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Third Party Openssl
提交 170b7358 编写于 作者: V Viktor Dukhovni
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DANE support for X509_verify_cert() 

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
上级 a8eba56e
展开全部 隐藏空白更改
内联 并排
Showing with 2674 addition and 12 deletion
crypto/x509/x509_err.c
浏览文件 @ 170b7358
......@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA X509_str_functs[] = {
{ERR_FUNC(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN), "build_chain"},
{ERR_FUNC(X509_F_BY_FILE_CTRL), "by_file_ctrl"},
{ERR_FUNC(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY), "check_policy"},
{ERR_FUNC(X509_F_DANE_I2D), "dane_i2d"},
{ERR_FUNC(X509_F_DIR_CTRL), "dir_ctrl"},
{ERR_FUNC(X509_F_GET_CERT_BY_SUBJECT), "get_cert_by_subject"},
{ERR_FUNC(X509_F_NETSCAPE_SPKI_B64_DECODE), "NETSCAPE_SPKI_b64_decode"},
......@@ -134,6 +135,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA X509_str_functs[] = {
static ERR_STRING_DATA X509_str_reasons[] = {
{ERR_REASON(X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH), "akid mismatch"},
{ERR_REASON(X509_R_BAD_SELECTOR), "bad selector"},
{ERR_REASON(X509_R_BAD_X509_FILETYPE), "bad x509 filetype"},
{ERR_REASON(X509_R_BASE64_DECODE_ERROR), "base64 decode error"},
{ERR_REASON(X509_R_CANT_CHECK_DH_KEY), "cant check dh key"},
......
crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
浏览文件 @ 170b7358
......@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@
static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e);
static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
......@@ -125,6 +126,7 @@ static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth);
static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
......@@ -237,6 +239,7 @@ static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
struct dane_st *dane = (struct dane_st *)ctx->dane;
if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
......@@ -264,6 +267,14 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
X509_up_ref(ctx->cert);
ctx->num_untrusted = 1;
/*
* If dane->trecs is an empty stack, we'll fail, since the user enabled
* DANE. If none of the TLSA records were usable, and it makes sense to
* keep going with an unauthenticated handshake, they can handle that in
* the verify callback, or not set SSL_VERIFY_PEER.
*/
if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane))
return dane_verify(ctx);
return verify_chain(ctx);
}
......@@ -565,9 +576,18 @@ static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted)
X509 *x = NULL;
X509 *mx;
int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx) = ctx->verify_cb;
struct dane_st *dane = (struct dane_st *)ctx->dane;
int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
int trust;
if (DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) && num_untrusted > 0) {
switch (trust = check_dane_issuer(ctx, num_untrusted)) {
case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
return trust;
}
}
/*
* Check trusted certificates in chain at depth num_untrusted and up.
* Note, that depths 0..num_untrusted-1 may also contain trusted
......@@ -637,7 +657,14 @@ static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted)
return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
trusted:
return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(dane))
return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
if (dane->pdpth < 0)
dane->pdpth = num_untrusted;
/* With DANE, PKIX alone is not trusted until we have both */
if (dane->mdpth >= 0)
return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
}
static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
......@@ -1524,6 +1551,17 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
ctx->error_depth = n;
xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
/*
* With DANE-verified bare public key TA signatures, it remains only to
* check the timestamps of the top certificate. We report the issuer as
* NULL, since all we have is a bare key.
*/
if (ctx->bare_ta_signed) {
xs = xi;
xi = NULL;
goto check_cert;
}
if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
xs = xi;
else {
......@@ -2074,6 +2112,7 @@ int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
ctx->tree = NULL;
ctx->parent = NULL;
ctx->dane = NULL;
ctx->bare_ta_signed = 0;
/* Zero ex_data to make sure we're cleanup-safe */
memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data));
......@@ -2270,15 +2309,311 @@ void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, struct dane_st *dane)
ctx->dane = dane;
}
static unsigned char *dane_i2d(
X509 *cert,
uint8_t selector,
unsigned int *i2dlen)
{
unsigned char *buf = NULL;
int len;
/*
* Extract ASN.1 DER form of certificate or public key.
