1. 12 12月, 2013 1 次提交
  2. 07 12月, 2013 5 次提交
  3. 06 12月, 2013 1 次提交
  4. 29 11月, 2013 1 次提交
  5. 24 11月, 2013 1 次提交
  6. 15 11月, 2013 2 次提交
  7. 04 11月, 2013 2 次提交
    • D
      net: sctp: do not trigger BUG_ON in sctp_cmd_delete_tcb · 7926c1d5
      Daniel Borkmann 提交于
      Introduced in f9e42b85 ("net: sctp: sideeffect: throw BUG if
      primary_path is NULL"), we intended to find a buggy assoc that's
      part of the assoc hash table with a primary_path that is NULL.
      However, we better remove the BUG_ON for now and find a more
      suitable place to assert for these things as Mark reports that
      this also triggers the bug when duplication cookie processing
      happens, and the assoc is not part of the hash table (so all
      good in this case). Such a situation can for example easily be
      reproduced by:
      
        tc qdisc add dev eth0 root handle 1: prio bands 2 priomap 1 1 1 1 1 1
        tc qdisc add dev eth0 parent 1:2 handle 20: netem loss 20%
        tc filter add dev eth0 protocol ip parent 1: prio 2 u32 match ip \
                  protocol 132 0xff match u8 0x0b 0xff at 32 flowid 1:2
      
      This drops 20% of COOKIE-ACK packets. After some follow-up
      discussion with Vlad we came to the conclusion that for now we
      should still better remove this BUG_ON() assertion, and come up
      with two follow-ups later on, that is, i) find a more suitable
      place for this assertion, and possibly ii) have a special
      allocator/initializer for such kind of temporary assocs.
      Reported-by: NMark Thomas <Mark.Thomas@metaswitch.com>
      Signed-off-by: NVlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
      Acked-by: NNeil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      7926c1d5
    • D
      net: sctp: fix and consolidate SCTP checksumming code · e6d8b64b
      Daniel Borkmann 提交于
      This fixes an outstanding bug found through IPVS, where SCTP packets
      with skb->data_len > 0 (non-linearized) and empty frag_list, but data
      accumulated in frags[] member, are forwarded with incorrect checksum
      letting SCTP initial handshake fail on some systems. Linearizing each
      SCTP skb in IPVS to prevent that would not be a good solution as
      this leads to an additional and unnecessary performance penalty on
      the load-balancer itself for no good reason (as we actually only want
      to update the checksum, and can do that in a different/better way
      presented here).
      
      The actual problem is elsewhere, namely, that SCTP's checksumming
      in sctp_compute_cksum() does not take frags[] into account like
      skb_checksum() does. So while we are fixing this up, we better reuse
      the existing code that we have anyway in __skb_checksum() and use it
      for walking through the data doing checksumming. This will not only
      fix this issue, but also consolidates some SCTP code with core
      sk_buff code, bringing it closer together and removing respectively
      avoiding reimplementation of skb_checksum() for no good reason.
      
      As crc32c() can use hardware implementation within the crypto layer,
      we leave that intact (it wraps around / falls back to e.g. slice-by-8
      algorithm in __crc32c_le() otherwise); plus use the __crc32c_le_combine()
      combinator for crc32c blocks.
      
      Also, we remove all other SCTP checksumming code, so that we only
      have to use sctp_compute_cksum() from now on; for doing that, we need
      to transform SCTP checkumming in output path slightly, and can leave
      the rest intact.
      Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      e6d8b64b
  8. 28 10月, 2013 3 次提交
  9. 24 10月, 2013 1 次提交
  10. 18 10月, 2013 2 次提交
  11. 09 10月, 2013 1 次提交
    • E
      ipv6: make lookups simpler and faster · efe4208f
      Eric Dumazet 提交于
      TCP listener refactoring, part 4 :
      
      To speed up inet lookups, we moved IPv4 addresses from inet to struct
      sock_common
      
      Now is time to do the same for IPv6, because it permits us to have fast
      lookups for all kind of sockets, including upcoming SYN_RECV.
      
