Updates from 1.0.0-stable branch.

CHANGES.SSLeay

@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ eric (about to go bushwalking for the 4 day easter break :-)
       This would tend to cause memory overwrites since SSLv3 has
       a maximum packet size of 16k.  If your program uses
       buffers <= 16k, you would probably never see this problem.
-    - Fixed a new errors that were cause by malloc() not returning
+    - Fixed a few errors that were cause by malloc() not returning
       0 initialised memory..
     - SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG was being switched on when using
       SSL_CTX_set_options(ssl_ctx,SSL_OP_ALL); which was a bad thing

apps/cms.c

@@ -704,7 +704,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 
 		if (secret_key && !secret_keyid)
 			{
-			BIO_printf(bio_err, "No sectre key id\n");
+			BIO_printf(bio_err, "No secret key id\n");
 			goto end;
 			}
 

apps/s_server.c

@@ -671,7 +671,7 @@ static int MS_CALLBACK ssl_servername_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg)
 			return p->extension_error;
 		if (ctx2)
 			{
-			BIO_printf(p->biodebug,"Swiching server context.\n");
+			BIO_printf(p->biodebug,"Switching server context.\n");
 			SSL_set_SSL_CTX(s,ctx2);
 			}     
 		}

crypto/cryptlib.c

@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ int CRYPTO_get_new_lockid(char *name)
 #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16)
 	/* A hack to make Visual C++ 5.0 work correctly when linking as
 	 * a DLL using /MT. Without this, the application cannot use
-	 * and floating point printf's.
+	 * any floating point printf's.
 	 * It also seems to be needed for Visual C 1.5 (win16) */
 	SSLeay_MSVC5_hack=(double)name[0]*(double)name[1];
 #endif

crypto/mem_dbg.c

@@ -787,7 +787,7 @@ void CRYPTO_mem_leaks(BIO *b)
 		 * XXX    This should be in CRYPTO_mem_leaks_cb,
 		 * and CRYPTO_mem_leaks should be implemented by
 		 * using CRYPTO_mem_leaks_cb.
-		 * (Also their should be a variant of lh_doall_arg
+		 * (Also there should be a variant of lh_doall_arg
 		 * that takes a function pointer instead of a void *;
 		 * this would obviate the ugly and illegal
 		 * void_fn_to_char kludge in CRYPTO_mem_leaks_cb.

crypto/symhacks.h

@@ -382,7 +382,7 @@
 #endif /* defined OPENSSL_SYS_VMS */
 
 
-/* Case insensiteve linking causes problems.... */
+/* Case insensitive linking causes problems.... */
 #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_OS2)
 #undef ERR_load_CRYPTO_strings
 #define ERR_load_CRYPTO_strings			ERR_load_CRYPTOlib_strings

crypto/x509v3/v3_crld.c

@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ static int set_dist_point_name(DIST_POINT_NAME **pdp, X509V3_CTX *ctx,
 				sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(rnm) - 1)->set)
 			{
 			X509V3err(X509V3_F_SET_DIST_POINT_NAME,
-						X509V3_R_INVAID_MULTIPLE_RDNS);
+						X509V3_R_INVALID_MULTIPLE_RDNS);
 			goto err;
 			}
 		}

crypto/x509v3/v3_pci.c

@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ static int process_pci_value(CONF_VALUE *val,
 		{
 		if (*language)
 			{
-			X509V3err(X509V3_F_PROCESS_PCI_VALUE,X509V3_R_POLICY_LANGUAGE_ALREADTY_DEFINED);
+			X509V3err(X509V3_F_PROCESS_PCI_VALUE,X509V3_R_POLICY_LANGUAGE_ALREADY_DEFINED);
 			X509V3_conf_err(val);
 			return 0;
 			}
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ static int process_pci_value(CONF_VALUE *val,
 		{
 		if (*pathlen)
 			{
-			X509V3err(X509V3_F_PROCESS_PCI_VALUE,X509V3_R_POLICY_PATH_LENGTH_ALREADTY_DEFINED);
+			X509V3err(X509V3_F_PROCESS_PCI_VALUE,X509V3_R_POLICY_PATH_LENGTH_ALREADY_DEFINED);
 			X509V3_conf_err(val);
 			return 0;
 			}

