1. 11 9月, 2014 1 次提交
  2. 06 9月, 2014 1 次提交
  3. 05 9月, 2014 1 次提交
    • F
      nohz: Restore NMI safe local irq work for local nohz kick · 40bea039
      Frederic Weisbecker 提交于
      The local nohz kick is currently used by perf which needs it to be
      NMI-safe. Recent commit though (7d1311b9)
      changed its implementation to fire the local kick using the remote kick
      API. It was convenient to make the code more generic but the remote kick
      isn't NMI-safe.
      
      As a result:
      
      	WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 18062 at kernel/irq_work.c:72 irq_work_queue_on+0x11e/0x140()
      	CPU: 3 PID: 18062 Comm: trinity-subchil Not tainted 3.16.0+ #34
      	0000000000000009 00000000903774d1 ffff880244e06c00 ffffffff9a7f1e37
      	0000000000000000 ffff880244e06c38 ffffffff9a0791dd ffff880244fce180
      	0000000000000003 ffff880244e06d58 ffff880244e06ef8 0000000000000000
      	Call Trace:
      	<NMI>  [<ffffffff9a7f1e37>] dump_stack+0x4e/0x7a
      	[<ffffffff9a0791dd>] warn_slowpath_common+0x7d/0xa0
      	[<ffffffff9a07930a>] warn_slowpath_null+0x1a/0x20
      	[<ffffffff9a17ca1e>] irq_work_queue_on+0x11e/0x140
      	[<ffffffff9a10a2c7>] tick_nohz_full_kick_cpu+0x57/0x90
      	[<ffffffff9a186cd5>] __perf_event_overflow+0x275/0x350
      	[<ffffffff9a184f80>] ? perf_event_task_disable+0xa0/0xa0
      	[<ffffffff9a01a4cf>] ? x86_perf_event_set_period+0xbf/0x150
      	[<ffffffff9a187934>] perf_event_overflow+0x14/0x20
      	[<ffffffff9a020386>] intel_pmu_handle_irq+0x206/0x410
      	[<ffffffff9a0b54d3>] ? arch_vtime_task_switch+0x63/0x130
      	[<ffffffff9a01937b>] perf_event_nmi_handler+0x2b/0x50
      	[<ffffffff9a007b72>] nmi_handle+0xd2/0x390
      	[<ffffffff9a007aa5>] ? nmi_handle+0x5/0x390
      	[<ffffffff9a0d131b>] ? lock_release+0xab/0x330
      	[<ffffffff9a008062>] default_do_nmi+0x72/0x1c0
      	[<ffffffff9a0c925f>] ? cpuacct_account_field+0xcf/0x200
      	[<ffffffff9a008268>] do_nmi+0xb8/0x100
      
      Lets fix this by restoring the use of local irq work for the nohz local
      kick.
      Reported-by: NCatalin Iacob <iacobcatalin@gmail.com>
      Reported-and-tested-by: NDave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Signed-off-by: NFrederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
      40bea039
  4. 03 9月, 2014 2 次提交
    • G
    • J
      Revert "leds: convert blink timer to workqueue" · 9067359f
      Jiri Kosina 提交于
      This reverts commit 8b37e1be.
      
      It's broken as it changes led_blink_set() in a way that it can now sleep
      (while synchronously waiting for workqueue to be cancelled). That's a
      problem, because it's possible that this function gets called from atomic
      context (tpt_trig_timer() takes a readlock and thus disables preemption).
      
      This has been brought up 3 weeks ago already [1] but no proper fix has
      materialized, and I keep seeing the problem since 3.17-rc1.
      
