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  1. 26 9月, 2006 8 次提交
  3. 23 9月, 2006 16 次提交
    • V
      [SELINUX]: Fix bug in security_sid_mls_copy · 4eb327b5
      由 Venkat Yekkirala 提交于 
      The following fixes a bug where random mem is being tampered with in the
non-mls case; encountered by Jashua Brindle on a gentoo box.
Signed-off-by: NVenkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      4eb327b5
    • P
      [NetLabel]: add some missing #includes to various header files · 7a0e1d60
      由 Paul Moore 提交于 
      Add some missing include files to the NetLabel related header files.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      7a0e1d60
    • P
      [NetLabel]: uninline selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() · e448e931
      由 Paul Moore 提交于 
      Uninline the selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() at the request of
Andrew Morton.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      e448e931
    • P
      [NetLabel]: Cleanup ebitmap_import() · 7b3bbb92
      由 Paul Moore 提交于 
      Rewrite ebitmap_import() so it is a bit cleaner and easier to read.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      7b3bbb92
    • P
      [NetLabel]: Comment corrections. · c1b14c0a
      由 Paul Moore 提交于 
      Fix some incorrect comments.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      c1b14c0a
    • P
      [NetLabel]: Correctly initialize the NetLabel fields. · 99f59ed0
      由 Paul Moore 提交于 
      Fix a problem where the NetLabel specific fields of the sk_security_struct
structure were not being initialized early enough in some cases.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      99f59ed0
    • A
      [SELINUX]: security/selinux/hooks.c: Make 4 functions static. · 9a673e56
      由 Adrian Bunk 提交于 
      This patch makes four needlessly global functions static.
Signed-off-by: NAdrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      9a673e56
    • V
      [NetLabel]: SELinux support · 7420ed23
      由 Venkat Yekkirala 提交于 
      Add NetLabel support to the SELinux LSM and modify the
socket_post_create() LSM hook to return an error code.  The most
significant part of this patch is the addition of NetLabel hooks into
the following SELinux LSM hooks:

 * selinux_file_permission()
 * selinux_socket_sendmsg()
 * selinux_socket_post_create()
 * selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb()
 * selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream()
 * selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram()
 * selinux_sock_graft()
 * selinux_inet_conn_request()

The basic reasoning behind this patch is that outgoing packets are
"NetLabel'd" by labeling their socket and the NetLabel security
attributes are checked via the additional hook in
selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb().  NetLabel itself is only a labeling
mechanism, similar to filesystem extended attributes, it is up to the
SELinux enforcement mechanism to perform the actual access checks.

In addition to the changes outlined above this patch also includes
some changes to the extended bitmap (ebitmap) and multi-level security
(mls) code to import and export SELinux TE/MLS attributes into and out
of NetLabel.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      7420ed23
    • V
      [MLSXFRM]: Fix build with SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM disabled. · a51c64f1
      由 Venkat Yekkirala 提交于 
      The following patch will fix the build problem (encountered by Andrew
Morton) when SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM is not enabled.

As compared to git-net-selinux_xfrm_decode_session-build-fix.patch in
-mm, this patch sets the return parameter sid to SECSID_NULL in
selinux_xfrm_decode_session() and handles this value in the caller
selinux_inet_conn_request() appropriately.
Signed-off-by: NVenkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      a51c64f1
    • V
      [MLSXFRM]: Auto-labeling of child sockets · 4237c75c
      由 Venkat Yekkirala 提交于 
      This automatically labels the TCP, Unix stream, and dccp child sockets
as well as openreqs to be at the same MLS level as the peer. This will
result in the selection of appropriately labeled IPSec Security
Associations.

This also uses the sock's sid (as opposed to the isec sid) in SELinux
enforcement of secmark in rcv_skb and postroute_last hooks.
Signed-off-by: NVenkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      4237c75c
    • V
      [MLSXFRM]: Default labeling of socket specific IPSec policies · cb969f07
      由 Venkat Yekkirala 提交于 
      This defaults the label of socket-specific IPSec policies to be the
same as the socket they are set on.
Signed-off-by: NVenkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      cb969f07
    • V
      [MLSXFRM]: Add flow labeling · beb8d13b
      由 Venkat Yekkirala 提交于 
      This labels the flows that could utilize IPSec xfrms at the points the
flows are defined so that IPSec policy and SAs at the right label can
be used.

The following protos are currently not handled, but they should
continue to be able to use single-labeled IPSec like they currently
do.

ipmr
ip_gre
ipip
igmp
sit
sctp
ip6_tunnel (IPv6 over IPv6 tunnel device)
decnet
Signed-off-by: NVenkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      beb8d13b
    • V
      [MLSXFRM]: Flow based matching of xfrm policy and state · e0d1caa7
      由 Venkat Yekkirala 提交于 
      This implements a seemless mechanism for xfrm policy selection and
state matching based on the flow sid. This also includes the necessary
SELinux enforcement pieces.
Signed-off-by: NVenkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      e0d1caa7
    • V
      [MLSXFRM]: Add security sid to sock · 892c141e
      由 Venkat Yekkirala 提交于 
      This adds security for IP sockets at the sock level. Security at the
sock level is needed to enforce the SELinux security policy for
security associations even when a sock is orphaned (such as in the TCP
LAST_ACK state).

