Opencode a cheasy approach with kevent. The idea here is that we'll
add some generic delayed work infrastructure, which probably wont be
based on pdflush (or maybe it will, in which case we can just add it
back).

This is in preparation for getting rid of pdflush completely.
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>

Chris says it's safe to kill.
Acked-by: NChris Mason <chris.mason@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>

The integrity bio allocation needs its own bio_set to avoid violating
the mempool allocation rules and risking deadlocks.
Signed-off-by: NMartin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>

If we don't have CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INTEGRITY set, then we don't have
any external dependencies on the bio_vec slabs. So don't create
the ones that we will inline anyway.
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>

this warning (which got fixed by commit b2bf9683):

  fs/bio.c: In function ‘bio_alloc_bioset’:
  fs/bio.c:305: warning: ‘p’ may be used uninitialized in this function

Triggered because the code flow in bio_alloc_bioset() is correct
but a bit complex for the compiler to see through.

Streamline it a bit - this also makes the code a tiny bit more compact:

   text	   data	    bss	    dec	    hex	filename
   7540	    256	     40	   7836	   1e9c	bio.o.before
   7539	    256	     40	   7835	   1e9b	bio.o.after

Also remove an older compiler-warnings annotation from this function,
it's not needed.
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>

Update all previous incarnations of my email address to the correct one.
Signed-off-by: NGertjan van Wingerde <gwingerde@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

If ecryptfs_encrypted_view or ecryptfs_xattr_metadata were being
specified as mount options, a NULL pointer dereference of crypt_stat
was possible during lookup.

This patch moves the crypt_stat assignment into
ecryptfs_lookup_and_interpose_lower(), ensuring that crypt_stat
will not be NULL before we attempt to dereference it.

Thanks to Dan Carpenter and his static analysis tool, smatch, for
finding this bug.
Signed-off-by: NTyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NDustin Kirkland <kirkland@canonical.com>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

When allocating the memory used to store the eCryptfs header contents, a
single, zeroed page was being allocated with get_zeroed_page().
However, the size of an eCryptfs header is either PAGE_CACHE_SIZE or
ECRYPTFS_MINIMUM_HEADER_EXTENT_SIZE (8192), whichever is larger, and is
stored in the file's private_data->crypt_stat->num_header_bytes_at_front
field.

ecryptfs_write_metadata_to_contents() was using
num_header_bytes_at_front to decide how many bytes should be written to
the lower filesystem for the file header.  Unfortunately, at least 8K
was being written from the page, despite the chance of the single,
zeroed page being smaller than 8K.  This resulted in random areas of
kernel memory being written between the 0x1000 and 0x1FFF bytes offsets
in the eCryptfs file headers if PAGE_SIZE was 4K.

This patch allocates a variable number of pages, calculated with
num_header_bytes_at_front, and passes the number of allocated pages
along to ecryptfs_write_metadata_to_contents().

Thanks to Florian Streibelt for reporting the data leak and working with
me to find the problem.  2.6.28 is the only kernel release with this
vulnerability.  Corresponds to CVE-2009-0787
Signed-off-by: NTyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NDustin Kirkland <kirkland@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: NEric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NEugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.sg>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Cc: dann frazier <dannf@dannf.org>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Florian Streibelt <florian@f-streibelt.de>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

The libaio test harness turned up a problem whereby lookup_ioctx on a
bogus io context was returning the 1 valid io context from the list
(harness/cases/3.p).

Because of that, an extra put_iocontext was done, and when the process
exited, it hit a BUG_ON in the put_iocontext macro called from exit_aio
(since we expect a users count of 1 and instead get 0).

The problem was introduced by "aio: make the lookup_ioctx() lockless"
(commit abf137dd).

Thanks to Zach for pointing out that hlist_for_each_entry_rcu will not
return with a NULL tpos at the end of the loop, even if the entry was
not found.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NZach Brown <zach.brown@oracle.com>
Acked-by: NJens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
Cc: Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Remove a source of fput() call from inside IRQ context.  Myself, like Eric,
wasn't able to reproduce an fput() call from IRQ context, but Jeff said he was
able to, with the attached test program.  Independently from this, the bug is
conceptually there, so we might be better off fixing it.  This patch adds an
optimization similar to the one we already do on ->ki_filp, on ->ki_eventfd.
Playing with ->f_count directly is not pretty in general, but the alternative
here would be to add a brand new delayed fput() infrastructure, that I'm not
sure is worth it.
Signed-off-by: NDavide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com>
Signed-off-by: NJeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Cc: Zach Brown <zach.brown@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Nick Piggin noticed this (very unlikely) race between setting a page
dirty and creating the buffers for it - we need to hold the mapping
private_lock until we've set the page dirty bit in order to make sure
that create_empty_buffers() might not build up a set of buffers without
the dirty bits set when the page is dirty.

