- 14 8月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Eric Paris 提交于
This patch adds a new selinux hook so SELinux can arbitrate if a given process should be allowed to trigger a request for the kernel to try to load a module. This is a different operation than a process trying to load a module itself, which is already protected by CAP_SYS_MODULE. Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 06 8月, 2009 2 次提交
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由 Eric Paris 提交于
Currently SELinux enforcement of controls on the ability to map low memory is determined by the mmap_min_addr tunable. This patch causes SELinux to ignore the tunable and instead use a seperate Kconfig option specific to how much space the LSM should protect. The tunable will now only control the need for CAP_SYS_RAWIO and SELinux permissions will always protect the amount of low memory designated by CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR. This allows users who need to disable the mmap_min_addr controls (usual reason being they run WINE as a non-root user) to do so and still have SELinux controls preventing confined domains (like a web server) from being able to map some area of low memory. Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Eric Paris 提交于
Currently SELinux does not check CAP_SYS_RAWIO in the file_mmap hook. This means there is no DAC check on the ability to mmap low addresses in the memory space. This function adds the DAC check for CAP_SYS_RAWIO while maintaining the selinux check on mmap_zero. This means that processes which need to mmap low memory will need CAP_SYS_RAWIO and mmap_zero but will NOT need the SELinux sys_rawio capability. Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 17 7月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Oleg Nesterov 提交于
- is_single_threaded(task) is not safe unless task == current, we can't use task->signal or task->mm. - it doesn't make sense unless task == current, the task can fork right after the check. Rename it to current_is_single_threaded() and kill the argument. Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 13 7月, 2009 2 次提交
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由 James Morris 提交于
This reverts commit 8113a8d8. The patch causes a stack overflow on my system during boot. Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Thomas Liu 提交于
Convert avc_audit in security/selinux/avc.c to use lsm_audit.h, for better maintainability and for less code duplication. - changed selinux to use common_audit_data instead of avc_audit_data - eliminated code in avc.c and used code from lsm_audit.h instead. I have tested to make sure that the avcs look the same before and after this patch. Signed-off-by: NThomas Liu <tliu@redhat.com> Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 25 6月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Thomas Liu 提交于
Added a call to free the avc_node_cache when inside selinux_disable because it should not waste resources allocated during avc_init if SELinux is disabled and the cache will never be used. Signed-off-by: NThomas Liu <tliu@redhat.com> Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 24 6月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Ingo Molnar 提交于
The ->ptrace_may_access() methods are named confusingly - the real ptrace_may_access() returns a bool, while these security checks have a retval convention. Rename it to ptrace_access_check, to reduce the confusion factor. [ Impact: cleanup, no code changed ] Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 23 6月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Stephen Smalley 提交于
Restore the optimization to skip revalidation in selinux_file_permission if nothing has changed since the dentry_open checks, accidentally removed by 389fb800. Also remove redundant test from selinux_revalidate_file_permission. Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Reviewed-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 18 6月, 2009 2 次提交
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由 KaiGai Kohei 提交于
The attached patch adds support to generate audit messages on two cases. The first one is a case when a multi-thread process tries to switch its performing security context using setcon(3), but new security context is not bounded by the old one. type=SELINUX_ERR msg=audit(1245311998.599:17): \ op=security_bounded_transition result=denied \ oldcontext=system_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0 \ newcontext=system_u:system_r:guest_webapp_t:s0 The other one is a case when security_compute_av() masked any permissions due to the type boundary violation. type=SELINUX_ERR msg=audit(1245312836.035:32): \ op=security_compute_av reason=bounds \ scontext=system_u:object_r:user_webapp_t:s0 \ tcontext=system_u:object_r:shadow_t:s0:c0 \ tclass=file perms=getattr,open Signed-off-by: NKaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 KaiGai Kohei 提交于
It is a cleanup patch to cut down a line within 80 columns. Signed-off-by: NKaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> -- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 6 +++--- 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 03 6月, 2009 2 次提交
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由 Eric Dumazet 提交于
Define three accessors to get/set dst attached to a skb struct dst_entry *skb_dst(const struct sk_buff *skb) void skb_dst_set(struct sk_buff *skb, struct dst_entry *dst) void skb_dst_drop(struct sk_buff *skb) This one should replace occurrences of : dst_release(skb->dst) skb->dst = NULL; Delete skb->dst field Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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由 Eric Paris 提交于
Audit trees defined 2 new netlink messages but the netlink mapping tables for selinux permissions were not set up. This patch maps these 2 new operations to AUDIT_WRITE. Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 19 5月, 2009 2 次提交
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由 Stephen Smalley 提交于
On Tue, 2009-05-19 at 00:05 -0400, Eamon Walsh wrote: > Recent versions of coreutils have bumped the read buffer size from 4K to > 32K in several of the utilities. > > This means that "cat /selinux/booleans/xserver_object_manager" no longer > works, it returns "Invalid argument" on F11. getsebool works fine. > > sel_read_bool has a check for "count > PAGE_SIZE" that doesn't seem to > be present in the other read functions. Maybe it could be removed? Yes, that check is obsoleted by the conversion of those functions to using simple_read_from_buffer(), which will reduce count if necessary to what is available in the buffer. Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Eric Paris 提交于
