1. 28 2月, 2009 2 次提交
  2. 21 2月, 2009 1 次提交
    • H
      x86, mce: remove incorrect __cpuinit for mce_cpu_features() · cc3ca220
      H. Peter Anvin 提交于
      Impact: Bug fix on UP
      
      Checkin 6ec68bff:
          x86, mce: reinitialize per cpu features on resume
      
      introduced a call to mce_cpu_features() in the resume path, in order
      for the MCE machinery to get properly reinitialized after a resume.
      However, this function (and its successors) was flagged __cpuinit,
      which becomes __init on UP configurations (on SMP suspend/resume
      requires CPU hotplug and so this would not be seen.)
      
      Remove the offending __cpuinit annotations for mce_cpu_features() and
      its successor functions.
      
      Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NH. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      cc3ca220
  3. 20 2月, 2009 1 次提交
  4. 18 2月, 2009 4 次提交
  5. 17 2月, 2009 3 次提交
  6. 16 2月, 2009 1 次提交
  7. 15 2月, 2009 1 次提交
    • Y
      x86: fix typo in filter_cpuid_features() · f6db44df
      Yinghai Lu 提交于
      Impact: fix wrong disabling of cpu features
      
      an amd system got this strange output:
      
       CPU: CPU feature monitor disabled due to lack of CPUID level 0x5
      
      but in /proc/cpuinfo I have:
      
       cpuid level	: 5
      
      on intel system:
      
       CPU: CPU feature monitor disabled due to lack of CPUID level 0x5
       CPU: CPU feature dca disabled due to lack of CPUID level 0x9
      
      but in /proc/cpuinfo i have:
      
       cpuid level     : 11
      
      Tt turns out there is a typo, and we should use level member in df.
      Signed-off-by: NYinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
      f6db44df
  8. 11 2月, 2009 1 次提交
    • P
      perf_counters: allow users to count user, kernel and/or hypervisor events · 0475f9ea
      Paul Mackerras 提交于
      Impact: new perf_counter feature
      
      This extends the perf_counter_hw_event struct with bits that specify
      that events in user, kernel and/or hypervisor mode should not be
      counted (i.e. should be excluded), and adds code to program the PMU
      mode selection bits accordingly on x86 and powerpc.
      
      For software counters, we don't currently have the infrastructure to
      distinguish which mode an event occurs in, so we currently fail the
      counter initialization if the setting of the hw_event.exclude_* bits
      would require us to distinguish.  Context switches and CPU migrations
      are currently considered to occur in kernel mode.
      
      On x86, this changes the previous policy that only root can count
      kernel events.  Now non-root users can count kernel events or exclude
      them.  Non-root users still can't use NMI events, though.  On x86 we
      don't appear to have any way to control whether hypervisor events are
      counted or not, so hw_event.exclude_hv is ignored.
      
      On powerpc, the selection of whether to count events in user, kernel
      and/or hypervisor mode is PMU-wide, not per-counter, so this adds a
      check that the hw_event.exclude_* settings are the same as other events
      on the PMU.  Counters being added to a group have to have the same
      settings as the other hardware counters in the group.  Counters and
      groups can only be enabled in hw_perf_group_sched_in or power_perf_enable
      if they have the same settings as any other counters already on the
      PMU.  If we are not running on a hypervisor, the exclude_hv setting
      is ignored (by forcing it to 0) since we can't ever get any
      hypervisor events.
      Signed-off-by: NPaul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
      0475f9ea
  9. 10 2月, 2009 1 次提交
    • T
      x86: implement x86_32 stack protector · 60a5317f
      Tejun Heo 提交于
      Impact: stack protector for x86_32
      
      Implement stack protector for x86_32.  GDT entry 28 is used for it.
      It's set to point to stack_canary-20 and have the length of 24 bytes.
      CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR turns off CONFIG_X86_32_LAZY_GS and sets %gs
      to the stack canary segment on entry.  As %gs is otherwise unused by
      the kernel, the canary can be anywhere.  It's defined as a percpu
      variable.
      
      x86_32 exception handlers take register frame on stack directly as
      struct pt_regs.  With -fstack-protector turned on, gcc copies the
      whole structure after the stack canary and (of course) doesn't copy
      back on return thus losing all changed.  For now, -fno-stack-protector
      is added to all files which contain those functions.  We definitely
      need something better.
      Signed-off-by: NTejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
      Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
      60a5317f
  10. 09 2月, 2009 3 次提交
  11. 06 2月, 2009 1 次提交
  12. 05 2月, 2009 1 次提交
  13. 04 2月, 2009 1 次提交
  14. 01 2月, 2009 1 次提交
  15. 31 1月, 2009 2 次提交
  16. 29 1月, 2009 5 次提交
  17. 28 1月, 2009 1 次提交
  18. 27 1月, 2009 3 次提交
  19. 26 1月, 2009 1 次提交
    • I
      x86: unmask CPUID levels on Intel CPUs, fix · 99fb4d34
      Ingo Molnar 提交于
      Impact: fix boot hang on pre-model-15 Intel CPUs
      
      rdmsrl_safe() does not work in very early bootup code yet, because we
      dont have the pagefault handler installed yet so exception section
      does not get parsed. rdmsr_safe() will just crash and hang the bootup.
      
      So limit the MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE MSR read to those CPU types that
      support it.
      Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
      99fb4d34
  20. 24 1月, 2009 2 次提交
    • H
      x86: filter CPU features dependent on unavailable CPUID levels · b38b0665
      H. Peter Anvin 提交于
      Impact: Fixes potential crashes on misconfigured systems.
      
      Some CPU features require specific CPUID levels to be available in
      order to function, as they contain information about the operation of
      a specific feature.  However, some BIOSes and virtualization software
      provide the ability to mask CPUID levels in order to support legacy
      operating systems.  We try to enable such CPUID levels when we know
      how to do it, but for the remaining cases, filter out such CPU
      features when there is no way for us to support them.
      
      Do this in one place, in the CPUID code, with a table-driven approach.
      Signed-off-by: NH. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
      b38b0665
    • H
      x86: handle PAT more like other CPU features · 75a04811
      H. Peter Anvin 提交于
      Impact: Cleanup
      
      When PAT was originally introduced, it was handled specially for a few
      reasons:
      
      - PAT bugs are hard to track down, so we wanted to maintain a
        whitelist of CPUs.
      - The i386 and x86-64 CPUID code was not yet unified.
      
      Both of these are now obsolete, so handle PAT like any other features,
      including ordinary feature blacklisting due to known bugs.
      Signed-off-by: NH. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
      75a04811
  21. 23 1月, 2009 4 次提交