SSL_CTX_set_options.pod 10.5 KB
Newer Older
1 2 3 4
=pod

=head1 NAME

5
SSL_CTX_set_options, SSL_set_options, SSL_CTX_get_options, SSL_get_options - manipulate SSL options
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

=head1 SYNOPSIS

 #include <openssl/ssl.h>

 long SSL_CTX_set_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, long options);
 long SSL_set_options(SSL *ssl, long options);

14 15 16
 long SSL_CTX_clear_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, long options);
 long SSL_clear_options(SSL *ssl, long options);

17 18 19
 long SSL_CTX_get_options(SSL_CTX *ctx);
 long SSL_get_options(SSL *ssl);

20 21
 long SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(SSL *ssl);

22 23
=head1 DESCRIPTION

24 25
Note: all these functions are implemented using macros.

26
SSL_CTX_set_options() adds the options set via bitmask in B<options> to B<ctx>.
27
Options already set before are not cleared!
28 29

SSL_set_options() adds the options set via bitmask in B<options> to B<ssl>.
30
Options already set before are not cleared!
31

32 33 34 35 36
SSL_CTX_clear_options() clears the options set via bitmask in B<options>
to B<ctx>.

SSL_clear_options() clears the options set via bitmask in B<options> to B<ssl>.

37 38 39 40
SSL_CTX_get_options() returns the options set for B<ctx>.

SSL_get_options() returns the options set for B<ssl>.

41 42 43
SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support() indicates whether the peer supports
secure renegotiation.

44 45 46 47
=head1 NOTES

The behaviour of the SSL library can be changed by setting several options.
The options are coded as bitmasks and can be combined by a logical B<or>
48
operation (|).
49

50 51 52
SSL_CTX_set_options() and SSL_set_options() affect the (external)
protocol behaviour of the SSL library. The (internal) behaviour of
the API can be changed by using the similar
53
L<SSL_CTX_set_mode(3)|SSL_CTX_set_mode(3)> and SSL_set_mode() functions.
54 55

During a handshake, the option settings of the SSL object are used. When
56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75
a new SSL object is created from a context using SSL_new(), the current
option setting is copied. Changes to B<ctx> do not affect already created
SSL objects. SSL_clear() does not affect the settings.

The following B<bug workaround> options are available:

=over 4

=item SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG

www.microsoft.com - when talking SSLv2, if session-id reuse is
performed, the session-id passed back in the server-finished message
is different from the one decided upon.

=item SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG

Netscape-Commerce/1.12, when talking SSLv2, accepts a 32 byte
challenge but then appears to only use 16 bytes when generating the
encryption keys.  Using 16 bytes is ok but it should be ok to use 32.
According to the SSLv3 spec, one should use 32 bytes for the challenge
U
ispell  
Ulf Möller 已提交
76
when operating in SSLv2/v3 compatibility mode, but as mentioned above,
77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103
this breaks this server so 16 bytes is the way to go.

=item SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG

ssl3.netscape.com:443, first a connection is established with RC4-MD5.
If it is then resumed, we end up using DES-CBC3-SHA.  It should be
RC4-MD5 according to 7.6.1.3, 'cipher_suite'.

Netscape-Enterprise/2.01 (https://merchant.netscape.com) has this bug.
It only really shows up when connecting via SSLv2/v3 then reconnecting
via SSLv3. The cipher list changes....

NEW INFORMATION.  Try connecting with a cipher list of just
DES-CBC-SHA:RC4-MD5.  For some weird reason, each new connection uses
RC4-MD5, but a re-connect tries to use DES-CBC-SHA.  So netscape, when
doing a re-connect, always takes the first cipher in the cipher list.

=item SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG

...

=item SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER

...

=item SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING

B
Bodo Möller 已提交
104
As of OpenSSL 0.9.7h and 0.9.8a, this option has no effect.
105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117

=item SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG

...

=item SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG

...

=item SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG

...

118 119 120 121 122 123 124
=item SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS

Disables a countermeasure against a SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 protocol
vulnerability affecting CBC ciphers, which cannot be handled by some
broken SSL implementations.  This option has no effect for connections
using other ciphers.

125 126 127 128 129 130
=item SSL_OP_ALL

All of the above bug workarounds.

=back

131 132 133
It is usually safe to use B<SSL_OP_ALL> to enable the bug workaround
options if compatibility with somewhat broken implementations is
desired.
134 135 136 137 138

The following B<modifying> options are available:

=over 4

139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150
=item SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG

Disable version rollback attack detection.

During the client key exchange, the client must send the same information
about acceptable SSL/TLS protocol levels as during the first hello. Some
clients violate this rule by adapting to the server's answer. (Example:
the client sends a SSLv2 hello and accepts up to SSLv3.1=TLSv1, the server
only understands up to SSLv3. In this case the client must still use the
same SSLv3.1=TLSv1 announcement. Some clients step down to SSLv3 with respect
to the server's answer and violate the version rollback protection.)