*/
switch (selector) {
case DANETLS_SELECTOR_CERT:
len = i2d_X509(cert, &buf);
break;
case DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI:
len = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert), &buf);
break;
default:
X509err(X509_F_DANE_I2D, X509_R_BAD_SELECTOR);
return NULL;
}
if (len < 0 || buf == NULL) {
X509err(X509_F_DANE_I2D, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
*i2dlen = (unsigned int)len;
return buf;
}
#define DANETLS_NONE 256 /* impossible uint8_t */
static int dane_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, int depth)
{
struct dane_st *dane = (struct dane_st *)ctx->dane;
unsigned usage = DANETLS_NONE;
unsigned selector = DANETLS_NONE;
unsigned ordinal = DANETLS_NONE;
unsigned mtype = DANETLS_NONE;
unsigned char *i2dbuf = NULL;
unsigned int i2dlen = 0;
unsigned char mdbuf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char *cmpbuf = NULL;
unsigned int cmplen = 0;
int i;
int recnum;
int matched = 0;
danetls_record *t = NULL;
uint32_t mask;
mask = (depth == 0) ? DANETLS_EE_MASK : DANETLS_TA_MASK;
/*
* The trust store is not applicable with DANE-TA(2)
*/
if (depth >= ctx->num_untrusted)
mask &= DANETLS_PKIX_MASK;
/*
* If we've previously matched a PKIX-?? record, no need to test any
* furher PKIX-?? records, it remains to just build the PKIX chain.
* Had the match been a DANE-?? record, we'd be done already.
*/
if (dane->mdpth >= 0)
mask &= ~DANETLS_PKIX_MASK;
/*-
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.1
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.2
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.3
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.4
*
* We handle DANE-EE(3) records first as they require no chain building
* and no expiration or hostname checks. We also process digests with
* higher ordinals first and ignore lower priorities except Full(0) which
* is always processed (last). If none match, we then process PKIX-EE(1).
*
* NOTE: This relies on DANE usages sorting before the corresponding PKIX
* usages in SSL_dane_tlsa_add(), and also on descending sorting of digest
* priorities. See twin comment in ssl/ssl_lib.c.
*
* We expect that most TLSA RRsets will have just a single usage, so we
* don't go out of our way to cache multiple selector-specific i2d buffers
* across usages, but if the selector happens to remain the same as switch
* usages, that's OK. Thus, a set of "3 1 1", "3 0 1", "1 1 1", "1 0 1",
* records would result in us generating each of the certificate and public
* key DER forms twice, but more typically we'd just see multiple "3 1 1"
* or multiple "3 0 1" records.
*
* As soon as we find a match at any given depth, we stop, because either
* we've matched a DANE-?? record and the peer is authenticated, or, after
* exhausing all DANE-?? records, we've matched a PKIX-?? record, which is
* sufficient for DANE, and what remains to do is ordinary PKIX validation.
*/
recnum = (dane->umask & mask) ? sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs) : 0;
for (i = 0; matched == 0 && i < recnum; ++i) {
t = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i);
if ((DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(t->usage) & mask) == 0)
continue;
if (t->usage != usage) {
usage = t->usage;
/* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */
mtype = DANETLS_NONE;
ordinal = dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype];
}
if (t->selector != selector) {
selector = t->selector;
/* Update per-selector state */
OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf);
i2dbuf = dane_i2d(cert, selector, &i2dlen);
if (i2dbuf == NULL)
return -1;
/* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */
mtype = DANETLS_NONE;
ordinal = dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype];
} else if (t->mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL) {
/*-
* Digest agility:
*
* <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-9>
*
* For a fixed selector, after processing all records with the
* highest mtype ordinal, ignore all mtypes with lower ordinals
* other than "Full".
*/
if (dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype] < ordinal)
continue;
}
/*
* Each time we hit a (new selector or) mtype, re-compute the relevant
* digest, more complex caching is not worth the code space.
*/
if (t->mtype != mtype) {
const EVP_MD *md = dane->dctx->mdevp[mtype = t->mtype];
cmpbuf = i2dbuf;
cmplen = i2dlen;
if (md != NULL) {
cmpbuf = mdbuf;
if (!EVP_Digest(i2dbuf, i2dlen, cmpbuf, &cmplen, md, 0)) {
matched = -1;
break;
}
}
}
/*
* Squirrel away the certificate and depth if we have a match. Any
* DANE match is dispositive, but with PKIX we still need to build a
* full chain.
