1. 07 1月, 2013 5 次提交
  2. 05 1月, 2013 9 次提交
  3. 04 1月, 2013 4 次提交
  4. 30 12月, 2012 2 次提交
    • S
      bridge: respect RFC2863 operational state · 576eb625
      stephen hemminger 提交于
      The bridge link detection should follow the operational state
      of the lower device, rather than the carrier bit. This allows devices
      like tunnels that are controlled by userspace control plane to work
      with bridge STP link management.
      Signed-off-by: NStephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com>
      Reviewed-by: NFlavio Leitner <fbl@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      576eb625
    • D
      net: filter: return -EINVAL if BPF_S_ANC* operation is not supported · aa1113d9
      Daniel Borkmann 提交于
      Currently, we return -EINVAL for malformed or wrong BPF filters.
      However, this is not done for BPF_S_ANC* operations, which makes it
      more difficult to detect if it's actually supported or not by the
      BPF machine. Therefore, we should also return -EINVAL if K is within
      the SKF_AD_OFF universe and the ancillary operation did not match.
      
      Why exactly is it needed? If tools such as libpcap/tcpdump want to
      make use of new ancillary operations (like filtering VLAN in kernel
      space), there is currently no sane way to test if this feature /
      BPF_S_ANC* op is present or not, since no error is returned. This
      patch will make life easier for that and allow for a proper usage
      for user space applications.
      
      There was concern, if this patch will break userland. Short answer: Yes
      and no. Long answer: It will "break" only for code that calls ...
      
        { BPF_LD | BPF_(W|H|B) | BPF_ABS, 0, 0, <K> },
      
      ... where <K> is in [0xfffff000, 0xffffffff] _and_ <K> is *not* an
      ancillary. And here comes the BUT: assuming some *old* code will have
      such an instruction where <K> is between [0xfffff000, 0xffffffff] and
      it doesn't know ancillary operations, then this will give a
      non-expected / unwanted behavior as well (since we do not return the
      BPF machine with 0 after a failed load_pointer(), which was the case
      before introducing ancillary operations, but load sth. into the
      accumulator instead, and continue with the next instruction, for
      instance). Thus, user space code would already have been broken by
      introducing ancillary operations into the BPF machine per se. Code
      that does such a direct load, e.g. "load word at packet offset
      0xffffffff into accumulator" ("ld [0xffffffff]") is quite broken,
      isn't it? The whole assumption of ancillary operations is that no-one
      intentionally calls things like "ld [0xffffffff]" and expect this
      word to be loaded from such a packet offset. Hence, we can also safely
      make use of this feature testing patch and facilitate application
      development. Therefore, at least from this patch onwards, we have
      *for sure* a check whether current or in future implemented BPF_S_ANC*
      ops are supported in the kernel. Patch was tested on x86_64.
      
      (Thanks to Eric for the previous review.)
      
      Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
      Reported-by: NAni Sinha <ani@aristanetworks.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      aa1113d9
  5. 29 12月, 2012 7 次提交
  6. 27 12月, 2012 6 次提交
  7. 25 12月, 2012 1 次提交
  8. 22 12月, 2012 6 次提交
    • S
      net: sched: integer overflow fix · d2fe85da
      Stefan Hasko 提交于
      Fixed integer overflow in function htb_dequeue
      Signed-off-by: NStefan Hasko <hasko.stevo@gmail.com>
      Acked-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      d2fe85da
    • G
      CONFIG_HOTPLUG removal from networking core · 8baf82b3
      Greg KH 提交于
      CONFIG_HOTPLUG is always enabled now, so remove the unused code that was
      trying to be compiled out when this option was disabled, in the
      networking core.
      
      Cc: Bill Pemberton <wfp5p@virginia.edu>
      Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      8baf82b3
    • G
      bridge: call br_netpoll_disable in br_add_if · 9b1536c4
      Gao feng 提交于
      When netdev_set_master faild in br_add_if, we should
      call br_netpoll_disable to do some cleanup jobs,such
      as free the memory of struct netpoll which allocated
      in br_netpoll_enable.
      Signed-off-by: NGao feng <gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com>
      Acked-by: NCong Wang <amwang@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      9b1536c4
    • E
      ipv4: arp: fix a lockdep splat in arp_solicit() · 9650388b
      Eric Dumazet 提交于
      Yan Burman reported following lockdep warning :
      
      =============================================
      [ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ]
      3.7.0+ #24 Not tainted
      ---------------------------------------------
      swapper/1/0 is trying to acquire lock:
        (&n->lock){++--..}, at: [<ffffffff8139f56e>] __neigh_event_send
      +0x2e/0x2f0
      
      but task is already holding lock:
        (&n->lock){++--..}, at: [<ffffffff813f63f4>] arp_solicit+0x1d4/0x280
      
      other info that might help us debug this:
        Possible unsafe locking scenario:
      
              CPU0
              ----
         lock(&n->lock);
         lock(&n->lock);
      
