- 05 12月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Chris Wright 提交于
Commit ae21ee65 "PCI: acs p2p upsteram forwarding enabling" doesn't actually enable ACS. Add a function to pci core to allow an IOMMU to request that ACS be enabled. The existing mechanism of using iommu_found() in the pci core to know when ACS should be enabled doesn't actually work due to initialization order; iommu has only been detected not initialized. Have Intel and AMD IOMMUs request ACS, and Xen does as well during early init of dom0. Cc: Allen Kay <allen.m.kay@intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joerg.roedel@amd.com> Signed-off-by: NChris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Signed-off-by: NJesse Barnes <jbarnes@virtuousgeek.org>
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- 04 12月, 2009 8 次提交
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由 Ian Campbell 提交于
tick_resume() is never called on secondary processors. Presumably this is because they are offlined for suspend on native and so this is normally taken care of in the CPU onlining path. Under Xen we keep all CPUs online over a suspend. This patch papers over the issue for me but I will investigate a more generic, less hacky, way of doing to the same. tick_suspend is also only called on the boot CPU which I presume should be fixed too. Signed-off-by: NIan Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Cc: Stable Kernel <stable@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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由 Jeremy Fitzhardinge 提交于
If Xen wants to return to a 32b usermode with sysret it must use the right form. When using VCGF_in_syscall to trigger this, it looks at the code segment and does a 32b sysret if it is FLAT_USER_CS32. However, this is different from __USER32_CS, so it fails to return properly if we use the normal Linux segment. So avoid the whole mess by dropping VCGF_in_syscall and simply use plain iret to return to usermode. Signed-off-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Acked-by: NJan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com> Cc: Stable Kernel <stable@kernel.org>
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由 Jeremy Fitzhardinge 提交于
printk timestamping uses sched_clock, which in turn relies on runstate info under Xen. So make sure we set it up before any printks can be called. Signed-off-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Cc: Stable Kernel <stable@kernel.org>
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由 Ian Campbell 提交于
The commit "xen: re-register runstate area earlier on resume" caused us to never try and setup the runstate area for secondary CPUs. Ensure that we do this... Signed-off-by: NIan Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Cc: Stable Kernel <stable@kernel.org>
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由 Ian Campbell 提交于
Otherwise the timer is disabled by dpm_suspend_noirq() which in turn prevents correct operation of stop_machine on multi-processor systems and breaks suspend. Signed-off-by: NIan Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Cc: Stable Kernel <stable@kernel.org>
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由 Ian Campbell 提交于
pvops kernels >= 2.6.30 can currently only be saved and restored once. The second attempt to save results in: ERROR Internal error: Frame# in pfn-to-mfn frame list is not in pseudophys ERROR Internal error: entry 0: p2m_frame_list[0] is 0xf2c2c2c2, max 0x120000 ERROR Internal error: Failed to map/save the p2m frame list I finally narrowed it down to: commit cdaead6b Author: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Date: Fri Feb 27 15:34:59 2009 -0800 xen: split construction of p2m mfn tables from registration Build the p2m_mfn_list_list early with the rest of the p2m table, but register it later when the real shared_info structure is in place. Signed-off-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> The unforeseen side-effect of this change was to cause the mfn list list to not be rebuilt on resume. Prior to this change it would have been rebuilt via xen_post_suspend() -> xen_setup_shared_info() -> xen_setup_mfn_list_list(). Fix by explicitly calling xen_build_mfn_list_list() from xen_post_suspend(). Signed-off-by: NIan Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Cc: Stable Kernel <stable@kernel.org>
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由 Jeremy Fitzhardinge 提交于
Even if have_vcpu_info_placement is not set, we still need to set up the runstate area on each resumed vcpu. Signed-off-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Cc: Stable Kernel <stable@kernel.org>
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由 Ian Campbell 提交于
This is necessary to ensure the runstate area is available to xen_sched_clock before any calls to printk which will require it in order to provide a timestamp. I chose to pull the xen_setup_runstate_info out of xen_time_init into the caller in order to maintain parity with calling xen_setup_runstate_info separately from calling xen_time_resume. Signed-off-by: NIan Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Cc: Stable Kernel <stable@kernel.org>
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- 17 11月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 H. Peter Anvin 提交于
The 32- and 64-bit code used very different mechanisms for enabling NX, but even the 32-bit code was enabling NX in head_32.S if it is available. Furthermore, we had a bewildering collection of tests for the available of NX. This patch: a) merges the 32-bit set_nx() and the 64-bit check_efer() function into a single x86_configure_nx() function. EFER control is left to the head code. b) eliminates the nx_enabled variable entirely. Things that need to test for NX enablement can verify __supported_pte_mask directly, and cpu_has_nx gives the supported status of NX. Signed-off-by: NH. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegardno@ifi.uio.no> Cc: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> LKML-Reference: <1258154897-6770-5-git-send-email-hpa@zytor.com> Acked-by: NKees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
