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  1. 14 1月, 2017 1 次提交
  3. 12 1月, 2017 2 次提交
    • J
      x86/unwind: Disable KASAN checks for non-current tasks · 84936118
      由 Josh Poimboeuf 提交于 
      There are a handful of callers to save_stack_trace_tsk() and
show_stack() which try to unwind the stack of a task other than current.
In such cases, it's remotely possible that the task is running on one
CPU while the unwinder is reading its stack from another CPU, causing
the unwinder to see stack corruption.

These cases seem to be mostly harmless.  The unwinder has checks which
prevent it from following bad pointers beyond the bounds of the stack.
So it's not really a bug as long as the caller understands that
unwinding another task will not always succeed.

In such cases, it's possible that the unwinder may read a KASAN-poisoned
region of the stack.  Account for that by using READ_ONCE_NOCHECK() when
reading the stack of another task.

Use READ_ONCE() when reading the stack of the current task, since KASAN
warnings can still be useful for finding bugs in that case.
Reported-by: NDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/4c575eb288ba9f73d498dfe0acde2f58674598f1.1483978430.git.jpoimboe@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      84936118
    • J
      x86/unwind: Silence warnings for non-current tasks · 900742d8
      由 Josh Poimboeuf 提交于 
      There are a handful of callers to save_stack_trace_tsk() and
show_stack() which try to unwind the stack of a task other than current.
In such cases, it's remotely possible that the task is running on one
CPU while the unwinder is reading its stack from another CPU, causing
the unwinder to see stack corruption.

These cases seem to be mostly harmless.  The unwinder has checks which
prevent it from following bad pointers beyond the bounds of the stack.
So it's not really a bug as long as the caller understands that
unwinding another task will not always succeed.

Since stack "corruption" on another task's stack isn't necessarily a
bug, silence the warnings when unwinding tasks other than current.
Reported-by: NDave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/00d8c50eea3446c1524a2a755397a3966629354c.1483978430.git.jpoimboe@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      900742d8
  5. 10 1月, 2017 4 次提交
  7. 06 1月, 2017 1 次提交
  9. 05 1月, 2017 1 次提交
  11. 27 12月, 2016 1 次提交
  13. 25 12月, 2016 4 次提交
  15. 24 12月, 2016 1 次提交
    • J
      Revert "x86/unwind: Detect bad stack return address" · c280f773
      由 Josh Poimboeuf 提交于 
      Revert the following commit:

  b6959a36 ("x86/unwind: Detect bad stack return address")

... because Andrey Konovalov reported an unwinder warning:

  WARNING: unrecognized kernel stack return address ffffffffa0000001 at ffff88006377fa18 in a.out:4467

The unwind was initiated from an interrupt which occurred while running in the
generated code for a kprobe.  The unwinder printed the warning because it
expected regs->ip to point to a valid text address, but instead it pointed to
the generated code.

Eventually we may want come up with a way to identify generated kprobe
code so the unwinder can know that it's a valid return address.  Until
then, just remove the warning.
Reported-by: NAndrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/02f296848fbf49fb72dfeea706413ecbd9d4caf6.1482418739.git.jpoimboe@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      c280f773
  17. 23 12月, 2016 1 次提交
    • P
      x86/paravirt: Mark unused patch_default label · cef4402d
      由 Peter Zijlstra 提交于 
      A bugfix commit:

  45dbea5f ("x86/paravirt: Fix native_patch()")

... introduced a harmless warning:

  arch/x86/kernel/paravirt_patch_32.c: In function 'native_patch':
  arch/x86/kernel/paravirt_patch_32.c:71:1: error: label 'patch_default' defined but not used [-Werror=unused-label]

Fix it by annotating the label as __maybe_unused.
Reported-by: NArnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reported-by: NPiotr Gregor <piotrgregor@rsyncme.org>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: 45dbea5f ("x86/paravirt: Fix native_patch()")
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      cef4402d
  19. 21 12月, 2016 1 次提交
  21. 20 12月, 2016 2 次提交
    • B
      x86/alternatives: Do not use sync_core() to serialize I$ · 34bfab0e
      由 Borislav Petkov 提交于 
      We use sync_core() in the alternatives code to stop speculative
execution of prefetched instructions because we are potentially changing
them and don't want to execute stale bytes.

What it does on most machines is call CPUID which is a serializing
instruction. And that's expensive.

