@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@ OpenHarmony is an open OS that allows you to easily develop services and applica
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This environment combines chip security and system security features with upper-layer security services to secure hardware, the system, data, device interconnection, applications, and updates.
This environment combines chip security and system security features with upper-layer security services to secure hardware, the system, data, device interconnection, applications, and updates.
**Figure 1** Security assurance
**Figure 1** Security assurance
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### Security Mechanism
### Security Mechanism
- Boot root of trust
- Boot root of trust
OpenHarmony devices use the public key infrastructure (PKI) to protect software integrity and ensure that the software source is valid and the software is not tampered with.
OpenHarmony devices use the public key infrastructure (PKI) to protect software integrity and ensure that the software source is valid and the software is not tampered with.
In the device boot process, software signature verification is performed at each phase to form a secure boot chain. If signature verification fails at any phase, the device boot will be terminated. The hardware or software entity that initially performs signature verification in the secure boot chain is the boot root of trust. It must be valid and should not be tampered with. The boot root of trust can be a built-in code segment in the read-only memory (ROM). This code segment is written in the chip during the chip manufacturing and cannot be modified later. When the device is powered on and initialized, this code segment is executed first and used to verify software signatures.
In the device boot process, software signature verification is performed at each phase to form a secure boot chain. If signature verification fails at any phase, the device boot will be terminated. The hardware or software entity that initially performs signature verification in the secure boot chain is the boot root of trust. It must be valid and should not be tampered with. The boot root of trust can be a built-in code segment in the read-only memory (ROM). This code segment is written in the chip during the chip manufacturing and cannot be modified later. When the device is powered on and initialized, this code segment is executed first and used to verify software signatures.
When you use the code for signature verification, ensure the validity of the PKI public keys. OpenHarmony devices use a storage medium such as eFUSE and one-time password (OTP) to store the public keys (for example, their hash values) and guarantee their validity. A public key is usually programed into the eFuse or OTP of a device during device manufacturing.
When you use the code for signature verification, ensure the validity of the PKI public keys. OpenHarmony devices use a storage medium such as eFUSE and one-time password (OTP) to store the public keys (for example, their hash values) and guarantee their validity. A public key is usually programed into the eFuse or OTP of a device during device manufacturing.
- Hardware-isolated trusted environment
- Hardware-isolated trusted environment
The hardware-isolated trusted environment complies with the design concept of the trusted computing system. There is a clear boundary between the trusted environment and untrusted one. OpenHarmony devices protect core sensitive data in the trusted environment. Even if OS vulnerabilities in the untrusted environment are exploited, sensitive data in the trusted environment is secure.
The hardware-isolated trusted environment complies with the design concept of the trusted computing system. There is a clear boundary between the trusted environment and untrusted one. OpenHarmony devices protect core sensitive data in the trusted environment. Even if OS vulnerabilities in the untrusted environment are exploited, sensitive data in the trusted environment is secure.
The trusted environment of OpenHarmony devices is built based on a hardware security isolation mechanism. The chip isolation mechanism varies slightly on different OpenHarmony devices, and the most common mechanism is Arm TrustZone. On some RISC-V chip platforms, independent security cores may also be used to build a trusted environment.
The trusted environment of OpenHarmony devices is built based on a hardware security isolation mechanism. The chip isolation mechanism varies slightly on different OpenHarmony devices, and the most common mechanism is Arm TrustZone. On some RISC-V chip platforms, independent security cores may also be used to build a trusted environment.
A specific, simplified OS iTrustee lite runs in the trusted environment to manage resources and schedule tasks in the environment and provide security services for OpenHarmony devices. Key management and data security are the most common security services in the trusted environment. A device has a unique hardware root key in the eFuse/OTP. Based on this root key and service context, the trusted environment generates multiple keys that provide key management and data encryption/decryption services for applications. During their whole lifecycle, core keys of devices stay in the trusted environment. The trusted environment also provides security services such as identity authentication, system status monitoring, and secure data storage to enhance device security.
