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  1. 22 6月, 2009 3 次提交
    • T
      x86: rename remap percpu first chunk allocator to lpage · 97c9bf06
      由 Tejun Heo 提交于 
      The "remap" allocator remaps large pages to build the first chunk;
however, the name isn't very good because 4k allocator remaps too and
the whole point of the remap allocator is using large page mapping.
The allocator will be generalized and exported outside of x86, rename
it to lpage before that happens.

percpu_alloc kernel parameter is updated to accept both "remap" and
"lpage" for lpage allocator.

[ Impact: code cleanup, kernel parameter argument updated ]
Signed-off-by: NTejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
      97c9bf06
    • T
      x86: fix duplicate free in setup_pcpu_remap() failure path · c5806df9
      由 Tejun Heo 提交于 
      In the failure path, setup_pcpu_remap() tries to free the area which
has already been freed to make holes in the large page.  Fix it.

[ Impact: fix duplicate free in failure path ]
Signed-off-by: NTejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
      c5806df9
    • L
      Move FAULT_FLAG_xyz into handle_mm_fault() callers · d06063cc
      由 Linus Torvalds 提交于 
      This allows the callers to now pass down the full set of FAULT_FLAG_xyz
flags to handle_mm_fault().  All callers have been (mechanically)
converted to the new calling convention, there's almost certainly room
for architectures to clean up their code and then add FAULT_FLAG_RETRY
when that support is added.
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      d06063cc
  3. 21 6月, 2009 2 次提交
    • L
      x86, 64-bit: Clean up user address masking · 9063c61f
      由 Linus Torvalds 提交于 
      The discussion about using "access_ok()" in get_user_pages_fast() (see
commit 7f818906: "x86: don't use
'access_ok()' as a range check in get_user_pages_fast()" for details and
end result), made us notice that x86-64 was really being very sloppy
about virtual address checking.

So be way more careful and straightforward about masking x86-64 virtual
addresses:

 - All the VIRTUAL_MASK* variants now cover half of the address
   space, it's not like we can use the full mask on a signed
   integer, and the larger mask just invites mistakes when
   applying it to either half of the 48-bit address space.

 - /proc/kcore's kc_offset_to_vaddr() becomes a lot more
   obvious when it transforms a file offset into a
   (kernel-half) virtual address.

 - Unify/simplify the 32-bit and 64-bit USER_DS definition to
   be based on TASK_SIZE_MAX.

This cleanup and more careful/obvious user virtual address checking also
uncovered a buglet in the x86-64 implementation of strnlen_user(): it
would do an "access_ok()" check on the whole potential area, even if the
string itself was much shorter, and thus return an error even for valid
strings. Our sloppy checking had hidden this.

So this fixes 'strnlen_user()' to do this properly, the same way we
already handled user strings in 'strncpy_from_user()'.  Namely by just
checking the first byte, and then relying on fault handling for the
rest.  That always works, since we impose a guard page that cannot be
mapped at the end of the user space address space (and even if we
didn't, we'd have the address space hole).
Acked-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh.dickins@tiscali.co.uk>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      9063c61f
    • L
      x86: don't use 'access_ok()' as a range check in get_user_pages_fast() · 7f818906
      由 Linus Torvalds 提交于 
      It's really not right to use 'access_ok()', since that is meant for the
normal "get_user()" and "copy_from/to_user()" accesses, which are done
through the TLB, rather than through the page tables.

Why? access_ok() does both too few, and too many checks.  Too many,
because it is meant for regular kernel accesses that will not honor the
'user' bit in the page tables, and because it honors the USER_DS vs
KERNEL_DS distinction that we shouldn't care about in GUP.  And too few,
because it doesn't do the 'canonical' check on the address on x86-64,
since the TLB will do that for us.

So instead of using a function that isn't meant for this, and does
something else and much more complicated, just do the real rules: we
don't want the range to overflow, and on x86-64, we want it to be a
canonical low address (on 32-bit, all addresses are canonical).
Acked-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      7f818906
  5. 20 6月, 2009 3 次提交
  7. 19 6月, 2009 29 次提交
  9. 18 6月, 2009 3 次提交