Detach the credentials from task_struct, duplicating them in copy_process()
and releasing them in __put_task_struct().
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Separate the task security context from task_struct.  At this point, the
security data is temporarily embedded in the task_struct with two pointers
pointing to it.

Note that the Alpha arch is altered as it refers to (E)UID and (E)GID in
entry.S via asm-offsets.

With comment fixes Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne <marc.c.dionne@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Constify the kernel_cap_t arguments to the capset LSM hooks.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Take away the ability for sys_capset() to affect processes other than current.

This means that current will not need to lock its own credentials when reading
them against interference by other processes.

This has effectively been the case for a while anyway, since:

 (1) Without LSM enabled, sys_capset() is disallowed.

 (2) With file-based capabilities, sys_capset() is neutered.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NAndrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Alter the use of the key instantiation and negation functions' link-to-keyring
arguments.  Currently this specifies a keyring in the target process to link
the key into, creating the keyring if it doesn't exist.  This, however, can be
a problem for copy-on-write credentials as it means that the instantiating
process can alter the credentials of the requesting process.

This patch alters the behaviour such that:

 (1) If keyctl_instantiate_key() or keyctl_negate_key() are given a specific
     keyring by ID (ringid >= 0), then that keyring will be used.

 (2) If keyctl_instantiate_key() or keyctl_negate_key() are given one of the
     special constants that refer to the requesting process's keyrings
     (KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING, all <= 0), then:

     (a) If sys_request_key() was given a keyring to use (destringid) then the
     	 key will be attached to that keyring.

     (b) If sys_request_key() was given a NULL keyring, then the key being
     	 instantiated will be attached to the default keyring as set by
     	 keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring().

 (3) No extra link will be made.

Decision point (1) follows current behaviour, and allows those instantiators
who've searched for a specifically named keyring in the requestor's keyring so
as to partition the keys by type to still have their named keyrings.

Decision point (2) allows the requestor to make sure that the key or keys that
get produced by request_key() go where they want, whilst allowing the
instantiator to request that the key is retained.  This is mainly useful for
situations where the instantiator makes a secondary request, the key for which
should be retained by the initial requestor:

	+-----------+        +--------------+        +--------------+
	|           |        |              |        |              |
	| Requestor |------->| Instantiator |------->| Instantiator |
	|           |        |              |        |              |
	+-----------+        +--------------+        +--------------+
	           request_key()           request_key()

This might be useful, for example, in Kerberos, where the requestor requests a
ticket, and then the ticket instantiator requests the TGT, which someone else
then has to go and fetch.  The TGT, however, should be retained in the
keyrings of the requestor, not the first instantiator.  To make this explict
an extra special keyring constant is also added.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Disperse the bits of linux/key_ui.h as the reason they were put here (keyfs)
didn't get in.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Remove broken declarations for security_capable* functions,
which were not needed anyway.
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

make an A or B type decision instead of a security decision.  Currently
this is the case at least for filesystems when deciding if a process can use
the reserved 'root' blocks and for the case of things like the oom
algorithm determining if processes are root processes and should be less
likely to be killed.  These types of security system requests should not be
audited or logged since they are not really security decisions.  It would be
possible to solve this problem like the vm_enough_memory security check did
by creating a new LSM interface and moving all of the policy into that
interface but proves the needlessly bloat the LSM and provide complex
indirection.