I doubt anybody has ever hit this race (and it didn't solve the issue
Nick was looking at), but as Nick says: "Still, it does appear to solve
a real race, which we should close."
Acked-by: NNick Piggin <nickpiggin@yahoo.com.au>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Although this operation is unsupported by our implementation
we still need to provide an encode routine for it to
merely encode its (error) status back in the compound reply.

Thanks for Bill Baker at sun.com for testing with the Sun
OpenSolaris' client, finding, and reporting this bug at
Connectathon 2009.

This bug was introduced in 2.6.27
Signed-off-by: NBenny Halevy <bhalevy@panasas.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>

Commit ee6f779b ("filp->f_pos not
correctly updated in proc_task_readdir") changed the proc code to use
filp->f_pos directly, rather than through a temporary variable.  In the
process, that caused the operations to be done on the full 64 bits, even
though the offset is never that big.

That's all fine and dandy per se, but for some unfathomable reason gcc
generates absolutely horrid code when using 64-bit values in switch()
statements.  To the point of actually calling out to gcc helper
functions like __cmpdi2 rather than just doing the trivial comparisons
directly the way gcc does for normal compares.  At which point we get
link failures, because we really don't want to support that kind of
crazy code.

Fix this by just casting the f_pos value to "unsigned long", which
is plenty big enough for /proc, and avoids the gcc code generation issue.
Reported-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Zhang Le <r0bertz@gentoo.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

This is for Red Hat bug 490026: EXT4 panic, list corruption in
ext4_mb_new_inode_pa

ext4_lock_group(sb, group) is supposed to protect this list for
each group, and a common code flow to remove an album is like
this:

    ext4_get_group_no_and_offset(sb, pa->pa_pstart, &grp, NULL);
    ext4_lock_group(sb, grp);
    list_del(&pa->pa_group_list);
    ext4_unlock_group(sb, grp);

so it's critical that we get the right group number back for
this prealloc context, to lock the right group (the one 
associated with this pa) and prevent concurrent list manipulation.

however, ext4_mb_put_pa() passes in (pa->pa_pstart - 1) with a 
comment, "-1 is to protect from crossing allocation group".

This makes sense for the group_pa, where pa_pstart is advanced
by the length which has been used (in ext4_mb_release_context()),
and when the entire length has been used, pa_pstart has been
advanced to the first block of the next group.

However, for inode_pa, pa_pstart is never advanced; it's just
set once to the first block in the group and not moved after
that.  So in this case, if we subtract one in ext4_mb_put_pa(),
we are actually locking the *previous* group, and opening the
race with the other threads which do not subtract off the extra
block.
Signed-off-by: NEric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: N"Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>

filp->f_pos only get updated at the end of the function. Thus d_off of those
dirents who are in the middle will be 0, and this will cause a problem in
glibc's readdir implementation, specifically endless loop. Because when overflow
occurs, f_pos will be set to next dirent to read, however it will be 0, unless
the next one is the last one. So it will start over again and again.

There is a sample program in man 2 gendents. This is the output of the program
running on a multithread program's task dir before this patch is applied:

  $ ./a.out /proc/3807/task
  --------------- nread=128 ---------------
  i-node#  file type  d_reclen  d_off   d_name
    506442  directory    16          1  .
    506441  directory    16          0  ..
    506443  directory    16          0  3807
    506444  directory    16          0  3809
    506445  directory    16          0  3812
    506446  directory    16          0  3861
    506447  directory    16          0  3862
    506448  directory    16          8  3863

This is the output after this patch is applied

  $ ./a.out /proc/3807/task
  --------------- nread=128 ---------------
  i-node#  file type  d_reclen  d_off   d_name
    506442  directory    16          1  .
    506441  directory    16          2  ..
    506443  directory    16          3  3807
    506444  directory    16          4  3809
    506445  directory    16          5  3812
    506446  directory    16          6  3861
    506447  directory    16          7  3862
    506448  directory    16          8  3863
Signed-off-by: NZhang Le <r0bertz@gentoo.org>
Acked-by: NAl Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

