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  1. 06 6月, 2014 1 次提交
  3. 05 6月, 2014 4 次提交
  5. 02 6月, 2014 2 次提交
  7. 28 5月, 2014 2 次提交
    • T
      rtmutex: Fix deadlock detector for real · 397335f0
      由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于 
      The current deadlock detection logic does not work reliably due to the
following early exit path:

	/*
	 * Drop out, when the task has no waiters. Note,
	 * top_waiter can be NULL, when we are in the deboosting
	 * mode!
	 */
	if (top_waiter && (!task_has_pi_waiters(task) ||
			   top_waiter != task_top_pi_waiter(task)))
		goto out_unlock_pi;

So this not only exits when the task has no waiters, it also exits
unconditionally when the current waiter is not the top priority waiter
of the task.

So in a nested locking scenario, it might abort the lock chain walk
and therefor miss a potential deadlock.

Simple fix: Continue the chain walk, when deadlock detection is
enabled.

We also avoid the whole enqueue, if we detect the deadlock right away
(A-A). It's an optimization, but also prevents that another waiter who
comes in after the detection and before the task has undone the damage
observes the situation and detects the deadlock and returns
-EDEADLOCK, which is wrong as the other task is not in a deadlock
situation.
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: NSteven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140522031949.725272460@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      397335f0
    • S
      powerpc, kexec: Fix "Processor X is stuck" issue during kexec from ST mode · 011e4b02
      由 Srivatsa S. Bhat 提交于 
      If we try to perform a kexec when the machine is in ST (Single-Threaded) mode
(ppc64_cpu --smt=off), the kexec operation doesn't succeed properly, and we
get the following messages during boot:

[    0.089866] POWER8 performance monitor hardware support registered
[    0.089985] power8-pmu: PMAO restore workaround active.
[    5.095419] Processor 1 is stuck.
[   10.097933] Processor 2 is stuck.
[   15.100480] Processor 3 is stuck.
[   20.102982] Processor 4 is stuck.
[   25.105489] Processor 5 is stuck.
[   30.108005] Processor 6 is stuck.
[   35.110518] Processor 7 is stuck.
[   40.113369] Processor 9 is stuck.
[   45.115879] Processor 10 is stuck.
[   50.118389] Processor 11 is stuck.
[   55.120904] Processor 12 is stuck.
[   60.123425] Processor 13 is stuck.
[   65.125970] Processor 14 is stuck.
[   70.128495] Processor 15 is stuck.
[   75.131316] Processor 17 is stuck.

Note that only the sibling threads are stuck, while the primary threads (0, 8,
16 etc) boot just fine. Looking closer at the previous step of kexec, we observe
that kexec tries to wakeup (bring online) the sibling threads of all the cores,
before performing kexec:

[ 9464.131231] Starting new kernel
[ 9464.148507] kexec: Waking offline cpu 1.
[ 9464.148552] kexec: Waking offline cpu 2.
[ 9464.148600] kexec: Waking offline cpu 3.
[ 9464.148636] kexec: Waking offline cpu 4.
[ 9464.148671] kexec: Waking offline cpu 5.
[ 9464.148708] kexec: Waking offline cpu 6.
[ 9464.148743] kexec: Waking offline cpu 7.
[ 9464.148779] kexec: Waking offline cpu 9.
[ 9464.148815] kexec: Waking offline cpu 10.
[ 9464.148851] kexec: Waking offline cpu 11.
[ 9464.148887] kexec: Waking offline cpu 12.
[ 9464.148922] kexec: Waking offline cpu 13.
[ 9464.148958] kexec: Waking offline cpu 14.
[ 9464.148994] kexec: Waking offline cpu 15.
[ 9464.149030] kexec: Waking offline cpu 17.

Instrumenting this piece of code revealed that the cpu_up() operation actually
fails with -EBUSY. Thus, only the primary threads of all the cores are online
during kexec, and hence this is a sure-shot receipe for disaster, as explained
in commit e8e5c215 (powerpc/kexec: Fix orphaned offline CPUs across kexec),
as well as in the comment above wake_offline_cpus().