*/
if (cmplen == t->dlen &&
memcmp(cmpbuf, t->data, cmplen) == 0) {
if (DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(usage) & DANETLS_DANE_MASK)
matched = 1;
if (matched || dane->mdpth < 0) {
dane->mdpth = depth;
dane->mtlsa = t;
OPENSSL_free(dane->mcert);
dane->mcert = cert;
X509_up_ref(cert);
}
break;
}
}
/* Clear the one-element DER cache */
OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf);
return matched;
}
static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
{
struct dane_st *dane = (struct dane_st *)ctx->dane;
int matched = 0;
X509 *cert;
if (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) || depth == 0)
return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
/*
* Record any DANE trust anchor matches, for the first depth to test, if
* there's one at that depth. (This'll be false for length 1 chains looking
* for an exact match for the leaf certificate).
*/
cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, depth);
if (cert != NULL && (matched = dane_match(ctx, cert, depth)) < 0)
return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
if (matched > 0) {
ctx->num_untrusted = depth - 1;
return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
}
return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
}
static int check_dane_pkeys(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
struct dane_st *dane = (struct dane_st *)ctx->dane;
danetls_record *t;
int num = ctx->num_untrusted;
X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
int recnum = sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs);
int i;
for (i = 0; i < recnum; ++i) {
t = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i);
if (t->usage != DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_TA ||
t->selector != DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI ||
t->mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL ||
X509_verify(cert, t->spki) <= 0)
continue;
/* Clear PKIX-?? matches that failed to panned out to a full chain */
X509_free(dane->mcert);
dane->mcert = NULL;
/* Record match via a bare TA public key */
ctx->bare_ta_signed = 1;
dane->mdpth = num - 1;
dane->mtlsa = t;
/* Prune any excess chain certificates */
num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
for (; num > ctx->num_untrusted; --num)
X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain));
return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
}
return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
}
static void dane_reset(struct dane_st *dane)
{
/*
* Reset state to verify another chain, or clear after failure.
*/
X509_free(dane->mcert);
dane->mcert = NULL;
dane->mtlsa = NULL;
dane->mdpth = -1;
dane->pdpth = -1;
}
static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
X509 *cert = ctx->cert;
int (*cb)(int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx) = ctx->verify_cb;
struct dane_st *dane = (struct dane_st *)ctx->dane;
int matched;
int done;
dane_reset(dane);
matched = dane_match(ctx, ctx->cert, 0);
done = matched != 0 || (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) && dane->mdpth < 0);
if (done)
X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
if (matched > 0) {
ctx->error_depth = 0;
ctx->current_cert = cert;
return cb(1, ctx);
}
if (matched < 0) {
ctx->error_depth = 0;
ctx->current_cert = cert;
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
return -1;
}
if (done) {
/* Fail early, TA-based success is not possible */
ctx->current_cert = cert;
ctx->error_depth = 0;
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
return cb(0, ctx);
}
/*
* Chain verification for usages 0/1/2. TLSA record matching of depth > 0
* certificates happens in-line with building the rest of the chain.
*/
return verify_chain(ctx);
}
static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
struct dane_st *dane = (struct dane_st *)ctx->dane;
int (*cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *) = ctx->verify_cb;
int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
int ss = cert_self_signed(cert);
STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL;
unsigned int search;
int may_trusted = 1;
int may_trusted = 0;
int may_alternate = 0;
int trust = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
int alt_untrusted = 0;
......@@ -2294,14 +2629,19 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
#define S_DOALTERNATE (1 << 2) /* Retry with pruned alternate chain */
/*
* Set up search policy, untrusted if possible, trusted-first if enabled.
* If not trusted-first, and alternate chains are not disabled, try
* building an alternate chain if no luck with untrusted first.
* If we're doing DANE and not doing PKIX-TA/PKIX-EE, we never look in the
* trust_store, otherwise we might look there first. If not trusted-first,
* and alternate chains are not disabled, try building an alternate chain
* if no luck with untrusted first.