If bio_integrity_clone() fails, bio_clone() returns NULL without freeing
the newly allocated bio.
Signed-off-by: NLi Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>

Stricter gfp_mask might be required for clone allocation.
For example, request-based dm may clone bio in interrupt context
so it has to use GFP_ATOMIC.
Signed-off-by: NKiyoshi Ueda <k-ueda@ct.jp.nec.com>
Signed-off-by: NJun'ichi Nomura <j-nomura@ce.jp.nec.com>
Acked-by: NMartin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Cc: Alasdair G Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>

eCryptfs has file encryption keys (FEK), file encryption key encryption
keys (FEKEK), and filename encryption keys (FNEK).  The per-file FEK is
encrypted with one or more FEKEKs and stored in the header of the
encrypted file.  I noticed that the FEK is also being encrypted by the
FNEK.  This is a problem if a user wants to use a different FNEK than
their FEKEK, as their file contents will still be accessible with the
FNEK.

This is a minimalistic patch which prevents the FNEKs signatures from
being copied to the inode signatures list.  Ultimately, it keeps the FEK
from being encrypted with a FNEK.
Signed-off-by: NTyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NDustin Kirkland <kirkland@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

When a ramfs nommu mapping is expanded, contiguous pages are allocated
and added to the pagecache.  The caller's reference is then passed on
by moving whole pagevecs to the file lru list.

If the page cache adding fails, make sure that the error path also
moves the pagevec contents which might still contain up to PAGEVEC_SIZE
successfully added pages, of which we would leak references otherwise.
Signed-off-by: NJohannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Enrik Berkhan <Enrik.Berkhan@ge.com>
Cc: Nick Piggin <nickpiggin@yahoo.com.au>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

The pages attached to a ramfs inode's pagecache by truncation from nothing
- as done by SYSV SHM for example - may get discarded under memory
pressure.

The problem is that the pages are not marked dirty.  Anything that creates
data in an MMU-based ramfs will cause the pages holding that data will
cause the set_page_dirty() aop to be called.

For the NOMMU-based mmap, set_page_dirty() may be called by write(), but
it won't be called by page-writing faults on writable mmaps, and it isn't
called by ramfs_nommu_expand_for_mapping() when a file is being truncated
from nothing to allocate a contiguous run.

The solution is to mark the pages dirty at the point of allocation by the
truncation code.
Signed-off-by: NEnrik Berkhan <Enrik.Berkhan@ge.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Nick Piggin <nickpiggin@yahoo.com.au>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Thiemo Nagel reported that:

# dd if=/dev/zero of=image.ext4 bs=1M count=2
# mkfs.ext4 -v -F -b 1024 -m 0 -g 512 -G 4 -I 128 -N 1 \
  -O large_file,dir_index,flex_bg,extent,sparse_super image.ext4
# mount -o loop image.ext4 mnt/
# dd if=/dev/zero of=mnt/file

oopsed, with a BUG_ON in ext4_mb_normalize_request because
size == EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP

It appears to me (esp. after talking to Andreas) that the BUG_ON
is bogus; a request of exactly EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP should
be allowed, though larger sizes do indicate a problem.

Fix that an another (apparently rare) codepath with a similar check.
Reported-by: NThiemo Nagel <thiemo.nagel@ph.tum.de>
Signed-off-by: NEric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: N"Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>

A long time ago, xs->base is allocated a 4K size and all the contents
in the bucket are copied to the it. Now we use ocfs2_xattr_bucket to
abstract xattr bucket and xs->base is initialized to the start of the
bu_bhs[0]. So xs->base + offset will overflow when the value root is
stored outside the first block.

Then why we can survive the xattr test by now? It is because we always
read the bucket contiguously now and kernel mm allocate continguous
memory for us. We are lucky, but we should fix it. So just get the
right value root as other callers do.
Signed-off-by: NTao Ma <tao.ma@oracle.com>
Acked-by: NJoel Becker <joel.becker@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NMark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.com>

We need to use le32_to_cpu to test rec->e_cpos in
ocfs2_dinode_insert_check.
Signed-off-by: NTao Ma <tao.ma@oracle.com>
Acked-by: NJoel Becker <joel.becker@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NMark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.com>

Replace max_inline_data with max_inline_data_with_xattr
to ensure it correct when xattr inlined.
Signed-off-by: NTiger Yang <tiger.yang@oracle.com>
Acked-by: NJoel Becker <joel.becker@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NMark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.com>

If this is a new directory with inline data, we choose to
reserve the entire inline area for directory contents and
force an external xattr block.
Signed-off-by: NTiger Yang <tiger.yang@oracle.com>
Acked-by: NJoel Becker <joel.becker@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NMark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.com>

There was a report of a data corruption
http://lkml.org/lkml/2008/11/14/121.  There is a script included to
reproduce the problem.