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- 05 11月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Jeremy Fitzhardinge 提交于
Move xen_domain and related tests out of asm-x86 to xen/xen.h so they can be included whenever they are necessary. Signed-off-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: NJesse Barnes <jbarnes@virtuousgeek.org>
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- 04 11月, 2009 2 次提交
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由 Rusty Russell 提交于
Signed-off-by: NRusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> LKML-Reference: <200911031458.38406.rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
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由 Jeremy Fitzhardinge 提交于
A Xen guest never needs to know about extended topology, and knowing would just confuse it. This patch just zeros ebx in leaf 0xb which indicates no topology info, preventing a crash under Xen on cpus which support this leaf. Signed-off-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Cc: Stable Kernel <stable@kernel.org>
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- 29 10月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Tejun Heo 提交于
This patch updates percpu related symbols in xen such that percpu symbols are unique and don't clash with local symbols. This serves two purposes of decreasing the possibility of global percpu symbol collision and allowing dropping per_cpu__ prefix from percpu symbols. * arch/x86/xen/smp.c, arch/x86/xen/time.c, arch/ia64/xen/irq_xen.c: add xen_ prefix to percpu variables * arch/ia64/xen/time.c: add xen_ prefix to percpu variables, drop processed_ prefix and make them static Partly based on Rusty Russell's "alloc_percpu: rename percpu vars which cause name clashes" patch. Signed-off-by: NTejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
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- 28 10月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Jeremy Fitzhardinge 提交于
xen_setup_stackprotector() ends up trying to set page protections, so we need to have vm_mmu_ops set up before trying to do so. Failing to do so causes an early boot crash. [ Impact: Fix early crash under Xen. ] Signed-off-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
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- 02 10月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Alexey Dobriyan 提交于
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix KVM] Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Acked-by: NMike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- 24 9月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Rusty Russell 提交于
Makes code futureproof against the impending change to mm->cpu_vm_mask (to be a pointer). It's also a chance to use the new cpumask_ ops which take a pointer (the older ones are deprecated, but there's no hurry for arch code). Signed-off-by: NRusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
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- 22 9月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Jeremy Fitzhardinge 提交于
x86-64 assumes NX is available by default, so we need to explicitly check for it before using NX. Some first-generation Intel x86-64 processors didn't support NX, and even recent systems allow it to be disabled in BIOS. [ Impact: prevent Xen crash on NX-less 64-bit machines ] Signed-off-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Cc: Stable Kernel <stable@kernel.org>
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- 16 9月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Feng Tang 提交于
get/set_wallclock() have already a set of platform dependent implementations (default, EFI, paravirt). MRST will add another variant. Moving them to platform ops simplifies the existing code and minimizes the effort to integrate new variants. Signed-off-by: NFeng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com> LKML-Reference: <new-submission> Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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- 10 9月, 2009 3 次提交
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由 Yang Xiaowei 提交于
We need to have a stronger barrier between releasing the lock and checking for any waiting spinners. A compiler barrier is not sufficient because the CPU's ordering rules do not prevent the read xl->spinners from happening before the unlock assignment, as they are different memory locations. We need to have an explicit barrier to enforce the write-read ordering to different memory locations. Because of it, I can't bring up > 4 HVM guests on one SMP machine. [ Code and commit comments expanded -J ] [ Impact: avoid deadlock when using Xen PV spinlocks ] Signed-off-by: NYang Xiaowei <xiaowei.yang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
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由 Jeremy Fitzhardinge 提交于
Where possible we enable interrupts while waiting for a spinlock to become free, in order to reduce big latency spikes in interrupt handling. However, at present if we manage to pick up the spinlock just before blocking, we'll end up holding the lock with interrupts enabled for a while. This will cause a deadlock if we recieve an interrupt in that window, and the interrupt handler tries to take the lock too. Solve this by shrinking the interrupt-enabled region to just around the blocking call. [ Impact: avoid race/deadlock when using Xen PV spinlocks ] Reported-by: N"Yang, Xiaowei" <xiaowei.yang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
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由 Jeremy Fitzhardinge 提交于
