Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>

As Bruce points out in RFC 4121, section 4.2.3:

   "In Wrap tokens that provide for confidentiality, the first 16 octets
    of the Wrap token (the "header", as defined in section 4.2.6), SHALL
    be appended to the plaintext data before encryption.  Filler octets
    MAY be inserted between the plaintext data and the "header.""

...and...

   "In Wrap tokens with confidentiality, the EC field SHALL be used to
    encode the number of octets in the filler..."

It's possible for the client to stuff different data in that area on a
retransmission, which could make the checksum come out wrong in the DRC
code.

After decrypting the blob, we should trim off any extra count bytes in
addition to the checksum blob.
Reported-by: N"J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>

A couple times recently somebody has noticed that we're ignoring a
sequence number here and wondered whether there's a bug.

In fact, there's not.  Thanks to Andy Adamson for pointing out a useful
explanation in rfc 2203.  Add comments citing that rfc, and remove
"seqnum" to prevent static checkers complaining about unused variables.
Reported-by: NAndi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>

Reported-by: NAndi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>

For every other problem here we bail out with an error, but here for
some reason we're setting a negative cache entry (with, note, an
undefined expiry).

It seems simplest just to bail out in the same way as we do in other
cases.

Cc: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Reported-by: NAndi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>

We depend on the xdr decoder to set this pointer, but if we error out
before we decode this piece it could be left NULL.

I think this is probably tough to hit without a buggy gss-proxy.
Reported-by: NAndi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>

I've been hitting a NULL ptr deref while using netconsole because the
np->dev check and the pointer manipulation in netpoll_cleanup are done
without rtnl and the following sequence happens when having a netconsole
over a vlan and we remove the vlan while disabling the netconsole:
	CPU 1					CPU2
					removes vlan and calls the notifier
enters store_enabled(), calls
netdev_cleanup which checks np->dev
and then waits for rtnl
					executes the netconsole netdev
					release notifier making np->dev
					== NULL and releases rtnl
continues to dereference a member of
np->dev which at this point is == NULL
Signed-off-by: NNikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

If local fragmentation is allowed, then ip_select_ident() and
ip_select_ident_more() need to generate unique IDs to ensure
correct defragmentation on the peer.

For example, if IPsec (tunnel mode) has to encrypt large skbs
that have local_df bit set, then all IP fragments that belonged
to different ESP datagrams would have used the same identificator.
If one of these IP fragments would get lost or reordered, then
peer could possibly stitch together wrong IP fragments that did
not belong to the same datagram. This would lead to a packet loss
or data corruption.
Signed-off-by: NAnsis Atteka <aatteka@nicira.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

skb->data already points to IP header, but for the sake of
consistency we can also use ip_hdr() to retrieve it.
Signed-off-by: NAnsis Atteka <aatteka@nicira.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

DCCP shouldn't be setting sk_err on redirects as it
isn't an error condition. it should be doing exactly
what tcp is doing and leaving the error handler without
touching the socket.
Signed-off-by: NDuan Jiong <duanj.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This fixes a regression since  eb6dc19d
"RPCSEC_GSS: Share all credential caches on a per-transport basis" which
could cause an occasional oops in the nfsd code (see below).

The problem was that an auth was left referencing a client that had been
freed.  To avoid this we need to ensure that auths are shared only
between descendants of a common client; the fact that a clone of an
rpc_client takes a reference on its parent then ensures that the parent
client will last as long as the auth.

Also add a comment explaining what I think was the intention of this
code.