      [1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2014/8/16/128
      
       BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/workqueue.c:2650
       in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 2335, name: wpa_supplicant
       5 locks held by wpa_supplicant/2335:
        #0:  (rtnl_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff814c7c92>] rtnl_lock+0x12/0x20
        #1:  (&wdev->mtx){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffc06e649c>] cfg80211_mgd_wext_siwessid+0x5c/0x180 [cfg80211]
        #2:  (&local->mtx){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffc0817dea>] ieee80211_prep_connection+0x17a/0x9a0 [mac80211]
        #3:  (&local->chanctx_mtx){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffc08081ed>] ieee80211_vif_use_channel+0x5d/0x2a0 [mac80211]
        #4:  (&trig->leddev_list_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffffc081e68c>] tpt_trig_timer+0xec/0x170 [mac80211]
       CPU: 0 PID: 2335 Comm: wpa_supplicant Not tainted 3.17.0-rc3 #1
       Hardware name: LENOVO 7470BN2/7470BN2, BIOS 6DET38WW (2.02 ) 12/19/2008
        ffff8800360b5a50 ffff8800751f76d8 ffffffff8159e97f ffff8800360b5a30
        ffff8800751f76e8 ffffffff810739a5 ffff8800751f77b0 ffffffff8106862f
        ffffffff810685d0 0aa2209200000000 ffff880000000004 ffff8800361c59d0
       Call Trace:
        [<ffffffff8159e97f>] dump_stack+0x4d/0x66
        [<ffffffff810739a5>] __might_sleep+0xe5/0x120
        [<ffffffff8106862f>] flush_work+0x5f/0x270
        [<ffffffff810685d0>] ? mod_delayed_work_on+0x80/0x80
        [<ffffffff810945ca>] ? mark_held_locks+0x6a/0x90
        [<ffffffff81068a5f>] ? __cancel_work_timer+0x6f/0x100
        [<ffffffff810946ed>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0xfd/0x1c0
        [<ffffffff81068a6b>] __cancel_work_timer+0x7b/0x100
        [<ffffffff81068b0e>] cancel_delayed_work_sync+0xe/0x10
        [<ffffffff8147cf3b>] led_blink_set+0x1b/0x40
        [<ffffffffc081e6b0>] tpt_trig_timer+0x110/0x170 [mac80211]
        [<ffffffffc081ecdd>] ieee80211_mod_tpt_led_trig+0x9d/0x160 [mac80211]
        [<ffffffffc07e4278>] __ieee80211_recalc_idle+0x98/0x140 [mac80211]
        [<ffffffffc07e59ce>] ieee80211_idle_off+0xe/0x10 [mac80211]
        [<ffffffffc0804e5b>] ieee80211_add_chanctx+0x3b/0x220 [mac80211]
        [<ffffffffc08062e4>] ieee80211_new_chanctx+0x44/0xf0 [mac80211]
        [<ffffffffc080838a>] ieee80211_vif_use_channel+0x1fa/0x2a0 [mac80211]
        [<ffffffffc0817df8>] ieee80211_prep_connection+0x188/0x9a0 [mac80211]
        [<ffffffffc081c246>] ieee80211_mgd_auth+0x256/0x2e0 [mac80211]
        [<ffffffffc07eab33>] ieee80211_auth+0x13/0x20 [mac80211]
        [<ffffffffc06cb006>] cfg80211_mlme_auth+0x106/0x270 [cfg80211]
        [<ffffffffc06ce085>] cfg80211_conn_do_work+0x155/0x3b0 [cfg80211]
        [<ffffffffc06cf670>] cfg80211_connect+0x3f0/0x540 [cfg80211]
        [<ffffffffc06e6148>] cfg80211_mgd_wext_connect+0x158/0x1f0 [cfg80211]
        [<ffffffffc06e651e>] cfg80211_mgd_wext_siwessid+0xde/0x180 [cfg80211]
        [<ffffffffc06e36c0>] ? cfg80211_wext_giwessid+0x50/0x50 [cfg80211]
        [<ffffffffc06e36dd>] cfg80211_wext_siwessid+0x1d/0x40 [cfg80211]
        [<ffffffff81584d0c>] ioctl_standard_iw_point+0x14c/0x3e0
        [<ffffffff810946ed>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0xfd/0x1c0
        [<ffffffff8158502a>] ioctl_standard_call+0x8a/0xd0
        [<ffffffff81584fa0>] ? ioctl_standard_iw_point+0x3e0/0x3e0
        [<ffffffff81584b76>] wireless_process_ioctl.constprop.10+0xb6/0x100
        [<ffffffff8158521d>] wext_handle_ioctl+0x5d/0xb0
        [<ffffffff814cfb29>] dev_ioctl+0x329/0x620
        [<ffffffff810946ed>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0xfd/0x1c0
        [<ffffffff8149c7f2>] sock_ioctl+0x142/0x2e0
        [<ffffffff811b0140>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x300/0x520
        [<ffffffff815a67fb>] ? sysret_check+0x1b/0x56
        [<ffffffff810946ed>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0xfd/0x1c0
        [<ffffffff811b03e1>] SyS_ioctl+0x81/0xa0
        [<ffffffff815a67d6>] system_call_fastpath+0x1a/0x1f
       wlan0: send auth to 00:0b:6b:3c:8c:e4 (try 1/3)
       wlan0: authenticated
       wlan0: associate with 00:0b:6b:3c:8c:e4 (try 1/3)
       wlan0: RX AssocResp from 00:0b:6b:3c:8c:e4 (capab=0x431 status=0 aid=2)
       wlan0: associated
       IPv6: ADDRCONF(NETDEV_CHANGE): wlan0: link becomes ready
       cfg80211: Calling CRDA for country: NA
       wlan0: Limiting TX power to 27 (27 - 0) dBm as advertised by 00:0b:6b:3c:8c:e4
      
