINAL_EC_PT_FORMATS), "final_ec_pt_formats"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_FINAL_EMS), "final_ems"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE), "final_key_share"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_FINAL_RENEGOTIATE), "final_renegotiate"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_FINAL_SIG_ALGS), "final_sig_algs"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_NSS_KEYLOG_INT), "nss_keylog_int"},
......
......@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ static int init_etm(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
static int init_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
static int final_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, int *al);
static int init_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
static int final_key_share(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, int *al);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
static int init_srtp(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
#endif
......@@ -252,7 +253,8 @@ static const EXTENSION_DEFINITION ext_defs[] = {
| EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST | EXT_TLS_IMPLEMENTATION_ONLY
| EXT_TLS1_3_ONLY,
NULL, tls_parse_ctos_key_share, tls_parse_stoc_key_share,
tls_construct_stoc_key_share, tls_construct_ctos_key_share, NULL
tls_construct_stoc_key_share, tls_construct_ctos_key_share,
final_key_share
},
{
/*
......@@ -955,6 +957,45 @@ static int final_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, int *al)
return 1;
}
static int final_key_share(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, int *al)
{
if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
return 1;
/*
* If
* we have no key_share
* AND
* (we are not resuming
* OR the kex_mode doesn't allow non key_share resumes)
* THEN
* fail
*/
if (((s->server && s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL) || (!s->server && !sent))
&& (!s->hit
|| (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE) == 0)) {
/* No suitable share */
/* TODO(TLS1.3): Send a HelloRetryRequest */
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
return 0;
}
/*
* For a client side resumption with no key_share we need to generate
* the handshake secret (otherwise this is done during key_share
* processing).
*/
if (!sent && !s->server && !tls13_generate_handshake_secret(s, NULL, 0)) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static int init_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
{
s->ext.psk_kex_mode = TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_NONE;
......
......@@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ int tls_parse_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx,
int group_nid, found = 0;
unsigned int curve_flags;
if (s->hit)
if (s->hit && (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE) == 0)
return 1;
/* Sanity check */
......
......@@ -1557,15 +1557,6 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
goto f_err;
}
/* Check we've got a key_share for TLSv1.3 */
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL && !s->hit) {
/* No suitable share */
/* TODO(TLS1.3): Send a HelloRetryRequest */
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
goto f_err;
}
/*
* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
* for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
......
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