151 152
=item SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE

153
Always create a new key when using temporary/ephemeral DH parameters
154
(see L<SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(3)|SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(3)>).
155 156 157 158
This option must be used to prevent small subgroup attacks, when
the DH parameters were not generated using "strong" primes
(e.g. when using DSA-parameters, see L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)>).
If "strong" primes were used, it is not strictly necessary to generate
U
ispell  
Ulf Möller 已提交
159
a new DH key during each handshake but it is also recommended.
160
B<SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE> should therefore be enabled whenever
161
temporary/ephemeral DH parameters are used.
162 163 164

=item SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA

165
Always use ephemeral (temporary) RSA key when doing RSA operations
166
(see L<SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(3)|SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(3)>).
167 168 169 170 171 172 173
According to the specifications this is only done, when a RSA key
can only be used for signature operations (namely under export ciphers
with restricted RSA keylength). By setting this option, ephemeral
RSA keys are always used. This option breaks compatibility with the
SSL/TLS specifications and may lead to interoperability problems with
clients and should therefore never be used. Ciphers with EDH (ephemeral
Diffie-Hellman) key exchange should be used instead.
174

175 176 177 178 179
=item SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE

When choosing a cipher, use the server's preferences instead of the client
preferences. When not set, the SSL server will always follow the clients
preferences. When set, the SSLv3/TLSv1 server will choose following its
U
ispell  
Ulf Möller 已提交
180
own preferences. Because of the different protocol, for SSLv2 the server
D
Dr. Stephen Henson 已提交
181
will send its list of preferences to the client and the client chooses.
182

183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193
=item SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1

...

=item SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2

...

=item SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG

If we accept a netscape connection, demand a client cert, have a
R
Richard Levitte 已提交
194
non-self-signed CA which does not have its CA in netscape, and the
195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212
browser has a cert, it will crash/hang.  Works for 3.x and 4.xbeta 

=item SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG

...

=item SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2

Do not use the SSLv2 protocol.

=item SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3

Do not use the SSLv3 protocol.

=item SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1

Do not use the TLSv1 protocol.

213 214 215 216
=item SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION

When performing renegotiation as a server, always start a new session
(i.e., session resumption requests are only accepted in the initial
217
handshake). This option is not needed for clients.
218

219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226
=item SSL_OP_NO_TICKET

Normally clients and servers will, where possible, transparently make use
of RFC4507bis tickets for stateless session resumption.

If this option is set this functionality is disabled and tickets will
not be used by clients or servers.

227 228 229 230 231
=item SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION

See the B<SECURE RENEGOTIATION> section for a discussion of the purpose of
this option

232 233
=back

234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269
=head1 SECURE RENEGOTIATION

OpenSSL by 0.9.8m and later always attempts to use secure renegotiation as
described in draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation (FIXME: replace by RFC). This
counters a prefix attack described in the draft and elsewhere (FIXME: need full
reference).

This attack has far reaching consequences which application writers should be
aware of. In the description below an implementation supporting secure
renegotiation is referred to as I<patched>. A server not supporting secure
renegotiation is referred to as I<unpatched>.

If an unpatched client attempts to connect to a patched OpenSSL server then
the attempt will succeed but renegotiation is not permitted. As required
by the standard a B<no_renegotiation> alert is sent back to the client if
the TLS v1.0 protocol is used. If SSLv3.0 is used then renegotiation results
in a fatal B<handshake_failed> alert.

If a patched OpenSSL client attempts to connect to an unpatched server
then the connection will fail because it is not possible to determine
whether an attack is taking place.

If the option B<SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION> is set then the
renegotiation between unpatched clients and patched servers is permitted as
well as initial connections and renegotiation between patched clients and
unpatched servers. This option should be used with caution because it leaves
both clients and servers vulnerable. However unpatched servers and clients are
likely to be around for some time and simply refusing to connect to unpatched
servers may well be considered unacceptable. So applications may be forced to
use this option for the immediate future.

The function SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support() indicates whether the peer
supports secure renegotiation. 

The deprecated SSLv2 protocol does not support secure renegotiation at all.

270 271 272 273 274
=head1 RETURN VALUES

SSL_CTX_set_options() and SSL_set_options() return the new options bitmask
after adding B<options>.

275 276 277
SSL_CTX_clear_options() and SSL_clear_options() return the new options bitmask
after clearing B<options>.

278 279
SSL_CTX_get_options() and SSL_get_options() return the current bitmask.

280 281 282
SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support() returns 1 is the peer supports
secure renegotiation and 0 if it does not.

283 284
=head1 SEE ALSO

285 286
L<ssl(3)|ssl(3)>, L<SSL_new(3)|SSL_new(3)>, L<SSL_clear(3)|SSL_clear(3)>,
L<SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(3)|SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(3)>,
287 288
L<SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(3)|SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(3)>,
L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)>
289 290 291

=head1 HISTORY

292 293 294
B<SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE> and
B<SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION> have been added in
OpenSSL 0.9.7.
295

296 297
B<SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG> has been added in OpenSSL 0.9.6 and was automatically
enabled with B<SSL_OP_ALL>. As of 0.9.7, it is no longer included in B<SSL_OP_ALL>
U
ispell  
Ulf Möller 已提交
298
and must be explicitly set.
299

300 301 302 303 304
B<SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS> has been added in OpenSSL 0.9.6e.
Versions up to OpenSSL 0.9.6c do not include the countermeasure that
can be disabled with this option (in OpenSSL 0.9.6d, it was always
enabled).

305 306 307 308 309 310
SSL_CTX_clear_options() and SSL_clear_options() were first added in OpenSSL
0.9.8m.

B<SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION> was first added in OpenSSL
0.9.8m.

311
=cut