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  1. 03 4月, 2007 1 次提交
  3. 17 3月, 2007 1 次提交
    • J
      [PATCH] fix process crash caused by randomisation and 64k pages · d1cabd63
      由 James Bottomley 提交于 
      This bug was seen on ppc64, but it could have occurred on any
architecture with a page size of 64k or above.  The problem is that in
fs/binfmt_elf.c:randomize_stack_top() randomizes the stack to within
0x7ff pages.  On 4k page machines, this is 8MB; on 64k page boxes, this
is 128MB.

The problem is that the new binary layout (selected in
arch_pick_mmap_layout) places the mapping segment 128MB or the stack
rlimit away from the top of the process memory, whichever is larger.  If
you chose an rlimit of less than 128MB (most defaults are in the 8Mb
range) then you can end up having your entire stack randomized away.

The fix is to make randomize_stack_top() only steal at most 8MB, which this
patch does.  However, I have to point out that even with this, your stack
rlimit might not be exactly what you get if it's > 128MB, because you're
still losing the random offset of up to 8MB.

The true fix should be to leave an explicit gap for the randomization plus
a buffer when determining mmap_base, but that would involve fixing all the
architectures.

Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      d1cabd63
  5. 13 2月, 2007 1 次提交
  7. 27 1月, 2007 3 次提交
  9. 07 1月, 2007 1 次提交
    • L
      Revert "[PATCH] binfmt_elf: randomize PIE binaries (2nd try)" · 90cb28e8
      由 Linus Torvalds 提交于 
      This reverts commit 59287c09.

Hugh Dickins reports that it causes random failures on x86 with SuSE
10.2, and points out

  "Isn't that randomization, anywhere from 0x10000 to ELF_ET_DYN_BASE,
   sure to place the ET_DYN from time to time just where the comment
   says it's trying to avoid? I assume that somehow results in the error
   reported."

(where the comment in question is the existing comment in the source
code about mmap/brk clashes).
Suggested-by: NHugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Acked-by: NMarcus Meissner <meissner@suse.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
      90cb28e8
  11. 09 12月, 2006 2 次提交
  13. 08 12月, 2006 4 次提交
  15. 04 12月, 2006 1 次提交
    • D
      [POWERPC] coredump: Add SPU elf notes to coredump. · bf1ab978
      由 Dwayne Grant McConnell 提交于 
      This patch adds SPU elf notes to the coredump. It creates a separate note
for each of /regs, /fpcr, /lslr, /decr, /decr_status, /mem, /signal1,
/signal1_type, /signal2, /signal2_type, /event_mask, /event_status,
/mbox_info, /ibox_info, /wbox_info, /dma_info, /proxydma_info, /object-id.

A new macro, ARCH_HAVE_EXTRA_NOTES, was created for architectures to
specify they have extra elf core notes.

A new macro, ELF_CORE_EXTRA_NOTES_SIZE, was created so the size of the
additional notes could be calculated and added to the notes phdr entry.

A new macro, ELF_CORE_WRITE_EXTRA_NOTES, was created so the new notes
would be written after the existing notes.

The SPU coredump code resides in spufs. Stub functions are provided in the
kernel which are hooked into the spufs code which does the actual work via
register_arch_coredump_calls().

A new set of __spufs_<file>_read/get() functions was provided to allow the
coredump code to read from the spufs files without having to lock the
SPU context for each file read from.

Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NDwayne Grant McConnell <decimal@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NArnd Bergmann <arnd.bergmann@de.ibm.com>
      bf1ab978
  17. 16 10月, 2006 1 次提交
  19. 13 10月, 2006 1 次提交
    • P
      [PATCH] Get core dump code to work... · 7f14daa1
      由 Petr Vandrovec 提交于 
      The file based core dump code was broken by pipe changes - a relative
llseek returns the absolute file position on success, not the relative
one, so dump_seek() always failed when invoked with non-zero current
position.

Only success/failure can be tested with relative lseek, we have to trust
kernel that on success we've got right file offset.  With this fix in
place I have finally real core files instead of 1KB fragments...
Signed-off-by: NPetr Vandrovec <petr@vandrovec.name>
[ Cleaned it up a bit while here - use SEEK_CUR instead of hardcoding 1 ]
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
      7f14daa1
  21. 01 10月, 2006 2 次提交
    • A
      [PATCH] Support piping into commands in /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern · d025c9db
      由 Andi Kleen 提交于 
      Using the infrastructure created in previous patches implement support to
pipe core dumps into programs.

