1. 29 2月, 2008 1 次提交
    • T
      [XFRM]: Speed up xfrm_policy and xfrm_state walking · 4c563f76
      Timo Teras 提交于
      Change xfrm_policy and xfrm_state walking algorithm from O(n^2) to O(n).
      This is achieved adding the entries to one more list which is used
      solely for walking the entries.
      
      This also fixes some races where the dump can have duplicate or missing
      entries when the SPD/SADB is modified during an ongoing dump.
      
      Dumping SADB with 20000 entries using "time ip xfrm state" the sys
      time dropped from 1.012s to 0.080s.
      Signed-off-by: NTimo Teras <timo.teras@iki.fi>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      4c563f76
  2. 01 2月, 2008 1 次提交
    • H
      [IPSEC]: Add support for combined mode algorithms · 1a6509d9
      Herbert Xu 提交于
      This patch adds support for combined mode algorithms with GCM being
      the first algorithm supported.
      
      Combined mode algorithms can be added through the xfrm_user interface
      using the new algorithm payload type XFRMA_ALG_AEAD.  Each algorithms
      is identified by its name and the ICV length.
      
      For the purposes of matching algorithms in xfrm_tmpl structures,
      combined mode algorithms occupy the same name space as encryption
      algorithms.  This is in line with how they are negotiated using IKE.
      Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      1a6509d9
  3. 29 1月, 2008 4 次提交
  4. 05 5月, 2007 2 次提交
  5. 29 4月, 2007 1 次提交
  6. 26 4月, 2007 1 次提交
    • J
      [XFRM]: Export SAD info. · 28d8909b
      Jamal Hadi Salim 提交于
      On a system with a lot of SAs, counting SAD entries chews useful
      CPU time since you need to dump the whole SAD to user space;
      i.e something like ip xfrm state ls | grep -i src | wc -l
      I have seen taking literally minutes on a 40K SAs when the system
      is swapping.
      With this patch, some of the SAD info (that was already being tracked)
      is exposed to user space. i.e you do:
      ip xfrm state count
      And you get the count; you can also pass -s to the command line and
      get the hash info.
      Signed-off-by: NJamal Hadi Salim <hadi@cyberus.ca>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      28d8909b
  7. 09 2月, 2007 1 次提交
  8. 09 12月, 2006 1 次提交
  9. 03 12月, 2006 2 次提交
  10. 04 10月, 2006 1 次提交
  11. 29 9月, 2006 4 次提交
  12. 23 9月, 2006 8 次提交
  13. 18 6月, 2006 1 次提交
  14. 21 3月, 2006 2 次提交
  15. 04 1月, 2006 1 次提交
    • T
      [LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction. · df71837d
      Trent Jaeger 提交于
      This patch series implements per packet access control via the
      extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in
      the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security
      associations to label packets.  Extensions to the SELinux LSM are
      included that leverage the patch for this purpose.
      
      This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem,
      pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a
      socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security
      association) to send/receive network packets.
      
      Patch purpose:
      
      The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on
      the strongly authenticated IPSec security association.  Such access
      controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP
      address.  The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be
      spoofed.  By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote
      hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism.
      This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application
      if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to
      enforce the access control policy.
      
      Patch design approach:
      
      The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by
      user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a
      security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM
      subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via
      security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those
      policies.
      
      A presentation available at
      www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf
      from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach.
      
      Patch implementation details:
      
      On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or
      xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of
      the socket and the same security context is required for resultant
      security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in
      ipsec-tools).  This is enforced in xfrm_state_find.
      
      On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket
      (at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must
      also match the security association being used.
      
      The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec.
      The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as
      before.
      
      Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is
      minimal.  The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the
      combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec
      processing proceeds as in the original case.
      
      Testing:
      
      The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools.  ipsec-tools have
      been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version
      0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security
      associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation
      using the security contexts via racoon.
      
      The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set
      security contexts.  These programs are also available from me, and
      contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing
      this interface.  Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel
      behavior.
      Signed-off-by: NTrent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu>
      Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      df71837d
  16. 30 8月, 2005 1 次提交
  17. 21 6月, 2005 1 次提交
    • H
      [IPSEC]: Add XFRM_STATE_NOPMTUDISC flag · dd87147e
      Herbert Xu 提交于
      This patch adds the flag XFRM_STATE_NOPMTUDISC for xfrm states.  It is
      similar to the nopmtudisc on IPIP/GRE tunnels.  It only has an effect
      on IPv4 tunnel mode states.  For these states, it will ensure that the
      DF flag is always cleared.
      
      This is primarily useful to work around ICMP blackholes.
      
      In future this flag could also allow a larger MTU to be set within the
      tunnel just like IPIP/GRE tunnels.  This could be useful for short haul
      tunnels where temporary fragmentation outside the tunnel is desired over
      smaller fragments inside the tunnel.
      Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      dd87147e
  18. 19 6月, 2005 2 次提交
  19. 04 5月, 2005 2 次提交
  20. 17 4月, 2005 1 次提交
    • L
      Linux-2.6.12-rc2 · 1da177e4
      Linus Torvalds 提交于
      Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
      even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
      archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
      3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
      git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
      infrastructure for it.
      
      Let it rip!
      1da177e4