This merely allows those decisions to be made where they belong and to not
flood logs or printk with denials for thing that are not security decisions.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

actual capbilities being added/removed.  This patch adds a new record type
which emits the target pid and the eff, inh, and perm cap sets.

example output if you audit capset syscalls would be:

type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1225743140.465:76): arch=c000003e syscall=126 success=yes exit=0 a0=17f2014 a1=17f201c a2=80000000 a3=7fff2ab7f060 items=0 ppid=2160 pid=2223 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts0 ses=1 comm="setcap" exe="/usr/sbin/setcap" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=UNKNOWN[1322] msg=audit(1225743140.465:76): pid=0 cap_pi=ffffffffffffffff cap_pp=ffffffffffffffff cap_pe=ffffffffffffffff
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

non-zero pE we will crate a new audit record which contains the entire set
of known information about the executable in question, fP, fI, fE, fversion
and includes the process's pE, pI, pP.  Before and after the bprm capability
are applied.  This record type will only be emitted from execve syscalls.

an example of making ping use fcaps instead of setuid:

setcap "cat_net_raw+pe" /bin/ping

type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1225742021.015:236): arch=c000003e syscall=59 success=yes exit=0 a0=1457f30 a1=14606b0 a2=1463940 a3=321b770a70 items=2 ppid=2929 pid=2963 auid=0 uid=500 gid=500 euid=500 suid=500 fsuid=500 egid=500 sgid=500 fsgid=500 tty=pts0 ses=3 comm="ping" exe="/bin/ping" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=UNKNOWN[1321] msg=audit(1225742021.015:236): fver=2 fp=0000000000002000 fi=0000000000000000 fe=1 old_pp=0000000000000000 old_pi=0000000000000000 old_pe=0000000000000000 new_pp=0000000000002000 new_pi=0000000000000000 new_pe=0000000000002000
type=EXECVE msg=audit(1225742021.015:236): argc=2 a0="ping" a1="127.0.0.1"
type=CWD msg=audit(1225742021.015:236):  cwd="/home/test"
type=PATH msg=audit(1225742021.015:236): item=0 name="/bin/ping" inode=49256 dev=fd:00 mode=0100755 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:ping_exec_t:s0 cap_fp=0000000000002000 cap_fe=1 cap_fver=2
type=PATH msg=audit(1225742021.015:236): item=1 name=(null) inode=507915 dev=fd:00 mode=0100755 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:ld_so_t:s0
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

records of any file that has file capabilities set.  Files which do not
have fcaps set will not have different PATH records.

An example audit record if you run:
setcap "cap_net_admin+pie" /bin/bash
/bin/bash

type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1225741937.363:230): arch=c000003e syscall=59 success=yes exit=0 a0=2119230 a1=210da30 a2=20ee290 a3=8 items=2 ppid=2149 pid=2923 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts0 ses=3 comm="ping" exe="/bin/ping" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=EXECVE msg=audit(1225741937.363:230): argc=2 a0="ping" a1="www.google.com"
type=CWD msg=audit(1225741937.363:230):  cwd="/root"
type=PATH msg=audit(1225741937.363:230): item=0 name="/bin/ping" inode=49256 dev=fd:00 mode=0104755 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:ping_exec_t:s0 cap_fp=0000000000002000 cap_fi=0000000000002000 cap_fe=1 cap_fver=2
type=PATH msg=audit(1225741937.363:230): item=1 name=(null) inode=507915 dev=fd:00 mode=0100755 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:ld_so_t:s0
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

functions which retrieve fcaps information from disk.  This information is
necessary so fcaps information can be collected and recorded by the audit
system.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

which order the argument should be in.  So give an example.
Signed-off-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Add a no_file_caps boot option when file capabilities are
compiled into the kernel (CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES=y).

This allows distributions to ship a kernel with file capabilities
compiled in, without forcing users to use (and understand and
trust) them.

When no_file_caps is specified at boot, then when a process executes
a file, any file capabilities stored with that file will not be
used in the calculation of the process' new capability sets.

This means that booting with the no_file_caps boot option will
not be the same as booting a kernel with file capabilities
compiled out - in particular a task with  CAP_SETPCAP will not
have any chance of passing capabilities to another task (which
isn't "really" possible anyway, and which may soon by killed
altogether by David Howells in any case), and it will instead
be able to put new capabilities in its pI.  However since fI
will always be empty and pI is masked with fI, it gains the
task nothing.