During testing, I encountered a number of strange things with ext3, so I
tried ext2 to attempt to reduce complexity of the problem.  I found that
fsstress would quickly hang in wait_on_inode, waiting for I_LOCK to be
cleared, even though instrumentation showed that unlock_new_inode had
already been called for that inode.  This points to memory scribble, or
synchronisation problme.

i_state of I_NEW inodes is not protected by inode_lock because other
processes are not supposed to touch them until I_LOCK (and I_NEW) is
cleared.  Adding WARN_ON(inode->i_state & I_NEW) to sites where we modify
i_state revealed that generic_sync_sb_inodes is picking up new inodes from
the inode lists and passing them to __writeback_single_inode without
waiting for I_NEW.  Subsequently modifying i_state causes corruption.  In
my case it would look like this:

CPU0                            CPU1
unlock_new_inode()              __sync_single_inode()
 reg <- inode->i_state
 reg -> reg & ~(I_LOCK|I_NEW)   reg <- inode->i_state
 reg -> inode->i_state          reg -> reg | I_SYNC
                                reg -> inode->i_state

Non-atomic RMW on CPU1 overwrites CPU0 store and sets I_LOCK|I_NEW again.

Fix for this is rather than wait for I_NEW inodes, just skip over them:
inodes concurrently being created are not subject to data integrity
operations, and should not significantly contribute to dirty memory
either.

After this change, I'm unable to reproduce any of the added warnings or
hangs after ~1hour of running.  Previously, the new warnings would start
immediately and hang would happen in under 5 minutes.

I'm also testing on ext3 now, and so far no problems there either.  I
don't know whether this fixes the problem reported above, but it fixes a
real problem for me.

Cc: "Jorge Boncompte [DTI2]" <jorge@dti2.net>
Reported-by: NAdrian Hunter <ext-adrian.hunter@nokia.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NNick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

In sget(), destroy_super(s) is called with s->s_umount held, which makes
lockdep unhappy.
Signed-off-by: NLi Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Acked-by: NPeter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

If the second fasync_helper() fails, pipe_rdwr_fasync() returns the error
but leaves the file on ->fasync_readers.

This was always wrong, but since 233e70f4
"saner FASYNC handling on file close" we have the new problem.  Because in
this case setfl() doesn't set FASYNC bit, __fput() will not do
->fasync(0), and we leak fasync_struct with ->fa_file pointing to the
freed file.
Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Stephen Rothwell reports:

Today's linux-next build (powerpc ppc64_defconfig) failed like this:

fs/built-in.o: In function `.nfs_get_client':
client.c:(.text+0x115010): undefined reference to `.__ipv6_addr_type'

Fix by moving the IPV6 specific parts of commit
d7371c41 ("Bug 11061, NFS mounts dropped")
into the '#ifdef IPV6..." section.

Also fix up a couple of formatting issues.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

This is a short-term warning, and even printk_ratelimit() can result
in too much noise in system logs.  So only print it once as a warning.
Signed-off-by: N"Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>

The corrupted filesystem patch added a check against zlib trying to
output too much data in the presence of data corruption.  This check
triggered if zlib_inflate asked to be called again (Z_OK) with
avail_out == 0 and no more output buffers available.  This check proves
to be rather dumb, as it incorrectly catches the case where zlib has
generated all the output, but there are still input bytes to be processed.

This patch does a number of things.  It removes the original check and
replaces it with code to not move to the next output buffer if there
are no more output buffers available, relying on zlib to error if it
wants an extra output buffer in the case of data corruption.  It
also replaces the Z_NO_FLUSH flag with the more correct Z_SYNC_FLUSH
flag, and makes the error messages more understandable to
non-technical users.
Signed-off-by: NPhillip Lougher <phillip@lougher.demon.co.uk>
Reported-by: NStefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.L-H@gmx.de>

On swapon() path, it has already i_mutex. So, this uses i_alloc_sem
instead of it.
Signed-off-by: NOGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp>
Reported-by: NLaurent GUERBY <laurent@guerby.net>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Fix kpf_copy_bit(src,dst) to be kpf_copy_bit(dst,src) to match the
actual call patterns, e.g. kpf_copy_bit(kflags, KPF_LOCKED, PG_locked).

