1. 17 8月, 2009 1 次提交
    • T
      SELinux: Convert avc_audit to use lsm_audit.h · 2bf49690
      Thomas Liu 提交于
      Convert avc_audit in security/selinux/avc.c to use lsm_audit.h,
      for better maintainability.
      
       - changed selinux to use common_audit_data instead of
          avc_audit_data
       - eliminated code in avc.c and used code from lsm_audit.h instead.
      
      Had to add a LSM_AUDIT_NO_AUDIT to lsm_audit.h so that avc_audit
      can call common_lsm_audit and do the pre and post callbacks without
      doing the actual dump.  This makes it so that the patched version
      behaves the same way as the unpatched version.
      
      Also added a denied field to the selinux_audit_data private space,
      once again to make it so that the patched version behaves like the
      unpatched.
      
      I've tested and confirmed that AVCs look the same before and after
      this patch.
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Liu <tliu@redhat.com>
      Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
      Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      2bf49690
  2. 14 8月, 2009 1 次提交
  3. 06 8月, 2009 2 次提交
    • E
      Security/SELinux: seperate lsm specific mmap_min_addr · a2551df7
      Eric Paris 提交于
      Currently SELinux enforcement of controls on the ability to map low memory
      is determined by the mmap_min_addr tunable.  This patch causes SELinux to
      ignore the tunable and instead use a seperate Kconfig option specific to how
      much space the LSM should protect.
      
      The tunable will now only control the need for CAP_SYS_RAWIO and SELinux
      permissions will always protect the amount of low memory designated by
      CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR.
      
      This allows users who need to disable the mmap_min_addr controls (usual reason
      being they run WINE as a non-root user) to do so and still have SELinux
      controls preventing confined domains (like a web server) from being able to
      map some area of low memory.
      Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      a2551df7
    • E
      SELinux: call cap_file_mmap in selinux_file_mmap · 84336d1a
      Eric Paris 提交于
      Currently SELinux does not check CAP_SYS_RAWIO in the file_mmap hook.  This
      means there is no DAC check on the ability to mmap low addresses in the
      memory space.  This function adds the DAC check for CAP_SYS_RAWIO while
      maintaining the selinux check on mmap_zero.  This means that processes
      which need to mmap low memory will need CAP_SYS_RAWIO and mmap_zero but will
      NOT need the SELinux sys_rawio capability.
      Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      84336d1a
  4. 17 7月, 2009 1 次提交
  5. 13 7月, 2009 2 次提交
  6. 25 6月, 2009 1 次提交
  7. 24 6月, 2009 1 次提交
  8. 23 6月, 2009 1 次提交
  9. 03 6月, 2009 1 次提交
  10. 05 5月, 2009 1 次提交
  11. 30 4月, 2009 3 次提交
  12. 28 3月, 2009 2 次提交
    • P
      selinux: Remove the "compat_net" compatibility code · 58bfbb51
      Paul Moore 提交于
      The SELinux "compat_net" is marked as deprecated, the time has come to
      finally remove it from the kernel.  Further code simplifications are
      likely in the future, but this patch was intended to be a simple,
      straight-up removal of the compat_net code.
      Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      58bfbb51
    • P
      netlabel: Label incoming TCP connections correctly in SELinux · 389fb800
      Paul Moore 提交于
      The current NetLabel/SELinux behavior for incoming TCP connections works but
      only through a series of happy coincidences that rely on the limited nature of
      standard CIPSO (only able to convey MLS attributes) and the write equality
      imposed by the SELinux MLS constraints.  The problem is that network sockets
      created as the result of an incoming TCP connection were not on-the-wire
      labeled based on the security attributes of the parent socket but rather based
      on the wire label of the remote peer.  The issue had to do with how IP options
      were managed as part of the network stack and where the LSM hooks were in
      relation to the code which set the IP options on these newly created child
      sockets.  While NetLabel/SELinux did correctly set the socket's on-the-wire
      label it was promptly cleared by the network stack and reset based on the IP
      options of the remote peer.
      
      This patch, in conjunction with a prior patch that adjusted the LSM hook
      locations, works to set the correct on-the-wire label format for new incoming
      connections through the security_inet_conn_request() hook.  Besides the
      correct behavior there are many advantages to this change, the most significant
      is that all of the NetLabel socket labeling code in SELinux now lives in hooks
      which can return error codes to the core stack which allows us to finally get
      ride of the selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() logic which greatly simplfies
      the NetLabel/SELinux glue code.  In the process of developing this patch I
      also ran into a small handful of AF_INET6 cleanliness issues that have been
      fixed which should make the code safer and easier to extend in the future.
      Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
      Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      389fb800
  13. 10 3月, 2009 1 次提交
  14. 06 3月, 2009 1 次提交
  15. 14 2月, 2009 3 次提交
  16. 02 2月, 2009 1 次提交
  17. 30 1月, 2009 17 次提交