crypto/x509v3/v3err.c

@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA X509V3_str_reasons[]=
 {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_ILLEGAL_EMPTY_EXTENSION),"illegal empty extension"},
 {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_ILLEGAL_HEX_DIGIT)  ,"illegal hex digit"},
 {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_INCORRECT_POLICY_SYNTAX_TAG),"incorrect policy syntax tag"},
-{ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_INVAID_MULTIPLE_RDNS),"invaid multiple rdns"},
+{ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_INVALID_MULTIPLE_RDNS),"invalid multiple rdns"},
 {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_INVALID_ASNUMBER)   ,"invalid asnumber"},
 {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_INVALID_ASRANGE)    ,"invalid asrange"},
 {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_INVALID_BOOLEAN_STRING),"invalid boolean string"},
@@ -193,9 +193,9 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA X509V3_str_reasons[]=
 {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_ODD_NUMBER_OF_DIGITS),"odd number of digits"},
 {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_OPERATION_NOT_DEFINED),"operation not defined"},
 {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_OTHERNAME_ERROR)    ,"othername error"},
-{ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_POLICY_LANGUAGE_ALREADTY_DEFINED),"policy language alreadty defined"},
+{ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_POLICY_LANGUAGE_ALREADY_DEFINED),"policy language already defined"},
 {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_POLICY_PATH_LENGTH) ,"policy path length"},
-{ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_POLICY_PATH_LENGTH_ALREADTY_DEFINED),"policy path length alreadty defined"},
+{ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_POLICY_PATH_LENGTH_ALREADY_DEFINED),"policy path length already defined"},
 {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_POLICY_SYNTAX_NOT_CURRENTLY_SUPPORTED),"policy syntax not currently supported"},
 {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_POLICY_WHEN_PROXY_LANGUAGE_REQUIRES_NO_POLICY),"policy when proxy language requires no policy"},
 {ERR_REASON(X509V3_R_SECTION_NOT_FOUND)  ,"section not found"},

crypto/x509v3/x509v3.h

@@ -951,7 +951,7 @@ void ERR_load_X509V3_strings(void);
 #define X509V3_R_ILLEGAL_EMPTY_EXTENSION		 151
 #define X509V3_R_ILLEGAL_HEX_DIGIT			 113
 #define X509V3_R_INCORRECT_POLICY_SYNTAX_TAG		 152
-#define X509V3_R_INVAID_MULTIPLE_RDNS			 161
+#define X509V3_R_INVALID_MULTIPLE_RDNS			 161
 #define X509V3_R_INVALID_ASNUMBER			 162
 #define X509V3_R_INVALID_ASRANGE			 163
 #define X509V3_R_INVALID_BOOLEAN_STRING			 104
@@ -985,9 +985,9 @@ void ERR_load_X509V3_strings(void);
 #define X509V3_R_ODD_NUMBER_OF_DIGITS			 112
 #define X509V3_R_OPERATION_NOT_DEFINED			 148
 #define X509V3_R_OTHERNAME_ERROR			 147
-#define X509V3_R_POLICY_LANGUAGE_ALREADTY_DEFINED	 155
+#define X509V3_R_POLICY_LANGUAGE_ALREADY_DEFINED	 155
 #define X509V3_R_POLICY_PATH_LENGTH			 156
-#define X509V3_R_POLICY_PATH_LENGTH_ALREADTY_DEFINED	 157
+#define X509V3_R_POLICY_PATH_LENGTH_ALREADY_DEFINED	 157
 #define X509V3_R_POLICY_SYNTAX_NOT_CURRENTLY_SUPPORTED	 158
 #define X509V3_R_POLICY_WHEN_PROXY_LANGUAGE_REQUIRES_NO_POLICY 159
 #define X509V3_R_SECTION_NOT_FOUND			 150

doc/crypto/BIO_s_mem.pod

@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ Writes to memory BIOs will always succeed if memory is available: that is
 their size can grow indefinitely.
 
 Every read from a read write memory BIO will remove the data just read with
-an internal copy operation, if a BIO contains a lots of data and it is
+an internal copy operation, if a BIO contains a lot of data and it is
 read in small chunks the operation can be very slow. The use of a read only
 memory BIO avoids this problem. If the BIO must be read write then adding
 a buffering BIO to the chain will speed up the process.

doc/ssleay.txt

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ don't do that.
 ==== readme ========================================================
 
 This is the old 0.6.6 docuementation.  Most of the cipher stuff is still
-relevent but I'm working (very slowly) on new docuemtation.
+relevent but I'm working (very slowly) on new documentation.
 The current version can be found online at
 
 http://www.cryptsoft.com/ssleay/doc
@@ -548,8 +548,8 @@ application, ssleay.  This one program is composed of many programs that
 can all be compiled independantly.
 