However, the instruction cache is serialized when we're on the local CPU
and are changing the data through the same virtual address. So then, we
don't need the serializing CPUID but a simple control flow change. Last
being accomplished with a CALL/RET which the noinline causes.
Suggested-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Henrique de Moraes Holschuh <hmh@hmh.eng.br>
Cc: Matthew Whitehead <tedheadster@gmail.com>
Cc: One Thousand Gnomes <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161203150258.vwr5zzco7ctgc4pe@pd.tnicSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      34bfab0e
    • V
      x86/hyperv: Handle unknown NMIs on one CPU when unknown_nmi_panic · 59107e2f
      由 Vitaly Kuznetsov 提交于 
      There is a feature in Hyper-V ('Debug-VM --InjectNonMaskableInterrupt')
which injects NMI to the guest. We may want to crash the guest and do kdump
on this NMI by enabling unknown_nmi_panic. To make kdump succeed we need to
allow the kdump kernel to re-establish VMBus connection so it will see
VMBus devices (storage, network,..).

To properly unload VMBus making it possible to start over during kdump we
need to do the following:

 - Send an 'unload' message to the hypervisor. This can be done on any CPU
   so we do this the crashing CPU.

 - Receive the 'unload finished' reply message. WS2012R2 delivers this
   message to the CPU which was used to establish VMBus connection during
   module load and this CPU may differ from the CPU sending 'unload'.

Receiving a VMBus message means the following:

 - There is a per-CPU slot in memory for one message. This slot can in
   theory be accessed by any CPU.

 - We get an interrupt on the CPU when a message was placed into the slot.

 - When we read the message we need to clear the slot and signal the fact
   to the hypervisor. In case there are more messages to this CPU pending
   the hypervisor will deliver the next message. The signaling is done by
   writing to an MSR so this can only be done on the appropriate CPU.

To avoid doing cross-CPU work on crash we have vmbus_wait_for_unload()
function which checks message slots for all CPUs in a loop waiting for the
'unload finished' messages. However, there is an issue which arises when
these conditions are met:

 - We're crashing on a CPU which is different from the one which was used
   to initially contact the hypervisor.

 - The CPU which was used for the initial contact is blocked with interrupts
   disabled and there is a message pending in the message slot.

In this case we won't be able to read the 'unload finished' message on the
crashing CPU. This is reproducible when we receive unknown NMIs on all CPUs
simultaneously: the first CPU entering panic() will proceed to crash and
all other CPUs will stop themselves with interrupts disabled.

The suggested solution is to handle unknown NMIs for Hyper-V guests on the
first CPU which gets them only. This will allow us to rely on VMBus
interrupt handler being able to receive the 'unload finish' message in
case it is delivered to a different CPU.

The issue is not reproducible on WS2016 as Debug-VM delivers NMI to the
boot CPU only, WS2012R2 and earlier Hyper-V versions are affected.
Signed-off-by: NVitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NK. Y. Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com>
Cc: devel@linuxdriverproject.org
Cc: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161202100720.28121-1-vkuznets@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      59107e2f
  23. 19 12月, 2016 10 次提交
  25. 18 12月, 2016 2 次提交
    • T
      x86/tsc: Limit the adjust value further · 8c9b9d87
      由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于 
      Adjust value 0x80000000 and other values larger than that render the TSC
deadline timer disfunctional.

We have not yet any information about this from Intel, but experimentation
clearly proves that this is a 32/64 bit and sign extension issue.

If adjust values larger than that are actually required, which might be the
case for physical CPU hotplug, then we need to disable the deadline timer
on the affected package/CPUs and use the local APIC timer instead.

That requires some surgery in the APIC setup code, so we just limit the
ADJUST register value into the known to work range for now and revisit this
when Intel comes forth with proper information.
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Roland Scheidegger <rscheidegger_lists@hispeed.ch>
Cc: Bruce Schlobohm <bruce.schlobohm@intel.com>
Cc: Kevin Stanton <kevin.b.stanton@intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      8c9b9d87
    • T
      x86/tsc: Annotate printouts as firmware bug · 16588f65
      由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于 
      Make it more obvious that the BIOS is screwed up.
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Roland Scheidegger <rscheidegger_lists@hispeed.ch>
Cc: Bruce Schlobohm <bruce.schlobohm@intel.com>
Cc: Kevin Stanton <kevin.b.stanton@intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      16588f65
  27. 15 12月, 2016 6 次提交
    • T
      x86/tsc: Force TSC_ADJUST register to value >= zero · 5bae1562
      由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于 
      Roland reported that his DELL T5810 sports a value add BIOS which
completely wreckages the TSC. The squirmware [(TM) Ingo Molnar] boots with
random negative TSC_ADJUST values, different on all CPUs. That renders the
TSC useless because the sycnchronization check fails.