-fstack-protector uses a special per-cpu "stack canary" value. gcc generates special code in each function to test the canary to make sure that the function's stack hasn't been overrun. On x86-64, this is simply an offset of %gs, which is the usual per-cpu base segment register, so setting it up simply requires loading %gs's base as normal. On i386, the stack protector segment is %gs (rather than the usual kernel percpu %fs segment register). This requires setting up the full kernel GDT and then loading %gs accordingly. We also need to make sure %gs is initialized when bringing up secondary cpus too. To keep things consistent, we do the full GDT/segment register setup on both architectures. Because we need to avoid -fstack-protected code before setting up the GDT and because there's no way to disable it on a per-function basis, several files need to have stack-protector inhibited. [ Impact: allow Xen booting with stack-protector enabled ] Signed-off-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
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- 01 9月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 H. Peter Anvin 提交于
For some reason, the _safe MSR functions returned -EFAULT, not -EIO. However, the only user which cares about the return code as anything other than a boolean is the MSR driver, which wants -EIO. Change it to -EIO across the board. Signed-off-by: NH. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Alok Kataria <akataria@vmware.com> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
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- 31 8月, 2009 8 次提交
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由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于
TSC calibration is modified by the vmware hypervisor and paravirt by separate means. Moorestown wants to add its own calibration routine as well. So make calibrate_tsc a proper x86_init_ops function and override it by paravirt or by the early setup of the vmware hypervisor. Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于
The timer init code is convoluted with several quirks and the paravirt timer chooser. Figuring out which code path is actually taken is not for the faint hearted. Move the numaq TSC quirk to tsc_pre_init x86_init_ops function and replace the paravirt time chooser and the remaining x86 quirk with a simple x86_init_ops function. Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于
paravirt overrides the setup of the default apic timers as per cpu timers. Moorestown needs to override that as well. Move it to x86_init_ops setup and create a separate x86_cpuinit struct which holds the function for the secondary evtl. hotplugabble CPUs. Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于
We really do not need two paravirt/x86_init_ops functions which are called in two consecutive source lines. Move the only user of post_allocator_init into the already existing pagetable_setup_done function. Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于
Replace more paravirt hackery by proper x86_init_ops. Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于
Replace another obscure paravirt magic and move it to x86_init_ops. Such a hook is also useful for embedded and special hardware. Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于
ARCH_SETUP is a horrible leftover from the old arch/i386 mach support code. It still has a lonely user in xen. Move it to x86_init_ops. Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于
irq_init is overridden by x86_quirks and by paravirts. Unify the whole mess and make it an unconditional x86_init_ops function which defaults to the standard function and can be overridden by the early platform code. Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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- 27 8月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于
memory_setup is overridden by x86_quirks and by paravirts with weak functions and quirks. Unify the whole mess and make it an unconditional x86_init_ops function which defaults to the standard function and can be overridden by the early platform code. Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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- 26 8月, 2009 2 次提交
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由 H. Peter Anvin 提交于
Initialize cx before calling xen_cpuid(), in order to suppress the "may be used uninitialized in this function" warning. Signed-off-by: NH. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org>
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由 Jeremy Fitzhardinge 提交于
Xen always runs on CPUs which properly support WP enforcement in privileged mode, so there's no need to test for it. This also works around a crash reported by Arnd Hannemann, though I think its just a band-aid for that case. Reported-by: NArnd Hannemann <hannemann@nets.rwth-aachen.de> Signed-off-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Acked-by: NPekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi> Signed-off-by: NH. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
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- 20 8月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Jeremy Fitzhardinge 提交于
Make sure the stack-protector segment registers are properly set up before calling any functions which may have stack-protection compiled into them. [ Impact: prevent Xen early-boot crash when stack-protector is enabled ] Signed-off-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
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- 16 5月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Jeremy Fitzhardinge 提交于