A specific, simplified OS iTrustee lite runs in the trusted environment to manage resources and schedule tasks in the environment and provide security services for OpenHarmony devices. Key management and data security are the most common security services in the trusted environment. A device has a unique hardware root key in the eFuse/OTP. Based on this root key and service context, the trusted environment generates multiple keys that provide key management and data encryption/decryption services for applications. During their whole lifecycle, core keys of devices stay in the trusted environment. The trusted environment also provides security services such as identity authentication, system status monitoring, and secure data storage to enhance device security.
- Hardware key engine
- Hardware key engine
Cryptography is the basis of information security. Data encryption/decryption requires high efficiency and security of computing devices. Hardware encryption/decryption technologies use computer hardware to assist or even replace software to encrypt or decrypt data. Hardware-based encryption/decryption is more efficient and secure than software-based encryption/decryption.
Cryptography is the basis of information security. Data encryption/decryption requires high efficiency and security of computing devices. Hardware encryption/decryption technologies use computer hardware to assist or even replace software to encrypt or decrypt data. Hardware-based encryption/decryption is more efficient and secure than software-based encryption/decryption.
Since some dedicated hardware resources are used for data encryption/decryption, the CPU can concurrently execute other computing tasks, which greatly improves performance and reduces the CPU load. In addition, a well-designed hardware key engine protects keys from leak even if the software is cracked and even defends against electromagnetic and radiation attacks from physical channels.
Since some dedicated hardware resources are used for data encryption/decryption, the CPU can concurrently execute other computing tasks, which greatly improves performance and reduces the CPU load. In addition, a well-designed hardware key engine protects keys from leak even if the software is cracked and even defends against electromagnetic and radiation attacks from physical channels.
OpenHarmony devices support the hardware key engine, which allows OpenHarmony to perform computing tasks such as data encryption and decryption, certificate signature verification, and hash value calculation. The hardware key engine supports popular algorithms such as Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA).
OpenHarmony devices support the hardware key engine, which allows OpenHarmony to perform computing tasks such as data encryption and decryption, certificate signature verification, and hash value calculation. The hardware key engine supports popular algorithms such as Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA).
### Recommended Practices
### Recommended Practices
- The boot root of trust consists of a built-in code segment in the chip and the root key of the device. The root of trust is written into the chip during manufacturing and cannot be modified in the device lifecycle. It is used to verify software certificates in the device boot process. The root key is the public key matching the private key of the device certificate signature. The private key is maintained on the PKI signature server and the public key is written to the device. To prevent attackers from tampering with the public key to bypass signature authentication, you can write the public key to media such as fuses on OpenHarmony devices. Considering that the fuse space is limited, you can store only the hash value of the public key in the fuse and verify the validity of the public key using the boot code.
- The boot root of trust consists of a built-in code segment in the chip and the root key of the device. The root of trust is written into the chip during manufacturing and cannot be modified in the device lifecycle. It is used to verify software certificates in the device boot process. The root key is the public key matching the private key of the device certificate signature. The private key is maintained on the PKI signature server and the public key is written to the device. To prevent attackers from tampering with the public key to bypass signature authentication, you can write the public key to media such as fuses on OpenHarmony devices. Considering that the fuse space is limited, you can store only the hash value of the public key in the fuse and verify the validity of the public key using the boot code.
- Generally, a trusted execution environment (TEE) is built based on the Arm TrustZone technology, and can also adopt other isolation mechanisms, such as TrustZone-M and independent security cores, depending on the device form. A TEE OS must be deployed in the TEE to manage resources and schedule tasks. OpenHarmony provides iTrustee as the TEE OS. You can develop and deploy security services based on iTrustee.
- Generally, a trusted execution environment (TEE) is built based on the Arm TrustZone technology, and can also adopt other isolation mechanisms, such as TrustZone-M and independent security cores, depending on the device form. A TEE OS must be deployed in the TEE to manage resources and schedule tasks. OpenHarmony provides iTrustee as the TEE OS. You can develop and deploy security services based on iTrustee.
Not all OpenHarmony devices need to support the TEE, for example, some devices with thin resources that run less sensitive services may not need the TEE. You can choose whether to support the TEE and how to implement the TEE based on service requirements.
Not all OpenHarmony devices need to support the TEE, for example, some devices with thin resources that run less sensitive services may not need the TEE. You can choose whether to support the TEE and how to implement the TEE based on service requirements.
