Also, support dccp sockets.
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Signed-off-by: NPatrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Signed-off-by: NPatrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

netlink_broadcast users must initialize NETLINK_CB(skb).dst_groups to the
destination group mask for netlink_recvmsg.
Signed-off-by: NPatrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

- Remove bogus code for compiling netlink as module
- Add module refcounting support for modules implementing a netlink
  protocol
- Add support for autoloading modules that implement a netlink protocol
  as soon as someone opens a socket for that protocol
Signed-off-by: NHarald Welte <laforge@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

The attached patch makes sure that a keyring that failed to instantiate
properly is destroyed without oopsing [CAN-2005-2099].

The problem occurs in three stages:

 (1) The key allocator initialises the type-specific data to all zeroes. In
     the case of a keyring, this will become a link in the keyring name list
     when the keyring is instantiated.

 (2) If a user (any user) attempts to add a keyring with anything other than
     an empty payload, the keyring instantiation function will fail with an
     error and won't add the keyring to the name list.

 (3) The keyring's destructor then sees that the keyring has a description
     (name) and tries to remove the keyring from the name list, which oopses
     because the link pointers are both zero.

This bug permits any user to take down a box trivially.
Signed-Off-By: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

The attached patch prevents an error during the key session joining operation
from hanging future joins in the D state [CAN-2005-2098].

The problem is that the error handling path for the KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING
operation has one error path that doesn't release the session management
semaphore. Further attempts to get the semaphore will then sleep for ever in
the D state.

This can happen in four situations, all involving an attempt to allocate a new
session keyring:

 (1) ENOMEM.

 (2) The users key quota being reached.

 (3) A keyring name that is an empty string.

 (4) A keyring name that is too long.

Any user may attempt this operation, and so any user can cause the problem to
occur.
Signed-Off-By: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

This fixes five bugs in the key management syscall interface:

 (1) add_key() returns 0 rather than EINVAL if the key type is "".

     Checking the key type isn't "" should be left to lookup_user_key().

 (2) request_key() returns ENOKEY rather than EPERM if the key type begins
     with a ".".

     lookup_user_key() can't do this because internal key types begin with a
     ".".

 (3) Key revocation always returns 0, even if it fails.

 (4) Key read can return EAGAIN rather than EACCES under some circumstances.

     A key is permitted to by read by a process if it doesn't grant read
     access, but it does grant search access and it is in the process's
     keyrings. That search returns EAGAIN if it fails, and this needs
     translating to EACCES.

 (5) request_key() never adds the new key to the destination keyring if one is
     supplied.

     The wrong macro was being used to test for an error condition: PTR_ERR()
     will always return true, whether or not there's an error; this should've
     been IS_ERR().
Signed-Off-By: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

This patch fixes the address length checks in the selinux_socket_connect
hook to be no more restrictive than the underlying ipv4 and ipv6 code;
otherwise, this hook can reject valid connect calls.  This patch is in
response to a bug report where an application was calling connect on an
INET6 socket with an address that didn't include the optional scope id and
failing due to these checks.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

Implement kernel labeling of the MLS (multilevel security) field of
security contexts for files which have no existing MLS field.  This is to
enable upgrades of a system from non-MLS to MLS without performing a full
filesystem relabel including all of the mountpoints, which would be quite
painful for users.

With this patch, with MLS enabled, if a file has no MLS field, the kernel
internally adds an MLS field to the in-core inode (but not to the on-disk
file).  This MLS field added is the default for the superblock, allowing
per-mountpoint control over the values via fixed policy or mount options.

This patch has been tested by enabling MLS without relabeling its
filesystem, and seems to be working correctly.
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

The attached patch makes the keyring functions calculate the new size of a
keyring's payload based on the size of pointer to the key struct, not the size
of the key struct itself.
Signed-Off-By: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

Currently selinux_sb_copy_data requires an entire page be allocated to
*orig when the function is called.  This "requirement" is based on the fact
that we call copy_page(in_save, nosec_save) and in_save = orig when the
data is not FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA.  This means that if a caller were to call
do_kern_mount with only about 10 bytes of options, they would get passed
here and then we would corrupt PAGE_SIZE - 10 bytes of memory (with all
zeros.)

