this code will not work yet because the necessary relocations are not
supported, and cannot be supported without some internal changes to
how relocation processing works (coming soon).

only TLS in the main program is supported so far; TLS defined in
shared libraries will not work yet.

the design for TLS in dynamic-linked programs is mostly complete too,
but I have not yet implemented it. cost is nonzero but still low for
programs which do not use TLS and/or do not use threads (a few hundred
bytes of new code, plus dependency on memcpy). i believe it can be
made smaller at some point by merging __init_tls and __init_security
into __libc_start_main and avoiding duplicate auxv-parsing code.

at the same time, I've also slightly changed the logic pthread_create
uses to allocate guard pages to ensure that guard pages are not
counted towards commit charge.

for some reason this option is undocumented. not sure when it was
added, so I'm using a configure test. gcc was already setting the mark
correctly for C files, but assembler source files would need ugly
.note boilerplate in every single file to achieve this without the
option to the assembler.

blame whoever thought it would be a good idea to make the stack
executable by default rather than doing it the other way around...

based on proposed patches by Daniel Cegiełka, with minor changes:
- use a weak symbol for optreset so it doesn't clash with namespace
- also reset optpos (position in multi-option arg like -lR)
- also make getopt_long support reset

also fix one minor bug: failure to free the early-reserved slot when
the semaphore later found to already be mapped.

this function was overly complicated and not even obviously correct.
avoid using openat/linkat just like in shm_open, and instead expand
pathname using code shared with shm_open. remove bogus (and dangerous,
with priorities) use of spinlocks.

this commit also heavily streamlines the code and ensures there are no
failure cases that can happen after a new semaphore has been created
in the filesystem, since that case is unreportable.

1. don't make non-cloexec file descriptors
2. cancellation safety (cleanup handlers were missing, now unneeded)
3. share name validation/mapping code between open/unlink functions
4. avoid wasteful/slow syscalls

this feature will be in the next version of POSIX, and can be used
internally immediately. there are many internal uses of fopen where
close-on-exec is needed to fix bugs.

it will be in the next version of POSIX

they will be in the next version of POSIX

these interfaces have been adopted by the Austin Group for inclusion
in the next version of POSIX.

also update syslog to use SOCK_CLOEXEC rather than separate fcntl
step, to make it safe in multithreaded programs that run external
programs.

emulation is not atomic; it could be made atomic by holding a lock on
forking during the operation, but this seems like overkill. my goal is
not to achieve perfect behavior on old kernels (which have plenty of
other imperfect behavior already) but to avoid catastrophic breakage
in (1) syslog, which would give no output on old kernels with the
change to use SOCK_CLOEXEC, and (2) programs built on a new kernel
where configure scripts detected a working SOCK_CLOEXEC, which later
get run on older kernels (they may otherwise fail to work completely).

this did not matter because we don't yet treat process-shared special.
when private futex support is added, however, it will matter.

based on initial work by rdp, with heavy modifications. some features
including threads are untested because qemu app-level emulation seems
to be broken and I do not have a proper system image for testing.

the code to exit the new thread/process after the start function
returns was mixed up in its syscall convention.

when strchr fails, and important piece of information already
computed, the string length, is thrown away. have strchrnul (with
namespace protection) be the underlying function so this information
can be kept, and let strchr be a wrapper for it. this also allows
strcspn to be considerably faster in the case where the match set has
a single element that's not matched.

testing with gcc 4.6.3 on x86, -Os, the old version does a duplicate
null byte check after the first loop. this is purely the compiler
being stupid, but the old code was also stupid and unintuitive in how
it expressed the check.

also optimized a bit.

austin group interpretation for defect #529
(http://austingroupbugs.net/view.php?id=529) tightens the
requirements on close such that, if it returns with EINTR, the file
descriptor must not be closed. the linux kernel developers vehemently
disagree with this, and will not change it. we catch and remap EINTR
to EINPROGRESS, which the standard allows close() to return when the
operation was not finished but the file descriptor has been closed.

new behavior can be summarized as:
inputs that parse completely as a decimal number are treated as one,
and rejected only if the result is out of 16-bit range.
inputs that do not parse as a decimal number (where strtoul leaves
anything left over in the input) are searched in /etc/services.

also cleanup cruft related to the issue

not tested on mips and arm; they may still be broken. x86_64 should be
ok now.

this is useful when the underlying gcc is already a wrapper, which is
the case at least on some uclibc-based system images. it's also useful
for running an older/newer/nondefault version of gcc.

issue reported/requested by Justin Cormack

patch by Justin Cormack, with slight modification

the linux O_PATH mode provides the necessary semantics for both the
O_SEARCH and O_EXEC modes defined and required by POSIX 2008.

contributed by nsz

this could cause major bugs, and warrants a fix release right away.

no problems were detected so far, but the constraints seem to have
been invalid just like the mips ones.

it was determined in discussion that these kind of limits are not
sufficient to protect single-threaded servers against denial of
service attacks from maliciously large round counts. the time scales
simply vary too much; many users will want login passwords with rounds
counts on a scale that gives decisecond latency, while highly loaded
webservers will need millisecond latency or shorter.

still some limit is left in place; the idea is not to protect against
attacks, but to avoid the runtime of a single call to crypt being, for
all practical purposes, infinite, so that configuration errors can be
caught and fixed without bringing down whole systems. these limits are
very high, on the order of minute-long runtimes for modest systems.

these fixes were already made to the normal syscall asm but not the
cancellation point version.