1. 08 7月, 2017 1 次提交
    • T
      arm/syscalls: Check address limit on user-mode return · 73ac5d6a
      Thomas Garnier 提交于
      Ensure the address limit is a user-mode segment before returning to
      user-mode. Otherwise a process can corrupt kernel-mode memory and
      elevate privileges [1].
      
      The set_fs function sets the TIF_SETFS flag to force a slow path on
      return. In the slow path, the address limit is checked to be USER_DS if
      needed.
      
      The TIF_SETFS flag is added to _TIF_WORK_MASK shifting _TIF_SYSCALL_WORK
      for arm instruction immediate support. The global work mask is too big
      to used on a single instruction so adapt ret_fast_syscall.
      
      [1] https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=990Signed-off-by: NThomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
      Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
      Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
      Cc: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
      Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com>
      Cc: Pratyush Anand <panand@redhat.com>
      Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
      Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
      Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
      Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
      Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
      Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
      Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
      Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170615011203.144108-2-thgarnie@google.com
      73ac5d6a
  2. 17 9月, 2015 1 次提交
  3. 16 9月, 2015 1 次提交
  4. 25 8月, 2015 1 次提交
  5. 13 4月, 2015 1 次提交
  6. 13 2月, 2015 1 次提交
    • A
      all arches, signal: move restart_block to struct task_struct · f56141e3
      Andy Lutomirski 提交于
      If an attacker can cause a controlled kernel stack overflow, overwriting
      the restart block is a very juicy exploit target.  This is because the
      restart_block is held in the same memory allocation as the kernel stack.
      
      Moving the restart block to struct task_struct prevents this exploit by
      making the restart_block harder to locate.
      
      Note that there are other fields in thread_info that are also easy
      targets, at least on some architectures.
      
      It's also a decent simplification, since the restart code is more or less
      identical on all architectures.
      
      [james.hogan@imgtec.com: metag: align thread_info::supervisor_stack]
      Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      Acked-by: NRichard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
      Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
      Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
      Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
      Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
      Cc: Russell King <rmk@arm.linux.org.uk>
      Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
      Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Cc: Haavard Skinnemoen <hskinnemoen@gmail.com>
      Cc: Hans-Christian Egtvedt <egtvedt@samfundet.no>
      Cc: Steven Miao <realmz6@gmail.com>
      Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
      Cc: Aurelien Jacquiot <a-jacquiot@ti.com>
      Cc: Mikael Starvik <starvik@axis.com>
      Cc: Jesper Nilsson <jesper.nilsson@axis.com>
      Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      Cc: Richard Kuo <rkuo@codeaurora.org>
      Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
      Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
      Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu>
      Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
      Cc: Jonas Bonn <jonas@southpole.se>
      Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@parisc-linux.org>
      Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
      Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
      Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
      Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> (powerpc)
      Tested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> (powerpc)
      Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
      Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
      Cc: Chen Liqin <liqin.linux@gmail.com>
      Cc: Lennox Wu <lennox.wu@gmail.com>
      Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com>
      Cc: Guan Xuetao <gxt@mprc.pku.edu.cn>
      Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
      Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
      Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
      Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
      Signed-off-by: NJames Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      f56141e3
  7. 18 11月, 2014 1 次提交
  8. 19 3月, 2014 1 次提交
  9. 07 11月, 2013 1 次提交
  10. 20 10月, 2013 1 次提交
  11. 03 8月, 2013 2 次提交
  12. 01 8月, 2013 1 次提交
    • R
      ARM: move signal handlers into a vdso-like page · 48be69a0
      Russell King 提交于
      Move the signal handlers into a VDSO page rather than keeping them in
      the vectors page.  This allows us to place them randomly within this
      page, and also map the page at a random location within userspace
      further protecting these code fragments from ROP attacks.  The new
      VDSO page is also poisoned in the same way as the vector page.
      Signed-off-by: NRussell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
      48be69a0
  13. 17 6月, 2013 1 次提交
    • J
      ARM: mpu: protect the vectors page with an MPU region · 9dfc28b6
      Jonathan Austin 提交于
      Without an MMU it is possible for userspace programs to start executing code
      in places that they have no business executing. The MPU allows some level of
      protection against this.
      
      This patch protects the vectors page from access by userspace processes.
      Userspace tasks that dereference a null pointer are already protected by an
      svc at 0x0 that kills them. However when tasks use an offset from a null
      pointer (eg a function in a null struct) they miss this carefully placed svc
      and enter the exception vectors in user mode, ending up in the kernel.
      
      This patch causes programs that do this to receive a SEGV instead of happily
      entering the kernel in user-mode, and hence avoid a 'Bad Mode' panic.
      
      As part of this change it is necessary to make sigreturn happen via the
      stack when there is not an sa_restorer function. This change is invisible to
      userspace, and irrelevant to code compiled using a uClibc toolchain, which
      always uses an sa_restorer function.
      
      Because we don't get to remap the vectors in !MMU kuser_helpers are not
      in a defined location, and hence aren't usable. This means we don't need to
      worry about keeping them accessible from PL0
      Signed-off-by: NJonathan Austin <jonathan.austin@arm.com>
      Reviewed-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      CC: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>
      CC: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
      9dfc28b6
  14. 14 2月, 2013 1 次提交
  15. 04 2月, 2013 3 次提交
  16. 01 10月, 2012 1 次提交
  17. 28 7月, 2012 5 次提交
  18. 05 7月, 2012 2 次提交
  19. 02 6月, 2012 5 次提交
  20. 24 5月, 2012 1 次提交
  21. 22 5月, 2012 7 次提交
  22. 26 4月, 2012 1 次提交