This misplacement of src/dst only affected reporting of PG_writeback,
PG_reclaim and PG_buddy. For others kflags==uflags so not affected.
Signed-off-by: NWu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: NKOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Addresses: http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11061

sockaddr structures can't be reliably compared using memcmp() because
there are padding bytes in the structure which can't be guaranteed to
be the same even when the sockaddr structures refer to the same
socket. Instead compare all the relevant fields. In the case of IPv6
sin6_flowinfo is not compared because it only affects QoS and
sin6_scope_id is only compared if the address is "link local" because
"link local" addresses need only be unique to a specific link.
Signed-off-by: NIan Dall <ian@beware.dropbear.id.au>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Hi Trond,

I have been looking at a bugreport where trying to open applications on KDE
on a NFS mounted home fails temporarily. There have been multiple reports on
different kernel versions pointing to this common issue:
http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12557
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/linux/+bug/269954
http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=508866.html

This issue can be reproducible consistently by doing this on a NFS mounted
home (KDE):
1. Open 2 xterm sessions
2. From one of the xterm session, do "ssh -X <remote host>"
3. "stat ~/.Xauthority" on the remote SSH session
4. Close the two xterm sessions
5. On the server do a "stat ~/.Xauthority"
6. Now on the client, try to open xterm
This will fail.

Even if the filehandle had become stale, the NFS client should invalidate
the cache/inode and should repeat LOOKUP. Looking at the packet capture when
the failure occurs shows that there were two subsequent ACCESS() calls with
the same filehandle and both fails with -ESTALE error.

I have tested the fix below. Now the client issue a LOOKUP after the
ACCESS() call fails with -ESTALE. If all this makes sense to you, can you
consider this for inclusion?

Thanks,


If the server returns an -ESTALE error due to stale filehandle in response to
an ACCESS() call, we need to invalidate the cache and inode so that LOOKUP()
can be retried. Without this change, the nfs client retries ACCESS() with the
same filehandle, fails again and could lead to temporary failure of
applications running on nfs mounted home.
Signed-off-by: NSuresh Jayaraman <sjayaraman@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

The NFS mount command may pass an AF_INET server address to lockd.  If
lockd happens to be using a PF_INET6 listener, the nlm_cmp_addr() in
nlmclnt_grant() will fail to match requests from that host because they
will all have a mapped IPv4 AF_INET6 address.

Adopt the same solution used in nfs_sockaddr_match_ipaddr() for NFSv4
callbacks: if either address is AF_INET, map it to an AF_INET6 address
before doing the comparison.
Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Fix a memory leak due to allocation in the XDR layer. In cases where the
RPC call needs to be retransmitted, we end up allocating new pages without
clearing the old ones. Fix this by moving the allocation into
nfs3_proc_setacls().

Also fix an issue discovered by Kevin Rudd, whereby the amount of memory
reserved for the acls in the xdr_buf->head was miscalculated, and causing
corruption.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

The changeset ea31a443 (nfs: Fix
misparsing of nfsv4 fs_locations attribute) causes the mountpath that is
calculated at the beginning of try_location() to be clobbered when we
later strncpy a non-nul terminated hostname using an incorrect buffer
length.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Very annoying when working with containters.
Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

The ext4_ext_search_right() function is confusing; it uses a
"depth" variable which is 0 at the root and maximum at the leaves, 
but the on-disk metadata uses a "depth" (actually eh_depth) which
is opposite: maximum at the root, and 0 at the leaves.

The ext4_ext_check_header() function is given a depth and checks
the header agaisnt that depth; it expects the on-disk semantics,
but we are giving it the opposite in the while loop in this 
function.  We should be giving it the on-disk notion of "depth"
which we can get from (p_depth - depth) - and if you look, the last
(more commonly hit) call to ext4_ext_check_header() does just this.

Sending in the wrong depth results in (incorrect) messages
about corruption:

EXT4-fs error (device sdb1): ext4_ext_search_right: bad header
in inode #2621457: unexpected eh_depth - magic f30a, entries 340,
max 340(0), depth 1(2)

http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12821Reported-by: NDavid Dindorp <ddi@dubex.dk>
Signed-off-by: NEric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: N"Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>