This patch adds an execstack permission check that controls the ability to
make the main process stack executable so that attempts to make the stack
executable can still be prevented even if the process is allowed the
existing execmem permission in order to e.g.  perform runtime code
generation.  Note that this does not yet address thread stacks.  Note also
that unlike the execmem check, the execstack check is only applied on
mprotect calls, not mmap calls, as the current security_file_mmap hook is
not passed the necessary information presently.

The original author of the code that makes the distinction of the stack
region, is Ingo Molnar, who wrote it within his patch for
/proc/<pid>/maps markers.
(http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=linux-kernel&m=110719881508591&w=2)

The patches also can be found at:
http://pearls.tuxedo-es.org/patches/selinux/policy-execstack.patch
http://pearls.tuxedo-es.org/patches/selinux/kernel-execstack.patch

policy-execstack.patch is the patch that needs to be applied to the policy in
order to support the execstack permission and exclude it
from general_domain_access within macros/core_macros.te.

kernel-execstack.patch adds such permission to the SELinux code within
the kernel and adds the proper permission check to the selinux_file_mprotect() hook.
Signed-off-by: NLorenzo Hernandez Garcia-Hierro <lorenzo@gnu.org>
Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

There is a memory leak during mount when SELinux is active and mount
options are specified.
Signed-off-by: NGerald Schaefer <geraldsc@de.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

This patch adds more messages types to the audit subsystem so that audit 
analysis is quicker, intuitive, and more useful.
Signed-off-by: NSteve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
---
I forgot one type in the big patch. I need to add one for user space 
originating SE Linux avc messages. This is used by dbus and nscd.

-Steve
---
Updated to 2.6.12-rc4-mm1.
-dwmw2
Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>

This patch removes the sclass argument from ipc_has_perm in the SELinux
module, as it can be obtained from the ipc security structure.  The use of
a separate argument was a legacy of the older precondition function
handling in SELinux and is obsolete.  Please apply.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

The SELinux hooks invoke ipv6_skip_exthdr() with an incorrect
length final argument.  However, the length argument turns out
to be superfluous.

I was just reading ipv6_skip_exthdr and it occured to me that we can
get rid of len altogether.  The only place where len is used is to
check whether the skb has two bytes for ipv6_opt_hdr.  This check
is done by skb_header_pointer/skb_copy_bits anyway.

Now it might appear that we've made the code slower by deferring
the check to skb_copy_bits.  However, this check should not trigger
in the common case so this is OK.
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This patch adds SELinux support for the KOBJECT_UEVENT Netlink family, so
that SELinux can apply finer grained controls to it.  For example, security
policy for hald can be locked down to the KOBJECT_UEVENT Netlink family
only.  Currently, this family simply defaults to the default Netlink socket
class.

Note that some new permission definitions are added to sync with changes in
the core userspace policy package, which auto-generates header files.
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
infrastructure for it.

Let it rip!