       =================================
       [ INFO: inconsistent lock state ]
       3.17.0-rc3 #1 Not tainted
       ---------------------------------
       inconsistent {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} -> {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} usage.
       swapper/0/0 [HC0[0]:SC1[1]:HE1:SE0] takes:
        ((&(&led_cdev->blink_work)->work)){+.?...}, at: [<ffffffff810685d0>] flush_work+0x0/0x270
       {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} state was registered at:
         [<ffffffff81094dbe>] __lock_acquire+0x30e/0x1a30
         [<ffffffff81096c81>] lock_acquire+0x91/0x110
         [<ffffffff81068608>] flush_work+0x38/0x270
         [<ffffffff81068a6b>] __cancel_work_timer+0x7b/0x100
         [<ffffffff81068b0e>] cancel_delayed_work_sync+0xe/0x10
         [<ffffffff8147cf3b>] led_blink_set+0x1b/0x40
         [<ffffffffc081e6b0>] tpt_trig_timer+0x110/0x170 [mac80211]
         [<ffffffffc081ecdd>] ieee80211_mod_tpt_led_trig+0x9d/0x160 [mac80211]
         [<ffffffffc07e4278>] __ieee80211_recalc_idle+0x98/0x140 [mac80211]
         [<ffffffffc07e59ce>] ieee80211_idle_off+0xe/0x10 [mac80211]
         [<ffffffffc0804e5b>] ieee80211_add_chanctx+0x3b/0x220 [mac80211]
         [<ffffffffc08062e4>] ieee80211_new_chanctx+0x44/0xf0 [mac80211]
         [<ffffffffc080838a>] ieee80211_vif_use_channel+0x1fa/0x2a0 [mac80211]
         [<ffffffffc0817df8>] ieee80211_prep_connection+0x188/0x9a0 [mac80211]
         [<ffffffffc081c246>] ieee80211_mgd_auth+0x256/0x2e0 [mac80211]
         [<ffffffffc07eab33>] ieee80211_auth+0x13/0x20 [mac80211]
         [<ffffffffc06cb006>] cfg80211_mlme_auth+0x106/0x270 [cfg80211]
         [<ffffffffc06ce085>] cfg80211_conn_do_work+0x155/0x3b0 [cfg80211]
         [<ffffffffc06cf670>] cfg80211_connect+0x3f0/0x540 [cfg80211]
         [<ffffffffc06e6148>] cfg80211_mgd_wext_connect+0x158/0x1f0 [cfg80211]
         [<ffffffffc06e651e>] cfg80211_mgd_wext_siwessid+0xde/0x180 [cfg80211]
         [<ffffffffc06e36dd>] cfg80211_wext_siwessid+0x1d/0x40 [cfg80211]
         [<ffffffff81584d0c>] ioctl_standard_iw_point+0x14c/0x3e0
         [<ffffffff8158502a>] ioctl_standard_call+0x8a/0xd0
         [<ffffffff81584b76>] wireless_process_ioctl.constprop.10+0xb6/0x100
         [<ffffffff8158521d>] wext_handle_ioctl+0x5d/0xb0
         [<ffffffff814cfb29>] dev_ioctl+0x329/0x620
         [<ffffffff8149c7f2>] sock_ioctl+0x142/0x2e0
         [<ffffffff811b0140>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x300/0x520
         [<ffffffff811b03e1>] SyS_ioctl+0x81/0xa0
         [<ffffffff815a67d6>] system_call_fastpath+0x1a/0x1f
       irq event stamp: 493416
       hardirqs last  enabled at (493416): [<ffffffff81068a5f>] __cancel_work_timer+0x6f/0x100
       hardirqs last disabled at (493415): [<ffffffff81067e9f>] try_to_grab_pending+0x1f/0x160
       softirqs last  enabled at (493408): [<ffffffff81053ced>] _local_bh_enable+0x1d/0x50
       softirqs last disabled at (493409): [<ffffffff81054c75>] irq_exit+0xa5/0xb0
      
       other info that might help us debug this:
        Possible unsafe locking scenario:
      
              CPU0
              ----
         lock((&(&led_cdev->blink_work)->work));
         <Interrupt>
           lock((&(&led_cdev->blink_work)->work));
      
        *** DEADLOCK ***
      
       2 locks held by swapper/0/0:
        #0:  (((&tpt_trig->timer))){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff810b4c50>] call_timer_fn+0x0/0x180
        #1:  (&trig->leddev_list_lock){.+.?..}, at: [<ffffffffc081e68c>] tpt_trig_timer+0xec/0x170 [mac80211]
      