      Getting IPv6 addresses in TCP lookups currently requires two extra cache
      lines, plus a dereference (and memory stall).
      
      inet6_sk(sk) does the dereference of inet_sk(__sk)->pinet6
      
      This patch is way bigger than its IPv4 counter part, because for IPv4,
      we could add aliases (inet_daddr, inet_rcv_saddr), while on IPv6,
      it's not doable easily.
      
      inet6_sk(sk)->daddr becomes sk->sk_v6_daddr
      inet6_sk(sk)->rcv_saddr becomes sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr
      
      And timewait socket also have tw->tw_v6_daddr & tw->tw_v6_rcv_saddr
      at the same offset.
      
      We get rid of INET6_TW_MATCH() as INET6_MATCH() is now the generic
      macro.
      Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      efe4208f
  12. 01 10月, 2013 1 次提交
  13. 17 9月, 2013 1 次提交
  14. 13 9月, 2013 1 次提交
    • D
      net: sctp: fix ipv6 ipsec encryption bug in sctp_v6_xmit · 95ee6208
      Daniel Borkmann 提交于
      Alan Chester reported an issue with IPv6 on SCTP that IPsec traffic is not
      being encrypted, whereas on IPv4 it is. Setting up an AH + ESP transport
      does not seem to have the desired effect:
      
      SCTP + IPv4:
      
        22:14:20.809645 IP (tos 0x2,ECT(0), ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto AH (51), length 116)
          192.168.0.2 > 192.168.0.5: AH(spi=0x00000042,sumlen=16,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00000044,seq=0x1), length 72
        22:14:20.813270 IP (tos 0x2,ECT(0), ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto AH (51), length 340)
          192.168.0.5 > 192.168.0.2: AH(spi=0x00000043,sumlen=16,seq=0x1):
      
      SCTP + IPv6:
      
        22:31:19.215029 IP6 (class 0x02, hlim 64, next-header SCTP (132) payload length: 364)
          fe80::222:15ff:fe87:7fc.3333 > fe80::92e6:baff:fe0d:5a54.36767: sctp
          1) [INIT ACK] [init tag: 747759530] [rwnd: 62464] [OS: 10] [MIS: 10]
      
      Moreover, Alan says:
      
        This problem was seen with both Racoon and Racoon2. Other people have seen
        this with OpenSwan. When IPsec is configured to encrypt all upper layer
        protocols the SCTP connection does not initialize. After using Wireshark to
        follow packets, this is because the SCTP packet leaves Box A unencrypted and
        Box B believes all upper layer protocols are to be encrypted so it drops
        this packet, causing the SCTP connection to fail to initialize. When IPsec
        is configured to encrypt just SCTP, the SCTP packets are observed unencrypted.
      
      In fact, using `socat sctp6-listen:3333 -` on one end and transferring "plaintext"
      string on the other end, results in cleartext on the wire where SCTP eventually
      does not report any errors, thus in the latter case that Alan reports, the
      non-paranoid user might think he's communicating over an encrypted transport on
      SCTP although he's not (tcpdump ... -X):
      
        ...
        0x0030: 5d70 8e1a 0003 001a 177d eb6c 0000 0000  ]p.......}.l....
        0x0040: 0000 0000 706c 6169 6e74 6578 740a 0000  ....plaintext...
      
      Only in /proc/net/xfrm_stat we can see XfrmInTmplMismatch increasing on the
      receiver side. Initial follow-up analysis from Alan's bug report was done by
      Alexey Dobriyan. Also thanks to Vlad Yasevich for feedback on this.
      
      SCTP has its own implementation of sctp_v6_xmit() not calling inet6_csk_xmit().
      This has the implication that it probably never really got updated along with
      changes in inet6_csk_xmit() and therefore does not seem to invoke xfrm handlers.
      