This will also be used to enforce SELinux controls over data arriving
at or leaving a child socket while it's still waiting to be accepted.
Signed-off-by: NVenkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      892c141e
    • V
      [MLSXFRM]: Define new SELinux service routine · 08554d6b
      由 Venkat Yekkirala 提交于 
      This defines a routine that combines the Type Enforcement portion of
one sid with the MLS portion from the other sid to arrive at a new
sid. This would be used to define a sid for a security association
that is to be negotiated by IKE as well as for determing the sid for
open requests and connection-oriented child sockets.
Signed-off-by: NVenkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      08554d6b
    • V
      [MLSXFRM]: Granular IPSec associations for use in MLS environments · 51bd3986
      由 Venkat Yekkirala 提交于 
      The current approach to labeling Security Associations for SELinux
purposes uses a one-to-one mapping between xfrm policy rules and
security associations.

This doesn't address the needs of real world MLS (Multi-level System,
traditional Bell-LaPadula) environments where a single xfrm policy
rule (pertaining to a range, classified to secret for example) might
need to map to multiple Security Associations (one each for
classified, secret, top secret and all the compartments applicable to
these security levels).

This patch set addresses the above problem by allowing for the mapping
of a single xfrm policy rule to multiple security associations, with
each association used in the security context it is defined for. It
also includes the security context to be used in IKE negotiation in
the acquire messages sent to the IKE daemon so that a unique SA can be
negotiated for each unique security context. A couple of bug fixes are
also included; checks to make sure the SAs used by a packet match
policy (security context-wise) on the inbound and also that the bundle
used for the outbound matches the security context of the flow. This
patch set also makes the use of the SELinux sid in flow cache lookups
seemless by including the sid in the flow key itself. Also, open
requests as well as connection-oriented child sockets are labeled
automatically to be at the same level as the peer to allow for use of
appropriately labeled IPSec associations.

Description of changes:

A "sid" member has been added to the flow cache key resulting in the
sid being available at all needed locations and the flow cache lookups
automatically using the sid. The flow sid is derived from the socket
on the outbound and the SAs (unlabeled where an SA was not used) on
the inbound.

Outbound case:
1. Find policy for the socket.

2. OLD: Find an SA that matches the policy.
 NEW: Find an SA that matches BOTH the policy and the flow/socket.
   This is necessary since not every SA that matches the policy
   can be used for the flow/socket. Consider policy range Secret-TS,
   and SAs each for Secret and TS. We don't want a TS socket to
   use the Secret SA. Hence the additional check for the SA Vs. flow/socket.

3. NEW: When looking thru bundles for a policy, make sure the
        flow/socket can use the bundle. If a bundle is not found,
        create one, calling for IKE if necessary. If using IKE,
        include the security context in the acquire message to the IKE
        daemon.

Inbound case:
1. OLD: Find policy for the socket.
 NEW: Find policy for the incoming packet based on the sid of the
      SA(s) it used or the unlabeled sid if no SAs were
      used. (Consider a case where a socket is "authorized" for two
      policies (unclassified-confidential, secret-top_secret). If the
      packet has come in using a secret SA, we really ought to be
      using the latter policy (secret-top_secret).)

2. OLD: BUG: No check to see if the SAs used by the packet agree with
             the policy sec_ctx-wise.

             (It was indicated in selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb() that
              this was being accomplished by
              (x->id.spi == tmpl->id.spi || !tmpl->id.spi) in xfrm_state_ok,
	      but it turns out tmpl->id.spi
              would normally be zero (unless xfrm policy rules specify one
              at the template level, which they usually don't).
 NEW: The socket is checked for access to the SAs used (based on the
      sid of the SAs) in selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb().

Forward case:
 This would be Step 1 from the Inbound case, followed by Steps 2 and 3
from the Outbound case.

Outstanding items/issues:

- Timewait acknowledgements and such are generated in the
  current/upstream implementation using a NULL socket resulting in the
  any_socket sid (SYSTEM_HIGH) to be used. This problem is not addressed
  by this patch set.

This patch: Add new flask definitions to SELinux

Adds a new avperm "polmatch" to arbitrate flow/state access to a xfrm
policy rule.
Signed-off-by: NVenkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      51bd3986
  5. 03 8月, 2006 1 次提交
    • C
      [AF_UNIX]: Kernel memory leak fix for af_unix datagram getpeersec patch · dc49c1f9
      由 Catherine Zhang 提交于 
      From: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com>

This patch implements a cleaner fix for the memory leak problem of the
original unix datagram getpeersec patch.  Instead of creating a
security context each time a unix datagram is sent, we only create the
security context when the receiver requests it.