Currently it appears all in kernel FS's use one page of data so this has
not been a problem.  An out of kernel FS did just what is described above
and it would almost always panic shortly after they tried to mount.  From
looking else where in the kernel it is obvious that this string of data
must always be null terminated.  (See example in do_mount where it always
zeros the last byte.) Thus I suggest we use strcpy in place of copy_page.
In this way we make sure the amount we copy is always less than or equal to
the amount we received and since do_mount is zeroing the last byte this
should be safe for all.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

kfree(NULL) is legal.
Signed-off-by: NJesper Juhl <juhl-lkml@dif.dk>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

2.6.12-rc6-mm1 has a few remaining synchronize_kernel()s, some (but not
all) in comments.  This patch changes these synchronize_kernel() calls (and
comments) to synchronize_rcu() or synchronize_sched() as follows:

- arch/x86_64/kernel/mce.c mce_read(): change to synchronize_sched() to
  handle races with machine-check exceptions (synchronize_rcu() would not cut
  it given RCU implementations intended for hardcore realtime use.

- drivers/input/serio/i8042.c i8042_stop(): change to synchronize_sched() to
  handle races with i8042_interrupt() interrupt handler.  Again,
  synchronize_rcu() would not cut it given RCU implementations intended for
  hardcore realtime use.

- include/*/kdebug.h comments: change to synchronize_sched() to handle races
  with NMIs.  As before, synchronize_rcu() would not cut it...

- include/linux/list.h comment: change to synchronize_rcu(), since this
  comment is for list_del_rcu().

- security/keys/key.c unregister_key_type(): change to synchronize_rcu(),
  since this is interacting with RCU read side.

- security/keys/process_keys.c install_session_keyring(): change to
  synchronize_rcu(), since this is interacting with RCU read side.
Signed-off-by: N"Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

This patch,based on sample code by Roland McGrath, adds an execheap
permission check that controls the ability to make the heap executable so
that this can be prevented in almost all cases (the X server is presently
an exception, but this will hopefully be resolved in the future) so that
even programs with execmem permission will need to have the anonymous
memory mapped in order to make it executable.

The only reason that we use a permission check for such restriction (vs.
making it unconditional) is that the X module loader presently needs it; it
could possibly be made unconditional in the future when X is changed.

The policy patch for the execheap permission is available at:
http://pearls.tuxedo-es.org/patches/selinux/policy-execheap.patchSigned-off-by: NLorenzo Hernandez Garcia-Hierro <lorenzo@gnu.org>
Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

This patch adds an execstack permission check that controls the ability to
make the main process stack executable so that attempts to make the stack
executable can still be prevented even if the process is allowed the
existing execmem permission in order to e.g.  perform runtime code
generation.  Note that this does not yet address thread stacks.  Note also
that unlike the execmem check, the execstack check is only applied on
mprotect calls, not mmap calls, as the current security_file_mmap hook is
not passed the necessary information presently.

The original author of the code that makes the distinction of the stack
region, is Ingo Molnar, who wrote it within his patch for
/proc/<pid>/maps markers.
(http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=linux-kernel&m=110719881508591&w=2)

The patches also can be found at:
http://pearls.tuxedo-es.org/patches/selinux/policy-execstack.patch
http://pearls.tuxedo-es.org/patches/selinux/kernel-execstack.patch

policy-execstack.patch is the patch that needs to be applied to the policy in
order to support the execstack permission and exclude it
from general_domain_access within macros/core_macros.te.

kernel-execstack.patch adds such permission to the SELinux code within
the kernel and adds the proper permission check to the selinux_file_mprotect() hook.
Signed-off-by: NLorenzo Hernandez Garcia-Hierro <lorenzo@gnu.org>
Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

Export this symbol to GPL modules for eCryptfs: an out-of-tree GPL'ed
filesystem.

Signed off by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

The attached patch makes the following changes:

 (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth".

     This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and
     another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be
     created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services.

     Authorisation keys hold two references:

     (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being
     	 constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked,
     	 rendering it of no further use.