*/
search = (ctx->untrusted != NULL) ? S_DOUNTRUSTED : 0;
if (search == 0 || ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
search |= S_DOTRUSTED;
else if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS))
may_alternate = 1;
if (DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || !DANETLS_HAS_DANE(dane)) {
if (search == 0 || ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
search |= S_DOTRUSTED;
else if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS))
may_alternate = 1;
may_trusted = 1;
}
/*
* Shallow-copy the stack of untrusted certificates (with TLS, this is
......@@ -2313,6 +2653,17 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
return 0;
}
/* Include any untrusted full certificates from DNS */
if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && dane->certs != NULL) {
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(dane->certs); ++i) {
if (!sk_X509_push(sktmp, sk_X509_value(dane->certs, i))) {
sk_X509_free(sktmp);
X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
}
}
/*
* Still absurdly large, but arithmetically safe, a lower hard upper bound
* might be reasonable.
......@@ -2381,6 +2732,10 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
* case we may prune some more untrusted certificates and try
* again. Thus the S_DOALTERNATE bit may yet be turned on
* again with an even shorter untrusted chain!
*
* If in the process we threw away our matching PKIX-TA trust
* anchor, reset DANE trust. We might find a suitable trusted
* certificate among the ones from the trust store.
*/
if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0) {
OPENSSL_assert(num > i && i > 0 && ss == 0);
......@@ -2388,6 +2743,16 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
for (; num > i; --num)
X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain));
ctx->num_untrusted = num;
if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) &&
dane->mdpth >= ctx->num_untrusted) {
dane->mdpth = -1;
X509_free(dane->mcert);
dane->mcert = NULL;
}
if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) &&
dane->pdpth >= ctx->num_untrusted)
dane->pdpth = -1;
}
/*
......@@ -2426,6 +2791,13 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
* trust. If not done, and not self-signed look deeper.
* Whether or not we're doing "trusted first", we no longer
* look for untrusted certificates from the peer's chain.
*
* At this point ctx->num_trusted and num must reflect the
* correct number of untrusted certificates, since the DANE
* logic in check_trust() depends on distinguishing CAs from
* "the wire" from CAs from the trust store. In particular, the
* certificate at depth "num" should be the new trusted
* certificate with ctx->num_untrusted <= num.
*/
if (ok) {
OPENSSL_assert(ctx->num_untrusted <= num);
......@@ -2497,14 +2869,27 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
* certificates over and over.
*/
(void) sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, x);
/*
* Check for DANE-TA trust of the topmost untrusted certificate.
*/
switch (trust = check_dane_issuer(ctx, ctx->num_untrusted - 1)) {
case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
search = 0;
continue;
}
}
}
sk_X509_free(sktmp);
/*
* Last chance to make a trusted chain, check for direct leaf PKIX trust.
* Last chance to make a trusted chain, either bare DANE-TA public-key
* signers, or else direct leaf PKIX trust.
*/
if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) <= depth) {
if (trust == X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED && DANETLS_HAS_DANE_TA(dane))
trust = check_dane_pkeys(ctx);
if (trust == X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED &&
sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == ctx->num_untrusted)
trust = check_trust(ctx, 1);
......@@ -2522,6 +2907,9 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
ctx->error_depth = num-1;
if (num > depth)
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG;
else if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) &&
(!DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || dane->pdpth >= 0))
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
else if (ss && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
else if (ss)
......@@ -2530,6 +2918,8 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
else
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane))
dane_reset(dane);
return cb(0, ctx);
}
}
include/openssl/x509.h
浏览文件 @ 170b7358
......@@ -1073,6 +1073,7 @@ void ERR_load_X509_strings(void);
# define X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN 106
# define X509_F_BY_FILE_CTRL 101
# define X509_F_CHECK_POLICY 145
# define X509_F_DANE_I2D 107
# define X509_F_DIR_CTRL 102
# define X509_F_GET_CERT_BY_SUBJECT 103
# define X509_F_NETSCAPE_SPKI_B64_DECODE 129
......@@ -1119,6 +1120,7 @@ void ERR_load_X509_strings(void);
/* Reason codes. */
# define X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH 110
# define X509_R_BAD_SELECTOR 133
# define X509_R_BAD_X509_FILETYPE 100
# define X509_R_BASE64_DECODE_ERROR 118
# define X509_R_CANT_CHECK_DH_KEY 114
......