Roland tested the new TSC_ADJUST mechanism. While it manages to readjust
the TSCs he needs to disable the TSC deadline timer, otherwise the machine
just stops booting.

Deeper investigation unearthed that the TSC deadline timer is sensitive to
the TSC_ADJUST value. Writing TSC_ADJUST to a negative value results in an
interrupt storm caused by the TSC deadline timer.

This does not make any sense and it's hard to imagine what kind of hardware
wreckage is behind that misfeature, but it's reliably reproducible on other
systems which have TSC_ADJUST and TSC deadline timer.

While it would be understandable that a big enough negative value which
moves the resulting TSC readout into the negative space could have the
described effect, this happens even with a adjust value of -1, which keeps
the TSC readout definitely in the positive space. The compare register for
the TSC deadline timer is set to a positive value larger than the TSC, but
despite not having reached the deadline the interrupt is raised
immediately. If this happens on the boot CPU, then the machine dies
silently because this setup happens before the NMI watchdog is armed.

Further experiments showed that any other adjustment of TSC_ADJUST works as
expected as long as it stays in the positive range. The direction of the
adjustment has no influence either. See the lkml link for further analysis.

Yet another proof for the theory that timers are designed by janitors and
the underlying (obviously undocumented) mechanisms which allow BIOSes to
wreckage them are considered a feature. Well done Intel - NOT!

To address this wreckage add the following sanity measures:

- If the TSC_ADJUST value on the boot cpu is not 0, set it to 0

- If the TSC_ADJUST value on any cpu is negative, set it to 0

- Prevent the cross package synchronization mechanism from setting negative
  TSC_ADJUST values.
Reported-and-tested-by: NRoland Scheidegger <rscheidegger_lists@hispeed.ch>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Bruce Schlobohm <bruce.schlobohm@intel.com>
Cc: Kevin Stanton <kevin.b.stanton@intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Allen Hung <allen_hung@dell.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161213131211.397588033@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      5bae1562
    • T
      x86/tsc: Validate TSC_ADJUST after resume · 6a369583
      由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于 
      Some 'feature' BIOSes fiddle with the TSC_ADJUST register during
suspend/resume which renders the TSC unusable.

Add sanity checks into the resume path and restore the
original value if it was adjusted.
Reported-and-tested-by: NRoland Scheidegger <rscheidegger_lists@hispeed.ch>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Bruce Schlobohm <bruce.schlobohm@intel.com>
Cc: Kevin Stanton <kevin.b.stanton@intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Allen Hung <allen_hung@dell.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161213131211.317654500@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      6a369583
    • B
      x86/acpi: Use proper macro for invalid node · 4370a3ef
      由 Boris Ostrovsky 提交于 
      Use NUMA_NO_NODE instead of -1.
Signed-off-by: NBoris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: len.brown@intel.com
Cc: rjw@rjwysocki.net
Cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: pavel@ucw.cz
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1481570993-13941-1-git-send-email-boris.ostrovsky@oracle.comSigned-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      4370a3ef
    • T
      x86/smpboot: Prevent false positive out of bounds cpumask access warning · 427d77a3
      由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于 
      prefill_possible_map() reinitializes the cpu_possible_map by setting the
possible cpu bits and clearing all other bits up to NR_CPUS.

This is technically always correct because cpu_possible_map is statically
allocated and sized NR_CPUS. With CPUMASK_OFFSTACK and DEBUG_PER_CPU_MAPS
enabled the bounds check of cpu masks happens on nr_cpu_ids. nr_cpu_ids is
initialized to NR_CPUS and only limited after the set/clear bit loops have
been executed. 

But if the system was booted with "nr_cpus=N" on the command line, where N
is < NR_CPUS then nr_cpu_ids is limited in the parameter parsing function
before prefill_possible_map() is invoked. As a consequence the cpumask
bounds check triggers when clearing the bits past nr_cpu_ids.

