There is interest in being able to see what the actual policy is that was
loaded into the kernel.  The patch creates a new selinuxfs file
/selinux/policy which can be read by userspace.  The actual policy that is
loaded into the kernel will be written back out to userspace.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

This patch kills ugly warnings when the "Improve SELinux performance
when ACV misses" patch.
Signed-off-by: NKaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

* We add ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit() which enables to walk on
  any positive bit on the given ebitmap, to improve its performance
  using common bit-operations defined in linux/bitops.h.
  In the previous version, this logic was implemented using a combination
  of ebitmap_for_each_bit() and ebitmap_node_get_bit(), but is was worse
  in performance aspect.
  This logic is most frequestly used to compute a new AVC entry,
  so this patch can improve SELinux performance when AVC misses are happen.
* struct ebitmap_node is redefined as an array of "unsigned long", to get
  suitable for using find_next_bit() which is fasted than iteration of
  shift and logical operation, and to maximize memory usage allocated
  from general purpose slab.
* Any ebitmap_for_each_bit() are repleced by the new implementation
  in ss/service.c and ss/mls.c. Some of related implementation are
  changed, however, there is no incompatibility with the previous
  version.
* The width of any new line are less or equal than 80-chars.

The following benchmark shows the effect of this patch, when we
access many files which have different security context one after
another. The number is more than /selinux/avc/cache_threshold, so
any access always causes AVC misses.

      selinux-2.6      selinux-2.6-ebitmap
AVG:   22.763 [s]          8.750 [s]
STD:    0.265              0.019
------------------------------------------
1st:   22.558 [s]          8.786 [s]
2nd:   22.458 [s]          8.750 [s]
3rd:   22.478 [s]          8.754 [s]
4th:   22.724 [s]          8.745 [s]
5th:   22.918 [s]          8.748 [s]
6th:   22.905 [s]          8.764 [s]
7th:   23.238 [s]          8.726 [s]
8th:   22.822 [s]          8.729 [s]
Signed-off-by: NKaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

The original NetLabel category bitmap was a straight char bitmap which worked
fine for the initial release as it only supported 240 bits due to limitations
in the CIPSO restricted bitmap tag (tag type 0x01).  This patch converts that
straight char bitmap into an extensibile/sparse bitmap in order to lay the
foundation for other CIPSO tag types and protocols.

This patch also has a nice side effect in that all of the security attributes
passed by NetLabel into the LSM are now in a format which is in the host's
native byte/bit ordering which makes the LSM specific code much simpler; look
at the changes in security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c as an example.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Add NetLabel support to the SELinux LSM and modify the
socket_post_create() LSM hook to return an error code.  The most
significant part of this patch is the addition of NetLabel hooks into
the following SELinux LSM hooks:

 * selinux_file_permission()
 * selinux_socket_sendmsg()
 * selinux_socket_post_create()
 * selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb()
 * selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream()
 * selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram()
 * selinux_sock_graft()
 * selinux_inet_conn_request()

The basic reasoning behind this patch is that outgoing packets are
"NetLabel'd" by labeling their socket and the NetLabel security
attributes are checked via the additional hook in
selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb().  NetLabel itself is only a labeling
mechanism, similar to filesystem extended attributes, it is up to the
SELinux enforcement mechanism to perform the actual access checks.

In addition to the changes outlined above this patch also includes
some changes to the extended bitmap (ebitmap) and multi-level security
(mls) code to import and export SELinux TE/MLS attributes into and out
of NetLabel.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This patch improves memory use by SELinux by both reducing the avtab node
size and reducing the number of avtab nodes.  The memory savings are
substantial, e.g.  on a 64-bit system after boot, James Morris reported the
following data for the targeted and strict policies:

            #objs  objsize   kernmem
Targeted:
  Before:  237888       40     9.1MB
  After:    19968       24     468KB

Strict:
  Before:  571680       40   21.81MB
  After:   221052       24    5.06MB

The improvement in memory use comes at a cost in the speed of security
server computations of access vectors, but these computations are only
required on AVC cache misses, and performance measurements by James Morris
using a number of benchmarks have shown that the change does not cause any
significant degradation.

Note that a rebuilt policy via an updated policy toolchain
(libsepol/checkpolicy) is required in order to gain the full benefits of
this patch, although some memory savings benefits are immediately applied
even to older policies (in particular, the reduction in avtab node size).
Sources for the updated toolchain are presently available from the
sourceforge CVS tree (http://sourceforge.net/cvs/?group_id=21266), and
tarballs are available from http://www.flux.utah.edu/~sds.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
infrastructure for it.

Let it rip!