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  1. 06 1月, 2014 1 次提交
  3. 05 1月, 2014 5 次提交
  5. 04 1月, 2014 12 次提交
    • S
      llc: make lock static · 5e419e68
      由 stephen hemminger 提交于 
      The llc_sap_list_lock does not need to be global, only acquired
in core.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      5e419e68
    • S
      socket: cleanups · 8f09898b
      由 stephen hemminger 提交于 
      Namespace related cleaning

 * make cred_to_ucred static
 * remove unused sock_rmalloc function
Signed-off-by: NStephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      8f09898b
    • T
      ipv4: Use percpu Cache route in IP tunnels · 9a4aa9af
      由 Tom Herbert 提交于 
      percpu route cache eliminates share of dst refcnt between CPUs.
Signed-off-by: NTom Herbert <therbert@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      9a4aa9af
    • T
      ipv4: Cache dst in tunnels · 7d442fab
      由 Tom Herbert 提交于 
      Avoid doing a route lookup on every packet being tunneled.

In ip_tunnel.c cache the route returned from ip_route_output if
the tunnel is "connected" so that all the rouitng parameters are
taken from tunnel parms for a packet. Specifically, not NBMA tunnel
and tos is from tunnel parms (not inner packet).
Signed-off-by: NTom Herbert <therbert@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      7d442fab
    • N
      sctp: Add process name and pid to deprecation warnings · f916ec96
      由 Neil Horman 提交于 
      Recently I updated the sctp socket option deprecation warnings to be both a bit
more clear and ratelimited to prevent user processes from spamming the log file.
Ben Hutchings suggested that I add the process name and pid to these warnings so
that users can tell who is responsible for using the deprecated apis.  This
patch accomplishes that.
Signed-off-by: NNeil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
CC: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      f916ec96
    • D
      netfilter: x_tables: lightweight process control group matching · 82a37132
      由 Daniel Borkmann 提交于 
      It would be useful e.g. in a server or desktop environment to have
a facility in the notion of fine-grained "per application" or "per
application group" firewall policies. Probably, users in the mobile,
embedded area (e.g. Android based) with different security policy
requirements for application groups could have great benefit from
that as well. For example, with a little bit of configuration effort,
an admin could whitelist well-known applications, and thus block
otherwise unwanted "hard-to-track" applications like [1] from a
user's machine. Blocking is just one example, but it is not limited
to that, meaning we can have much different scenarios/policies that
netfilter allows us than just blocking, e.g. fine grained settings
where applications are allowed to connect/send traffic to, application
traffic marking/conntracking, application-specific packet mangling,
and so on.

Implementation of PID-based matching would not be appropriate
as they frequently change, and child tracking would make that
even more complex and ugly. Cgroups would be a perfect candidate
for accomplishing that as they associate a set of tasks with a
set of parameters for one or more subsystems, in our case the
netfilter subsystem, which, of course, can be combined with other
cgroup subsystems into something more complex if needed.

As mentioned, to overcome this constraint, such processes could
be placed into one or multiple cgroups where different fine-grained
rules can be defined depending on the application scenario, while
e.g. everything else that is not part of that could be dropped (or
vice versa), thus making life harder for unwanted processes to
communicate to the outside world. So, we make use of cgroups here
to track jobs and limit their resources in terms of iptables
policies; in other words, limiting, tracking, etc what they are
allowed to communicate.

In our case we're working on outgoing traffic based on which local
socket that originated from. Also, one doesn't even need to have
an a-prio knowledge of the application internals regarding their
particular use of ports or protocols. Matching is *extremly*
lightweight as we just test for the sk_classid marker of sockets,
originating from net_cls. net_cls and netfilter do not contradict
each other; in fact, each construct can live as standalone or they
can be used in combination with each other, which is perfectly fine,
plus it serves Tejun's requirement to not introduce a new cgroups
subsystem. Through this, we result in a very minimal and efficient
module, and don't add anything except netfilter code.

One possible, minimal usage example (many other iptables options
can be applied obviously):

 1) Configuring cgroups if not already done, e.g.:

  mkdir /sys/fs/cgroup/net_cls
  mount -t cgroup -o net_cls net_cls /sys/fs/cgroup/net_cls
  mkdir /sys/fs/cgroup/net_cls/0
  echo 1 > /sys/fs/cgroup/net_cls/0/net_cls.classid
  (resp. a real flow handle id for tc)

 2) Configuring netfilter (iptables-nftables), e.g.:

  iptables -A OUTPUT -m cgroup ! --cgroup 1 -j DROP

 3) Running applications, e.g.:

  ping 208.67.222.222  <pid:1799>
  echo 1799 > /sys/fs/cgroup/net_cls/0/tasks
  64 bytes from 208.67.222.222: icmp_seq=44 ttl=49 time=11.9 ms
  [...]
  ping 208.67.220.220  <pid:1804>
  ping: sendmsg: Operation not permitted
  [...]
  echo 1804 > /sys/fs/cgroup/net_cls/0/tasks
  64 bytes from 208.67.220.220: icmp_seq=89 ttl=56 time=19.0 ms
  [...]

Of course, real-world deployments would make use of cgroups user
space toolsuite, or own custom policy daemons dynamically moving
applications from/to various cgroups.