We also support the extra prctl options, setting securebits and
dropping capabilities from the per-process bounding set.

The other remaining difference is that killpriv, task_setscheduler,
setioprio, and setnice will continue to be hooked.  That will
be noticable in the case where a root task changed its uid
while keeping some caps, and another task owned by the new uid
tries to change settings for the more privileged task.

Changelog:
	Nov 05 2008: (v4) trivial port on top of always-start-\
		with-clear-caps patch
	Sep 23 2008: nixed file_caps_enabled when file caps are
		not compiled in as it isn't used.
		Document no_file_caps in kernel-parameters.txt.
Signed-off-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NAndrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

libata always uses PIO for ATAPI commands when the number of bytes to
transfer isn't multiple of 16 but quantum DAT72 chokes on odd bytes
PIO transfers.  Implement a horkage to skip the mod16 check and apply
it to the quantum device.

This is reported by John Clark in the following thread.

  http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.ide/34748Signed-off-by: NTejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: John Clark <clarkjc@runbox.com>
Signed-off-by: NJeff Garzik <jgarzik@redhat.com>

Impact: cleanup

clean up ifdefs: change #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32/64 to
CONFIG_HAVE_ATOMIC_IOMAP.

flip around the #ifdef sections to clean up the structure.
Signed-off-by: NKeith Packard <keithp@keithp.com>
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>

This will let userland know when to submit its batchbuffers, before they get
too big to fit in the aperture.
Signed-off-by: NEric Anholt <eric@anholt.net>
Signed-off-by: NDave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>

s/user/used/
Signed-off-by: NJeff Garzik <jgarzik@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Impact: add new generic io_map_*() APIs

Graphics devices have large PCI apertures which would consume a significant
fraction of a 32-bit address space if mapped during driver initialization.
Using ioremap at runtime is impractical as it is too slow.

This new set of interfaces uses atomic mappings on 32-bit processors and a
large static mapping on 64-bit processors to provide reasonable 32-bit
performance and optimal 64-bit performance.

The current implementation sits atop the io_map_atomic fixmap-based
mechanism for 32-bit processors.

This includes some editorial suggestions from Randy Dunlap for
Documentation/io-mapping.txt
Signed-off-by: NKeith Packard <keithp@keithp.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric Anholt <eric@anholt.net>
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>

Impact: introduce new APIs, separate kmap code from CONFIG_HIGHMEM

This takes the code used for CONFIG_HIGHMEM memory mappings except that
it's designed for dynamic IO resource mapping.

These fixmaps are available even with CONFIG_HIGHMEM turned off.
Signed-off-by: NKeith Packard <keithp@keithp.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric Anholt <eric@anholt.net>
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>

netns ops which are registered with register_pernet_gen_device() are
shutdown strictly before those which are registered with
register_pernet_subsys(). Sometimes this leads to opposite (read: buggy)
shutdown ordering between two modules.

Add register_pernet_gen_subsys()/unregister_pernet_gen_subsys() for modules
which aren't elite enough for entry in struct net, and which can't use
register_pernet_gen_device(). PPTP conntracking module is such one.
Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NPatrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Remove excess kernel-doc function parameters from networking header
& driver files:

Warning(include/net/sock.h:946): Excess function parameter or struct member 'sk' description in 'sk_filter_release'
Warning(include/linux/netdevice.h:1545): Excess function parameter or struct member 'cpu' description in 'netif_tx_lock'
Warning(drivers/net/wan/z85230.c:712): Excess function parameter or struct member 'regs' description in 'z8530_interrupt'
Signed-off-by: NRandy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

libata currently imposes a UDMA5 max transfer rate and 200 sector max
transfer size for SATA devices that sit behind a pata-sata bridge. Lots
of devices have known good bridges that don't need this limit applied.
The MTRON SSD disks are such devices. Transfer rates are increased by
20-30% with the restriction removed.