The selinuxfs superblock magic is used inside the IMA code, but is being defined in two places and could someday get out of sync. This patch moves the declaration into magic.h so it is only done once. Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 05 5月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Stephen Smalley 提交于
The CRED patch incorrectly converted the SELinux send_sigiotask hook to use the current task SID rather than the target task SID in its permission check, yielding the wrong permission check. This fixes the hook function. Detected by the ltp selinux testsuite and confirmed to correct the test failure. Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 30 4月, 2009 3 次提交
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由 Oleg Nesterov 提交于
We shouldn't worry about the tracer if current is ptraced, exec() must not succeed if the tracer has no rights to trace this task after cred changing. But we should notify ->real_parent which is, well, real parent. Also, we don't need _irq to take tasklist, and we don't need parent's ->siglock to wake_up_interruptible(real_parent->signal->wait_chldexit). Since we hold tasklist, real_parent->signal must be stable. Otherwise spin_lock(siglock) is not safe too and can't help anyway. Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 David Howells 提交于
Don't flush inherited SIGKILL during execve() in SELinux's post cred commit hook. This isn't really a security problem: if the SIGKILL came before the credentials were changed, then we were right to receive it at the time, and should honour it; if it came after the creds were changed, then we definitely should honour it; and in any case, all that will happen is that the process will be scrapped before it ever returns to userspace. Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Eric Paris 提交于
We are still calling secondary_ops->sysctl even though the capabilities module does not define a sysctl operation. Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 02 4月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 KaiGai Kohei 提交于
This patch enables applications to handle permissive domain correctly. Since the v2.6.26 kernel, SELinux has supported an idea of permissive domain which allows certain processes to work as if permissive mode, even if the global setting is enforcing mode. However, we don't have an application program interface to inform what domains are permissive one, and what domains are not. It means applications focuses on SELinux (XACE/SELinux, SE-PostgreSQL and so on) cannot handle permissive domain correctly. This patch add the sixth field (flags) on the reply of the /selinux/access interface which is used to make an access control decision from userspace. If the first bit of the flags field is positive, it means the required access control decision is on permissive domain, so application should allow any required actions, as the kernel doing. This patch also has a side benefit. The av_decision.flags is set at context_struct_compute_av(). It enables to check required permissions without read_lock(&policy_rwlock). Signed-off-by: NKaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> -- security/selinux/avc.c | 2 +- security/selinux/include/security.h | 4 +++- security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 4 ++-- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 30 +++++------------------------- 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 28 3月, 2009 2 次提交
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由 Paul Moore 提交于
The SELinux "compat_net" is marked as deprecated, the time has come to finally remove it from the kernel. Further code simplifications are likely in the future, but this patch was intended to be a simple, straight-up removal of the compat_net code. Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Paul Moore 提交于
The current NetLabel/SELinux behavior for incoming TCP connections works but only through a series of happy coincidences that rely on the limited nature of standard CIPSO (only able to convey MLS attributes) and the write equality imposed by the SELinux MLS constraints. The problem is that network sockets created as the result of an incoming TCP connection were not on-the-wire labeled based on the security attributes of the parent socket but rather based on the wire label of the remote peer. The issue had to do with how IP options were managed as part of the network stack and where the LSM hooks were in relation to the code which set the IP options on these newly created child sockets. While NetLabel/SELinux did correctly set the socket's on-the-wire label it was promptly cleared by the network stack and reset based on the IP options of the remote peer. This patch, in conjunction with a prior patch that adjusted the LSM hook locations, works to set the correct on-the-wire label format for new incoming connections through the security_inet_conn_request() hook. Besides the correct behavior there are many advantages to this change, the most significant is that all of the NetLabel socket labeling code in SELinux now lives in hooks which can return error codes to the core stack which allows us to finally get ride of the selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() logic which greatly simplfies the NetLabel/SELinux glue code. In the process of developing this patch I also ran into a small handful of AF_INET6 cleanliness issues that have been fixed which should make the code safer and easier to extend in the future. Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 10 3月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Eric Paris 提交于
Drop the printk message when an inode is found without an associated dentry. This should only happen when userspace can't be accessing those inodes and those labels will get set correctly on the next d_instantiate. Thus there is no reason to send this message. Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 06 3月, 2009 2 次提交
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由 Eric Paris 提交于
New selinux permission to separate the ability to turn on tty auditing from the ability to set audit rules. Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Eric Paris 提交于