 ssleay has 3 modes of operation.
-1) If the ssleay binaray has the name of one of its component programs, it
-executes that program and then exits.  This can be achieve by using hard or
+1) If the ssleay binary has the name of one of its component programs, it
+executes that program and then exits.  This can be achieved by using hard or
 symbolic links, or failing that, just renaming the binary.
 2) If the first argument to ssleay is the name of one of the component
 programs, that program runs that program and then exits.
@@ -1185,7 +1185,7 @@ typedef struct bio_st
 	example is for BIO_s_sock().  A socket needs to be 
 	assigned to the BIO before it can be used.
 -	'shutdown', this flag indicates if the underlying 
-	comunication primative being used should be closed/freed 
+	communication primitive being used should be closed/freed 
 	when the BIO is closed.
 -	'flags' is used to hold extra state.  It is primarily used 
 	to hold information about why a non-blocking operation 
@@ -1799,7 +1799,7 @@ int BN_set_word(BIGNUM *a, unsigned long w);
 
 unsigned long BN_get_word(BIGNUM *a);
 	Returns 'a' in an unsigned long.  Not remarkably, often 'a' will
-	be biger than a word, in which case 0xffffffffL is returned.
+	be bigger than a word, in which case 0xffffffffL is returned.
 
 Word Operations
 These functions are much more efficient that the normal bignum arithmetic
@@ -2058,7 +2058,7 @@ Now you will notice that macros like
                 PEM_ASN1_write((int (*)())i2d_X509,PEM_STRING_X509,fp, \
 		                        (char *)x, NULL,NULL,0,NULL)
 Don't do encryption normally.  If you want to PEM encrypt your X509 structure,
-either just call PEM_ASN1_write directly or just define you own
+either just call PEM_ASN1_write directly or just define your own
 macro variant.  As you can see, this macro just sets all encryption related
 parameters to NULL.
 
@@ -5566,7 +5566,7 @@ These 2 functions create and destroy SSL_CTX structures
 
 The SSL_CTX has a session_cache_mode which is by default,
 in SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER mode.  What this means is that the library
-will automatically add new session-id's to the cache apon sucsessful
+will automatically add new session-id's to the cache upon successful
 SSL_accept() calls.
 If SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT is set, then client certificates are also added
 to the cache.
@@ -5580,12 +5580,12 @@ SSL_SESS_NO_CACHE_BOTH	- Either SSL_accept() or SSL_connect().
 If SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR is set, old timed out sessions are
 not automatically removed each 255, SSL_connect()s or SSL_accept()s.
 
-By default, apon every 255 successful SSL_connect() or SSL_accept()s,
+By default, upon every 255 successful SSL_connect() or SSL_accept()s,
 the cache is flush.  Please note that this could be expensive on
 a heavily loaded SSL server, in which case, turn this off and
 clear the cache of old entries 'manually' (with one of the functions
 listed below) every few hours.  Perhaps I should up this number, it is hard
-to say.  Remember, the '255' new calls is just a mechanims to get called
+to say.  Remember, the '255' new calls is just a mechanism to get called
 every now and then, in theory at most 255 new session-id's will have been
 added but if 100 are added every minute, you would still have
 500 in the cache before any would start being flushed (assuming a 3 minute
@@ -5628,10 +5628,10 @@ if copy is 1.  Otherwise, the reference count is not modified.
 void SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(ctx,cb) sets the callback and
 int (*cb)()SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb(ctx) returns the callback.
 
-These callbacks are basically indended to be used by processes to
+These callbacks are basically intended to be used by processes to
 send their session-id's to other processes.  I currently have not implemented
-non-blocking semantics for these callbacks, it is upto the appication
-to make the callbacks effiecent if they require blocking (perhaps
+non-blocking semantics for these callbacks, it is upto the application
+to make the callbacks efficient if they require blocking (perhaps
 by 'saving' them and then 'posting them' when control returns from
 the SSL_accept().
 
@@ -6589,7 +6589,7 @@ This information can be used to recall the functions when the 'error'
 condition has dissapeared.
 
 After the connection has been made, information can be retrived about the
-SSL session and the session-id values that have been decided apon.
+SSL session and the session-id values that have been decided upon.
 The 'peer' certificate can be retrieved.
 
