Sacrifice queueing fairness for performance.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

 Remove some senseless wrappers.
Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

 Not only are the qop parameters that are passed around throughout the gssapi
 unused by any currently implemented mechanism, but there appears to be some
 doubt as to whether they will ever be used.  Let's just kill them off for now.
Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

 Add support for privacy to the krb5 rpcsec_gss mechanism.
Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

 The code this was originally derived from processed wrap and mic tokens using
 the same functions.  This required some contortions, and more would be required
 with the addition of xdr_buf's, so it's better to separate out the two code
 paths.

 In preparation for adding privacy support, remove the last vestiges of the
 old wrap token code.
Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

 Factor out some code that will be shared by privacy crypto routines
Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

 Add the code to the client side to handle privacy.  This is dead code until
 we actually add privacy support to krb5.
Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

 Various xdr encode routines use au_rslack to guess where the reply argument
 will end up, so we can set up the xdr_buf to recieve data into the right place
 for zero copy.

 Currently we calculate the au_rslack estimate when we check the verifier.
 Normally this only depends on the verifier size.  In the integrity case we add
 a few bytes to allow for a length and sequence number.

 It's a bit simpler to calculate only the verifier size when we check the
 verifier, and delay the full calculation till we unwrap.
Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

 For privacy we need to allocate extra pages to hold encrypted page data when
 wrapping requests.  This allocation may fail, and we handle that case by
 waiting and retrying.
Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

 For privacy, we need to allocate pages to store the encrypted data (passed
 in pages can't be used without the risk of corrupting data in the page cache).
 So we need a way to free that memory after the request has been transmitted.
Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

 Add support for privacy to generic gss-api code.  This is dead code until we
 have both a mechanism that supports privacy and code in the client or server
 that uses it.
Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

 resp_len is passed in as buffer size to decode routine; make sure it's
 set right in case where userspace provides less than a page's worth of
 buffer.
Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

 Stop handing garbage to userspace in the case where a weird server clears the
 acl bit in the getattr return (despite the fact that they've already claimed
 acl support.)
Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

 This patch stops the release_pipe() funtion from being called
 twice by invalidating the ops pointer in the rpc_inode
 when rpc_pipe_release() is called.
Signed-off-by: NSteve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

 Storing a pointer to the struct rpc_task in the nfs_seqid is broken
 since the nfs_seqid may be freed well after the task has been destroyed.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

 If someone tries to rename a directory onto an empty directory, we
 currently fail and return EBUSY.
 This patch ensures that we try the rename if both source and target
 are directories, and that we fail with a correct error of EISDIR if
 the source is not a directory.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

 We currently fail Connectathon test 6.10 in the case of 32-bit locks due
 to incorrect error checking.
 Also add support for l->l_len < 0 to 64-bit locks.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

 If the server is in the unconfirmed OPEN state for a given open owner
 and receives a second OPEN for the same open owner, it will cancel the
 state of the first request and set up an OPEN_CONFIRM for the second.

 This can cause a race that is discussed in rfc3530 on page 181.

 The following patch allows the client to recover by retrying the
 original open request.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

 Unless of course the open fails due to permission issues.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

 This will allow nfs_permission() to perform additional optimizations when
 walking the path, by folding the ACCESS(MAY_EXEC) call on the directory
 into the lookup revalidation.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

 Since it appears that some servers don't...
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

 Make NFSv4 return the fully initialized file pointer with the
 stateid that it created in the lookup w/intent.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

 This is needed by NFSv4 for atomicity reasons: our open command is in
 fact a lookup+open, so we need to be able to propagate open context
 information from lookup() into the resulting struct file's
 private_data field.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

 ...and fix a memory corruption bug due to improper use of memcpy() on
 a struct file_lock.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

 Currently we fail to do so if the process was signalled.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

 We no longer need to worry about collisions between close() and the state
 recovery code, since the new close will automatically recheck the
 file state once it is done waiting on its sequence slot.

 Ditto for the nfs4_proc_locku() procedure.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

 OPEN, CLOSE, etc no longer need these semaphores to ensure ordering of
 requests.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

 Once the state_owner and lock_owner semaphores get removed, it will be
 possible for other OPEN requests to reopen the same file if they have
 lower sequence ids than our CLOSE call.
 This patch ensures that we recheck the file state once
 nfs_wait_on_sequence() has completed waiting.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

 NFSv4 file state-changing functions such as OPEN, CLOSE, LOCK,... are all
 labelled with "sequence identifiers" in order to prevent the server from
 reordering RPC requests, as this could cause its file state to
 become out of sync with the client.

 Currently the NFS client code enforces this ordering locally using
 semaphores to restrict access to structures until the RPC call is done.
 This, of course, only works with synchronous RPC calls, since the
 user process must first grab the semaphore.
 By dropping semaphores, and instead teaching the RPC engine to hold
 the RPC calls until they are ready to be sent, we can extend this
 process to work nicely with asynchronous RPC calls too.

 This patch adds a new list called "rpc_sequence" that defines the order
 of the RPC calls to be sent. We add one such list for each state_owner.
 When an RPC call is ready to be sent, it checks if it is top of the
 rpc_sequence list. If so, it proceeds. If not, it goes back to sleep,
 and loops until it hits top of the list.
 Once the RPC call has completed, it can then bump the sequence id counter,
 and remove itself from the rpc_sequence list, and then wake up the next
 sleeper.

 Note that the state_owner sequence ids and lock_owner sequence ids are
 all indexed to the same rpc_sequence list, so OPEN, LOCK,... requests
 are all ordered w.r.t. each other.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

 Currently, call_encode will cause the entire RPC call to abort if it returns
 an error. This is unnecessarily rigid, and gets in the way of attempts
 to allow the NFSv4 layer to order RPC calls that carry sequence ids.
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

 After a server crash/reboot, rebinding should always retry, otherwise
 requests on "hard" mounts will fail when they shouldn't.

 Test plan:
 Run a lock-intensive workload against a server while rebooting the server
 repeatedly.
Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <cel@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Reported by: Bob Tracy <rct@gherkin.frus.com>

 "...I've got a Toshiba notebook (730XCDT -- Pentium 150MMX) for which
  I'm using the Vesa FB driver.  When the machine has been idle for some
  time and the driver attempts to powerdown the display, rather than the
  display going blank, it goes gray with several strange lines.  When I
  hit the "shift" key or other-wise wake up the display, the old video
  state is not fully restored..."

vesafb recently added a blank method which has only 2 states, powerup and
powerdown.  The powerdown state is used for all blanking levels, but in his
case, powerdown does not work correctly for higher levels of display
powersaving. Thus, for intermediate power levels, use software blanking,
and use only hardware blanking for an explicit powerdown.
Signed-off-by: NAntonino Daplas <adaplas@pol.net>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>