      SCTP's IPv4 xmit however, properly calls ip_queue_xmit() to do the work. Since
      a call to inet6_csk_xmit() would solve this problem, but result in unecessary
      route lookups, let us just use the cached flowi6 instead that we got through
      sctp_v6_get_dst(). Since all SCTP packets are being sent through sctp_packet_transmit(),
      we do the route lookup / flow caching in sctp_transport_route(), hold it in
      tp->dst and skb_dst_set() right after that. If we would alter fl6->daddr in
      sctp_v6_xmit() to np->opt->srcrt, we possibly could run into the same effect
      of not having xfrm layer pick it up, hence, use fl6_update_dst() in sctp_v6_get_dst()
      instead to get the correct source routed dst entry, which we assign to the skb.
      
      Also source address routing example from 62503411 ("sctp: fix sctp to work with
      ipv6 source address routing") still works with this patch! Nevertheless, in RFC5095
      it is actually 'recommended' to not use that anyway due to traffic amplification [1].
      So it seems we're not supposed to do that anyway in sctp_v6_xmit(). Moreover, if
      we overwrite the flow destination here, the lower IPv6 layer will be unable to
      put the correct destination address into IP header, as routing header is added in
      ipv6_push_nfrag_opts() but then probably with wrong final destination. Things aside,
      result of this patch is that we do not have any XfrmInTmplMismatch increase plus on
      the wire with this patch it now looks like:
      
      SCTP + IPv6:
      
        08:17:47.074080 IP6 2620:52:0:102f:7a2b:cbff:fe27:1b0a > 2620:52:0:102f:213:72ff:fe32:7eba:
          AH(spi=0x00005fb4,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00005fb5,seq=0x1), length 72
        08:17:47.074264 IP6 2620:52:0:102f:213:72ff:fe32:7eba > 2620:52:0:102f:7a2b:cbff:fe27:1b0a:
          AH(spi=0x00003d54,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00003d55,seq=0x1), length 296
      
      This fixes Kernel Bugzilla 24412. This security issue seems to be present since
      2.6.18 kernels. Lets just hope some big passive adversary in the wild didn't have
      its fun with that. lksctp-tools IPv6 regression test suite passes as well with
      this patch.
      
       [1] http://www.secdev.org/conf/IPv6_RH_security-csw07.pdfReported-by: NAlan Chester <alan.chester@tekelec.com>
      Reported-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
      Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
      Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
      Acked-by: NVlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      95ee6208
  15. 12 9月, 2013 2 次提交
  16. 05 9月, 2013 1 次提交
    • A
      net: sctp: Fix data chunk fragmentation for MTU values which are not multiple of 4 · c08751c8
      Alexander Sverdlin 提交于
      net: sctp: Fix data chunk fragmentation for MTU values which are not multiple of 4
      
      Initially the problem was observed with ipsec, but later it became clear that
      SCTP data chunk fragmentation algorithm has problems with MTU values which are
      not multiple of 4. Test program was used which just transmits 2000 bytes long
      packets to other host. tcpdump was used to observe re-fragmentation in IP layer
      after SCTP already fragmented data chunks.
      
      With MTU 1500:
      12:54:34.082904 IP (tos 0x2,ECT(0), ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto SCTP (132), length 1500)
          10.151.38.153.39303 > 10.151.24.91.54321: sctp (1) [DATA] (B) [TSN: 2366088589] [SID: 0] [SSEQ 1] [PPID 0x0]
      12:54:34.082933 IP (tos 0x2,ECT(0), ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto SCTP (132), length 596)
          10.151.38.153.39303 > 10.151.24.91.54321: sctp (1) [DATA] (E) [TSN: 2366088590] [SID: 0] [SSEQ 1] [PPID 0x0]
      12:54:34.090576 IP (tos 0x2,ECT(0), ttl 63, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto SCTP (132), length 48)
          10.151.24.91.54321 > 10.151.38.153.39303: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 2366088590] [a_rwnd 79920] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
      