- The hardware key engine must provide key algorithms related to true random numbers, public keys, symmetric keys, and hash values. By deploying required drivers in OpenHarmony, you can provide unified key management and key algorithms for applications.
- The hardware key engine must provide key algorithms related to true random numbers, public keys, symmetric keys, and hash values. By deploying required drivers in OpenHarmony, you can provide unified key management and key algorithms for applications.
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@@ -72,8 +77,8 @@ For device with 128 KB to 128 MB of memory, the OpenHarmony lite kernel is recom
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@@ -72,8 +77,8 @@ For device with 128 KB to 128 MB of memory, the OpenHarmony lite kernel is recom
The following figure shows how DAC works when a process accesses a file. The DAC first matches the process UID with the file UID, and then the process GID with the file GID. If the UID and GID both fail to match, DAC checks the **other** attribute of the file to determine whether the process is allowed to read, write, or execute the file. In addition, the system supports a privileged capability that is not subject to DAC mechanism (read, write, and execute) and can access files directly. Services with high permissions (such as system services) can manage files of applications with low permissions (such as third-party applications).
The following figure shows how DAC works when a process accesses a file. The DAC first matches the process UID with the file UID, and then the process GID with the file GID. If the UID and GID both fail to match, DAC checks the **other** attribute of the file to determine whether the process is allowed to read, write, or execute the file. In addition, the system supports a privileged capability that is not subject to DAC mechanism (read, write, and execute) and can access files directly. Services with high permissions (such as system services) can manage files of applications with low permissions (such as third-party applications).
**Figure 2** How DAC works
**Figure 2** How DAC works
- Capability mechanism
- Capability mechanism
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- Secure boot must be enabled, and the trusted root must be in the chip and cannot be modified. In addition, you must consider the impact of secure upgrade (if available) on secure boot, that is, the signature or hash value of an image file must be updated after a secure upgrade.
- Secure boot must be enabled, and the trusted root must be in the chip and cannot be modified. In addition, you must consider the impact of secure upgrade (if available) on secure boot, that is, the signature or hash value of an image file must be updated after a secure upgrade.
## Data Security
## Data security
### Security Mechanism
### Security Mechanism
OpenHarmony Universal KeyStore (HUKS) provides key and certificate management. For OpenHarmony, it mainly provides key management for HiChain (device identity authentication platform). The figure below shows the HUKS functions.
OpenHarmony Universal KeyStore (HUKS) provides key and certificate management. For OpenHarmony, it mainly provides key management for HiChain (device identity authentication platform). The figure below shows the HUKS functions.
**Figure 3** HUKS functions
**Figure 3** HUKS functions
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To ensure secure transmit of user data between devices, a trust relationship and a secure data transmission channel must be established between the devices. The following figure shows how an IoT controller and an IoT device establish a trust relationship.
To ensure secure transmit of user data between devices, a trust relationship and a secure data transmission channel must be established between the devices. The following figure shows how an IoT controller and an IoT device establish a trust relationship.
**Figure 4** Process of establishing a trust relationship between devices
**Figure 4** Process of establishing a trust relationship between devices
A trust relationship can be established between an IoT device that runs OpenHarmony (such as an AI speaker, smart home device, and wearable) and an IoT controller. Encrypted user data is transmitted between the IoT device and IoT controller through a secure connection.
A trust relationship can be established between an IoT device that runs OpenHarmony (such as an AI speaker, smart home device, and wearable) and an IoT controller. Encrypted user data is transmitted between the IoT device and IoT controller through a secure connection.
- IoT service identifier of the IoT controller
- IoT service identifier of the IoT controller
An IoT controller generates different identifiers for different IoT device management services to isolate these services. The identifier can be used for authentication and communication between an IoT controller and an IoT device. It is an Ed25519 public/private key pair generated using the elliptic curve cryptography.
An IoT controller generates different identifiers for different IoT device management services to isolate these services. The identifier can be used for authentication and communication between an IoT controller and an IoT device. It is an Ed25519 public/private key pair generated using the elliptic curve cryptography.