Xiaohui Xin and some other folks at Intel have been looking into what's behind the performance hit of paravirt_ops when running native. It appears that the hit is entirely due to the paravirtualized spinlocks introduced by: | commit 8efcbab6 | Date: Mon Jul 7 12:07:51 2008 -0700 | | paravirt: introduce a "lock-byte" spinlock implementation The extra call/return in the spinlock path is somehow causing an increase in the cycles/instruction of somewhere around 2-7% (seems to vary quite a lot from test to test). The working theory is that the CPU's pipeline is getting upset about the call->call->locked-op->return->return, and seems to be failing to speculate (though I haven't seen anything definitive about the precise reasons). This doesn't entirely make sense, because the performance hit is also visible on unlock and other operations which don't involve locked instructions. But spinlock operations clearly swamp all the other pvops operations, even though I can't imagine that they're nearly as common (there's only a .05% increase in instructions executed). If I disable just the pv-spinlock calls, my tests show that pvops is identical to non-pvops performance on native (my measurements show that it is actually about .1% faster, but Xiaohui shows a .05% slowdown). Summary of results, averaging 10 runs of the "mmperf" test, using a no-pvops build as baseline: nopv Pv-nospin Pv-spin CPU cycles 100.00% 99.89% 102.18% instructions 100.00% 100.10% 100.15% CPI 100.00% 99.79% 102.03% cache ref 100.00% 100.84% 100.28% cache miss 100.00% 90.47% 88.56% cache miss rate 100.00% 89.72% 88.31% branches 100.00% 99.93% 100.04% branch miss 100.00% 103.66% 107.72% branch miss rt 100.00% 103.73% 107.67% wallclock 100.00% 99.90% 102.20% The clear effect here is that the 2% increase in CPI is directly reflected in the final wallclock time. (The other interesting effect is that the more ops are out of line calls via pvops, the lower the cache access and miss rates. Not too surprising, but it suggests that the non-pvops kernel is over-inlined. On the flipside, the branch misses go up correspondingly...) So, what's the fix? Paravirt patching turns all the pvops calls into direct calls, so _spin_lock etc do end up having direct calls. For example, the compiler generated code for paravirtualized _spin_lock is: <_spin_lock+0>: mov %gs:0xb4c8,%rax <_spin_lock+9>: incl 0xffffffffffffe044(%rax) <_spin_lock+15>: callq *0xffffffff805a5b30 <_spin_lock+22>: retq The indirect call will get patched to: <_spin_lock+0>: mov %gs:0xb4c8,%rax <_spin_lock+9>: incl 0xffffffffffffe044(%rax) <_spin_lock+15>: callq <__ticket_spin_lock> <_spin_lock+20>: nop; nop /* or whatever 2-byte nop */ <_spin_lock+22>: retq One possibility is to inline _spin_lock, etc, when building an optimised kernel (ie, when there's no spinlock/preempt instrumentation/debugging enabled). That will remove the outer call/return pair, returning the instruction stream to a single call/return, which will presumably execute the same as the non-pvops case. The downsides arel 1) it will replicate the preempt_disable/enable code at eack lock/unlock callsite; this code is fairly small, but not nothing; and 2) the spinlock definitions are already a very heavily tangled mass of #ifdefs and other preprocessor magic, and making any changes will be non-trivial. The other obvious answer is to disable pv-spinlocks. Making them a separate config option is fairly easy, and it would be trivial to enable them only when Xen is enabled (as the only non-default user). But it doesn't really address the common case of a distro build which is going to have Xen support enabled, and leaves the open question of whether the native performance cost of pv-spinlocks is worth the performance improvement on a loaded Xen system (10% saving of overall system CPU when guests block rather than spin). Still it is a reasonable short-term workaround. [ Impact: fix pvops performance regression when running native ] Analysed-by: N"Xin Xiaohui" <xiaohui.xin@intel.com> Analysed-by: N"Li Xin" <xin.li@intel.com> Analysed-by: N"Nakajima Jun" <jun.nakajima@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Acked-by: NH. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de> Cc: Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xensource.com> LKML-Reference: <4A0B62F7.5030802@goop.org> [ fixed the help text ] Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
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- 13 5月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Randy Dunlap 提交于
mmu.c needs to #include module.h to prevent these warnings: arch/x86/xen/mmu.c:239: warning: data definition has no type or storage class arch/x86/xen/mmu.c:239: warning: type defaults to 'int' in declaration of 'EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL' arch/x86/xen/mmu.c:239: warning: parameter names (without types) in function declaration [ Impact: cleanup ] Signed-off-by: NRandy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Acked-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> LKML-Reference: <new-submission> Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
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- 09 5月, 2009 3 次提交
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由 Jeremy Fitzhardinge 提交于
stts() is implemented in terms of read_cr0/write_cr0 to update the state of the TS bit. This happens during context switch, and so is fairly performance critical. Rather than falling back to a trap-and-emulate native read_cr0, implement our own by caching the last-written value from write_cr0 (the TS bit is the only one we really care about). Impact: optimise Xen context switches Signed-off-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
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由 Jeremy Fitzhardinge 提交于
Ignore known IST-using traps. Aside from the debugger traps, they're low-level faults which Xen will handle for us, so the kernel needn't worry about them. Keep warning in case unknown trap starts using IST. Impact: suppress spurious warnings Signed-off-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
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由 Jeremy Fitzhardinge 提交于
Native x86-64 uses the IST mechanism to run int3 and debug traps on an alternative stack. Xen does not do this, and so the frames were being misinterpreted by the ptrace code. This change special-cases these two exceptions by using Xen variants which run on the normal kernel stack properly. Impact: avoid crash or bad data when IST trap is invoked under Xen Signed-off-by: NJeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
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