       stack backtrace:
       CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 3.17.0-rc3 #1
       Hardware name: LENOVO 7470BN2/7470BN2, BIOS 6DET38WW (2.02 ) 12/19/2008
        ffffffff8246eb30 ffff88007c203b00 ffffffff8159e97f ffffffff81a194c0
        ffff88007c203b50 ffffffff81599c29 0000000000000001 ffffffff00000001
        ffff880000000000 0000000000000006 ffffffff81a194c0 ffffffff81093ad0
       Call Trace:
        <IRQ>  [<ffffffff8159e97f>] dump_stack+0x4d/0x66
        [<ffffffff81599c29>] print_usage_bug+0x1f4/0x205
        [<ffffffff81093ad0>] ? check_usage_backwards+0x140/0x140
        [<ffffffff810944d3>] mark_lock+0x223/0x2b0
        [<ffffffff81094d60>] __lock_acquire+0x2b0/0x1a30
        [<ffffffff81096c81>] lock_acquire+0x91/0x110
        [<ffffffff810685d0>] ? mod_delayed_work_on+0x80/0x80
        [<ffffffffc081e5a0>] ? __ieee80211_get_rx_led_name+0x10/0x10 [mac80211]
        [<ffffffff81068608>] flush_work+0x38/0x270
        [<ffffffff810685d0>] ? mod_delayed_work_on+0x80/0x80
        [<ffffffff810945ca>] ? mark_held_locks+0x6a/0x90
        [<ffffffff81068a5f>] ? __cancel_work_timer+0x6f/0x100
        [<ffffffffc081e5a0>] ? __ieee80211_get_rx_led_name+0x10/0x10 [mac80211]
        [<ffffffff8109469d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0xad/0x1c0
        [<ffffffffc081e5a0>] ? __ieee80211_get_rx_led_name+0x10/0x10 [mac80211]
        [<ffffffff81068a6b>] __cancel_work_timer+0x7b/0x100
        [<ffffffff81068b0e>] cancel_delayed_work_sync+0xe/0x10
        [<ffffffff8147cf3b>] led_blink_set+0x1b/0x40
        [<ffffffffc081e6b0>] tpt_trig_timer+0x110/0x170 [mac80211]
        [<ffffffff810b4cc5>] call_timer_fn+0x75/0x180
        [<ffffffff810b4c50>] ? process_timeout+0x10/0x10
        [<ffffffffc081e5a0>] ? __ieee80211_get_rx_led_name+0x10/0x10 [mac80211]
        [<ffffffff810b50ac>] run_timer_softirq+0x1fc/0x2f0
        [<ffffffff81054805>] __do_softirq+0x115/0x2e0
        [<ffffffff81054c75>] irq_exit+0xa5/0xb0
        [<ffffffff810049b3>] do_IRQ+0x53/0xf0
        [<ffffffff815a74af>] common_interrupt+0x6f/0x6f
        <EOI>  [<ffffffff8147b56e>] ? cpuidle_enter_state+0x6e/0x180
        [<ffffffff8147b732>] cpuidle_enter+0x12/0x20
        [<ffffffff8108bba0>] cpu_startup_entry+0x330/0x360
        [<ffffffff8158fb51>] rest_init+0xc1/0xd0
        [<ffffffff8158fa90>] ? csum_partial_copy_generic+0x170/0x170
        [<ffffffff81af3ff2>] start_kernel+0x44f/0x45a
        [<ffffffff81af399c>] ? set_init_arg+0x53/0x53
        [<ffffffff81af35ad>] x86_64_start_reservations+0x2a/0x2c
        [<ffffffff81af36a0>] x86_64_start_kernel+0xf1/0xf4
      
      Cc: Vincent Donnefort <vdonnefort@gmail.com>
      Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
      Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NJiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
      Signed-off-by: NBryan Wu <cooloney@gmail.com>
      9067359f
  5. 02 9月, 2014 1 次提交
  6. 30 8月, 2014 1 次提交
  7. 29 8月, 2014 1 次提交
    • D
      jbd2: fix descriptor block size handling errors with journal_csum · db9ee220
      Darrick J. Wong 提交于
      It turns out that there are some serious problems with the on-disk
      format of journal checksum v2.  The foremost is that the function to
      calculate descriptor tag size returns sizes that are too big.  This
      causes alignment issues on some architectures and is compounded by the
      fact that some parts of jbd2 use the structure size (incorrectly) to
      determine the presence of a 64bit journal instead of checking the
      feature flags.
      
      Therefore, introduce journal checksum v3, which enlarges the
      descriptor block tag format to allow for full 32-bit checksums of
      journal blocks, fix the journal tag function to return the correct
      sizes, and fix the jbd2 recovery code to use feature flags to
      determine 64bitness.
      
      Add a few function helpers so we don't have to open-code quite so
      many pieces.
      
      Switching to a 16-byte block size was found to increase journal size
      overhead by a maximum of 0.1%, to convert a 32-bit journal with no
      checksumming to a 32-bit journal with checksum v3 enabled.
      Signed-off-by: NDarrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
      Reported-by: NTR Reardon <thomas_reardon@hotmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      db9ee220
  8. 28 8月, 2014 2 次提交
  9. 26 8月, 2014 1 次提交
    • R
      mtd: nand: omap: Revert to using software ECC by default · 7d5929c1
      Roger Quadros 提交于
      For v3.12 and prior, 1-bit Hamming code ECC via software was the
      default choice. Commit c66d0391 in v3.13 changed the behaviour
      to use 1-bit Hamming code via Hardware using a different ECC layout
      i.e. (ROM code layout) than what is used by software ECC.
      
      This ECC layout change causes NAND filesystems created in v3.12
      and prior to be unusable in v3.13 and later. So revert back to
      using software ECC by default if an ECC scheme is not explicitely
      specified.
      
      This defect can be observed on the following boards during legacy boot
      
      -omap3beagle
      -omap3touchbook
      -overo
      -am3517crane
      -devkit8000
      -ldp
      -3430sdp
      Signed-off-by: NRoger Quadros <rogerq@ti.com>
      Tested-by: NGrazvydas Ignotas <notasas@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NTony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
      7d5929c1
  10. 25 8月, 2014 1 次提交
  11. 23 8月, 2014 3 次提交
    • W
      nfs: don't sleep with inode lock in lock_and_join_requests · 7c3af975
      Weston Andros Adamson 提交于
      This handles the 'nonblock=false' case in nfs_lock_and_join_requests.
      If the group is already locked and blocking is allowed, drop the inode lock
      and wait for the group lock to be cleared before trying it all again.
      This should fix warnings found in peterz's tree (sched/wait branch), where
      might_sleep() checks are added to wait.[ch].
      Reported-by: NFengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NWeston Andros Adamson <dros@primarydata.com>
      Reviewed-by: NPeng Tao <tao.peng@primarydata.com>
      Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
      7c3af975
    • C
      f2fs: use macro for code readability · b5b82205
      Chao Yu 提交于
      This patch introduces DEF_NIDS_PER_INODE/GET_ORPHAN_BLOCKS/F2FS_CP_PACKS macro
      instead of numbers in code for readability.
      