- IoT device identifier
- IoT device identifier
An IoT device can generate its own device identifier for communicating with the IoT controller. It is also an Ed25519 public/private key pair generated using elliptic curve cryptography, with the private key stored on the IoT device. Each time the device is restored to factory settings, the public/private key pair will be reset.
An IoT device can generate its own device identifier for communicating with the IoT controller. It is also an Ed25519 public/private key pair generated using elliptic curve cryptography, with the private key stored on the IoT device. Each time the device is restored to factory settings, the public/private key pair will be reset.
The identifier can be used for secure communication between the IoT controller and IoT device. After the devices exchange the service identifier or device identifier, they can negotiate the key and establish a secure communication channel.
The identifier can be used for secure communication between the IoT controller and IoT device. After the devices exchange the service identifier or device identifier, they can negotiate the key and establish a secure communication channel.
- P2P trusted binding between devices
- P2P trusted binding between devices
When an IoT controller and an IoT device establish a trust relationship, they exchange identifiers.
When an IoT controller and an IoT device establish a trust relationship, they exchange identifiers.
During this process, the user needs to enter or scan the PIN provided by the IoT device on the IoT controller. PIN is either dynamically generated if the IoT device has a screen, or preset by the manufacturer if it does not have a screen. A PIN can be a number or a QR code. Then the IoT controller and IoT device perform authentication and session key exchange based on password authenticated key exchange (PAKE), and use the session key to encrypt the channel for exchanging identity public keys.
During this process, the user needs to enter or scan the PIN provided by the IoT device on the IoT controller. PIN is either dynamically generated if the IoT device has a screen, or preset by the manufacturer if it does not have a screen. A PIN can be a number or a QR code. Then the IoT controller and IoT device perform authentication and session key exchange based on password authenticated key exchange (PAKE), and use the session key to encrypt the channel for exchanging identity public keys.
- Secure communication between the IoT controller and IoT device
- Secure communication between the IoT controller and IoT device
When an IoT controller and an IoT device communicate with each other after establishing a trust relationship, they authenticate each other by using the locally stored identity public key of the peer. Bidirectional identity authentication and session key exchange are performed using the Station-to-Station (STS) protocol during each communication. The session key is used to encrypt the data transmission channel between the devices.
When an IoT controller and an IoT device communicate with each other after establishing a trust relationship, they authenticate each other by using the locally stored identity public key of the peer. Bidirectional identity authentication and session key exchange are performed using the Station-to-Station (STS) protocol during each communication. The session key is used to encrypt the data transmission channel between the devices.
## Application Security
## Application Security
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### Security Mechanism
### Security Mechanism
- Application signature management
- Application signature management
After developing and debugging an OpenHarmony application, sign the application installation package using a private key, which matches a public key. Generally, the OEM generates a public/private key pair, presets the public key in the device, and stores the private key on a local server that is not connected to the Internet to prevent private key leakage. After you finish developing an application, you can use an external device (such as a USB flash drive) to upload the installation package to the server where the private key is stored, calculate the signature, and download the signature to the external device. During application installation, the hash value of the bundle is calculated using the SHA-256 algorithm. The hash value, together with the signature and preset public key, is used for authentication. The application can be installed only after the authentication is successful.
After developing and debugging an OpenHarmony application, sign the application installation package using a private key, which matches a public key. Generally, the OEM generates a public/private key pair, presets the public key in the device, and stores the private key on a local server that is not connected to the Internet to prevent private key leakage. After you finish developing an application, you can use an external device (such as a USB flash drive) to upload the installation package to the server where the private key is stored, calculate the signature, and download the signature to the external device. During application installation, the hash value of the bundle is calculated using the SHA-256 algorithm. The hash value, together with the signature and preset public key, is used for authentication. The application can be installed only after the authentication is successful.
In addition, the application source must be verified to ensure that the application is from a valid developer. As a developer, you must apply for a development certificate and use it to sign the application you have developed. During application installation, the upper-level certificate stored on the device is used to verify the signature to ensure validity of the developer.
In addition, the application source must be verified to ensure that the application is from a valid developer. As a developer, you must apply for a development certificate and use it to sign the application you have developed. During application installation, the upper-level certificate stored on the device is used to verify the signature to ensure validity of the developer.
