1. 02 7月, 2005 1 次提交
    • D
      AUDIT: Stop waiting for backlog after audit_panic() happens · ac4cec44
      David Woodhouse 提交于
      We force a rate-limit on auditable events by making them wait for space 
      on the backlog queue. However, if auditd really is AWOL then this could 
      potentially bring the entire system to a halt, depending on the audit 
      rules in effect.
      
      Firstly, make sure the wait time is honoured correctly -- it's the 
      maximum time the process should wait, rather than the time to wait 
      _each_ time round the loop. We were getting re-woken _each_ time a 
      packet was dequeued, and the timeout was being restarted each time.
      
      Secondly, reset the wait time after audit_panic() is called. In general 
      this will be reset to zero, to allow progress to be made. If the system
      is configured to _actually_ panic on audit_panic() then that will 
      already have happened; otherwise we know that audit records are being 
      lost anyway. 
      
      These two tunables can't be exposed via AUDIT_GET and AUDIT_SET because 
      those aren't particularly well-designed. It probably should have been 
      done by sysctls or sysfs anyway -- one for a later patch.
      Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
      ac4cec44
  2. 25 6月, 2005 1 次提交
  3. 24 6月, 2005 1 次提交
  4. 22 6月, 2005 3 次提交
  5. 21 6月, 2005 1 次提交
  6. 20 6月, 2005 2 次提交
  7. 24 5月, 2005 1 次提交
  8. 22 5月, 2005 1 次提交
  9. 21 5月, 2005 2 次提交
  10. 19 5月, 2005 3 次提交
    • D
      AUDIT: Honour audit_backlog_limit again. · fb19b4c6
      David Woodhouse 提交于
      The limit on the number of outstanding audit messages was inadvertently
      removed with the switch to queuing skbs directly for sending by a kernel
      thread. Put it back again.
      Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
      fb19b4c6
    • D
      AUDIT: Send netlink messages from a separate kernel thread · b7d11258
      David Woodhouse 提交于
      netlink_unicast() will attempt to reallocate and will free messages if
      the socket's rcvbuf limit is reached unless we give it an infinite 
      timeout. So do that, from a kernel thread which is dedicated to spewing
      stuff up the netlink socket.
      Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
      b7d11258
    • S
      AUDIT: Clean up logging of untrusted strings · 168b7173
      Steve Grubb 提交于
      * If vsnprintf returns -1, it will mess up the sk buffer space accounting. 
      This is fixed by not calling skb_put with bogus len values.
      
      * audit_log_hex was a loop that called audit_log_vformat with %02X for each 
      character. This is very inefficient since conversion from unsigned character 
      to Ascii representation is essentially masking, shifting, and byte lookups. 
      Also, the length of the converted string is well known - it's twice the 
      original. Fixed by rewriting the function.
      
      * audit_log_untrustedstring had no comments. This makes it hard for 
      someone to understand what the string format will be.
      
      * audit_log_d_path was never fixed to use untrustedstring. This could mess
      up user space parsers. This was fixed to make a temp buffer, call d_path, 
      and log temp buffer using untrustedstring. 
      
      From: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
      168b7173
  11. 18 5月, 2005 1 次提交
  12. 14 5月, 2005 3 次提交
  13. 13 5月, 2005 1 次提交
  14. 11 5月, 2005 7 次提交
  15. 06 5月, 2005 5 次提交
  16. 04 5月, 2005 1 次提交
    • H
      [NETLINK]: Synchronous message processing. · 2a0a6ebe
      Herbert Xu 提交于
      Let's recap the problem.  The current asynchronous netlink kernel
      message processing is vulnerable to these attacks:
      
      1) Hit and run: Attacker sends one or more messages and then exits
      before they're processed.  This may confuse/disable the next netlink
      user that gets the netlink address of the attacker since it may
      receive the responses to the attacker's messages.
      
      Proposed solutions:
      
      a) Synchronous processing.
      b) Stream mode socket.
      c) Restrict/prohibit binding.
      
      2) Starvation: Because various netlink rcv functions were written
      to not return until all messages have been processed on a socket,
      it is possible for these functions to execute for an arbitrarily
      long period of time.  If this is successfully exploited it could
      also be used to hold rtnl forever.
      
      Proposed solutions:
      
      a) Synchronous processing.
      b) Stream mode socket.
      
      Firstly let's cross off solution c).  It only solves the first
      problem and it has user-visible impacts.  In particular, it'll
      break user space applications that expect to bind or communicate
      with specific netlink addresses (pid's).
      
      So we're left with a choice of synchronous processing versus
      SOCK_STREAM for netlink.
      
      For the moment I'm sticking with the synchronous approach as
      suggested by Alexey since it's simpler and I'd rather spend
      my time working on other things.
      
      However, it does have a number of deficiencies compared to the
      stream mode solution:
      
      1) User-space to user-space netlink communication is still vulnerable.
      
      2) Inefficient use of resources.  This is especially true for rtnetlink
      since the lock is shared with other users such as networking drivers.
      The latter could hold the rtnl while communicating with hardware which
      causes the rtnetlink user to wait when it could be doing other things.
      
      3) It is still possible to DoS all netlink users by flooding the kernel
      netlink receive queue.  The attacker simply fills the receive socket
      with a single netlink message that fills up the entire queue.  The
      attacker then continues to call sendmsg with the same message in a loop.
      
      Point 3) can be countered by retransmissions in user-space code, however
      it is pretty messy.
      
      In light of these problems (in particular, point 3), we should implement
      stream mode netlink at some point.  In the mean time, here is a patch
      that implements synchronous processing.  
      Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      2a0a6ebe
  17. 03 5月, 2005 1 次提交
    • C
      [PATCH] add new audit data to last skb · 0dd8e06b
      Chris Wright 提交于
      When adding more formatted audit data to an skb for delivery to userspace,
      the kernel will attempt to reuse an skb that has spare room.  However, if
      the audit message has already been fragmented to multiple skb's, the search
      for spare room in the skb uses the head of the list.  This will corrupt the
      audit message with trailing bytes being placed midway through the stream.
      Fix is to look at the end of the list.
      Signed-off-by: NChris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
      0dd8e06b
  18. 30 4月, 2005 1 次提交
  19. 29 4月, 2005 4 次提交