This is done by overloading the existing core_pattern sysctl
with a new syntax:

|program

When the first character of the pattern is a '|' the kernel will instead
threat the rest of the pattern as a command to run.  The core dump will be
written to the standard input of that program instead of to a file.

This is useful for having automatic core dump analysis without filling up
disks.  The program can do some simple analysis and save only a summary of
the core dump.

The core dump proces will run with the privileges and in the name space of
the process that caused the core dump.

I also increased the core pattern size to 128 bytes so that longer command
lines fit.

Most of the changes comes from allowing core dumps without seeks.  They are
fairly straight forward though.

One small incompatibility is that if someone had a core pattern previously
that started with '|' they will get suddenly new behaviour.  I think that's
unlikely to be a real problem though.

Additional background:

> Very nice, do you happen to have a program that can accept this kind of
> input for crash dumps?  I'm guessing that the embedded people will
> really want this functionality.

I had a cheesy demo/prototype.  Basically it wrote the dump to a file again,
ran gdb on it to get a backtrace and wrote the summary to a shared directory.
Then there was a simple CGI script to generate a "top 10" crashes HTML
listing.

Unfortunately this still had the disadvantage to needing full disk space for a
dump except for deleting it afterwards (in fact it was worse because over the
pipe holes didn't work so if you have a holey address map it would require
more space).

Fortunately gdb seems to be happy to handle /proc/pid/fd/xxx input pipes as
cores (at least it worked with zsh's =(cat core) syntax), so it would be
likely possible to do it without temporary space with a simple wrapper that
calls it in the right way.  I ran out of time before doing that though.

The demo prototype scripts weren't very good.  If there is really interest I
can dig them out (they are currently on a laptop disk on the desk with the
laptop itself being in service), but I would recommend to rewrite them for any
serious application of this and fix the disk space problem.

Also to be really useful it should probably find a way to automatically fetch
the debuginfos (I cheated and just installed them in advance).  If nobody else
does it I can probably do the rewrite myself again at some point.

My hope at some point was that desktops would support it in their builtin
crash reporters, but at least the KDE people I talked too seemed to be happy
with their user space only solution.

Alan sayeth:

  I don't believe that piping as such as neccessarily the right model, but
  the ability to intercept and processes core dumps from user space is asked
  for by many enterprise users as well.  They want to know about, capture,
  analyse and process core dumps, often centrally and in automated form.

[akpm@osdl.org: loff_t != unsigned long]
Signed-off-by: NAndi Kleen <ak@suse.de>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
      d025c9db
    • D
      [PATCH] BLOCK: Move extern declarations out of fs/*.c into header files [try #6] · 07f3f05c
      由 David Howells 提交于 
      Create a new header file, fs/internal.h, for common definitions local to the
sources in the fs/ directory.

Move extern definitions that should be in header files from fs/*.c to
fs/internal.h or other main header files where they span directories.
Signed-Off-By: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
      07f3f05c
  23. 30 9月, 2006 2 次提交
  25. 26 9月, 2006 2 次提交
  27. 11 7月, 2006 1 次提交
  29. 04 7月, 2006 1 次提交
    • C
      [PATCH] binfmt_elf: fix checks for bad address · ce51059b
      由 Chuck Ebbert 提交于 
      Fix check for bad address; use macro instead of open-coding two checks.

Taken from RHEL4 kernel update.

From: Ernie Petrides <petrides@redhat.com>

  For background, the BAD_ADDR() macro should return TRUE if the address is
  TASK_SIZE, because that's the lowest address that is *not* valid for
  user-space mappings.  The macro was correct in binfmt_aout.c but was wrong
  for the "equal to" case in binfmt_elf.c.  There were two in-line validations
  of user-space addresses in binfmt_elf.c, which have been appropriately
  converted to use the corrected BAD_ADDR() macro in the patch you posted
  yesterday.  Note that the size checks against TASK_SIZE are okay as coded.

  The additional changes that I propose are below.  These are in the error
  paths for bad ELF entry addresses once load_elf_binary() has already
  committed to exec'ing the new image (following the tearing down of the
  task's original address space).

  The 1st hunk deals with the interp-side of the outer "if".  There were two
  problems here.  The printk() should be removed because this path can be
  triggered at will by a bogus interpreter image created and used by a
  malicious user.  Further, the error code should not be ENOEXEC, because that
  causes the loop in search_binary_handler() to continue trying other exec
  handlers (twice, in fact).  But it's too late for this to work correctly,
  because the user address space has already been torn down, and an exec()
  failure cannot be returned to the user code because the code no longer
  exists.  The only recovery is to force a SIGSEGV, but it's best to terminate
  the search loop immediately.  I somewhat arbitrarily chose EINVAL as a
  fallback error code, but any error returned by load_elf_interp() will
  override that (but this value will never be seen by user-space).