- Application permission control
OpenHarmony allows users to install third-party applications and controls calls made by third-party applications to sensitive permissions. When developing an application, you need to declare the sensitive permissions that the application may require in the application configuration file. The permissions can be static or dynamic. Static permissions need to be registered during application installation, and dynamic permissions can be obtained only upon user authorization. Authorization modes include system settings, manual authorization by applications, and others. In addition, application signature control is used to ensure that the application installation package has been confirmed by the device vendor.
- Application permission control
**Table 1** OpenHarmony system permissions
OpenHarmony allows users to install third-party applications and controls calls made by third-party applications to sensitive permissions. When developing an application, you need to declare the sensitive permissions that the application may require in the application configuration file. The permissions can be static or dynamic. Static permissions need to be registered during application installation, and dynamic permissions can be obtained only upon user authorization. Authorization modes include system settings, manual authorization by applications, and others. In addition, application signature control is used to ensure that the application installation package has been confirmed by the device vendor.
| ohos.permission.GET_BUNDLE_INFO | system_grant (static permission)| Allows an application to obtain information about other applications.|
| -------- | -------- | -------- |
| ohos.permission.INSTALL_BUNDLE | system_grant (static permission)| Allows an application to install other applications.|
| ohos.permission.LISTEN_BUNDLE_CHANGE | system_grant (static permission)| Allows an application to listen for application changes.|
| ohos.permission.CAMERA | user_grant (dynamic permission)| Allows an application to use the camera to take photos and record videos at any time.|
| ohos.permission.GET_BUNDLE_INFO | system_grant (static permission)| Allows an application to obtain information about other applications.|
| ohos.permission.MODIFY_AUDIO_SETTINGS | system_grant (static permission)| Allows an application to modify global audio settings, such as the volume and speaker for output.|
| ohos.permission.INSTALL_BUNDLE | system_grant (static permission)| Allows an application to install other applications.|
| ohos.permission.READ_MEDIA | user_grant (dynamic permission)| Allows an application to read users' favorite videos.|
| ohos.permission.CAMERA | user_grant (dynamic permission)| Allows an application to use the camera to take photos and record videos at any time.|
| ohos.permission.MICROPHONE | user_grant (dynamic permission)| Allows an application to use the microphone for audio recording at any time.|
| ohos.permission.MODIFY_AUDIO_SETTINGS | system_grant (static permission)| Allows an application to modify global audio settings, such as the volume and speaker for output.|
| ohos.permission.WRITE_MEDIA | user_grant (dynamic permission)| Allows an application to write users' favorite music.|
| ohos.permission.READ_MEDIA | user_grant (dynamic permission)| Allows an application to read users' favorite videos.|
| ohos.permission.DISTRIBUTED_DATASYNC | user_grant (dynamic permission)| Allows an application to manage distributed data transmission.|
| ohos.permission.MICROPHONE | user_grant (dynamic permission)| Allows an application to use the microphone for audio recording at any time.|
| ohos.permission.DISTRIBUTED_VIRTUALDEVICE | user_grant (dynamic permission)| Allows an application to use distributed virtualization features.|
| ohos.permission.WRITE_MEDIA | user_grant (dynamic permission)| Allows an application to write users' favorite music.|
| ohos.permission.DISTRIBUTED_DATASYNC | user_grant (dynamic permission)| Allows an application to manage distributed data transmission.|
| ohos.permission.DISTRIBUTED_VIRTUALDEVICE | user_grant (dynamic permission)| Allows an application to use distributed virtualization features.|
### Recommended Practices
### Recommended Practices
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> **NOTE**
> **NOTE**
>
>
> The application configuration file varies depending on the application model. It is **config.json** for the application based on the FA model and **module.json5** for the application based on the stage mode. For details about the application models, see [Interpretation of the Application Model](../../application-dev/application-models/application-model-description.md).
> The application configuration file varies depending on the application model. It is **config.json** for the application based on the FA model and **module.json5** for the application based on the stage mode. For details about the application models, see [Interpretation of the Application Model](../../application-dev/application-models/application-model-description.md).