      With MTU 1499:
      13:02:49.955220 IP (tos 0x2,ECT(0), ttl 64, id 48215, offset 0, flags [+], proto SCTP (132), length 1492)
          10.151.38.153.39084 > 10.151.24.91.54321: sctp[|sctp]
      13:02:49.955249 IP (tos 0x2,ECT(0), ttl 64, id 48215, offset 1472, flags [none], proto SCTP (132), length 28)
          10.151.38.153 > 10.151.24.91: ip-proto-132
      13:02:49.955262 IP (tos 0x2,ECT(0), ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto SCTP (132), length 600)
          10.151.38.153.39084 > 10.151.24.91.54321: sctp (1) [DATA] (E) [TSN: 404355346] [SID: 0] [SSEQ 1] [PPID 0x0]
      13:02:49.956770 IP (tos 0x2,ECT(0), ttl 63, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto SCTP (132), length 48)
          10.151.24.91.54321 > 10.151.38.153.39084: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 404355346] [a_rwnd 79920] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
      
      Here problem in data portion limit calculation leads to re-fragmentation in IP,
      which is sub-optimal. The problem is max_data initial value, which doesn't take
      into account the fact, that data chunk must be padded to 4-bytes boundary.
      It's enough to correct max_data, because all later adjustments are correctly
      aligned to 4-bytes boundary.
      
      After the fix is applied, everything is fragmented correctly for uneven MTUs:
      15:16:27.083881 IP (tos 0x2,ECT(0), ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto SCTP (132), length 1496)
          10.151.38.153.53417 > 10.151.24.91.54321: sctp (1) [DATA] (B) [TSN: 3077098183] [SID: 0] [SSEQ 1] [PPID 0x0]
      15:16:27.083907 IP (tos 0x2,ECT(0), ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto SCTP (132), length 600)
          10.151.38.153.53417 > 10.151.24.91.54321: sctp (1) [DATA] (E) [TSN: 3077098184] [SID: 0] [SSEQ 1] [PPID 0x0]
      15:16:27.085640 IP (tos 0x2,ECT(0), ttl 63, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto SCTP (132), length 48)
          10.151.24.91.54321 > 10.151.38.153.53417: sctp (1) [SACK] [cum ack 3077098184] [a_rwnd 79920] [#gap acks 0] [#dup tsns 0]
      
      The bug was there for years already, but
       - is a performance issue, the packets are still transmitted
       - doesn't show up with default MTU 1500, but possibly with ipsec (MTU 1438)
      Signed-off-by: NAlexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin@nsn.com>
      Acked-by: NVlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
      Acked-by: NNeil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      c08751c8
  17. 04 9月, 2013 1 次提交
  18. 30 8月, 2013 1 次提交
  19. 23 8月, 2013 1 次提交
  20. 16 8月, 2013 1 次提交
  21. 14 8月, 2013 1 次提交
    • V
      net: sctp: Add rudimentary infrastructure to account for control chunks · 072017b4
      Vlad Yasevich 提交于
      This patch adds a base infrastructure that allows SCTP to do
      memory accounting for control chunks.  Real accounting code will
      follow.
      
      This patch alos fixes the following triggered bug ...
      
