1. 12 9月, 2008 25 次提交
  2. 11 9月, 2008 1 次提交
    • D
      ipv6: On interface down/unregister, purge icmp routes too. · 1e493d19
      David S. Miller 提交于
      Johannes Berg reported that occaisionally, bringing an interface
      down or unregistering it would hang for up to 30 seconds.  Using
      debugging output he provided it became clear that ICMP6 routes
      were the culprit.
      
      The problem is that ICMP6 routes live in their own world totally
      separate from normal ipv6 routes.  So there are all kinds of special
      cases throughout the ipv6 code to handle this.
      
      While we should really try to unify all of this stuff somehow,
      for the time being let's fix this by purging the ICMP6 routes
      that match the device in question during rt6_ifdown().
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      1e493d19
  3. 10 9月, 2008 7 次提交
  4. 09 9月, 2008 7 次提交
    • H
      ipsec: Restore larval states and socket policies in dump · 225f4005
      Herbert Xu 提交于
      The commit commit 4c563f76 ("[XFRM]:
      Speed up xfrm_policy and xfrm_state walking") inadvertently removed
      larval states and socket policies from netlink dumps.  This patch
      restores them.
      Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      225f4005
    • D
    • Y
      bnx2x: EEH recovery fix · f8ef6e44
      Yitchak Gertner 提交于
      When EEH detects an i/o error it resets the device thus it cannot be accessed.
      In this case the driver needs to unload its interface only with OS, kernel and
      network stack but not with the device.
      After successful recovery, the driver can load normally.
      Signed-off-by: NYitchak Gertner <gertner@broadcom.com>
      Signed-off-by: NEilon Greenstein <eilong@broadcom.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      f8ef6e44
    • G
      This reverts "Merge branch 'dccp' of git://eden-feed.erg.abdn.ac.uk/dccp_exp" · 410e27a4
      Gerrit Renker 提交于
      as it accentally contained the wrong set of patches. These will be
      submitted separately.
      Signed-off-by: NGerrit Renker <gerrit@erg.abdn.ac.uk>
      410e27a4
    • D
    • M
      [Bluetooth] Reject L2CAP connections on an insecure ACL link · e7c29cb1
      Marcel Holtmann 提交于
      The Security Mode 4 of the Bluetooth 2.1 specification has strict
      authentication and encryption requirements. It is the initiators job
      to create a secure ACL link. However in case of malicious devices, the
      acceptor has to make sure that the ACL is encrypted before allowing
      any kind of L2CAP connection. The only exception here is the PSM 1 for
      the service discovery protocol, because that is allowed to run on an
      insecure ACL link.
      
      Previously it was enough to reject a L2CAP connection during the
      connection setup phase, but with Bluetooth 2.1 it is forbidden to
      do any L2CAP protocol exchange on an insecure link (except SDP).
      
      The new hci_conn_check_link_mode() function can be used to check the
      integrity of an ACL link. This functions also takes care of the cases
      where Security Mode 4 is disabled or one of the devices is based on
      an older specification.
      Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
      e7c29cb1
    • M
      [Bluetooth] Enforce correct authentication requirements · 09ab6f4c
      Marcel Holtmann 提交于
      With the introduction of Security Mode 4 and Simple Pairing from the
      Bluetooth 2.1 specification it became mandatory that the initiator
      requires authentication and encryption before any L2CAP channel can
      be established. The only exception here is PSM 1 for the service
      discovery protocol (SDP). It is meant to be used without any encryption
      since it contains only public information. This is how Bluetooth 2.0
      and before handle connections on PSM 1.
      
      For Bluetooth 2.1 devices the pairing procedure differentiates between
      no bonding, general bonding and dedicated bonding. The L2CAP layer
      wrongly uses always general bonding when creating new connections, but it
      should not do this for SDP connections. In this case the authentication
      requirement should be no bonding and the just-works model should be used,
      but in case of non-SDP connection it is required to use general bonding.
      
      If the new connection requires man-in-the-middle (MITM) protection, it
      also first wrongly creates an unauthenticated link key and then later on
      requests an upgrade to an authenticated link key to provide full MITM
      protection. With Simple Pairing the link key generation is an expensive
      operation (compared to Bluetooth 2.0 and before) and doing this twice
      during a connection setup causes a noticeable delay when establishing
      a new connection. This should be avoided to not regress from the expected
      Bluetooth 2.0 connection times. The authentication requirements are known
      up-front and so enforce them.
      
      To fulfill these requirements the hci_connect() function has been extended
      with an authentication requirement parameter that will be stored inside
      the connection information and can be retrieved by userspace at any
      time. This allows the correct IO capabilities exchange and results in
      the expected behavior.
      Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
      09ab6f4c