1. 21 9月, 2006 5 次提交
  2. 14 8月, 2006 1 次提交
    • D
      [IPSEC]: Validate properly in xfrm_dst_check() · d49c73c7
      David S. Miller 提交于
      If dst->obsolete is -1, this is a signal from the
      bundle creator that we want the XFRM dst and the
      dsts that it references to be validated on every
      use.
      
      I misunderstood this intention when I changed
      xfrm_dst_check() to always return NULL.
      
      Now, when we purge a dst entry, by running dst_free()
      on it.  This will set the dst->obsolete to a positive
      integer, and we want to return NULL in that case so
      that the socket does a relookup for the route.
      
      Thus, if dst->obsolete<0, let stale_bundle() validate
      the state, else always return NULL.
      
      In general, we need to do things more intelligently
      here because we flush too much state during rule
      changes.  Herbert Xu has some ideas wherein the key
      manager gives us some help in this area.  We can also
      use smarter state management algorithms inside of
      the kernel as well.
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      d49c73c7
  3. 22 7月, 2006 1 次提交
  4. 01 7月, 2006 1 次提交
  5. 30 6月, 2006 2 次提交
  6. 18 6月, 2006 4 次提交
    • D
      [NET]: Fix warnings after LSM-IPSEC changes. · 6f68dc37
      David S. Miller 提交于
      Assignment used as truth value in xfrm_del_sa()
      and xfrm_get_policy().
      
      Wrong argument type declared for security_xfrm_state_delete()
      when SELINUX is disabled.
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      6f68dc37
    • C
      [LSM-IPsec]: SELinux Authorize · c8c05a8e
      Catherine Zhang 提交于
      This patch contains a fix for the previous patch that adds security
      contexts to IPsec policies and security associations.  In the previous
      patch, no authorization (besides the check for write permissions to
      SAD and SPD) is required to delete IPsec policies and security
      assocations with security contexts.  Thus a user authorized to change
      SAD and SPD can bypass the IPsec policy authorization by simply
      deleteing policies with security contexts.  To fix this security hole,
      an additional authorization check is added for removing security
      policies and security associations with security contexts.
      
      Note that if no security context is supplied on add or present on
      policy to be deleted, the SELinux module allows the change
      unconditionally.  The hook is called on deletion when no context is
      present, which we may want to change.  At present, I left it up to the
      module.
      
      LSM changes:
      
      The patch adds two new LSM hooks: xfrm_policy_delete and
      xfrm_state_delete.  The new hooks are necessary to authorize deletion
      of IPsec policies that have security contexts.  The existing hooks
      xfrm_policy_free and xfrm_state_free lack the context to do the
      authorization, so I decided to split authorization of deletion and
      memory management of security data, as is typical in the LSM
      interface.
      
      Use:
      
      The new delete hooks are checked when xfrm_policy or xfrm_state are
      deleted by either the xfrm_user interface (xfrm_get_policy,
      xfrm_del_sa) or the pfkey interface (pfkey_spddelete, pfkey_delete).
      
      SELinux changes:
      
      The new policy_delete and state_delete functions are added.
      Signed-off-by: NCatherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com>
      Signed-off-by: NTrent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu>
      Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      c8c05a8e
    • H
      [IPSEC] xfrm: Abstract out encapsulation modes · b59f45d0
      Herbert Xu 提交于
      This patch adds the structure xfrm_mode.  It is meant to represent
      the operations carried out by transport/tunnel modes.
      
      By doing this we allow additional encapsulation modes to be added
      without clogging up the xfrm_input/xfrm_output paths.
      
      Candidate modes include 4-to-6 tunnel mode, 6-to-4 tunnel mode, and
      BEET modes.
      Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      b59f45d0
    • H
      [IPSEC] xfrm: Undo afinfo lock proliferation · 546be240
      Herbert Xu 提交于
      The number of locks used to manage afinfo structures can easily be reduced
      down to one each for policy and state respectively.  This is based on the
      observation that the write locks are only held by module insertion/removal
      which are very rare events so there is no need to further differentiate
      between the insertion of modules like ipv6 versus esp6.
      