      change log from v1:
       o fix typo pointed out by Jaegeuk Kim.
      Signed-off-by: NChao Yu <chao2.yu@samsung.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
      b5b82205
    • S
      ftrace: Allow ftrace_ops to use the hashes from other ops · 33b7f99c
      Steven Rostedt (Red Hat) 提交于
      Currently the top level debug file system function tracer shares its
      ftrace_ops with the function graph tracer. This was thought to be fine
      because the tracers are not used together, as one can only enable
      function or function_graph tracer in the current_tracer file.
      
      But that assumption proved to be incorrect. The function profiler
      can use the function graph tracer when function tracing is enabled.
      Since all function graph users uses the function tracing ftrace_ops
      this causes a conflict and when a user enables both function profiling
      as well as the function tracer it will crash ftrace and disable it.
      
      The quick solution so far is to move them as separate ftrace_ops like
      it was earlier. The problem though is to synchronize the functions that
      are traced because both function and function_graph tracer are limited
      by the selections made in the set_ftrace_filter and set_ftrace_notrace
      files.
      
      To handle this, a new structure is made called ftrace_ops_hash. This
      structure will now hold the filter_hash and notrace_hash, and the
      ftrace_ops will point to this structure. That will allow two ftrace_ops
      to share the same hashes.
      
      Since most ftrace_ops do not share the hashes, and to keep allocation
      simple, the ftrace_ops structure will include both a pointer to the
      ftrace_ops_hash called func_hash, as well as the structure itself,
      called local_hash. When the ops are registered, the func_hash pointer
      will be initialized to point to the local_hash within the ftrace_ops
      structure. Some of the ftrace internal ftrace_ops will be initialized
      statically. This will allow for the function and function_graph tracer
      to have separate ops but still share the same hash tables that determine
      what functions they trace.
      
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.16 (apply after 3.17-rc4 is out)
      Signed-off-by: NSteven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
      33b7f99c
  12. 22 8月, 2014 1 次提交
  13. 21 8月, 2014 1 次提交
  14. 20 8月, 2014 1 次提交
  15. 19 8月, 2014 1 次提交
  16. 17 8月, 2014 1 次提交
  17. 16 8月, 2014 1 次提交
  18. 15 8月, 2014 3 次提交
  19. 13 8月, 2014 2 次提交
  20. 12 8月, 2014 1 次提交
    • V
      net: Always untag vlan-tagged traffic on input. · 0d5501c1
      Vlad Yasevich 提交于
      Currently the functionality to untag traffic on input resides
      as part of the vlan module and is build only when VLAN support
      is enabled in the kernel.  When VLAN is disabled, the function
      vlan_untag() turns into a stub and doesn't really untag the
      packets.  This seems to create an interesting interaction
      between VMs supporting checksum offloading and some network drivers.
      
      There are some drivers that do not allow the user to change
      tx-vlan-offload feature of the driver.  These drivers also seem
      to assume that any VLAN-tagged traffic they transmit will
      have the vlan information in the vlan_tci and not in the vlan
      header already in the skb.  When transmitting skbs that already
      have tagged data with partial checksum set, the checksum doesn't
      appear to be updated correctly by the card thus resulting in a
      failure to establish TCP connections.
      
      The following is a packet trace taken on the receiver where a
      sender is a VM with a VLAN configued.  The host VM is running on
      doest not have VLAN support and the outging interface on the
      host is tg3:
      10:12:43.503055 52:54:00:ae:42:3f > 28:d2:44:7d:c2:de, ethertype 802.1Q
      (0x8100), length 78: vlan 100, p 0, ethertype IPv4, (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 27243,
      offset 0, flags [DF], proto TCP (6), length 60)
          10.0.100.1.58545 > 10.0.100.10.ircu-2: Flags [S], cksum 0xdc39 (incorrect
      -> 0x48d9), seq 1069378582, win 29200, options [mss 1460,sackOK,TS val
      4294837885 ecr 0,nop,wscale 7], length 0
      10:12:44.505556 52:54:00:ae:42:3f > 28:d2:44:7d:c2:de, ethertype 802.1Q
      (0x8100), length 78: vlan 100, p 0, ethertype IPv4, (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 27244,
      offset 0, flags [DF], proto TCP (6), length 60)
          10.0.100.1.58545 > 10.0.100.10.ircu-2: Flags [S], cksum 0xdc39 (incorrect
      -> 0x44ee), seq 1069378582, win 29200, options [mss 1460,sackOK,TS val
      4294838888 ecr 0,nop,wscale 7], length 0
      
      This connection finally times out.
      
      I've only access to the TG3 hardware in this configuration thus have
      only tested this with TG3 driver.  There are a lot of other drivers
      that do not permit user changes to vlan acceleration features, and
      I don't know if they all suffere from a similar issue.
      
