Add Kerberos fix which was in 0.9.8-stable but never committed to HEAD and

1.0.0. Original fix was on 2007-Mar-09 and had the log message: "Fix kerberos
ciphersuite bugs introduced with PR:1336."

apps/verify.c

@@ -350,6 +350,9 @@ static int MS_CALLBACK cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 			case X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION:
 			ok = 1;
 
+			case X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN:
+			ok = 1;
+
 			}
 
 		return ok;

ssl/s3_clnt.c

@@ -981,7 +981,9 @@ int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
 
 	if (!ok) return((int)n);
 
-	if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)
+	if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) ||
+		((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5) && 
+		(s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE)))
 		{
 		s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
 		return(1);
@@ -2868,13 +2870,6 @@ int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
 	DH *dh;
 #endif
 
-	sc=s->session->sess_cert;
-	if (sc == NULL)
-		{
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-		goto err;
-		}
-
 	alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
 	alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
 
@@ -2882,6 +2877,13 @@ int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
 	if ((alg_a & (SSL_aDH|SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5)) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
 		return(1);
 
+	sc=s->session->sess_cert;
+	if (sc == NULL)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+		goto err;
+		}
+
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
 	rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
 #endif

ssl/s3_srvr.c

@@ -2286,7 +2286,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 				SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
 			goto err;
 			}
-		if (!((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
+		if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
 		    {
 		    /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
 		     * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
@@ -2296,8 +2296,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 		     * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. 
 		     * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
 		     */
-		    if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
-			   (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
+		    if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
 			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
 			       SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);