     (b) The "authorising process". This is either:

     	 (i) the process that called request_key(), or:

     	 (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an
     	      authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising
     	      process referred to by that authorisation key will also be
     	      referred to by the new authorisation key.

	 This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests
	 will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with
	 the keys obtained from them in its keyrings.

 (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to
     /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring.

 (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if
     it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the
     calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process
     specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials
     (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's
     credentials.

     This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging
     to the authorising process.

 (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have
     direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the
     keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the
     calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the
     credentials of the authorising process.

     This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging
     to the authorising process.

 (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or
     KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather
     than the process doing the instantiation.

 (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which
     request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is
     done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_*
     constants. The current setting can also be read using this call.

 (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another
     process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits
     a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting.
Signed-Off-By: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-Off-By: NBenoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

The attached patch uses RCU to manage the session keyring pointer in struct
signal_struct.  This means that searching need not disable interrupts and get
a the sighand spinlock to access this pointer.  Furthermore, by judicious use
of rcu_read_(un)lock(), this patch also avoids the need to take and put
refcounts on the session keyring itself, thus saving on even more atomic ops.
Signed-Off-By: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

The attached patch makes it possible to pass a session keyring through to the
process spawned by call_usermodehelper().  This allows patch 3/3 to pass an
authorisation key through to /sbin/request-key, thus permitting better access
controls when doing just-in-time key creation.
Signed-Off-By: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

The attached patch changes the key implementation in a number of ways:

 (1) It removes the spinlock from the key structure.

 (2) The key flags are now accessed using atomic bitops instead of
     write-locking the key spinlock and using C bitwise operators.

     The three instantiation flags are dealt with with the construction
     semaphore held during the request_key/instantiate/negate sequence, thus
     rendering the spinlock superfluous.

     The key flags are also now bit numbers not bit masks.

 (3) The key payload is now accessed using RCU. This permits the recursive
     keyring search algorithm to be simplified greatly since no locks need be
     taken other than the usual RCU preemption disablement. Searching now does
     not require any locks or semaphores to be held; merely that the starting
     keyring be pinned.

 (4) The keyring payload now includes an RCU head so that it can be disposed
     of by call_rcu(). This requires that the payload be copied on unlink to
     prevent introducing races in copy-down vs search-up.

 (5) The user key payload is now a structure with the data following it. It
     includes an RCU head like the keyring payload and for the same reason. It
     also contains a data length because the data length in the key may be
     changed on another CPU whilst an RCU protected read is in progress on the
     payload. This would then see the supposed RCU payload and the on-key data
     length getting out of sync.

     I'm tempted to drop the key's datalen entirely, except that it's used in
     conjunction with quota management and so is a little tricky to get rid
     of.

 (6) Update the keys documentation.
Signed-Off-By: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

Add a new `suid_dumpable' sysctl:

This value can be used to query and set the core dump mode for setuid
or otherwise protected/tainted binaries. The modes are

0 - (default) - traditional behaviour.  Any process which has changed
    privilege levels or is execute only will not be dumped

1 - (debug) - all processes dump core when possible.  The core dump is
    owned by the current user and no security is applied.  This is intended
    for system debugging situations only.  Ptrace is unchecked.

2 - (suidsafe) - any binary which normally would not be dumped is dumped
    readable by root only.  This allows the end user to remove such a dump but
    not access it directly.  For security reasons core dumps in this mode will
    not overwrite one another or other files.  This mode is appropriate when
    adminstrators are attempting to debug problems in a normal environment.

(akpm:

> > +EXPORT_SYMBOL(suid_dumpable);
>
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL?

No problem to me.

> >  	if (current->euid == current->uid && current->egid == current->gid)
> >  		current->mm->dumpable = 1;
>
> Should this be SUID_DUMP_USER?

Actually the feedback I had from last time was that the SUID_ defines
should go because its clearer to follow the numbers. They can go
everywhere (and there are lots of places where dumpable is tested/used
as a bool in untouched code)

> Maybe this should be renamed to `dump_policy' or something.  Doing that
> would help us catch any code which isn't using the #defines, too.