It turns out that cpu_up() was returning -EBUSY because the variable
'cpu_hotplug_disabled' was set to 1; and this disabling of CPU hotplug was done
by migrate_to_reboot_cpu() inside kernel_kexec().

Now, migrate_to_reboot_cpu() was originally written with the assumption that
any further code will not need to perform CPU hotplug, since we are anyway in
the reboot path. However, kexec is clearly not such a case, since we depend on
onlining CPUs, atleast on powerpc.

So re-enable cpu-hotplug after returning from migrate_to_reboot_cpu() in the
kexec path, to fix this regression in kexec on powerpc.

Also, wrap the cpu_up() in powerpc kexec code within a WARN_ON(), so that we
can catch such issues more easily in the future.

Fixes: c97102ba (kexec: migrate to reboot cpu)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NSrivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa.bhat@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NBenjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
      011e4b02
  9. 22 5月, 2014 7 次提交
  11. 19 5月, 2014 6 次提交
    • B
      perf/events/core: Drop unused variable after cleanup · 12665b35
      由 Borislav Petkov 提交于 
      ... in 3a497f48 ("perf: Simplify perf_event_exit_task_context()")
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1399720259-28275-1-git-send-email-bp@alien8.deSigned-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      12665b35
    • P
      perf: Fix a race between ring_buffer_detach() and ring_buffer_attach() · b69cf536
      由 Peter Zijlstra 提交于 
      Alexander noticed that we use RCU iteration on rb->event_list but do
not use list_{add,del}_rcu() to add,remove entries to that list, nor
do we observe proper grace periods when re-using the entries.

Merge ring_buffer_detach() into ring_buffer_attach() such that
attaching to the NULL buffer is detaching.

Furthermore, ensure that between any 'detach' and 'attach' of the same
event we observe the required grace period, but only when strictly
required. In effect this means that only ioctl(.request =
PERF_EVENT_IOC_SET_OUTPUT) will wait for a grace period, while the
normal initial attach and final detach will not be delayed.

This patch should, I think, do the right thing under all
circumstances, the 'normal' cases all should never see the extra grace
period, but the two cases:

 1) PERF_EVENT_IOC_SET_OUTPUT on an event which already has a
    ring_buffer set, will now observe the required grace period between
    removing itself from the old and attaching itself to the new buffer.

    This case is 'simple' in that both buffers are present in
    perf_event_set_output() one could think an unconditional
    synchronize_rcu() would be sufficient; however...

 2) an event that has a buffer attached, the buffer is destroyed
    (munmap) and then the event is attached to a new/different buffer
    using PERF_EVENT_IOC_SET_OUTPUT.

    This case is more complex because the buffer destruction does:
      ring_buffer_attach(.rb = NULL)
    followed by the ioctl() doing:
      ring_buffer_attach(.rb = foo);

    and we still need to observe the grace period between these two
    calls due to us reusing the event->rb_entry list_head.

In order to make 2 happen we use Paul's latest cond_synchronize_rcu()
call.

Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: NAlexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140507123526.GD13658@twins.programming.kicks-ass.netSigned-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      b69cf536
    • J
      perf: Prevent false warning in perf_swevent_add · 39af6b16
      由 Jiri Olsa 提交于 
      The perf cpu offline callback takes down all cpu context
events and releases swhash->swevent_hlist.

This could race with task context software event being just
scheduled on this cpu via perf_swevent_add while cpu hotplug
code already cleaned up event's data.

The race happens in the gap between the cpu notifier code
and the cpu being actually taken down. Note that only cpu
ctx events are terminated in the perf cpu hotplug code.

