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  1. 27 8月, 2011 10 次提交
  3. 25 8月, 2011 3 次提交
    • N
      Proportional Rate Reduction for TCP. · a262f0cd
      由 Nandita Dukkipati 提交于 
      This patch implements Proportional Rate Reduction (PRR) for TCP.
PRR is an algorithm that determines TCP's sending rate in fast
recovery. PRR avoids excessive window reductions and aims for
the actual congestion window size at the end of recovery to be as
close as possible to the window determined by the congestion control
algorithm. PRR also improves accuracy of the amount of data sent
during loss recovery.

The patch implements the recommended flavor of PRR called PRR-SSRB
(Proportional rate reduction with slow start reduction bound) and
replaces the existing rate halving algorithm. PRR improves upon the
existing Linux fast recovery under a number of conditions including:
  1) burst losses where the losses implicitly reduce the amount of
outstanding data (pipe) below the ssthresh value selected by the
congestion control algorithm and,
  2) losses near the end of short flows where application runs out of
data to send.

As an example, with the existing rate halving implementation a single
loss event can cause a connection carrying short Web transactions to
go into the slow start mode after the recovery. This is because during
recovery Linux pulls the congestion window down to packets_in_flight+1
on every ACK. A short Web response often runs out of new data to send
and its pipe reduces to zero by the end of recovery when all its packets
are drained from the network. Subsequent HTTP responses using the same
connection will have to slow start to raise cwnd to ssthresh. PRR on
the other hand aims for the cwnd to be as close as possible to ssthresh
by the end of recovery.

A description of PRR and a discussion of its performance can be found at
the following links:
- IETF Draft:
    http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mathis-tcpm-proportional-rate-reduction-01
- IETF Slides:
    http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/80/slides/tcpm-6.pdf
    http://tools.ietf.org/agenda/81/slides/tcpm-2.pdf
- Paper to appear in Internet Measurements Conference (IMC) 2011:
    Improving TCP Loss Recovery
    Nandita Dukkipati, Matt Mathis, Yuchung Cheng
Signed-off-by: NNandita Dukkipati <nanditad@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      a262f0cd
    • C
      af-packet: Added TPACKET_V3 headers. · 0d4691ce
      由 chetan loke 提交于 
      Added TPACKET_V3 definitions.
Signed-off-by: NChetan Loke <loke.chetan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      0d4691ce
    • I
      net: convert core to skb paged frag APIs · ea2ab693
      由 Ian Campbell 提交于 
      Signed-off-by: NIan Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: "Michał Mirosław" <mirq-linux@rere.qmqm.pl>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      ea2ab693
  5. 23 8月, 2011 1 次提交
  7. 19 8月, 2011 1 次提交
  9. 18 8月, 2011 3 次提交
  11. 17 8月, 2011 5 次提交
  13. 16 8月, 2011 1 次提交
  15. 15 8月, 2011 1 次提交
  17. 13 8月, 2011 4 次提交
  19. 12 8月, 2011 1 次提交
    • V
      move RLIMIT_NPROC check from set_user() to do_execve_common() · 72fa5997
      由 Vasiliy Kulikov 提交于 
      The patch http://lkml.org/lkml/2003/7/13/226 introduced an RLIMIT_NPROC
check in set_user() to check for NPROC exceeding via setuid() and
similar functions.

Before the check there was a possibility to greatly exceed the allowed
number of processes by an unprivileged user if the program relied on
rlimit only.  But the check created new security threat: many poorly
written programs simply don't check setuid() return code and believe it
cannot fail if executed with root privileges.  So, the check is removed
in this patch because of too often privilege escalations related to
buggy programs.

The NPROC can still be enforced in the common code flow of daemons
spawning user processes.  Most of daemons do fork()+setuid()+execve().
The check introduced in execve() (1) enforces the same limit as in
setuid() and (2) doesn't create similar security issues.

Neil Brown suggested to track what specific process has exceeded the
limit by setting PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED process flag.  With the change only
this process would fail on execve(), and other processes' execve()
behaviour is not changed.

Solar Designer suggested to re-check whether NPROC limit is still
exceeded at the moment of execve().  If the process was sleeping for
days between set*uid() and execve(), and the NPROC counter step down
under the limit, the defered execve() failure because NPROC limit was
exceeded days ago would be unexpected.  If the limit is not exceeded
anymore, we clear the flag on successful calls to execve() and fork().

The flag is also cleared on successful calls to set_user() as the limit
was exceeded for the previous user, not the current one.

Similar check was introduced in -ow patches (without the process flag).

v3 - clear PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED on successful calls to set_user().
Reviewed-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NVasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Acked-by: NNeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      72fa5997
  21. 10 8月, 2011 2 次提交
  23. 09 8月, 2011 8 次提交