include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
浏览文件 @ 170b7358
......@@ -264,6 +264,8 @@ struct x509_store_ctx_st { /* X509_STORE_CTX */
X509_STORE_CTX *parent;
CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
struct dane_st *dane;
/* signed via bare TA public key, rather than CA certificate */
int bare_ta_signed;
} /* X509_STORE_CTX */ ;
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth);
......
test/Makefile
浏览文件 @ 170b7358
......@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ RANDTEST= randtest
DHTEST= dhtest
DSATEST= dsatest
SSLTEST= ssltest
DANETEST= danetest
RSATEST= rsa_test
ENGINETEST= enginetest
EVPTEST= evp_test
......@@ -90,7 +91,7 @@ EXE= $(NPTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(BNTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(ECTEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
$(DESTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(SHA1TEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(SHA256TEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(SHA512TEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
$(MDC2TEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(RMDTEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
$(RANDTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(DHTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(ENGINETEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
$(GOST2814789TEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
$(GOST2814789TEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(DANETEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
$(BFTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(CASTTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(SSLTEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
$(EXPTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(DSATEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(RSATEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
$(EVPTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(EVPEXTRATEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(IGETEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
......@@ -108,7 +109,7 @@ OBJ= $(NPTEST).o $(BNTEST).o $(ECTEST).o \
$(HMACTEST).o $(WPTEST).o \
$(RC2TEST).o $(RC4TEST).o $(RC5TEST).o \
$(DESTEST).o $(SHA1TEST).o $(SHA256TEST).o $(SHA512TEST).o \
$(MDC2TEST).o $(RMDTEST).o \
$(MDC2TEST).o $(RMDTEST).o $(DANETEST).o \
$(RANDTEST).o $(DHTEST).o $(ENGINETEST).o $(CASTTEST).o \
$(BFTEST).o $(SSLTEST).o $(DSATEST).o $(EXPTEST).o $(RSATEST).o \
$(EVPTEST).o $(EVPEXTRATEST).o $(IGETEST).o $(JPAKETEST).o $(V3NAMETEST).o \
......@@ -120,7 +121,7 @@ SRC= $(NPTEST).c $(BNTEST).c $(ECTEST).c \
$(ECDSATEST).c $(ECDHTEST).c $(GMDIFFTEST).c $(PBELUTEST).c $(IDEATEST).c \
$(MD2TEST).c $(MD4TEST).c $(MD5TEST).c \
$(HMACTEST).c $(WPTEST).c \
$(RC2TEST).c $(RC4TEST).c $(RC5TEST).c \
$(RC2TEST).c $(RC4TEST).c $(RC5TEST).c $(DANETEST).c \
$(DESTEST).c $(SHA1TEST).c $(MDC2TEST).c $(RMDTEST).c \
$(RANDTEST).c $(DHTEST).c $(ENGINETEST).c $(CASTTEST).c \
$(BFTEST).c $(SSLTEST).c $(DSATEST).c $(EXPTEST).c $(RSATEST).c \
......@@ -317,6 +318,9 @@ $(METHTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(METHTEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
$(SSLTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(SSLTEST).o $(DLIBSSL) $(DLIBCRYPTO)
@target=$(SSLTEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
$(DANETEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(DANETEST).o $(DLIBSSL) $(DLIBCRYPTO)
@target=$(DANETEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
$(ENGINETEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(ENGINETEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
@target=$(ENGINETEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
......@@ -435,6 +439,23 @@ clienthellotest.o: clienthellotest.c
constant_time_test.o: ../e_os.h ../include/internal/constant_time_locl.h
constant_time_test.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
constant_time_test.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h constant_time_test.c
danetest.o: ../e_os.h ../include/internal/dane.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h
danetest.o: ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
danetest.o: ../include/openssl/comp.h ../include/openssl/conf.h
danetest.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dtls1.h
danetest.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
danetest.o: ../include/openssl/engine.h ../include/openssl/err.h
danetest.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
danetest.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
danetest.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
danetest.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
danetest.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
danetest.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
danetest.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srtp.h
danetest.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
danetest.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
danetest.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
danetest.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h danetest.c
destest.o: ../include/openssl/des.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
destest.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h destest.c
dhtest.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/bn.h
......
test/danetest.c 0 → 100644
浏览文件 @ 170b7358
/* danetest.c */
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2015 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* openssl-core@openssl.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/conf.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
#include <openssl/engine.h>
#endif
#include "../e_os.h"
static const char *progname;
/*
* Forward declaration, of function that uses internal interfaces, from headers
* included at the end of this module.
