提交 b1d6d55e 编写于 作者: P Pauli

Timing vulnerability in ECDSA signature generation (CVE-2018-0735)

Preallocate an extra limb for some of the big numbers to avoid a reallocation
that can potentially provide a side channel.
Reviewed-by: NBernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7486)

(cherry picked from commit 99540ec79491f59ed8b46b4edf130e17dc907f52)
上级 8abfe72e
...@@ -206,8 +206,8 @@ int ec_scalar_mul_ladder(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, ...@@ -206,8 +206,8 @@ int ec_scalar_mul_ladder(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
*/ */
cardinality_bits = BN_num_bits(cardinality); cardinality_bits = BN_num_bits(cardinality);
group_top = bn_get_top(cardinality); group_top = bn_get_top(cardinality);
if ((bn_wexpand(k, group_top + 1) == NULL) if ((bn_wexpand(k, group_top + 2) == NULL)
|| (bn_wexpand(lambda, group_top + 1) == NULL)) { || (bn_wexpand(lambda, group_top + 2) == NULL)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_SCALAR_MUL_LADDER, ERR_R_BN_LIB); ECerr(EC_F_EC_SCALAR_MUL_LADDER, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err; goto err;
} }
...@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ int ec_scalar_mul_ladder(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, ...@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ int ec_scalar_mul_ladder(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
* k := scalar + 2*cardinality * k := scalar + 2*cardinality
*/ */
kbit = BN_is_bit_set(lambda, cardinality_bits); kbit = BN_is_bit_set(lambda, cardinality_bits);
BN_consttime_swap(kbit, k, lambda, group_top + 1); BN_consttime_swap(kbit, k, lambda, group_top + 2);
group_top = bn_get_top(group->field); group_top = bn_get_top(group->field);
if ((bn_wexpand(s->X, group_top) == NULL) if ((bn_wexpand(s->X, group_top) == NULL)
......
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