Fair comment. The patch was designed to be easy to maintain for Red Hat
rather than for merging. Changing that field would create a gigantic
diff because it is used all over the place.

)
Signed-off-by: NAlan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

There is a memory leak during mount when SELinux is active and mount
options are specified.
Signed-off-by: NGerald Schaefer <geraldsc@de.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

sysfs: fix the rest of the kernel so if an attribute doesn't
       implement show or store method read/write will return
       -EIO instead of 0 or -EINVAL or -EPERM.
Signed-off-by: NDmitry Torokhov <dtor@mail.ru>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>

To retrieve the neighbour tables send RTM_GETNEIGHTBL with the
NLM_F_DUMP flag set. Every neighbour table configuration is
spread over multiple messages to avoid running into message
size limits on systems with many interfaces. The first message
in the sequence transports all not device specific data such as
statistics, configuration, and the default parameter set.
This message is followed by 0..n messages carrying device
specific parameter sets.

Although the ordering should be sufficient, NDTA_NAME can be
used to identify sequences. The initial message can be identified
by checking for NDTA_CONFIG. The device specific messages do
not contain this TLV but have NDTPA_IFINDEX set to the
corresponding interface index.

To change neighbour table attributes, send RTM_SETNEIGHTBL
with NDTA_NAME set. Changeable attribute include NDTA_THRESH[1-3],
NDTA_GC_INTERVAL, and all TLVs in NDTA_PARMS unless marked
otherwise. Device specific parameter sets can be changed by
setting NDTPA_IFINDEX to the interface index of the corresponding
device.
Signed-off-by: NThomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Per Steve Grubb's observation that there are some remaining cases where
avc_audit() directly logs untrusted strings without escaping them, here
is a patch that changes avc_audit() to use audit_log_untrustedstring()
or audit_log_hex() as appropriate.  Note that d_name.name is nul-
terminated by d_alloc(), and that sun_path is nul-terminated by
unix_mkname(), so it is not necessary for the AVC to create nul-
terminated copies or to alter audit_log_untrustedstring to take a length
argument.  In the case of an abstract name, we use audit_log_hex() with
an explicit length.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>

When I added the logging of pid= and comm= back to avc_audit() I 
screwed it up. Put it back how it should be.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>

This patch changes the SELinux AVC to defer logging of paths to the audit
framework upon syscall exit, by saving a reference to the (dentry,vfsmount)
pair in an auxiliary audit item on the current audit context for processing
by audit_log_exit.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>

We turned this all off because the 'exe=' was causing deadlocks on
dcache_lock. There's no need to leave the pid and comm out though. 
They'll all be logged correctly if full auditing is enabled, but we
should still print them in case auditing _isn't_ enabled.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>

It's silly to have to add explicit entries for new userspace messages
as we invent them. Just treat all messages in the user range the same.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>

This patch should fix the avc_alloc_node() oom condition that Andrew
reported when no policy is loaded in SELinux.

Prior to this patch, when no policy was loaded, the SELinux "security
server" (policy engine) was only returning allowed decisions for the
requested permissions for each access check.  This caused the cache to
thrash when trying to use SELinux for real work with no policy loaded
(typically, the no policy loaded state is only for bootstrapping to the
point where we can load an initial policy).

This patch changes the SELinux security server to return the complete
allowed access vector at once, and then to reset the cache after the
initial policy load to flush the initial cache state created during
bootstrapping.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

This patch adds more messages types to the audit subsystem so that audit 
analysis is quicker, intuitive, and more useful.
Signed-off-by: NSteve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
---
I forgot one type in the big patch. I need to add one for user space 
originating SE Linux avc messages. This is used by dbus and nscd.

-Steve
---
Updated to 2.6.12-rc4-mm1.
-dwmw2
Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>

Add audit_log_type to allow callers to specify type and pid when logging.
Convert audit_log to wrapper around audit_log_type.  Could have
converted all audit_log callers directly, but common case is default
of type AUDIT_KERNEL and pid 0.  Update audit_log_start to take type
and pid values when creating a new audit_buffer.  Move sequences that
did audit_log_start, audit_log_format, audit_set_type, audit_log_end,
to simply call audit_log_type directly.  This obsoletes audit_set_type
and audit_set_pid, so remove them.
Signed-off-by: NChris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>

shutdown credential information. It creates a new message type 
AUDIT_TERM_INFO, which is used by the audit daemon to query who issued the 
shutdown. 