*/
static void store_ctx_dane_init(X509_STORE_CTX *, SSL *);
static int saved_errno;
static void save_errno(void)
{
saved_errno = errno;
}
static int restore_errno(void)
{
int ret = errno;
errno = saved_errno;
return ret;
}
static void usage(void)
{
fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s: danetest basedomain CAfile tlsafile\n", progname);
}
static void print_errors(void)
{
unsigned long err;
char buffer[1024];
const char *file;
const char *data;
int line;
int flags;
while ((err = ERR_get_error_line_data(&file, &line, &data, &flags)) != 0) {
ERR_error_string_n(err, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
if (flags & ERR_TXT_STRING)
fprintf(stderr, "Error: %s:%s:%d:%s\n", buffer, file, line, data);
else
fprintf(stderr, "Error: %s:%s:%d\n", buffer, file, line);
}
}
static int verify_chain(SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
{
int ret;
X509_STORE_CTX *store_ctx;
SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx = SSL_get_SSL_CTX(ssl);
X509_STORE *store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ssl_ctx);
int store_ctx_idx = SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx();
X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
if ((store_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new()) == NULL)
return -1;
if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(store_ctx, store, cert, chain))
return 0;
X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(store_ctx, store_ctx_idx, ssl);
X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(store_ctx,
SSL_is_server(ssl) ? "ssl_client" : "ssl_server");
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(store_ctx),
SSL_get0_param(ssl));
store_ctx_dane_init(store_ctx, ssl);
if (SSL_get_verify_callback(ssl))
X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(store_ctx, SSL_get_verify_callback(ssl));
ret = X509_verify_cert(store_ctx);
SSL_set_verify_result(ssl, X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(store_ctx));
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(store_ctx);
X509_STORE_CTX_free(store_ctx);
return (ret);
}
static STACK_OF(X509) *load_chain(FILE *fp, int nelem)
{
int count;
char *name = 0;
char *header = 0;
unsigned char *data = 0;
long len;
char *errtype = 0; /* if error: cert or pkey? */
STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
typedef X509 *(*d2i_X509_t)(X509 **, const unsigned char **, long);
if ((chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == 0) {
perror("malloc");
exit(1);
}
for (count = 0;
count < nelem && errtype == 0
&& PEM_read(fp, &name, &header, &data, &len);
++count) {
const unsigned char *p = data;
if (strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_X509) == 0
|| strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_X509_TRUSTED) == 0
|| strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_X509_OLD) == 0) {
d2i_X509_t d = strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_X509_TRUSTED) ?
d2i_X509_AUX : d2i_X509;
X509 *cert = d(0, &p, len);
if (cert == 0 || (p - data) != len)
errtype = "certificate";
else if (sk_X509_push(chain, cert) == 0) {
perror("malloc");
goto err;
}
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "unexpected chain file object: %s\n", name);
goto err;
}
/*
* If any of these were null, PEM_read() would have failed.
*/
OPENSSL_free(name);
OPENSSL_free(header);
OPENSSL_free(data);
}
if (errtype) {
fprintf(stderr, "error reading: malformed %s\n", errtype);
goto err;
}
if (count == nelem) {
ERR_clear_error();
return chain;
}
err:
/* Some other PEM read error */
sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
print_errors();
return NULL;
}
static char *read_to_eol(FILE *f)
{
static char buf[1024];
int n;
if (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)== NULL)
return NULL;
n = strlen(buf);
if (buf[n-1] != '\n') {
if (n+1 == sizeof(buf)) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: warning: input too long\n", progname);
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: warning: EOF before newline\n", progname);