Add a helper which allows to reset cpu_possible_map w/o the bounds check
and then set only the possible bits which are well inside bounds.
Reported-by: NDmitry Safonov <dsafonov@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: 0x7f454c46@gmail.com
Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@novell.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1612131836050.3415@nanosSigned-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      427d77a3
    • B
      kexec: export the value of phys_base instead of symbol address · 401721ec
      由 Baoquan He 提交于 
      Currently in x86_64, the symbol address of phys_base is exported to
vmcoreinfo.  Dave Anderson complained this is really useless for his
Crash implementation.  Because in user-space utility Crash and
Makedumpfile which exported vmcore information is mainly used for, value
of phys_base is needed to covert virtual address of exported kernel
symbol to physical address.  Especially init_level4_pgt, if we want to
access and go over the page table to look up a PA corresponding to VA,
firstly we need calculate

  page_dir = SYMBOL(init_level4_pgt) - __START_KERNEL_map + phys_base;

Now in Crash and Makedumpfile, we have to analyze the vmcore elf program
header to get value of phys_base.  As Dave said, it would be preferable
if it were readily availabl in vmcoreinfo rather than depending upon the
PT_LOAD semantics.

Hence in this patch change to export the value of phys_base instead of
its virtual address.

And people also complained that KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE exporting is x86_64
only, should be moved into arch dependent function
arch_crash_save_vmcoreinfo.  Do the moving in this patch.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1478568596-30060-2-git-send-email-bhe@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NBaoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Xunlei Pang <xlpang@redhat.com>
Cc: HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Eugene Surovegin <surovegin@google.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Cc: Atsushi Kumagai <ats-kumagai@wm.jp.nec.com>
Cc: Dave Anderson <anderson@redhat.com>
Cc: Pratyush Anand <panand@redhat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      401721ec
    • B
      Revert "kdump, vmcoreinfo: report memory sections virtual addresses" · 69f58384
      由 Baoquan He 提交于 
      This reverts commit 0549a3c0 ("kdump, vmcoreinfo: report memory
sections virtual addresses").

Commit 0549a3c0 tells the userspace utility makedumpfile the
randomized base address of these memmory sections when mm kaslr is
enabled.  However the following patch "kexec: export the value of
phys_base instead of symbol address" makes makedumpfile not need these
addresses any more.

Besides we should use VMCOREINFO_NUMBER to export the value of the
variable so that we can use the existing number_table mechanism of
Makedumpfile to fetch it.  So revert it now.  If needed we can add it
later.

http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/kexec/2016-October/017540.html
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1478568596-30060-1-git-send-email-bhe@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NBaoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Xunlei Pang <xlpang@redhat.com>
Cc: HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Eugene Surovegin <surovegin@google.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Cc: Atsushi Kumagai <ats-kumagai@wm.jp.nec.com>
Cc: Dave Anderson <anderson@redhat.com>
Cc: Pratyush Anand <panand@redhat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      69f58384
  29. 14 12月, 2016 2 次提交
  31. 13 12月, 2016 1 次提交
    • T
      x86/smpboot: Make logical package management more robust · 9d85eb91
      由 Thomas Gleixner 提交于 
      The logical package management has several issues:

 - The APIC ids provided by ACPI are not required to be the same as the
   initial APIC id which can be retrieved by CPUID. The APIC ids provided
   by ACPI are those which are written by the BIOS into the APIC. The
   initial id is set by hardware and can not be changed. The hardware
   provided ids contain the real hardware package information.

   Especially AMD sets the effective APIC id different from the hardware id
   as they need to reserve space for the IOAPIC ids starting at id 0.

   As a consequence those machines trigger the currently active firmware
   bug printouts in dmesg, These are obviously wrong.

 - Virtual machines have their own interesting of enumerating APICs and
   packages which are not reliably covered by the current implementation.

The sizing of the mapping array has been tweaked to be generously large to
handle systems which provide a wrong core count when HT is disabled so the
whole magic which checks for space in the physical hotplug case is not
needed anymore.

Simplify the whole machinery and do the mapping when the CPU starts and the
CPUID derived physical package information is available. This solves the
observed problems on AMD machines and works for the virtualization issues
as well.

Remove the extra call from XEN cpu bringup code as it is not longer
required.

Fixes: d49597fd ("x86/cpu: Deal with broken firmware (VMWare/XEN)")
Reported-and-tested-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: NBoris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: M. Vefa Bicakci <m.v.b@runbox.com>
Cc: xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>
Cc: Charles (Chas) Williams <ciwillia@brocade.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Alok Kataria <akataria@vmware.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1612121102260.3429@nanosSigned-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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