 The session-id values include

e_os.h

@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ extern "C" {
 /********************************************************************
  The Microsoft section
  ********************************************************************/
-/* The following is used becaue of the small stack in some
+/* The following is used because of the small stack in some
  * Microsoft operating systems */
 #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32)
 #  define MS_STATIC	static
@@ -275,14 +275,14 @@ extern "C" {
 #    if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK) && defined(_WIN32_WINNT)
        /*
         * Just like defining _WIN32_WINNT including winsock2.h implies
-        * certain "discipline" for maintaing [broad] binary compatibility.
+        * certain "discipline" for maintaining [broad] binary compatibility.
         * As long as structures are invariant among Winsock versions,
         * it's sufficient to check for specific Winsock2 API availability
         * at run-time [DSO_global_lookup is recommended]...
         */
 #      include <winsock2.h>
 #      include <ws2tcpip.h>
-       /* yes, they have to be #included prior <windows.h> */
+       /* yes, they have to be #included prior to <windows.h> */
 #    endif
 #    include <windows.h>
 #    include <stdio.h>
@@ -372,7 +372,7 @@ static unsigned int _strlen31(const char *str)
 #    define DEFAULT_HOME  "C:"
 #  endif
 
-#else /* The non-microsoft world world */
+#else /* The non-microsoft world */
 
 #  ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
 #    define VMS 1

e_os2.h

@@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ extern "C" {
 #define OPENSSL_EXTERN OPENSSL_IMPORT
 
 /* Macros to allow global variables to be reached through function calls when
-   required (if a shared library version requvres it, for example.
+   required (if a shared library version requires it, for example.
    The way it's done allows definitions like this:
 
 	// in foobar.c

engines/ccgost/gost94_keyx.c

@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
 
 /* Computes Diffie-Hellman key and stores it into buffer in
  * little-endian byte order as expected by both versions of GOST 94
- * algorigthm
+ * algorithm
  */
 static int compute_pair_key_le(unsigned char *pair_key,BIGNUM *pub_key,DH *dh) 
 	{

engines/ccgost/gost_sign.c

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  *             Copyright (c) 2005-2006 Cryptocom LTD                  *
  *         This file is distributed under the same license as OpenSSL *
  *                                                                    *
- *       Implementation of GOST R 34.10-94 signature algoritgthm      *
+ *       Implementation of GOST R 34.10-94 signature algorithm        *
  *       for OpenSSL                                                  *
  *          Requires OpenSSL 0.9.9 for compilation                    *
  **********************************************************************/

ssl/d1_both.c

@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
 				const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
 				int xlen;
 
-				if (frag_off == 0)
+				if (frag_off == 0 && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
 					{
 					/* reconstruct message header is if it
 					 * is being sent in single fragment */
@@ -407,8 +407,10 @@ long dtls1_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok)
 			s2n (msg_hdr->seq,p);
 			l2n3(0,p);
 			l2n3(msg_len,p);
-			p       -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
-			msg_len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+			if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+				p       -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+				msg_len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+			}
 
 			ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, msg_len);
 			if (s->msg_callback)
@@ -775,6 +777,13 @@ int dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int a, int b)
 		*p++=SSL3_MT_CCS;
 		s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq;
 		s->init_num=DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+		if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+			s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq++;
+			s2n(s->d1->handshake_write_seq,p);
+			s->init_num+=2;
+		}
+
 		s->init_off=0;
 
 		dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, SSL3_MT_CCS, 0, 
@@ -989,7 +998,7 @@ dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int is_ccs)
 	if ( is_ccs)
 		{
 		OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + 
-			DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH == (unsigned int)s->init_num);
+			       ((s->version==DTLS1_VERSION)?DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH:3) == (unsigned int)s->init_num);
 		}
 	else
 		{

ssl/d1_clnt.c

@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ static int dtls1_get_hello_verify(SSL *s);
 
 static const SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_client_method(int ver)
 	{
-	if (ver == DTLS1_VERSION)
+	if (ver == DTLS1_VERSION || ver == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
 		return(DTLSv1_client_method());
 	else
 		return(NULL);
@@ -181,7 +181,8 @@ int dtls1_connect(SSL *s)
 			s->server=0;
 			if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
 