      The patch attempt to fix this another way.  It moves the vlan header
      stipping code out of the vlan module and always builds it into the
      kernel network core.  This way, even if vlan is not supported on
      a virtualizatoin host, the virtual machines running on top of such
      host will still work with VLANs enabled.
      
      CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
      CC: Nithin Nayak Sujir <nsujir@broadcom.com>
      CC: Michael Chan <mchan@broadcom.com>
      CC: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
      Signed-off-by: NVladislav Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
      Acked-by: NJiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      0d5501c1
  21. 11 8月, 2014 1 次提交
  22. 09 8月, 2014 12 次提交
    • V
      kexec: verify the signature of signed PE bzImage · 8e7d8381
      Vivek Goyal 提交于
      This is the final piece of the puzzle of verifying kernel image signature
      during kexec_file_load() syscall.
      
      This patch calls into PE file routines to verify signature of bzImage.  If
      signature are valid, kexec_file_load() succeeds otherwise it fails.
      
      Two new config options have been introduced.  First one is
      CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG.  This option enforces that kernel has to be
      validly signed otherwise kernel load will fail.  If this option is not
      set, no signature verification will be done.  Only exception will be when
      secureboot is enabled.  In that case signature verification should be
      automatically enforced when secureboot is enabled.  But that will happen
      when secureboot patches are merged.
      
      Second config option is CONFIG_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG.  This option
      enables signature verification support on bzImage.  If this option is not
      set and previous one is set, kernel image loading will fail because kernel
      does not have support to verify signature of bzImage.
      
      I tested these patches with both "pesign" and "sbsign" signed bzImages.
      
      I used signing_key.priv key and signing_key.x509 cert for signing as
      generated during kernel build process (if module signing is enabled).
      
      Used following method to sign bzImage.
      
      pesign
      ======
      - Convert DER format cert to PEM format cert
      openssl x509 -in signing_key.x509 -inform DER -out signing_key.x509.PEM -outform
      PEM
      
      - Generate a .p12 file from existing cert and private key file
      openssl pkcs12 -export -out kernel-key.p12 -inkey signing_key.priv -in
      signing_key.x509.PEM
      
      - Import .p12 file into pesign db
      pk12util -i /tmp/kernel-key.p12 -d /etc/pki/pesign
      
      - Sign bzImage
      pesign -i /boot/vmlinuz-3.16.0-rc3+ -o /boot/vmlinuz-3.16.0-rc3+.signed.pesign
      -c "Glacier signing key - Magrathea" -s
      
      sbsign
      ======
      sbsign --key signing_key.priv --cert signing_key.x509.PEM --output
      /boot/vmlinuz-3.16.0-rc3+.signed.sbsign /boot/vmlinuz-3.16.0-rc3+
      
      Patch details:
      
      Well all the hard work is done in previous patches.  Now bzImage loader
      has just call into that code and verify whether bzImage signature are
      valid or not.
      
      Also create two config options.  First one is CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG.
      This option enforces that kernel has to be validly signed otherwise kernel
      load will fail.  If this option is not set, no signature verification will
      be done.  Only exception will be when secureboot is enabled.  In that case
      signature verification should be automatically enforced when secureboot is
      enabled.  But that will happen when secureboot patches are merged.
      
      Second config option is CONFIG_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG.  This option
      enables signature verification support on bzImage.  If this option is not
      set and previous one is set, kernel image loading will fail because kernel
      does not have support to verify signature of bzImage.
      Signed-off-by: NVivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
      Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
      Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
      Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com>
      Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
      Cc: WANG Chao <chaowang@redhat.com>
      Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@console-pimps.org>
      Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      8e7d8381
    • V
      kexec: support kexec/kdump on EFI systems · 6a2c20e7
      Vivek Goyal 提交于
      This patch does two things.  It passes EFI run time mappings to second
      kernel in bootparams efi_info.  Second kernel parse this info and create
      new mappings in second kernel.  That means mappings in first and second
      kernel will be same.  This paves the way to enable EFI in kexec kernel.
      
      This patch also prepares and passes EFI setup data through bootparams.
      This contains bunch of information about various tables and their
      addresses.
      
      These information gathering and passing has been written along the lines
      of what current kexec-tools is doing to make kexec work with UEFI.
      
      [akpm@linux-foundation.org: s/get_efi/efi_get/g, per Matt]
      Signed-off-by: NVivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
      Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
      Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
      Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com>
      Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
      Cc: WANG Chao <chaowang@redhat.com>
      Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@console-pimps.org>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      6a2c20e7
    • V
      kexec-bzImage64: support for loading bzImage using 64bit entry · 27f48d3e
      Vivek Goyal 提交于
      This is loader specific code which can load bzImage and set it up for
      64bit entry.  This does not take care of 32bit entry or real mode entry.
      
      32bit mode entry can be implemented if somebody needs it.
      Signed-off-by: NVivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
      Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
      Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
      Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com>
      Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
      Cc: WANG Chao <chaowang@redhat.com>
      Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      27f48d3e
    • V
      kexec: load and relocate purgatory at kernel load time · 12db5562
      Vivek Goyal 提交于
      Load purgatory code in RAM and relocate it based on the location.
      Relocation code has been inspired by module relocation code and purgatory
      relocation code in kexec-tools.
      
      Also compute the checksums of loaded kexec segments and store them in
      purgatory.
      
