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  1. 07 1月, 2012 1 次提交
  3. 06 1月, 2012 7 次提交
  5. 04 1月, 2012 4 次提交
  7. 07 12月, 2011 1 次提交
  9. 04 12月, 2011 1 次提交
  11. 23 11月, 2011 1 次提交
  13. 01 11月, 2011 1 次提交
  15. 10 9月, 2011 4 次提交
  17. 02 8月, 2011 2 次提交
  19. 27 7月, 2011 1 次提交
  21. 20 7月, 2011 2 次提交
  23. 23 6月, 2011 1 次提交
  25. 09 6月, 2011 1 次提交
    • L
      selinux: simplify and clean up inode_has_perm() · 95f4efb2
      由 Linus Torvalds 提交于 
      This is a rather hot function that is called with a potentially NULL
"struct common_audit_data" pointer argument.  And in that case it has to
provide and initialize its own dummy common_audit_data structure.

However, all the _common_ cases already pass it a real audit-data
structure, so that uncommon NULL case not only creates a silly run-time
test, more importantly it causes that function to have a big stack frame
for the dummy variable that isn't even used in the common case!

So get rid of that stupid run-time behavior, and make the (few)
functions that currently call with a NULL pointer just call a new helper
function instead (naturally called inode_has_perm_noapd(), since it has
no adp argument).

This makes the run-time test be a static code generation issue instead,
and allows for a much denser stack since none of the common callers need
the dummy structure.  And a denser stack not only means less stack space
usage, it means better cache behavior.  So we have a win-win-win from
this simplification: less code executed, smaller stack footprint, and
better cache behavior.
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      95f4efb2
  27. 29 4月, 2011 3 次提交
    • E
      SELinux: pass last path component in may_create · cb1e922f
      由 Eric Paris 提交于 
      New inodes are created in a two stage process.  We first will compute the
label on a new inode in security_inode_create() and check if the
operation is allowed.  We will then actually re-compute that same label and
apply it in security_inode_init_security().  The change to do new label
calculations based in part on the last component of the path name only
passed the path component information all the way down the
security_inode_init_security hook.  Down the security_inode_create hook the
path information did not make it past may_create.  Thus the two calculations
came up differently and the permissions check might not actually be against
the label that is created.  Pass and use the same information in both places
to harmonize the calculations and checks.
Reported-by: NDominick Grift <domg472@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
      cb1e922f
    • E
      SELinux: introduce path_has_perm · 2875fa00
      由 Eric Paris 提交于 
      We currently have inode_has_perm and dentry_has_perm.  dentry_has_perm just
calls inode_has_perm with additional audit data.  But dentry_has_perm can
take either a dentry or a path.  Split those to make the code obvious and
to fix the previous problem where I thought dentry_has_perm always had a
valid dentry and mnt.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
      2875fa00
    • E
      SELinux: pass last path component in may_create · 562abf62
      由 Eric Paris 提交于 
      New inodes are created in a two stage process.  We first will compute the
label on a new inode in security_inode_create() and check if the
operation is allowed.  We will then actually re-compute that same label and
apply it in security_inode_init_security().  The change to do new label
calculations based in part on the last component of the path name only
passed the path component information all the way down the
security_inode_init_security hook.  Down the security_inode_create hook the
path information did not make it past may_create.  Thus the two calculations
came up differently and the permissions check might not actually be against
the label that is created.  Pass and use the same information in both places
to harmonize the calculations and checks.
Reported-by: NDominick Grift <domg472@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
      562abf62
  29. 26 4月, 2011 4 次提交
  31. 25 4月, 2011 2 次提交
  33. 23 4月, 2011 1 次提交
  35. 24 3月, 2011 2 次提交
    • S
      userns: rename is_owner_or_cap to inode_owner_or_capable · 2e149670
      由 Serge E. Hallyn 提交于 
      And give it a kernel-doc comment.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: btrfs changed in linux-next]
Signed-off-by: NSerge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr>
Acked-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      2e149670
    • S
      userns: security: make capabilities relative to the user namespace · 3486740a
      由 Serge E. Hallyn 提交于 
      - Introduce ns_capable to test for a capability in a non-default
  user namespace.
- Teach cap_capable to handle capabilities in a non-default
  user namespace.

The motivation is to get to the unprivileged creation of new
namespaces.  It looks like this gets us 90% of the way there, with
only potential uid confusion issues left.

I still need to handle getting all caps after creation but otherwise I
think I have a good starter patch that achieves all of your goals.

Changelog:
	11/05/2010: [serge] add apparmor
	12/14/2010: [serge] fix capabilities to created user namespaces
	Without this, if user serge creates a user_ns, he won't have
	capabilities to the user_ns he created.  THis is because we
	were first checking whether his effective caps had the caps
	he needed and returning -EPERM if not, and THEN checking whether
	he was the creator.  Reverse those checks.
	12/16/2010: [serge] security_real_capable needs ns argument in !security case
	01/11/2011: [serge] add task_ns_capable helper
	01/11/2011: [serge] add nsown_capable() helper per Bastian Blank suggestion
	02/16/2011: [serge] fix a logic bug: the root user is always creator of
		    init_user_ns, but should not always have capabilities to
		    it!  Fix the check in cap_capable().
	02/21/2011: Add the required user_ns parameter to security_capable,
		    fixing a compile failure.
	02/23/2011: Convert some macros to functions as per akpm comments.  Some
		    couldn't be converted because we can't easily forward-declare
		    them (they are inline if !SECURITY, extern if SECURITY).  Add
		    a current_user_ns function so we can use it in capability.h
		    without #including cred.h.  Move all forward declarations
		    together to the top of the #ifdef __KERNEL__ section, and use
		    kernel-doc format.
	02/23/2011: Per dhowells, clean up comment in cap_capable().
	02/23/2011: Per akpm, remove unreachable 'return -EPERM' in cap_capable.

(Original written and signed off by Eric;  latest, modified version
acked by him)

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: export current_user_ns() for ecryptfs]
[serge.hallyn@canonical.com: remove unneeded extra argument in selinux's task_has_capability]
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NSerge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: NDaniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr>
Acked-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NSerge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      3486740a
  37. 13 3月, 2011 1 次提交