}
return NULL;
}
/* Trim trailing whitespace */
while (n > 0 && isspace(buf[n-1]))
buf[--n] = '\0';
return buf;
}
/*
* Hex decoder that tolerates optional whitespace
*/
static ossl_ssize_t hexdecode(const char *in, void *result)
{
unsigned char **out = (unsigned char **)result;
unsigned char *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(strlen(in)/2);
unsigned char *cp = ret;
uint8_t byte;
int nibble = 0;
if (ret == NULL)
return -1;
for (byte = 0; *in; ++in) {
char c;
if (isspace(*in))
continue;
c = tolower(*in);
if ('0' <= c && c <= '9') {
byte |= c - '0';
} else if ('a' <= c && c <= 'f') {
byte |= c - 'a' + 10;
} else {
OPENSSL_free(ret);
return 0;
}
if ((nibble ^= 1) == 0) {
*cp++ = byte;
byte = 0;
} else {
byte <<= 4;
}
}
if (nibble != 0) {
OPENSSL_free(ret);
return 0;
}
return cp - (*out = ret);
}
static ossl_ssize_t checked_uint8(const char *in, void *out)
{
uint8_t *result = (uint8_t *)out;
const char *cp = in;
char *endp;
long v;
int e;
save_errno();
v = strtol(cp, &endp, 10);
e = restore_errno();
if (((v == LONG_MIN || v == LONG_MAX) && e == ERANGE) ||
endp == cp || !isspace(*endp) ||
v != (*(uint8_t *)result = (uint8_t) v)) {
return -1;
}
for (cp = endp; isspace(*cp); ++cp)
continue;
return cp - in;
}
static int tlsa_import_rr(SSL *ssl, const char *rrdata)
{
int ret;
uint8_t usage;
uint8_t selector;
uint8_t mtype;
unsigned char *data = NULL;
const char *cp = rrdata;
ossl_ssize_t len = 0;
struct tlsa_field {
void *var;
const char *name;
ossl_ssize_t (*parser)(const char *, void *);
} tlsa_fields[] = {
{ &usage, "usage", checked_uint8 },
{ &selector, "selector", checked_uint8 },
{ &mtype, "mtype", checked_uint8 },
{ &data, "data", hexdecode },
{ NULL, }
};
struct tlsa_field *f;
for (f = tlsa_fields; f->var; ++f) {
if ((len = f->parser(cp += len, f->var)) <= 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: warning: bad TLSA %s field in: %s\n",
progname, f->name, rrdata);
return 0;
}
}
ret = SSL_dane_tlsa_add(ssl, usage, selector, mtype, data, len);
OPENSSL_free(data);
if (ret == 0) {
print_errors();
fprintf(stderr, "%s: warning: unusable TLSA rrdata: %s\n",
progname, rrdata);
return 0;
}
if (ret < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: warning: error loading TLSA rrdata: %s\n",
progname, rrdata);
return 0;
}
return ret;
}
static int allws(const char *cp)
{
while (*cp)
if (!isspace(*cp++))
return 0;
return 1;
}
static int test_tlsafile(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *basename,
FILE *f, const char *path)
{
char *line;
int testno = 0;
int ret = 1;
SSL *ssl;
while (ret > 0 && (line = read_to_eol(f)) != NULL) {
STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
int ntlsa;
int ncert;
int want;
int want_depth;
int off;
int i;
int ok;
int err;
int mdpth;
if (*line == '\0' || *line == '#')
continue;
++testno;
if (sscanf(line, "%d %d %d %d%n", &ntlsa, &ncert, &want, &want_depth, &off) != 4
|| !allws(line + off)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Expected tlsa count, cert count and result"
" at test %d of %s\n", testno, path);
return 0;
}
if ((ssl = SSL_new(ctx)) == NULL)
return -1;
SSL_set_connect_state(ssl);
if (SSL_dane_enable(ssl, basename) <= 0) {
SSL_free(ssl);
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < ntlsa; ++i) {
if ((line = read_to_eol(f)) == NULL || !tlsa_import_rr(ssl, line)) {
SSL_free(ssl);
return 0;
}
}
/* Don't report old news */
ERR_clear_error();
chain = load_chain(f, ncert);
if (chain == NULL) {
SSL_free(ssl);
return -1;
}
ok = verify_chain(ssl, chain);
sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
err = SSL_get_verify_result(ssl);
mdpth = SSL_get0_dane_authority(ssl, NULL, NULL);
SSL_free(ssl);
if (ok < 0) {
ret = 0;
fprintf(stderr, "verify_chain internal error in %s test %d\n",
path, testno);
print_errors();
continue;
}
if (err != want || (want == 0 && !ok)) {
ret = 0;
if (err != want) {
if (want == X509_V_OK)
fprintf(stderr, "Verification failure in %s test %d: %d: %s\n",
path, testno, err, X509_verify_cert_error_string(err));