      Arch independent code provides this functionality so that arch dependent
      bootloaders can make use of it.
      
      Helper functions are provided to get/set symbol values in purgatory which
      are used by bootloaders later to set things like stack and entry point of
      second kernel etc.
      Signed-off-by: NVivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
      Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
      Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
      Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com>
      Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
      Cc: WANG Chao <chaowang@redhat.com>
      Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      12db5562
    • V
      kexec: implementation of new syscall kexec_file_load · cb105258
      Vivek Goyal 提交于
      Previous patch provided the interface definition and this patch prvides
      implementation of new syscall.
      
      Previously segment list was prepared in user space.  Now user space just
      passes kernel fd, initrd fd and command line and kernel will create a
      segment list internally.
      
      This patch contains generic part of the code.  Actual segment preparation
      and loading is done by arch and image specific loader.  Which comes in
      next patch.
      
      [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
      Signed-off-by: NVivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
      Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
      Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
      Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com>
      Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
      Cc: WANG Chao <chaowang@redhat.com>
      Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      cb105258
    • V
      kexec: new syscall kexec_file_load() declaration · f0895685
      Vivek Goyal 提交于
      This is the new syscall kexec_file_load() declaration/interface.  I have
      reserved the syscall number only for x86_64 so far.  Other architectures
      (including i386) can reserve syscall number when they enable the support
      for this new syscall.
      Signed-off-by: NVivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
      Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
      Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
      Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com>
      Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
      Cc: WANG Chao <chaowang@redhat.com>
      Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      f0895685
    • V
      kexec: make kexec_segment user buffer pointer a union · 815d5704
      Vivek Goyal 提交于
      So far kexec_segment->buf was always a user space pointer as user space
      passed the array of kexec_segment structures and kernel copied it.
      
      But with new system call, list of kexec segments will be prepared by
      kernel and kexec_segment->buf will point to a kernel memory.
      
      So while I was adding code where I made assumption that ->buf is pointing
      to kernel memory, sparse started giving warning.
      
      Make ->buf a union.  And where a user space pointer is expected, access it
      using ->buf and where a kernel space pointer is expected, access it using
      ->kbuf.  That takes care of sparse warnings.
      Signed-off-by: NVivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
      Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
      Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
      Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com>
      Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
      Cc: WANG Chao <chaowang@redhat.com>
      Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      815d5704
    • V
      resource: provide new functions to walk through resources · 8c86e70a
      Vivek Goyal 提交于
      I have added two more functions to walk through resources.
      
      Currently walk_system_ram_range() deals with pfn and /proc/iomem can
      contain partial pages.  By dealing in pfn, callback function loses the
      info that last page of a memory range is a partial page and not the full
      page.  So I implemented walk_system_ram_res() which returns u64 values to
      callback functions and now it properly return start and end address.
      
      walk_system_ram_range() uses find_next_system_ram() to find the next ram
      resource.  This in turn only travels through siblings of top level child
      and does not travers through all the nodes of the resoruce tree.  I also
      need another function where I can walk through all the resources, for
      example figure out where "GART" aperture is.  Figure out where ACPI memory
      is.
      
      So I wrote another function walk_iomem_res() which walks through all
      /proc/iomem resources and returns matches as asked by caller.  Caller can
      specify "name" of resource, start and end and flags.
      
      Got rid of find_next_system_ram_res() and instead implemented more generic
      find_next_iomem_res() which can be used to traverse top level children
      only based on an argument.
      Signed-off-by: NVivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
      Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
      Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
      Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com>
      Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
      Cc: WANG Chao <chaowang@redhat.com>
      Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      8c86e70a
    • V
      kexec: rename unusebale_pages to unusable_pages · 7d3e2bca
      Vivek Goyal 提交于
      Let's use the more common "unusable".
      
      This patch was originally written and posted by Boris. I am including it
      in this patch series.
      Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Signed-off-by: NVivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
      Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
      Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
      Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com>
      Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
      Cc: WANG Chao <chaowang@redhat.com>
      Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      7d3e2bca
    • D
      shm: add memfd_create() syscall · 9183df25
      David Herrmann 提交于
      memfd_create() is similar to mmap(MAP_ANON), but returns a file-descriptor
      that you can pass to mmap().  It can support sealing and avoids any
      connection to user-visible mount-points.  Thus, it's not subject to quotas
      on mounted file-systems, but can be used like malloc()'ed memory, but with
      a file-descriptor to it.
      
      memfd_create() returns the raw shmem file, so calls like ftruncate() can
      be used to modify the underlying inode.  Also calls like fstat() will
      return proper information and mark the file as regular file.  If you want
      sealing, you can specify MFD_ALLOW_SEALING.  Otherwise, sealing is not
      supported (like on all other regular files).
      