      [  553.109742] kernel BUG at include/linux/skbuff.h:1813!
      [  553.109766] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
      [  553.109789] Modules linked in: sctp libcrc32c rfcomm [...]
      [  553.110259]  uinput i915 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper e1000e drm ptp
      pps_core i2c_core wmi video sunrpc
      [  553.110320] CPU: 0 PID: 1636 Comm: lt-test_1_to_1_ Not tainted
      3.11.0-rc3+ #2
      [  553.110350] Hardware name: LENOVO 74597D6/74597D6, BIOS 6DET60WW
      (3.10 ) 09/17/2009
      [  553.110381] task: ffff88020a01dd40 ti: ffff880204ed0000 task.ti:
      ffff880204ed0000
      [  553.110411] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa0698017>]  [<ffffffffa0698017>]
      skb_orphan.part.9+0x4/0x6 [sctp]
      [  553.110459] RSP: 0018:ffff880204ed1bb8  EFLAGS: 00010286
      [  553.110483] RAX: ffff8802086f5a40 RBX: ffff880204303300 RCX:
      0000000000000000
      [  553.110487] RDX: ffff880204303c28 RSI: ffff8802086f5a40 RDI:
      ffff880202158000
      [  553.110487] RBP: ffff880204ed1bb8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09:
      0000000000000000
      [  553.110487] R10: ffff88022f2d9a04 R11: ffff880233001600 R12:
      0000000000000000
      [  553.110487] R13: ffff880204303c00 R14: ffff8802293d0000 R15:
      ffff880202158000
      [  553.110487] FS:  00007f31b31fe740(0000) GS:ffff88023bc00000(0000)
      knlGS:0000000000000000
      [  553.110487] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
      [  553.110487] CR2: 000000379980e3e0 CR3: 000000020d225000 CR4:
      00000000000407f0
      [  553.110487] Stack:
      [  553.110487]  ffff880204ed1ca8 ffffffffa068d7fc 0000000000000000
      0000000000000000
      [  553.110487]  0000000000000000 ffff8802293d0000 ffff880202158000
      ffffffff81cb7900
      [  553.110487]  0000000000000000 0000400000001c68 ffff8802086f5a40
      000000000000000f
      [  553.110487] Call Trace:
      [  553.110487]  [<ffffffffa068d7fc>] sctp_sendmsg+0x6bc/0xc80 [sctp]
      [  553.110487]  [<ffffffff8128f185>] ? sock_has_perm+0x75/0x90
      [  553.110487]  [<ffffffff815a3593>] inet_sendmsg+0x63/0xb0
      [  553.110487]  [<ffffffff8128f2b3>] ? selinux_socket_sendmsg+0x23/0x30
      [  553.110487]  [<ffffffff8151c5d6>] sock_sendmsg+0xa6/0xd0
      [  553.110487]  [<ffffffff81637b05>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20
      [  553.110487]  [<ffffffff8151cd38>] SYSC_sendto+0x128/0x180
      [  553.110487]  [<ffffffff8151ce6b>] ? SYSC_connect+0xdb/0x100
      [  553.110487]  [<ffffffffa0690031>] ? sctp_inet_listen+0x71/0x1f0
      [sctp]
      [  553.110487]  [<ffffffff8151d35e>] SyS_sendto+0xe/0x10
      [  553.110487]  [<ffffffff81640202>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
      [  553.110487] Code: e0 48 c7 c7 00 22 6a a0 e8 67 a3 f0 e0 48 c7 [...]
      [  553.110487] RIP  [<ffffffffa0698017>] skb_orphan.part.9+0x4/0x6
      [sctp]
      [  553.110487]  RSP <ffff880204ed1bb8>
      [  553.121578] ---[ end trace 46c20c5903ef5be2 ]---
      
      The approach taken here is to split data and control chunks
      creation a  bit.  Data chunks already have memory accounting
      so noting needs to happen.  For control chunks, add stubs handlers.
      Signed-off-by: NVlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      072017b4
  22. 13 8月, 2013 2 次提交
  23. 10 8月, 2013 3 次提交
  24. 03 8月, 2013 1 次提交
  25. 28 7月, 2013 1 次提交
  26. 25 7月, 2013 1 次提交
  27. 10 7月, 2013 1 次提交
    • D
      net: sctp: confirm route during forward progress · 8c2f414a
      Daniel Borkmann 提交于
      This fix has been proposed originally by Vlad Yasevich. He says:
      
        When SCTP makes forward progress (receives a SACK that acks new chunks,
        renegs, or answeres 0-window probes) or when HB-ACK arrives, mark
        the route as confirmed so we don't unnecessarily send NUD probes.
      
      Having a simple SCTP client/server that exchange data chunks every 1sec,
      without this patch ARP requests are sent periodically every 40-60sec.
      With this fix applied, an ARP request is only done once right at the
      "session" beginning. Also, when clearing the related ARP cache entry
      manually during the session, a new request is correctly done. I have
      only "backported" this to net-next and tested that it works, so full
      credit goes to Vlad.
      Signed-off-by: NVlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
      Acked-by: NNeil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      8c2f414a