It requires the placement of a hook function that gathers the information. The 
hook is after the DAC & MAC checks and before the function returns. Racing 
threads could overwrite the uid & pid - but they would have to be root and 
have policy that allows signalling the audit daemon. That should be a 
manageable risk.

The userspace component will be released later in audit 0.7.2. When it 
receives the TERM signal, it queries the kernel for shutdown information. 
When it receives it, it writes the message and exits. The message looks 
like this:

type=DAEMON msg=auditd(1114551182.000) auditd normal halt, sending pid=2650 
uid=525, auditd pid=1685
Signed-off-by: NSteve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>

This patch provides finer grained permissions for the audit family of
Netlink sockets under SELinux.

1.  We need a way to differentiate between privileged and unprivileged
   reads of kernel data maintained by the audit subsystem.  The AUDIT_GET
   operation is unprivileged: it returns the current status of the audit
   subsystem (e.g.  whether it's enabled etc.).  The AUDIT_LIST operation
   however returns a list of the current audit ruleset, which is considered
   privileged by the audit folk.  To deal with this, a new SELinux
   permission has been implemented and applied to the operation:
   nlmsg_readpriv, which can be allocated to appropriately privileged
   domains.  Unprivileged domains would only be allocated nlmsg_read.

2.  There is a requirement for certain domains to generate audit events
   from userspace.  These events need to be collected by the kernel,
   collated and transmitted sequentially back to the audit daemon.  An
   example is user level login, an auditable event under CAPP, where
   login-related domains generate AUDIT_USER messages via PAM which are
   relayed back to auditd via the kernel.  To prevent handing out
   nlmsg_write permissions to such domains, a new permission has been
   added, nlmsg_relay, which is intended for this type of purpose: data is
   passed via the kernel back to userspace but no privileged information is
   written to the kernel.

Also, AUDIT_LOGIN messages are now valid only for kernel->user messaging,
so this value has been removed from the SELinux nlmsgtab (which is only
used to check user->kernel messages).
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

This patch removes the sclass argument from ipc_has_perm in the SELinux
module, as it can be obtained from the ipc security structure.  The use of
a separate argument was a legacy of the older precondition function
handling in SELinux and is obsolete.  Please apply.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

The SELinux hooks invoke ipv6_skip_exthdr() with an incorrect
length final argument.  However, the length argument turns out
to be superfluous.

I was just reading ipv6_skip_exthdr and it occured to me that we can
get rid of len altogether.  The only place where len is used is to
check whether the skb has two bytes for ipv6_opt_hdr.  This check
is done by skb_header_pointer/skb_copy_bits anyway.

Now it might appear that we've made the code slower by deferring
the check to skb_copy_bits.  However, this check should not trigger
in the common case so this is OK.
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This fixes a deadlock on the dcache lock detected during testing at IBM
by moving the logging of the current executable information from the
SELinux avc_audit function to audit_log_exit (via an audit_log_task_info
helper) for processing upon syscall exit. 

For consistency, the patch also removes the logging of other
task-related information from avc_audit, deferring handling to
audit_log_exit instead. 

This allows simplification of the avc_audit code, allows the exe
information to be obtained more reliably, always includes the comm
information (useful for scripts), and avoids including bogus task
information for checks performed from irq or softirq. 
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

This patch adds SELinux support for the KOBJECT_UEVENT Netlink family, so
that SELinux can apply finer grained controls to it.  For example, security
policy for hald can be locked down to the KOBJECT_UEVENT Netlink family
only.  Currently, this family simply defaults to the default Netlink socket
class.

Note that some new permission definitions are added to sync with changes in
the core userspace policy package, which auto-generates header files.
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

This patch fixes a bug in the SELinux Netlink message type detection code,
where the wrong constant was being used in a case statement.  The incorrect
value is not valid for this class of object so it would not have been
reached, and fallen through to a default handler for all Netlink messages.
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>