So add a "blacklist" entry for the MTRON devices, with a flag indicating
that the bridge is known good.
Signed-off-by: NJeff Garzik <jgarzik@redhat.com>

The init_phy() function attaches to the PHY, then configures the
SerDes<->TBI link (in SGMII mode).  The TBI is on the MDIO bus with the PHY
(sort of) and is accessed via the gianfar's MDIO registers, using the
functions gfar_local_mdio_read/write(), which don't do any locking.

The previously attached PHY will start a work-queue on a timer, and
probably an irq handler as well, which will talk to the PHY and thus use
the MDIO bus.  This uses phy_read/write(), which have locking, but not
against the gfar_local_mdio versions.

The result is that PHY code will try to use the MDIO bus at the same time
as the SerDes setup code, corrupting the transfers.

Setting up the SerDes before attaching to the PHY will insure that there is
no race between the SerDes code and *our* PHY, but doesn't fix everything.
Typically the PHYs for all gianfar devices are on the same MDIO bus, which
is associated with the first gianfar device.  This means that the first
gianfar's SerDes code could corrupt the MDIO transfers for a different
gianfar's PHY.

The lock used by phy_read/write() is contained in the mii_bus structure,
which is pointed to by the PHY.  This is difficult to access from the
gianfar drivers, as there is no link between a gianfar device and the
mii_bus which shares the same MDIO registers.  As far as the device layer
and drivers are concerned they are two unrelated devices (which happen to
share registers).

Generally all gianfar devices' PHYs will be on the bus associated with the
first gianfar.  But this might not be the case, so simply locking the
gianfar's PHY's mii bus might not lock the mii bus that the SerDes setup
code is going to use.

We solve this by having the code that creates the gianfar platform device
look in the device tree for an mdio device that shares the gianfar's
registers.  If one is found the ID of its platform device is saved in the
gianfar's platform data.

A new function in the gianfar mii code, gfar_get_miibus(), can use the bus
ID to search through the platform devices for a gianfar_mdio device with
the right ID.  The platform device's driver data is the mii_bus structure,
which the SerDes setup code can use to lock the current bus.
Signed-off-by: NTrent Piepho <tpiepho@freescale.com>
CC: Andy Fleming <afleming@freescale.com>
Signed-off-by: NJeff Garzik <jgarzik@redhat.com>

Fix compile error below:

     LD      drivers/spi/built-in.o
     CC [M]  drivers/spi/spi_gpio.o
   In file included from drivers/spi/spi_gpio.c:26:
   include/linux/spi/spi_bitbang.h:23: error: field `work' has incomplete type
   make[2]: *** [drivers/spi/spi_gpio.o] Error 1
   make[1]: *** [drivers/spi] Error 2
   make: *** [drivers] Error 2
Signed-off-by: NFernando Luis Vazquez Cao <fernando@oss.ntt.co.jp>
Cc: David Brownell <david-b@pacbell.net>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Junjiro R.  Okajima reported a problem where knfsd crashes if you are
using it to export shmemfs objects and run strict overcommit.  In this
situation the current->mm based modifier to the overcommit goes through a
NULL pointer.

We could simply check for NULL and skip the modifier but we've caught
other real bugs in the past from mm being NULL here - cases where we did
need a valid mm set up (eg the exec bug about a year ago).

To preserve the checks and get the logic we want shuffle the checking
around and add a new helper to the vm_ security wrappers

Also fix a current->mm reference in nommu that should use the passed mm

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
Reported-by: NJunjiro R. Okajima <hooanon05@yahoo.co.jp>
Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NAlan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Put the kernel-doc for might_sleep() _immediately_ before the macro
(no intervening lines).  Otherwise kernel-doc complains like so:

Warning(linux-2.6.27-rc3-git2//include/linux/kernel.h:129): No description found for parameter 'file'
Warning(linux-2.6.27-rc3-git2//include/linux/kernel.h:129): No description found for parameter 'line'

because kernel-doc is looking at the wrong function prototype (i.e.,
__might_sleep).  [Yes, I have a todo note to myself to check/warn for that
inconsistency in scripts/kernel-doc.]
Signed-off-by: NRandy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Cc: <Uwe.Kleine-Koenig@digi.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Nothing uses prepare_write or commit_write. Remove them from the tree
completely.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: schedule simple_prepare_write() for unexporting]
Signed-off-by: NNick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

- remove 'private' field from struct subsys
- remove cgroup_init_smp()
Signed-off-by: NLi Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: NPaul Menage <menage@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Don't duplicate the implementation of thaw_process().