  [1] http://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-europe-06/bh-eu-06-biondi/bh-eu-06-biondi-up.pdfSigned-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: cgroups@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: NLi Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
      82a37132
    • D
      net: netprio: rename config to be more consistent with cgroup configs · 86f8515f
      由 Daniel Borkmann 提交于 
      While we're at it and introduced CGROUP_NET_CLASSID, lets also make
NETPRIO_CGROUP more consistent with the rest of cgroups and rename it
into CONFIG_CGROUP_NET_PRIO so that for networking, we now have
CONFIG_CGROUP_NET_{PRIO,CLASSID}. This not only makes the CONFIG
option consistent among networking cgroups, but also among cgroups
CONFIG conventions in general as the vast majority has a prefix of
CONFIG_CGROUP_<SUBSYS>.
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
Cc: cgroups@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: NLi Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
      86f8515f
    • D
      net: net_cls: move cgroupfs classid handling into core · fe1217c4
      由 Daniel Borkmann 提交于 
      Zefan Li requested [1] to perform the following cleanup/refactoring:

- Split cgroupfs classid handling into net core to better express a
  possible more generic use.

- Disable module support for cgroupfs bits as the majority of other
  cgroupfs subsystems do not have that, and seems to be not wished
  from cgroup side. Zefan probably might want to follow-up for netprio
  later on.

- By this, code can be further reduced which previously took care of
  functionality built when compiled as module.

cgroupfs bits are being placed under net/core/netclassid_cgroup.c, so
that we are consistent with {netclassid,netprio}_cgroup naming that is
under net/core/ as suggested by Zefan.

No change in functionality, but only code refactoring that is being
done here.

 [1] http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/304825/Suggested-by: NLi Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
Cc: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Cc: cgroups@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: NLi Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: NPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
      fe1217c4
    • E
      netfilter: xt_CT: fix error value in xt_ct_tg_check() · 14abfa16
      由 Eric Leblond 提交于 
      If setting event mask fails then we were returning 0 for success.
This patch updates return code to -EINVAL in case of problem.
Signed-off-by: NEric Leblond <eric@regit.org>
Signed-off-by: NPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
      14abfa16
    • S
      netfilter: nf_conntrack: remove dead code · dcd93ed4
      由 stephen hemminger 提交于 
      The following code is not used in current upstream code.
Some of this seems to be old hooks, other might be used by some
out of tree module (which I don't care about breaking), and
the need_ipv4_conntrack was used by old NAT code but no longer
called.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Signed-off-by: NPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
      dcd93ed4
    • S
      netfilter: ipset: remove unused code · 02eca9d2
      由 stephen hemminger 提交于 
      Function never used in current upstream code.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Signed-off-by: NPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
      02eca9d2
    • D
      netfilter: nf_nat: add full port randomization support · 34ce3240
      由 Daniel Borkmann 提交于 
      We currently use prandom_u32() for allocation of ports in tcp bind(0)
and udp code. In case of plain SNAT we try to keep the ports as is
or increment on collision.

SNAT --random mode does use per-destination incrementing port
allocation. As a recent paper pointed out in [1] that this mode of
port allocation makes it possible to an attacker to find the randomly
allocated ports through a timing side-channel in a socket overloading
attack conducted through an off-path attacker.

So, NF_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_RANDOM actually weakens the port randomization
in regard to the attack described in this paper. As we need to keep
compatibility, add another flag called NF_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_RANDOM_FULLY
that would replace the NF_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_RANDOM hash-based port
selection algorithm with a simple prandom_u32() in order to mitigate
this attack vector. Note that the lfsr113's internal state is
periodically reseeded by the kernel through a local secure entropy
source.

More details can be found in [1], the basic idea is to send bursts
of packets to a socket to overflow its receive queue and measure
the latency to detect a possible retransmit when the port is found.
Because of increasing ports to given destination and port, further
allocations can be predicted. This information could then be used by
an attacker for e.g. for cache-poisoning, NS pinning, and degradation
of service attacks against DNS servers [1]:

  The best defense against the poisoning attacks is to properly
  deploy and validate DNSSEC; DNSSEC provides security not only
  against off-path attacker but even against MitM attacker. We hope
  that our results will help motivate administrators to adopt DNSSEC.
  However, full DNSSEC deployment make take significant time, and
  until that happens, we recommend short-term, non-cryptographic
  defenses. We recommend to support full port randomisation,
  according to practices recommended in [2], and to avoid
  per-destination sequential port allocation, which we show may be
  vulnerable to derandomisation attacks.

Joint work between Hannes Frederic Sowa and Daniel Borkmann.

 [1] https://sites.google.com/site/hayashulman/files/NIC-derandomisation.pdf
 [2] http://arxiv.org/pdf/1205.5190v1.pdfSigned-off-by: NHannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
      34ce3240
  7. 03 1月, 2014 1 次提交
    • C
      net: revert "sched classifier: make cgroup table local" · c1ddf295
      由 Cong Wang 提交于 
      This reverts commit de6fb288.
Otherwise we got:

net/sched/cls_cgroup.c:106:29: error: static declaration of ‘net_cls_subsys’ follows non-static declaration
 static struct cgroup_subsys net_cls_subsys = {
                             ^
In file included from include/linux/cgroup.h:654:0,
                 from net/sched/cls_cgroup.c:18:
include/linux/cgroup_subsys.h:35:29: note: previous declaration of ‘net_cls_subsys’ was here
 SUBSYS(net_cls)
                             ^
make[2]: *** [net/sched/cls_cgroup.o] Error 1

Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NCong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      c1ddf295
  9. 02 1月, 2014 11 次提交
  11. 01 1月, 2014 10 次提交