This new design requires modification of the current
unix_getsecpeer_dgram LSM hook and addition of two new hooks, namely,
secid_to_secctx and release_secctx.  The former retrieves the security
context and the latter releases it.  A hook is required for releasing
the security context because it is up to the security module to decide
how that's done.  In the case of Selinux, it's a simple kfree
operation.
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      dc49c1f9
  7. 01 8月, 2006 2 次提交
  9. 15 7月, 2006 1 次提交
  11. 11 7月, 2006 2 次提交
  13. 01 7月, 2006 5 次提交
  15. 30 6月, 2006 2 次提交
    • C
      [AF_UNIX]: Datagram getpeersec · 877ce7c1
      由 Catherine Zhang 提交于 
      This patch implements an API whereby an application can determine the
label of its peer's Unix datagram sockets via the auxiliary data mechanism of
recvmsg.

Patch purpose:

This patch enables a security-aware application to retrieve the
security context of the peer of a Unix datagram socket.  The application
can then use this security context to determine the security context for
processing on behalf of the peer who sent the packet.

Patch design and implementation:

The design and implementation is very similar to the UDP case for INET
sockets.  Basically we build upon the existing Unix domain socket API for
retrieving user credentials.  Linux offers the API for obtaining user
credentials via ancillary messages (i.e., out of band/control messages
that are bundled together with a normal message).  To retrieve the security
context, the application first indicates to the kernel such desire by
setting the SO_PASSSEC option via getsockopt.  Then the application
retrieves the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism.

An example server application for Unix datagram socket should look like this:

toggle = 1;
toggle_len = sizeof(toggle);

setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PASSSEC, &toggle, &toggle_len);
recvmsg(sockfd, &msg_hdr, 0);
if (msg_hdr.msg_controllen > sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) {
    cmsg_hdr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg_hdr);
    if (cmsg_hdr->cmsg_len <= CMSG_LEN(sizeof(scontext)) &&
        cmsg_hdr->cmsg_level == SOL_SOCKET &&
        cmsg_hdr->cmsg_type == SCM_SECURITY) {
        memcpy(&scontext, CMSG_DATA(cmsg_hdr), sizeof(scontext));
    }
}

sock_setsockopt is enhanced with a new socket option SOCK_PASSSEC to allow
a server socket to receive security context of the peer.

Testing:

We have tested the patch by setting up Unix datagram client and server
applications.  We verified that the server can retrieve the security context
using the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg.
Signed-off-by: NCatherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NAcked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      877ce7c1
    • D
      [NETLINK]: Encapsulate eff_cap usage within security framework. · c7bdb545
      由 Darrel Goeddel 提交于 
      This patch encapsulates the usage of eff_cap (in netlink_skb_params) within
the security framework by extending security_netlink_recv to include a required
capability parameter and converting all direct usage of eff_caps outside
of the lsm modules to use the interface.  It also updates the SELinux
implementation of the security_netlink_send and security_netlink_recv
hooks to take advantage of the sid in the netlink_skb_params struct.
This also enables SELinux to perform auditing of netlink capability checks.
Please apply, for 2.6.18 if possible.
Signed-off-by: NDarrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      c7bdb545
  17. 28 6月, 2006 1 次提交
  19. 27 6月, 2006 2 次提交
    • E
      [PATCH] SELinux: Add sockcreate node to procattr API · 42c3e03e
      由 Eric Paris 提交于 
      Below is a patch to add a new /proc/self/attr/sockcreate A process may write a
context into this interface and all subsequent sockets created will be labeled
with that context.  This is the same idea as the fscreate interface where a
process can specify the label of a file about to be created.  At this time one
envisioned user of this will be xinetd.  It will be able to better label
sockets for the actual services.  At this time all sockets take the label of
the creating process, so all xinitd sockets would just be labeled the same.

I tested this by creating a tcp sender and listener.  The sender was able to
write to this new proc file and then create sockets with the specified label.
I am able to be sure the new label was used since the avc denial messages
kicked out by the kernel included both the new security permission
setsockcreate and all the socket denials were for the new label, not the label
of the running process.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
      42c3e03e
    • M
      [PATCH] keys: add a way to store the appropriate context for newly-created keys · 4eb582cf
      由 Michael LeMay 提交于 
      Add a /proc/<pid>/attr/keycreate entry that stores the appropriate context for
newly-created keys.  Modify the selinux_key_alloc hook to make use of the new
entry.  Update the flask headers to include a new "setkeycreate" permission
for processes.  Update the flask headers to include a new "create" permission
for keys.  Use the create permission to restrict which SIDs each task can
assign to newly-created keys.  Add a new parameter to the security hook
"security_key_alloc" to indicate whether it is being invoked by the kernel, or
from userspace.  If it is being invoked by the kernel, the security hook
should never fail.  Update the documentation to reflect these changes.
Signed-off-by: NMichael LeMay <mdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
      4eb582cf