      The removal of the read locks in xfrm4_policy.c/xfrm6_policy.c might look
      suspicious at first.  However, after you realise that nobody ever takes
      the corresponding write lock you'll feel better :)
      
      As far as I can gather it's an attempt to guard against the removal of
      the corresponding modules.  Since neither module can be unloaded at all
      we can leave it to whoever fixes up IPv6 unloading :)
      Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      546be240
  7. 23 5月, 2006 1 次提交
  8. 30 4月, 2006 3 次提交
    • I
      [XFRM]: fix incorrect xfrm_policy_afinfo_lock use · e959d812
      Ingo Molnar 提交于
      xfrm_policy_afinfo_lock can be taken in bh context, at:
      
       [<c013fe1a>] lockdep_acquire_read+0x54/0x6d
       [<c0f6e024>] _read_lock+0x15/0x22
       [<c0e8fcdb>] xfrm_policy_get_afinfo+0x1a/0x3d
       [<c0e8fd10>] xfrm_decode_session+0x12/0x32
       [<c0e66094>] ip_route_me_harder+0x1c9/0x25b
       [<c0e770d3>] ip_nat_local_fn+0x94/0xad
       [<c0e2bbc8>] nf_iterate+0x2e/0x7a
       [<c0e2bc50>] nf_hook_slow+0x3c/0x9e
       [<c0e3a342>] ip_push_pending_frames+0x2de/0x3a7
       [<c0e53e19>] icmp_push_reply+0x136/0x141
       [<c0e543fb>] icmp_reply+0x118/0x1a0
       [<c0e54581>] icmp_echo+0x44/0x46
       [<c0e53fad>] icmp_rcv+0x111/0x138
       [<c0e36764>] ip_local_deliver+0x150/0x1f9
       [<c0e36be2>] ip_rcv+0x3d5/0x413
       [<c0df760f>] netif_receive_skb+0x337/0x356
       [<c0df76c3>] process_backlog+0x95/0x110
       [<c0df5fe2>] net_rx_action+0xa5/0x16d
       [<c012d8a7>] __do_softirq+0x6f/0xe6
       [<c0105ec2>] do_softirq+0x52/0xb1
      
      this means that all write-locking of xfrm_policy_afinfo_lock must be
      bh-safe. This patch fixes xfrm_policy_register_afinfo() and
      xfrm_policy_unregister_afinfo().
      Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      e959d812
    • I
      [XFRM]: fix incorrect xfrm_state_afinfo_lock use · f3111502
      Ingo Molnar 提交于
      xfrm_state_afinfo_lock can be read-locked from bh context, so take it
      in a bh-safe manner in xfrm_state_register_afinfo() and
      xfrm_state_unregister_afinfo(). Found by the lock validator.
      Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      f3111502
    • I
      [XFRM]: fix softirq-unsafe xfrm typemap->lock use · 8dff7c29
      Ingo Molnar 提交于
      xfrm typemap->lock may be used in softirq context, so all write_lock()
      uses must be softirq-safe.
      Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      8dff7c29
  9. 15 4月, 2006 1 次提交
  10. 01 4月, 2006 1 次提交
  11. 21 3月, 2006 11 次提交
  12. 28 2月, 2006 1 次提交
    • H
      [IPSEC]: Kill post_input hook and do NAT-T in esp_input directly · 752c1f4c
      Herbert Xu 提交于
      The only reason post_input exists at all is that it gives us the
      potential to adjust the checksums incrementally in future which
      we ought to do.
      
      However, after thinking about it for a bit we can adjust the
      checksums without using this post_input stuff at all.  The crucial
      point is that only the inner-most NAT-T SA needs to be considered
      when adjusting checksums.  What's more, the checksum adjustment
      comes down to a single u32 due to the linearity of IP checksums.
      
      We just happen to have a spare u32 lying around in our skb structure :)
      When ip_summed is set to CHECKSUM_NONE on input, the value of skb->csum
      is currently unused.  All we have to do is to make that the checksum
      adjustment and voila, there goes all the post_input and decap structures!
      