else
fprintf(stderr, "Unexpected error in %s test %d: %d: wanted %d\n",
path, testno, err, want);
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Verification failure in %s test %d: ok=0\n",
path, testno);
}
print_errors();
continue;
}
if (mdpth != want_depth) {
ret = 0;
fprintf(stderr, "Wrong match depth, in %s test %d: wanted %d, got: %d\n",
path, testno, want_depth, mdpth);
}
fprintf(stderr, "%s: test %d successful\n", path, testno);
}
ERR_clear_error();
return ret;
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
progname = argv[0];
FILE *f;
BIO *bio_err;
SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL;
const char *basedomain;
const char *CAfile;
const char *tlsafile;
int ret = 1;
if (argc != 4) {
usage();
EXIT(1);
}
basedomain = argv[1];
CAfile = argv[2];
tlsafile = argv[3];
f = fopen(tlsafile, "r");
if (f == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: Error opening tlsa record file: '%s': %s\n",
progname, tlsafile, strerror(errno));
return 0;
}
bio_err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT);
/* enable memory leak checking unless explicitly disabled */
if (!((getenv("OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY") != NULL)
&& (0 == strcmp(getenv("OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY"), "off")))) {
CRYPTO_malloc_debug_init();
CRYPTO_set_mem_debug_options(V_CRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL);
} else {
/* OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY=off */
CRYPTO_set_mem_debug_functions(0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
}
CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
SSL_library_init();
SSL_load_error_strings();
ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_client_method());
if (SSL_CTX_dane_enable(ctx) <= 0) {
print_errors();
goto end;
}
if (!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, CAfile, NULL)) {
print_errors();
goto end;
}
if ((SSL_CTX_dane_mtype_set(ctx, EVP_sha512(), 2, 1)) <= 0) {
print_errors();
goto end;
}
if ((SSL_CTX_dane_mtype_set(ctx, EVP_sha256(), 1, 2)) <= 0) {
print_errors();
goto end;
}
if (test_tlsafile(ctx, argv[1], f, tlsafile) <= 0) {
print_errors();
goto end;
}
ret = 0;
end:
(void) fclose(f);
SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
ENGINE_cleanup();
#endif
CONF_modules_unload(1);
CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
ERR_free_strings();
ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL);
EVP_cleanup();
CRYPTO_mem_leaks(bio_err);
BIO_free(bio_err);
EXIT(ret);
}
#include <internal/dane.h>
static void store_ctx_dane_init(X509_STORE_CTX *store_ctx, SSL *ssl)
{
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(store_ctx, SSL_get0_dane(ssl));
}
test/danetest.in 0 → 100644
浏览文件 @ 170b7358
此差异已折叠。
test/danetest.pem 0 → 100644
浏览文件 @ 170b7358
subject= /CN=Root CA
issuer= /CN=Root CA
notBefore=Dec 13 23:13:08 2015 GMT
notAfter=Apr 15 23:13:08 3015 GMT
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIBZDCCAQugAwIBAgIBATAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdSb290IENB
MCAXDTE1MTIxMzIzMTMwOFoYDzMwMTUwNDE1MjMxMzA4WjASMRAwDgYDVQQDDAdS
b290IENBMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE0dpXj9GPuGRWsNkbVla9
1o1N29JQ4zdXESfHXgVg9B0K+Rv6+IBfgMKMAmoU1P6MMKlnO57AwFqEqoENE0G3
bKNQME4wHQYDVR0OBBYEFOS9QF8FKoIN35iD+T19P5Cq7HI/MB8GA1UdIwQYMBaA
FOS9QF8FKoIN35iD+T19P5Cq7HI/MAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wCgYIKoZIzj0EAwID
RwAwRAIgaGnmqp+bTUvzCAkaWnqyww42GbDXXlKIGUaOS7km9MkCIBfxuEWGEZZv
vBCcrtNYKWa/JfwFmOq6bHk8WNzDU3zF
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
test/recipes/80-test_dane.t 0 → 100644
浏览文件 @ 170b7358
#! /usr/bin/perl
use strict;
use warnings;
use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT top_dir top_file/;
setup("test_dane");
plan tests => 1; # The number of tests being performed
ok(run(test(["danetest", "example.com",
top_file("test", "danetest.pem"),
top_file("test", "danetest.in")])), "dane tests");
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