It's easily reproduced with:
  $ perf record -e faults perf bench sched pipe

while putting one of the cpus offline:
  # echo 0 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu1/online

Console emits following warning:
  WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 2845 at kernel/events/core.c:5672 perf_swevent_add+0x18d/0x1a0()
  Modules linked in:
  CPU: 1 PID: 2845 Comm: sched-pipe Tainted: G        W    3.14.0+ #256
  Hardware name: Intel Corporation Montevina platform/To be filled by O.E.M., BIOS AMVACRB1.86C.0066.B00.0805070703 05/07/2008
   0000000000000009 ffff880077233ab8 ffffffff81665a23 0000000000200005
   0000000000000000 ffff880077233af8 ffffffff8104732c 0000000000000046
   ffff88007467c800 0000000000000002 ffff88007a9cf2a0 0000000000000001
  Call Trace:
   [<ffffffff81665a23>] dump_stack+0x4f/0x7c
   [<ffffffff8104732c>] warn_slowpath_common+0x8c/0xc0
   [<ffffffff8104737a>] warn_slowpath_null+0x1a/0x20
   [<ffffffff8110fb3d>] perf_swevent_add+0x18d/0x1a0
   [<ffffffff811162ae>] event_sched_in.isra.75+0x9e/0x1f0
   [<ffffffff8111646a>] group_sched_in+0x6a/0x1f0
   [<ffffffff81083dd5>] ? sched_clock_local+0x25/0xa0
   [<ffffffff811167e6>] ctx_sched_in+0x1f6/0x450
   [<ffffffff8111757b>] perf_event_sched_in+0x6b/0xa0
   [<ffffffff81117a4b>] perf_event_context_sched_in+0x7b/0xc0
   [<ffffffff81117ece>] __perf_event_task_sched_in+0x43e/0x460
   [<ffffffff81096f1e>] ? put_lock_stats.isra.18+0xe/0x30
   [<ffffffff8107b3c8>] finish_task_switch+0xb8/0x100
   [<ffffffff8166a7de>] __schedule+0x30e/0xad0
   [<ffffffff81172dd2>] ? pipe_read+0x3e2/0x560
   [<ffffffff8166b45e>] ? preempt_schedule_irq+0x3e/0x70
   [<ffffffff8166b45e>] ? preempt_schedule_irq+0x3e/0x70
   [<ffffffff8166b464>] preempt_schedule_irq+0x44/0x70
   [<ffffffff816707f0>] retint_kernel+0x20/0x30
   [<ffffffff8109e60a>] ? lockdep_sys_exit+0x1a/0x90
   [<ffffffff812a4234>] lockdep_sys_exit_thunk+0x35/0x67
   [<ffffffff81679321>] ? sysret_check+0x5/0x56

Fixing this by tracking the cpu hotplug state and displaying
the WARN only if current cpu is initialized properly.

Cc: Corey Ashford <cjashfor@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: NFengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NJiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1396861448-10097-1-git-send-email-jolsa@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      39af6b16
    • P
      perf: Limit perf_event_attr::sample_period to 63 bits · 0819b2e3
      由 Peter Zijlstra 提交于 
      Vince reported that using a large sample_period (one with bit 63 set)
results in wreckage since while the sample_period is fundamentally
unsigned (negative periods don't make sense) the way we implement
things very much rely on signed logic.

So limit sample_period to 63 bits to avoid tripping over this.
Reported-by: NVince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-p25fhunibl4y3qi0zuqmyf4b@git.kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      0819b2e3
    • T
      futex: Prevent attaching to kernel threads · f0d71b3d
      由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于 
      We happily allow userspace to declare a random kernel thread to be the
owner of a user space PI futex.

Found while analysing the fallout of Dave Jones syscall fuzzer.

We also should validate the thread group for private futexes and find
some fast way to validate whether the "alleged" owner has RW access on
the file which backs the SHM, but that's a separate issue.
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Darren Hart <darren@dvhart.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Clark Williams <williams@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com>
Cc: Carlos ODonell <carlos@redhat.com>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140512201701.194824402@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      f0d71b3d
    • T
      futex: Add another early deadlock detection check · 866293ee
      由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于 
      Dave Jones trinity syscall fuzzer exposed an issue in the deadlock
detection code of rtmutex:
  http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140429151655.GA14277@redhat.com

That underlying issue has been fixed with a patch to the rtmutex code,
but the futex code must not call into rtmutex in that case because
    - it can detect that issue early
    - it avoids a different and more complex fixup for backing out

If the user space variable got manipulated to 0x80000000 which means
no lock holder, but the waiters bit set and an active pi_state in the
kernel is found we can figure out the recursive locking issue by
looking at the pi_state owner. If that is the current task, then we
can safely return -EDEADLK.