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: make __thaw_process() static]
Signed-off-by: NLi Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Cedric Le Goater <clg@fr.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NMatt Helsley <matthltc@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

By default, non-privileged tasks can only mlock() a small amount of
memory to avoid a DoS attack by ordinary users.  The Linux kernel
defaulted to 32k (on a 4k page size system) to accommodate the needs of
gpg.

However, newer gpg2 needs 64k in various circumstances and otherwise
fails miserably, see bnc#329675.

Change the default to 64k, and make it more agnostic to PAGE_SIZE.
Signed-off-by: NKurt Garloff <garloff@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NNick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

When ASoC was converted to support full int width masks SOC_SINGLE_VALUE()
omitted the assignment of rshift, causing the control operatins to report
some mono controls as stereo. This happened to work some of the time due
to a confusion between shift and min in snd_soc_info_volsw().
Signed-off-by: NMark Brown <broonie@opensource.wolfsonmicro.com>
Signed-off-by: NTakashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>

Add rodata equivalents for assembly use, and fix the section attributes
used by __REFCONST.
Signed-off-by: NJan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NSam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org>

Change all users of header files to correct path.
Remove some unneeded headers for arch-v32.
Signed-off-by: NJesper Nilsson <jesper.nilsson@axis.com>

struct hid_device_id contains hidden padding which is bad for cross
compiling.  Make the padding explicit and consistent across
architectures.
Signed-off-by: NAndreas Schwab <schwab@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NJiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>

Reserve some space so we can add more data.
Signed-off-by: NAvi Kivity <avi@qumranet.com>

Every call of kvm_set_irq() should offer an irq_source_id, which is
allocated by kvm_request_irq_source_id(). Based on irq_source_id, we
identify the irq source and implement logical OR for shared level
interrupts.

The allocated irq_source_id can be freed by kvm_free_irq_source_id().

Currently, we support at most sizeof(unsigned long) different irq sources.

[Amit: - rebase to kvm.git HEAD
       - move definition of KVM_USERSPACE_IRQ_SOURCE_ID to common file
       - move kvm_request_irq_source_id to the update_irq ioctl]

[Xiantao: - Add kvm/ia64 stuff and make it work for kvm/ia64 guests]
Signed-off-by: NSheng Yang <sheng@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NAmit Shah <amit.shah@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NXiantao Zhang <xiantao.zhang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NAvi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>

Fix mac80211.h kernel-doc: it had some extra parameters that were
no longer valid and incorrect format for a return value in 2 places.

Warning(lin2628-rc2//include/net/mac80211.h:1487): Excess function parameter or struct member 'control' description in 'ieee80211_beacon_get'
Warning(lin2628-rc2//include/net/mac80211.h:1596): Excess function parameter or struct member 'control' description in 'ieee80211_get_buffered_bc'
Warning(lin2628-rc2//include/net/mac80211.h:1632): Excess function parameter or struct member 'rc4key' description in 'ieee80211_get_tkip_key'
Warning(lin2628-rc2//include/net/mac80211.h:1735): Excess function parameter or struct member 'return' description in 'ieee80211_start_tx_ba_session'
Warning(lin2628-rc2//include/net/mac80211.h:1775): Excess function parameter or struct member 'return' description in 'ieee80211_stop_tx_ba_session'
Signed-off-by: NRandy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Acked-by: NJohannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: NJohn W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>