      I've left in the decap data structures for now since it's intricately
      woven into the sec_path stuff.  We can kill them later too.
      Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      752c1f4c
  13. 24 2月, 2006 2 次提交
  14. 20 2月, 2006 1 次提交
    • P
      [XFRM]: Fix policy double put · 99511014
      Patrick McHardy 提交于
      The policy is put once immediately and once at the error label, which results
      in the following Oops:
      
      kernel BUG at net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:250!
      invalid opcode: 0000 [#2]
      PREEMPT
      [...]
      CPU:    0
      EIP:    0060:[<c028caf7>]    Not tainted VLI
      EFLAGS: 00210246   (2.6.16-rc3 #39)
      EIP is at __xfrm_policy_destroy+0xf/0x46
      eax: d49f2000   ebx: d49f2000   ecx: f74bd880   edx: f74bd280
      esi: d49f2000   edi: 00000001   ebp: cd506dcc   esp: cd506dc8
      ds: 007b   es: 007b   ss: 0068
      Process ssh (pid: 31970, threadinfo=cd506000 task=cfb04a70)
      Stack: <0>cd506000 cd506e34 c028e92b ebde7280 cd506e58 cd506ec0 f74bd280 00000000
             00000214 0000000a 0000000a 00000000 00000002 f7ae6000 00000000 cd506e58
             cd506e14 c0299e36 f74bd280 e873fe00 c02943fd cd506ec0 ebde7280 f271f440
      Call Trace:
       [<c0103a44>] show_stack_log_lvl+0xaa/0xb5
       [<c0103b75>] show_registers+0x126/0x18c
       [<c0103e68>] die+0x14e/0x1db
       [<c02b6809>] do_trap+0x7c/0x96
       [<c0104237>] do_invalid_op+0x89/0x93
       [<c01035af>] error_code+0x4f/0x54
       [<c028e92b>] xfrm_lookup+0x349/0x3c2
       [<c02b0b0d>] ip6_datagram_connect+0x317/0x452
       [<c0281749>] inet_dgram_connect+0x49/0x54
       [<c02404d2>] sys_connect+0x51/0x68
       [<c0240928>] sys_socketcall+0x6f/0x166
       [<c0102aa1>] syscall_call+0x7/0xb
      Signed-off-by: NPatrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      99511014
  15. 14 2月, 2006 1 次提交
    • H
      [IPSEC]: Fix strange IPsec freeze. · 00de651d
      Herbert Xu 提交于
      Problem discovered and initial patch by Olaf Kirch:
      
      	there's a problem with IPsec that has been bugging some of our users
      	for the last couple of kernel revs. Every now and then, IPsec will
      	freeze the machine completely. This is with openswan user land,
      	and with kernels up to and including 2.6.16-rc2.
      
      	I managed to debug this a little, and what happens is that we end
      	up looping in xfrm_lookup, and never get out. With a bit of debug
      	printks added, I can this happening:
      
      		ip_route_output_flow calls xfrm_lookup
      
      		xfrm_find_bundle returns NULL (apparently we're in the
      			middle of negotiating a new SA or something)
      
      		We therefore call xfrm_tmpl_resolve. This returns EAGAIN
      			We go to sleep, waiting for a policy update.
      			Then we loop back to the top
      
      		Apparently, the dst_orig that was passed into xfrm_lookup
      			has been dropped from the routing table (obsolete=2)
      			This leads to the endless loop, because we now create
      			a new bundle, check the new bundle and find it's stale
      			(stale_bundle -> xfrm_bundle_ok -> dst_check() return 0)
      
      	People have been testing with the patch below, which seems to fix the
      	problem partially. They still see connection hangs however (things
      	only clear up when they start a new ping or new ssh). So the patch
      	is obvsiouly not sufficient, and something else seems to go wrong.
      
      	I'm grateful for any hints you may have...
      
      I suggest that we simply bail out always.  If the dst decides to die
      on us later on, the packet will be dropped anyway.  So there is no
      great urgency to retry here.  Once we have the proper resolution
      queueing, we can then do the retry again.
      Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      Acked-by: NOlaf Kirch <okir@suse.de>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      00de651d
  16. 08 2月, 2006 1 次提交
  17. 10 1月, 2006 1 次提交
  18. 08 1月, 2006 2 次提交