      Compared to O_TMPFILE, it does not require a tmpfs mount-point and is not
      subject to a filesystem size limit.  It is still properly accounted to
      memcg limits, though, and to the same overcommit or no-overcommit
      accounting as all user memory.
      Signed-off-by: NDavid Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
      Acked-by: NHugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
      Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
      Cc: Ryan Lortie <desrt@desrt.ca>
      Cc: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
      Cc: Daniel Mack <zonque@gmail.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      9183df25
    • D
      shm: add sealing API · 40e041a2
      David Herrmann 提交于
      If two processes share a common memory region, they usually want some
      guarantees to allow safe access. This often includes:
        - one side cannot overwrite data while the other reads it
        - one side cannot shrink the buffer while the other accesses it
        - one side cannot grow the buffer beyond previously set boundaries
      
      If there is a trust-relationship between both parties, there is no need
      for policy enforcement.  However, if there's no trust relationship (eg.,
      for general-purpose IPC) sharing memory-regions is highly fragile and
      often not possible without local copies.  Look at the following two
      use-cases:
      
        1) A graphics client wants to share its rendering-buffer with a
           graphics-server. The memory-region is allocated by the client for
           read/write access and a second FD is passed to the server. While
           scanning out from the memory region, the server has no guarantee that
           the client doesn't shrink the buffer at any time, requiring rather
           cumbersome SIGBUS handling.
        2) A process wants to perform an RPC on another process. To avoid huge
           bandwidth consumption, zero-copy is preferred. After a message is
           assembled in-memory and a FD is passed to the remote side, both sides
           want to be sure that neither modifies this shared copy, anymore. The
           source may have put sensible data into the message without a separate
           copy and the target may want to parse the message inline, to avoid a
           local copy.
      
      While SIGBUS handling, POSIX mandatory locking and MAP_DENYWRITE provide
      ways to achieve most of this, the first one is unproportionally ugly to
      use in libraries and the latter two are broken/racy or even disabled due
      to denial of service attacks.
      
      This patch introduces the concept of SEALING.  If you seal a file, a
      specific set of operations is blocked on that file forever.  Unlike locks,
      seals can only be set, never removed.  Hence, once you verified a specific
      set of seals is set, you're guaranteed that no-one can perform the blocked
      operations on this file, anymore.
      
      An initial set of SEALS is introduced by this patch:
        - SHRINK: If SEAL_SHRINK is set, the file in question cannot be reduced
                  in size. This affects ftruncate() and open(O_TRUNC).
        - GROW: If SEAL_GROW is set, the file in question cannot be increased
                in size. This affects ftruncate(), fallocate() and write().
        - WRITE: If SEAL_WRITE is set, no write operations (besides resizing)
                 are possible. This affects fallocate(PUNCH_HOLE), mmap() and
                 write().
        - SEAL: If SEAL_SEAL is set, no further seals can be added to a file.
                This basically prevents the F_ADD_SEAL operation on a file and
                can be set to prevent others from adding further seals that you
                don't want.
      
      The described use-cases can easily use these seals to provide safe use
      without any trust-relationship:
      
        1) The graphics server can verify that a passed file-descriptor has
           SEAL_SHRINK set. This allows safe scanout, while the client is
           allowed to increase buffer size for window-resizing on-the-fly.
           Concurrent writes are explicitly allowed.
        2) For general-purpose IPC, both processes can verify that SEAL_SHRINK,
           SEAL_GROW and SEAL_WRITE are set. This guarantees that neither
           process can modify the data while the other side parses it.
           Furthermore, it guarantees that even with writable FDs passed to the
           peer, it cannot increase the size to hit memory-limits of the source
           process (in case the file-storage is accounted to the source).
      
      The new API is an extension to fcntl(), adding two new commands:
        F_GET_SEALS: Return a bitset describing the seals on the file. This
                     can be called on any FD if the underlying file supports
                     sealing.
        F_ADD_SEALS: Change the seals of a given file. This requires WRITE
                     access to the file and F_SEAL_SEAL may not already be set.
                     Furthermore, the underlying file must support sealing and
                     there may not be any existing shared mapping of that file.
                     Otherwise, EBADF/EPERM is returned.
                     The given seals are _added_ to the existing set of seals
                     on the file. You cannot remove seals again.
      
      The fcntl() handler is currently specific to shmem and disabled on all
      files. A file needs to explicitly support sealing for this interface to
      work. A separate syscall is added in a follow-up, which creates files that
      support sealing. There is no intention to support this on other
      file-systems. Semantics are unclear for non-volatile files and we lack any
      use-case right now. Therefore, the implementation is specific to shmem.
      Signed-off-by: NDavid Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
      Acked-by: NHugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
      Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
      Cc: Ryan Lortie <desrt@desrt.ca>
      Cc: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
      Cc: Daniel Mack <zonque@gmail.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      40e041a2
    • D
      mm: allow drivers to prevent new writable mappings · 4bb5f5d9
      David Herrmann 提交于
      This patch (of 6):
      
      The i_mmap_writable field counts existing writable mappings of an
      address_space.  To allow drivers to prevent new writable mappings, make
      this counter signed and prevent new writable mappings if it is negative.
      This is modelled after i_writecount and DENYWRITE.
      
      This will be required by the shmem-sealing infrastructure to prevent any
      new writable mappings after the WRITE seal has been set.  In case there
      exists a writable mapping, this operation will fail with EBUSY.
      
      Note that we rely on the fact that iff you already own a writable mapping,
      you can increase the counter without using the helpers.  This is the same
      that we do for i_writecount.
      Signed-off-by: NDavid Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
      Acked-by: NHugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
      Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
      Cc: Ryan Lortie <desrt@desrt.ca>
      Cc: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
      Cc: Daniel Mack <zonque@gmail.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      4bb5f5d9