The check should have been added in commit 59fa6245 (futex: Handle
futex_pi OWNER_DIED take over correctly) already, but I did not see
the above issue caused by user space manipulation back then.
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Darren Hart <darren@dvhart.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Clark Williams <williams@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com>
Cc: Carlos ODonell <carlos@redhat.com>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140512201701.097349971@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      866293ee
  13. 14 5月, 2014 2 次提交
    • O
      uprobes/x86: Fix the wrong ->si_addr when xol triggers a trap · b02ef20a
      由 Oleg Nesterov 提交于 
      If the probed insn triggers a trap, ->si_addr = regs->ip is technically
correct, but this is not what the signal handler wants; we need to pass
the address of the probed insn, not the address of xol slot.

Add the new arch-agnostic helper, uprobe_get_trap_addr(), and change
fill_trap_info() and math_error() to use it. !CONFIG_UPROBES case in
uprobes.h uses a macro to avoid include hell and ensure that it can be
compiled even if an architecture doesn't define instruction_pointer().

Test-case:

	#include <signal.h>
	#include <stdio.h>
	#include <unistd.h>

	extern void probe_div(void);

	void sigh(int sig, siginfo_t *info, void *c)
	{
		int passed = (info->si_addr == probe_div);
		printf(passed ? "PASS\n" : "FAIL\n");
		_exit(!passed);
	}

	int main(void)
	{
		struct sigaction sa = {
			.sa_sigaction	= sigh,
			.sa_flags	= SA_SIGINFO,
		};

		sigaction(SIGFPE, &sa, NULL);

		asm (
			"xor %ecx,%ecx\n"
			".globl probe_div; probe_div:\n"
			"idiv %ecx\n"
		);

		return 0;
	}

it fails if probe_div() is probed.

Note: show_unhandled_signals users should probably use this helper too,
but we need to cleanup them first.
Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NMasami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com>
      b02ef20a
    • O
      uprobes: Add mem_cgroup_charge_anon() into uprobe_write_opcode() · 29dedee0
      由 Oleg Nesterov 提交于 
      Hugh says:

    The one I noticed was that it forgets all about memcg (because
    it was copied from KSM, and there the replacement page has already
    been charged to a memcg). See how mm/memory.c do_anonymous_page()
    does a mem_cgroup_charge_anon().

Hopefully not a big problem, uprobes is a system-wide thing and only
root can insert the probes. But I agree, should be fixed anyway.

Add mem_cgroup_{un,}charge_anon() into uprobe_write_opcode(). To simplify
the error handling (and avoid the new "uncharge" label) the patch also
moves anon_vma_prepare() up before we alloc/charge the new page.

While at it fix the comment about ->mmap_sem, it is held for write.
Suggested-by: NHugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
      29dedee0
  15. 13 5月, 2014 3 次提交
    • T
      cgroup: fix rcu_read_lock() leak in update_if_frozen() · 36e9d2eb
      由 Tejun Heo 提交于 
      While updating cgroup_freezer locking, 68fafb77d827 ("cgroup_freezer:
replace freezer->lock with freezer_mutex") introduced a bug in
update_if_frozen() where it returns with rcu_read_lock() held.  Fix it
by adding rcu_read_unlock() before returning.
Signed-off-by: NTejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Nkbuild test robot <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
      36e9d2eb
    • T
      cgroup_freezer: replace freezer->lock with freezer_mutex · e5ced8eb
      由 Tejun Heo 提交于 
      After 96d365e0 ("cgroup: make css_set_lock a rwsem and rename it
to css_set_rwsem"), css task iterators requires sleepable context as
it may block on css_set_rwsem.  I missed that cgroup_freezer was
iterating tasks under IRQ-safe spinlock freezer->lock.  This leads to
errors like the following on freezer state reads and transitions.

  BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at /work
 /os/work/kernel/locking/rwsem.c:20
  in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 462, name: bash
  5 locks held by bash/462:
   #0:  (sb_writers#7){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff811f0843>] vfs_write+0x1a3/0x1c0
   #1:  (&of->mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff8126d78b>] kernfs_fop_write+0xbb/0x170
   #2:  (s_active#70){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff8126d793>] kernfs_fop_write+0xc3/0x170
   #3:  (freezer_mutex){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff81135981>] freezer_write+0x61/0x1e0
   #4:  (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff81135973>] freezer_write+0x53/0x1e0
  Preemption disabled at:[<ffffffff81104404>] console_unlock+0x1e4/0x460

  CPU: 3 PID: 462 Comm: bash Not tainted 3.15.0-rc1-work+ #10
  Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
   ffff88000916a6d0 ffff88000e0a3da0 ffffffff81cf8c96 0000000000000000
   ffff88000e0a3dc8 ffffffff810cf4f2 ffffffff82388040 ffff880013aaf740
   0000000000000002 ffff88000e0a3de8 ffffffff81d05974 0000000000000246
  Call Trace:
   [<ffffffff81cf8c96>] dump_stack+0x4e/0x7a
   [<ffffffff810cf4f2>] __might_sleep+0x162/0x260
   [<ffffffff81d05974>] down_read+0x24/0x60
   [<ffffffff81133e87>] css_task_iter_start+0x27/0x70
   [<ffffffff8113584d>] freezer_apply_state+0x5d/0x130
   [<ffffffff81135a16>] freezer_write+0xf6/0x1e0
   [<ffffffff8112eb88>] cgroup_file_write+0xd8/0x230
   [<ffffffff8126d7b7>] kernfs_fop_write+0xe7/0x170
   [<ffffffff811f0756>] vfs_write+0xb6/0x1c0
   [<ffffffff811f121d>] SyS_write+0x4d/0xc0
   [<ffffffff81d08292>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b

freezer->lock used to be used in hot paths but that time is long gone
and there's no reason for the lock to be IRQ-safe spinlock or even
per-cgroup.  In fact, given the fact that a cgroup may contain large
number of tasks, it's not a good idea to iterate over them while
holding IRQ-safe spinlock.

Let's simplify locking by replacing per-cgroup freezer->lock with
global freezer_mutex.  This also makes the comments explaining the
intricacies of policy inheritance and the locking around it as the
states are protected by a common mutex.

The conversion is mostly straight-forward.  The followings are worth
mentioning.

* freezer_css_online() no longer needs double locking.

* freezer_attach() now performs propagation simply while holding
  freezer_mutex.  update_if_frozen() race no longer exists and the
  comment is removed.

* freezer_fork() now tests whether the task is in root cgroup using
  the new task_css_is_root() without doing rcu_read_lock/unlock().  If
  not, it grabs freezer_mutex and performs the operation.

* freezer_read() and freezer_change_state() grab freezer_mutex across
  the whole operation and pin the css while iterating so that each
  descendant processing happens in sleepable context.

Fixes: 96d365e0 ("cgroup: make css_set_lock a rwsem and rename it to css_set_rwsem")
Signed-off-by: NTejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NLi Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
      e5ced8eb
    • T
      cgroup: introduce task_css_is_root() · 5024ae29
      由 Tejun Heo 提交于 
      Determining the css of a task usually requires RCU read lock as that's
the only thing which keeps the returned css accessible till its
reference is acquired; however, testing whether a task belongs to the
root can be performed without dereferencing the returned css by
comparing the returned pointer against the root one in init_css_set[]
which never changes.

Implement task_css_is_root() which can be invoked in any context.
This will be used by the scheduled cgroup_freezer change.

v2: cgroup no longer supports modular controllers.  No need to export
    init_css_set.  Pointed out by Li.
Signed-off-by: NTejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NLi Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
      5024ae29
  17. 12 5月, 2014 1 次提交
  19. 08 5月, 2014 1 次提交
  21. 07 5月, 2014 11 次提交