-			if ((s->version & 0xff00 ) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00))
+			if ((s->version & 0xff00 ) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00) &&
+			    (s->version & 0xff00 ) != (DTLS1_BAD_VER & 0xff00))
 				{
 				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CONNECT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 				ret = -1;

ssl/d1_lib.c

@@ -176,7 +176,10 @@ void dtls1_free(SSL *s)
 void dtls1_clear(SSL *s)
 	{
 	ssl3_clear(s);
-	s->version=DTLS1_VERSION;
+	if (s->options & SSL_OP_CISCO_ANYCONNECT)
+		s->version=DTLS1_BAD_VER;
+	else
+		s->version=DTLS1_VERSION;
 	}
 
 /*

ssl/d1_pkt.c

@@ -591,7 +591,7 @@ again:
 				}
 			}
 
-		if ((version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00))
+		if ((version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00))
 			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
 			goto err;
@@ -1067,13 +1067,17 @@ start:
 	if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
 		{
 		struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
+		int ccs_hdr_len = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
 
 		dtls1_get_ccs_header(rr->data, &ccs_hdr);
 
+		if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+			ccs_hdr_len = 3;
+
 		/* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
 		 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
 		/* XDTLS: check that epoch is consistent */
-		if (	(rr->length != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH) || 
+		if (	(rr->length != ccs_hdr_len) || 
 			(rr->off != 0) || (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
 			{
 			i=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
@@ -1094,6 +1098,9 @@ start:
 		/* do this whenever CCS is processed */
 		dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
 
+		if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+			s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
+
 		goto start;
 		}
 
@@ -1401,7 +1408,7 @@ int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len,
 #if 0
 	/* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
 	if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done
-		&& SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION)
+	    && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
 		{
 		/* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
 		 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) 
@@ -1428,7 +1435,6 @@ int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len,
 		s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
 		}
 #endif
-
 	p = wb->buf + prefix_len;
 
 	/* write the header */

ssl/d1_srvr.c

@@ -292,7 +292,8 @@ int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
 			s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
 
 			/* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
-			ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
+			if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+				ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
 			break;
 			
 		case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:

ssl/dtls1.h

@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ extern "C" {
 #endif
 
 #define DTLS1_VERSION			0xFEFF
+#define DTLS1_BAD_VER			0x0100
 
 #if 0
 /* this alert description is not specified anywhere... */

ssl/kssl.c

@@ -68,11 +68,6 @@
 
 #include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
 
-#define _XOPEN_SOURCE 500 /* glibc2 needs this to declare strptime() */
-#include <time.h>
-#if 0 /* Experimental */
-#undef _XOPEN_SOURCE /* To avoid clashes with anything else... */
-#endif
 #include <string.h>
 
 #define KRB5_PRIVATE	1

ssl/s3_clnt.c

@@ -737,7 +737,7 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
 
 	if (!ok) return((int)n);
 
-	if ( SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION)
+	if ( SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
 		{
 		if ( s->s3->tmp.message_type == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST)
 			{

ssl/s3_enc.c

@@ -655,7 +655,7 @@ static int ssl3_handshake_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid,
 		if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
 			return 0;
 
-	/* Search for djgest of specified type  in the handshake_dgst
+	/* Search for digest of specified type in the handshake_dgst
 	 * array*/
 	for (i=0;i<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;i++) 
 		{

ssl/s3_pkt.c

@@ -177,8 +177,8 @@ int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
 		}
 
 	/* extend reads should not span multiple packets for DTLS */
-	if ( SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION &&
-		extend)
+	if ( (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+	     &&	extend)
 		{
 		if ( left > 0 && n > left)
 			n = left;
@@ -836,9 +836,9 @@ int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
 			return(s->s3->wpend_ret);
 			}
 		else if (i <= 0) {
-			if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION) {
-				/* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the wh
-ole
+			if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION ||
+			    s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+				/* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole
 				   point in using a datagram service */
 				wb->left = 0;
 			}

ssl/s3_srvr.c

@@ -1920,7 +1920,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			}
 
 		/* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
-		if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
+		if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
 			{
 			n2s(p,i);
 			if (n != i+2)

ssl/ssl.h

@@ -542,6 +542,8 @@ typedef struct ssl_session_st
 #define SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE              0x00002000L
 /* Don't use RFC4507 ticket extension */
 #define SSL_OP_NO_TICKET	            0x00004000L
+/* Use Cisco's "speshul" version of DTLS_BAD_VER (as client)  */
+#define SSL_OP_CISCO_ANYCONNECT		    0x00008000L
 