When I did open permissions I didn't think any sockets would have an open. Turns out AF_UNIX sockets can have an open when they are bound to the filesystem namespace. This patch adds a new SOCK_FILE__OPEN permission. It's safe to add this as the open perms are already predicated on capabilities and capabilities means we have unknown perm handling so systems should be as backwards compatible as the policy wants them to be. https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=475224Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 02 3月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Paul Moore 提交于
Rick McNeal from LSI identified a panic in selinux_netlbl_inode_permission() caused by a certain sequence of SUNRPC operations. The problem appears to be due to the lack of NULL pointer checking in the function; this patch adds the pointer checks so the function will exit safely in the cases where the socket is not completely initialized. Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 23 2月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 Paul Moore 提交于
At some point we (okay, I) managed to break the ability for users to use the setsockopt() syscall to set IPv4 options when NetLabel was not active on the socket in question. The problem was noticed by someone trying to use the "-R" (record route) option of ping: # ping -R 10.0.0.1 ping: record route: No message of desired type The solution is relatively simple, we catch the unlabeled socket case and clear the error code, allowing the operation to succeed. Please note that we still deny users the ability to override IPv4 options on socket's which have NetLabel labeling active; this is done to ensure the labeling remains intact. Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 14 2月, 2009 9 次提交
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由 Eric Paris 提交于
We do not need O(1) access to the tail of the avc cache lists and so we are wasting lots of space using struct list_head instead of struct hlist_head. This patch converts the avc cache to use hlists in which there is a single pointer from the head which saves us about 4k of global memory. Resulted in about a 1.5% decrease in time spent in avc_has_perm_noaudit based on oprofile sampling of tbench. Although likely within the noise.... Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Eric Paris 提交于
The code making use of struct avc_cache was not easy to read thanks to liberal use of &avc_cache.{slots_lock,slots}[hvalue] throughout. This patch simply creates local pointers and uses those instead of the long global names. Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Eric Paris 提交于
It appears there was an intention to have the security server only decide certain permissions and leave other for later as some sort of a portential performance win. We are currently always deciding all 32 bits of permissions and this is a useless couple of branches and wasted space. This patch completely drops the av.decided concept. This in a 17% reduction in the time spent in avc_has_perm_noaudit based on oprofile sampling of a tbench benchmark. Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Eric Paris 提交于
we are often needlessly jumping through hoops when it comes to avd entries in avc_has_perm_noaudit and we have extra initialization and memcpy which are just wasting performance. Try to clean the function up a bit. This patch resulted in a 13% drop in time spent in avc_has_perm_noaudit in my oprofile sampling of a tbench benchmark. Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Eric Paris 提交于
Currently SELinux code has an atomic which was intended to track how many times an avc entry was used and to evict entries when they haven't been used recently. Instead we never let this atomic get above 1 and evict when it is first checked for eviction since it hits zero. This is a total waste of time so I'm completely dropping ae.used. This change resulted in about a 3% faster avc_has_perm_noaudit when running oprofile against a tbench benchmark. Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Eric Paris 提交于
The avc update node callbacks do not check the seqno of the caller with the seqno of the node found. It is possible that a policy change could happen (although almost impossibly unlikely) in which a permissive or permissive_domain decision is not valid for the entry found. Simply pass and check that the seqno of the caller and the seqno of the node found match. Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Eric Paris 提交于
When a context is pulled in from disk we don't know that it is null terminated. This patch forecebly null terminates contexts when we pull them from disk. Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Eric Paris 提交于
Currently when an inode is read into the kernel with an invalid label string (can often happen with removable media) we output a string like: SELinux: inode_doinit_with_dentry: context_to_sid([SOME INVALID LABEL]) returned -22 dor dev=[blah] ino=[blah] Which is all but incomprehensible to all but a couple of us. Instead, on EINVAL only, I plan to output a much more user friendly string and I plan to ratelimit the printk since many of these could be generated very rapidly. Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 Eric Paris 提交于
For cleanliness and efficiency remove all calls to secondary-> and instead call capabilities code directly. capabilities are the only module that selinux stacks with and so the code should not indicate that other stacking might be possible. Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- 02 2月, 2009 1 次提交
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由 James Morris 提交于
Remove SELinux hooks which do nothing except defer to the capabilites hooks (or in one case, replicates the function). Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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- 30 1月, 2009 3 次提交
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由 James Morris 提交于
Remove secondary ops call to shm_shmat, which is a noop in capabilities. Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 James Morris 提交于
Remove secondary ops call to unix_stream_connect, which is a noop in capabilities. Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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由 James Morris 提交于
Remove secondary ops call to task_kill, which is a noop in capabilities. Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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