  The 2nd hunk deals with the non-interp-side of the outer "if".  There were
  two problems here as well.  The SIGSEGV needs to be forced, because a prior
  sigaction() syscall might have set the associated disposition to SIG_IGN.
  And the ENOEXEC should be changed to EINVAL as described above.
Signed-off-by: NChuck Ebbert <76306.1226@compuserve.com>
Signed-off-by: NErnie Petrides <petrides@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
      ce51059b
  31. 23 6月, 2006 3 次提交
    • J
      [PATCH] binflt_elf: remove more casts · 785d5570
      由 Jesper Juhl 提交于 
      Remove redundant casts from NEW_AUX_ENT() arguments in fs/binfmt_elf.c
Signed-off-by: NJesper Juhl <jesper.juhl@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
      785d5570
    • J
      [PATCH] binfmt_elf: CodingStyle cleanup and remove some pointless casts · f4e5cc2c
      由 Jesper Juhl 提交于 
      Do a CodingStyle cleanup of fs/binfmt_elf.c and also remove some pointless
casts of kmalloc() return values in the same file.
Signed-off-by: NJesper Juhl <jesper.juhl@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
      f4e5cc2c
    • M
      [PATCH] remove steal_locks() · c89681ed
      由 Miklos Szeredi 提交于 
      This patch removes the steal_locks() function.

steal_locks() doesn't work correctly with any filesystem that does it's own
lock management, including NFS, CIFS, etc.

In addition it has weird semantics on local filesystems in case tasks
sharing file-descriptor tables are doing POSIX locking operations in
parallel to execve().

The steal_locks() function has an effect on applications doing:

clone(CLONE_FILES)
  /* in child */
  lock
  execve
  lock

POSIX locks acquired before execve (by "child", "parent" or any further
task sharing files_struct) will after the execve be owned exclusively by
"child".

According to Chris Wright some LSB/LTP kind of suite triggers without the
stealing behavior, but there's no known real-world application that would
also fail.

Apps using NPTL are not affected, since all other threads are killed before
execve.

Apps using LinuxThreads are only affected if they

  - have multiple threads during exec (LinuxThreads doesn't kill other
    threads, the app may do it with pthread_kill_other_threads_np())
  - rely on POSIX locks being inherited across exec

Both conditions are documented, but not their interaction.

Apps using clone() natively are affected if they

  - use clone(CLONE_FILES)
  - rely on POSIX locks being inherited across exec

The above scenarios are unlikely, but possible.

If the patch is vetoed, there's a plan B, that involves mostly keeping the
weird stealing semantics, but changing the way lock ownership is handled so
that network and local filesystems work consistently.

That would add more complexity though, so this solution seems to be
preferred by most people.
Signed-off-by: NMiklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@debian.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Steven French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
      c89681ed
  33. 26 3月, 2006 3 次提交
  35. 27 2月, 2006 1 次提交
  37. 15 1月, 2006 1 次提交
  39. 11 1月, 2006 2 次提交
  41. 09 1月, 2006 2 次提交
  43. 07 11月, 2005 1 次提交
  45. 31 10月, 2005 1 次提交
    • E
      [PATCH] Don't uselessly export task_struct to userspace in core dumps · a9289728
      由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于 
      task_struct is an internal structure to the kernel with a lot of good
information, that is probably interesting in core dumps.  However there is
no way for user space to know what format that information is in making it
useless.

I grepped the GDB 6.3 source code and NT_TASKSTRUCT while defined is not
used anywhere else.  So I would be surprised if anyone notices it is
missing.

In addition exporting kernel pointers to all the interesting kernel data
structures sounds like the very definition of an information leak.  I
haven't a clue what someone with evil intentions could do with that
information, but in any attack against the kernel it looks like this is the
perfect tool for aiming that attack.

So since NT_TASKSTRUCT is useless as currently defined and is potentially
dangerous, let's just not export it.

(akpm: Daniel Jacobowitz <dan@debian.org> "would be amazed" if anything was
using NT_TASKSTRUCT).
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
      a9289728
  47. 30 10月, 2005 1 次提交
  49. 12 10月, 2005 1 次提交