 /* As server, disallow session resumption on renegotiation */
 #define SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION	0x00010000L

ssl/ssl_lib.c

@@ -1038,7 +1038,8 @@ long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd,long larg,void *parg)
 		s->max_cert_list=larg;
 		return(l);
 	case SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU:
-		if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION)
+		if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION ||
+		    SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
 			{
 			s->d1->mtu = larg;
 			return larg;

ssl/ssl_sess.c

@@ -300,6 +300,11 @@ int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session)
 			ss->ssl_version=TLS1_VERSION;
 			ss->session_id_length=SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
 			}
+		else if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+			{
+			ss->ssl_version=DTLS1_BAD_VER;
+			ss->session_id_length=SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+			}
 		else if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION)
 			{
 			ss->ssl_version=DTLS1_VERSION;

ssl/t1_enc.c

@@ -882,7 +882,7 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
 			mac_ctx = &hmac;
 		}
 
-	if (ssl->version == DTLS1_VERSION)
+	if (ssl->version == DTLS1_VERSION || ssl->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
 		{
 		unsigned char dtlsseq[8],*p=dtlsseq;
 
@@ -911,7 +911,7 @@ printf("rec=");
 {unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rec->length; z++) printf("%02X ",buf[z]); printf("\n"); }
 #endif
 
-	if (ssl->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+	if (ssl->version != DTLS1_VERSION && ssl->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
 		{
 		for (i=7; i>=0; i--)
 			{

test/times

 
 More number for the questions about SSL overheads....
 
-The following numbers were generated on a pentium pro 200, running linux.
+The following numbers were generated on a Pentium pro 200, running Linux.
 They give an indication of the SSL protocol and encryption overheads.
 
 The program that generated them is an unreleased version of ssl/ssltest.c
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ interface.
 
 How do I read this?  The protocol and cipher are reasonable obvious.
 The next number is the number of connections being made.  The next is the
-number of bytes exchanged bewteen the client and server side of the protocol.
+number of bytes exchanged between the client and server side of the protocol.
 This is the number of bytes that the client sends to the server, and then
 the server sends back.  Because this is all happening in one process,
 the data is being encrypted, decrypted, encrypted and then decrypted again.
@@ -55,10 +55,10 @@ SSLv3 DES-CBC3-SHA 1000 x 102400  336.61s 323.82s
 
 What does this all mean?  Well for a server, with no session-id reuse, with
 a transfer size of 10240 bytes, using RC4-MD5 and a 512bit server key,
-a pentium pro 200 running linux can handle the SSLv3 protocol overheads of
+a Pentium pro 200 running Linux can handle the SSLv3 protocol overheads of
 about 49 connections a second.  Reality will be quite different :-).
 
-Remeber the first number is 1000 full ssl handshakes, the second is
+Remember the first number is 1000 full ssl handshakes, the second is
 1 full and 999 with session-id reuse.  The RSA overheads for each exchange
 would be one public and one private operation, but the protocol/MAC/cipher
 cost would be quite similar in both the client and server.
@@ -72,21 +72,21 @@ eric (adding numbers to speculation)
   killer in SSL.  Often delays in the TCP protocol will make session-id
   reuse look slower that new sessions, but this would not be the case on
   a loaded server.
-- The TCP round trip latencies, while slowing indervidual connections,
+- The TCP round trip latencies, while slowing individual connections,
   would have minimal impact on throughput.
 - Instead of sending one 102400 byte buffer, one 8k buffer is sent until
 - the required number of bytes are processed.
-- The SSLv3 connections were actually SSLv2 compatable SSLv3 headers.
+- The SSLv3 connections were actually SSLv2 compatible SSLv3 headers.
 - A 512bit server key was being used except where noted.
 - No server key verification was being performed on the client side of the
   protocol.  This would slow things down very little.
 - The library being used is SSLeay 0.8.x.
-- The normal mesauring system was commands of the form
+- The normal measuring system was commands of the form
   time ./ssltest -num 1000 -bytes 102400 -cipher DES-CBC-SHA -reuse
   This modified version of ssltest should be in the next public release of
   SSLeay.
 
-The general cipher performace number for this platform are
+The general cipher performance number for this platform are
 
 SSLeay 0.8.2a 04-Sep-1997
 built on Fri Sep  5 17:37:05 EST 1997

times/x86/des3s.cpp

@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ void main(int argc,char *argv[])
 			des_encrypt3(&data[0],key1,key2,key3);
 			}
 
-		printf("des %d %d (%d)\n",
+		printf("des3 %d %d (%d)\n",
 			e1-s1,e2-s2,((e2-s2)-(e1-s1)));
 		}
 	}