        *** DEADLOCK ***
      
        May be due to missing lock nesting notation
      
      4 locks held by swapper/1/0:
        #0:  (((&n->timer))){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8104b350>]
      call_timer_fn+0x0/0x1c0
        #1:  (&n->lock){++--..}, at: [<ffffffff813f63f4>] arp_solicit
      +0x1d4/0x280
        #2:  (rcu_read_lock_bh){.+....}, at: [<ffffffff81395400>]
      dev_queue_xmit+0x0/0x5d0
        #3:  (rcu_read_lock_bh){.+....}, at: [<ffffffff813cb41e>]
      ip_finish_output+0x13e/0x640
      
      stack backtrace:
      Pid: 0, comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 3.7.0+ #24
      Call Trace:
        <IRQ>  [<ffffffff8108c7ac>] validate_chain+0xdcc/0x11f0
        [<ffffffff8108d570>] ? __lock_acquire+0x440/0xc30
        [<ffffffff81120565>] ? kmem_cache_free+0xe5/0x1c0
        [<ffffffff8108d570>] __lock_acquire+0x440/0xc30
        [<ffffffff813c3570>] ? inet_getpeer+0x40/0x600
        [<ffffffff8108d570>] ? __lock_acquire+0x440/0xc30
        [<ffffffff8139f56e>] ? __neigh_event_send+0x2e/0x2f0
        [<ffffffff8108ddf5>] lock_acquire+0x95/0x140
        [<ffffffff8139f56e>] ? __neigh_event_send+0x2e/0x2f0
        [<ffffffff8108d570>] ? __lock_acquire+0x440/0xc30
        [<ffffffff81448d4b>] _raw_write_lock_bh+0x3b/0x50
        [<ffffffff8139f56e>] ? __neigh_event_send+0x2e/0x2f0
        [<ffffffff8139f56e>] __neigh_event_send+0x2e/0x2f0
        [<ffffffff8139f99b>] neigh_resolve_output+0x16b/0x270
        [<ffffffff813cb62d>] ip_finish_output+0x34d/0x640
        [<ffffffff813cb41e>] ? ip_finish_output+0x13e/0x640
        [<ffffffffa046f146>] ? vxlan_xmit+0x556/0xbec [vxlan]
        [<ffffffff813cb9a0>] ip_output+0x80/0xf0
        [<ffffffff813ca368>] ip_local_out+0x28/0x80
        [<ffffffffa046f25a>] vxlan_xmit+0x66a/0xbec [vxlan]
        [<ffffffffa046f146>] ? vxlan_xmit+0x556/0xbec [vxlan]
        [<ffffffff81394a50>] ? skb_gso_segment+0x2b0/0x2b0
        [<ffffffff81449355>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x65/0x80
        [<ffffffff81394c57>] ? dev_queue_xmit_nit+0x207/0x270
        [<ffffffff813950c8>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x298/0x5d0
        [<ffffffff813956f3>] dev_queue_xmit+0x2f3/0x5d0
        [<ffffffff81395400>] ? dev_hard_start_xmit+0x5d0/0x5d0
        [<ffffffff813f5788>] arp_xmit+0x58/0x60
        [<ffffffff813f59db>] arp_send+0x3b/0x40
        [<ffffffff813f6424>] arp_solicit+0x204/0x280
        [<ffffffff813a1a70>] ? neigh_add+0x310/0x310
        [<ffffffff8139f515>] neigh_probe+0x45/0x70
        [<ffffffff813a1c10>] neigh_timer_handler+0x1a0/0x2a0
        [<ffffffff8104b3cf>] call_timer_fn+0x7f/0x1c0
        [<ffffffff8104b350>] ? detach_if_pending+0x120/0x120
        [<ffffffff8104b748>] run_timer_softirq+0x238/0x2b0
        [<ffffffff813a1a70>] ? neigh_add+0x310/0x310
        [<ffffffff81043e51>] __do_softirq+0x101/0x280
        [<ffffffff814518cc>] call_softirq+0x1c/0x30
        [<ffffffff81003b65>] do_softirq+0x85/0xc0
        [<ffffffff81043a7e>] irq_exit+0x9e/0xc0
        [<ffffffff810264f8>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x68/0xa0
        [<ffffffff8145122f>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x6f/0x80
        <EOI>  [<ffffffff8100a054>] ? mwait_idle+0xa4/0x1c0
        [<ffffffff8100a04b>] ? mwait_idle+0x9b/0x1c0
        [<ffffffff8100a6a9>] cpu_idle+0x89/0xe0
        [<ffffffff81441127>] start_secondary+0x1b2/0x1b6
      
      Bug is from arp_solicit(), releasing the neigh lock after arp_send()
      In case of vxlan, we eventually need to write lock a neigh lock later.
      
      Its a false positive, but we can get rid of it without lockdep
      annotations.
      
      We can instead use neigh_ha_snapshot() helper.
      Reported-by: NYan Burman <yanb@mellanox.com>
      Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Acked-by: NStephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      9650388b
    • E
      net: devnet_rename_seq should be a seqcount · 30e6c9fa
      Eric Dumazet 提交于
      Using a seqlock for devnet_rename_seq is not a good idea,
      as device_rename() can sleep.
      
      As we hold RTNL, we dont need a protection for writers,
      and only need a seqcount so that readers can catch a change done
      by a writer.
      
      Bug added in commit c91f6df2 (sockopt: Change getsockopt() of
      SO_BINDTODEVICE to return an interface name)
      Reported-by: NDave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Cc: Brian Haley <brian.haley@hp.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      30e6c9fa
    • E
      ip_gre: fix possible use after free · f7e75ba1
      Eric Dumazet 提交于
      Once skb_realloc_headroom() is called, tiph might point to freed memory.
      
      Cache tiph->ttl value before the reallocation, to avoid unexpected
      behavior.
      Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Cc: Isaku Yamahata <yamahata@valinux.co.jp>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      f7e75ba1