  general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
  Modules linked in: rpcsec_gss_krb5 nfsd auth_rpcgss oid_registry nfs_acl lockd sunrpc
  CPU: 3 PID: 4071 Comm: kworker/u8:2 Not tainted 3.11.0-rc2-00182-g025145f #1665
  Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
  Workqueue: nfsd4_callbacks nfsd4_do_callback_rpc [nfsd]
  task: ffff88003e206080 ti: ffff88003c384000 task.ti: ffff88003c384000
  RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa00001f3>]  [<ffffffffa00001f3>] rpc_net_ns+0x53/0x70 [sunrpc]
  RSP: 0000:ffff88003c385ab8  EFLAGS: 00010246
  RAX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b RBX: ffff88003af9a800 RCX: 0000000000000002
  RDX: ffffffffa00001a5 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffffffff81e284e0
  RBP: ffff88003c385ad8 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
  R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000015 R12: ffff88003c990840
  R13: ffff88003c990878 R14: ffff88003c385ba8 R15: ffff88003e206080
  FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88003fd80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
  CR2: 00007fcdf737e000 CR3: 000000003ad2b000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
  Stack:
   ffffffffa00001a5 0000000000000006 0000000000000006 ffff88003af9a800
   ffff88003c385b08 ffffffffa00d52a4 ffff88003c385ba8 ffff88003c751bd8
   ffff88003c751bc0 ffff88003e113600 ffff88003c385b18 ffffffffa00d530c
  Call Trace:
   [<ffffffffa00001a5>] ? rpc_net_ns+0x5/0x70 [sunrpc]
   [<ffffffffa00d52a4>] __gss_pipe_release+0x54/0x90 [auth_rpcgss]
   [<ffffffffa00d530c>] gss_pipe_free+0x2c/0x30 [auth_rpcgss]
   [<ffffffffa00d678b>] gss_destroy+0x9b/0xf0 [auth_rpcgss]
   [<ffffffffa000de63>] rpcauth_release+0x23/0x30 [sunrpc]
   [<ffffffffa0001e81>] rpc_release_client+0x51/0xb0 [sunrpc]
   [<ffffffffa00020d5>] rpc_shutdown_client+0xe5/0x170 [sunrpc]
   [<ffffffff81098a14>] ? cpuacct_charge+0xa4/0xb0
   [<ffffffff81098975>] ? cpuacct_charge+0x5/0xb0
   [<ffffffffa019556f>] nfsd4_process_cb_update.isra.17+0x2f/0x210 [nfsd]
   [<ffffffff819a4ac0>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x30/0x60
   [<ffffffff819a4acb>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x3b/0x60
   [<ffffffff810703ab>] ? process_one_work+0x15b/0x510
   [<ffffffffa01957dd>] nfsd4_do_callback_rpc+0x8d/0xa0 [nfsd]
   [<ffffffff8107041e>] process_one_work+0x1ce/0x510
   [<ffffffff810703ab>] ? process_one_work+0x15b/0x510
   [<ffffffff810712ab>] worker_thread+0x11b/0x370
   [<ffffffff81071190>] ? manage_workers.isra.24+0x2b0/0x2b0
   [<ffffffff8107854b>] kthread+0xdb/0xe0
   [<ffffffff819a4ac0>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x30/0x60
   [<ffffffff81078470>] ? __init_kthread_worker+0x70/0x70
   [<ffffffff819ac7dc>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
   [<ffffffff81078470>] ? __init_kthread_worker+0x70/0x70
  Code: a5 01 00 a0 31 d2 31 f6 48 c7 c7 e0 84 e2 81 e8 f4 91 0a e1 48 8b 43 60 48 c7 c2 a5 01 00 a0 be 01 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 e0 84 e2 81 <48> 8b 98 10 07 00 00 e8 91 8f 0a e1 e8
  +3c 4e 07 e1 48 83 c4 18
  RIP  [<ffffffffa00001f3>] rpc_net_ns+0x53/0x70 [sunrpc]
   RSP <ffff88003c385ab8>
Signed-off-by: NJ. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

Commit 1b7fdd2a ("tcp: do not use cached RTT for RTT estimation")
did not correctly account for the fact that crtt is the RTT shifted
left 3 bits. Fix the calculation to consistently reflect this fact.
Signed-off-by: NNeal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Acked-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-By: NYuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

When receiving or sending a packet a packet on a VLAN, the
vid has to be marked with the TAG flag in order to make any
component in batman-adv understand that the packet is coming
from a really tagged network.

This fix the Bridge Loop Avoidance behaviour which was not
able to send announces over VLAN interfaces.

Introduced by 0b1da1765fdb00ca5d53bc95c9abc70dfc9aae5b
("batman-adv: change VID semantic in the BLA code")
Signed-off-by: NAntonio Quartulli <antonio@open-mesh.org>
Acked-by: NSimon Wunderlich <siwu@hrz.tu-chemnitz.de>
Signed-off-by: NMarek Lindner <mareklindner@neomailbox.ch>

Instead of the netlink skb.
Signed-off-by: NGao feng <gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: NPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>

Adapt the same behaviour for SCTP as present in TCP for ICMP redirect
messages. For IPv6, RFC4443, section 2.4. says:

  ...
  (e) An ICMPv6 error message MUST NOT be originated as a result of
      receiving the following:
  ...
       (e.2) An ICMPv6 redirect message [IPv6-DISC].
  ...

Therefore, do not report an error to user space, just invoke dst's redirect
callback and leave, same for IPv4 as done in TCP as well. The implication
w/o having this patch could be that the reception of such packets would
generate a poll notification and in worst case it could even tear down the
whole connection. Therefore, stop updating sk_err on redirects.
Reported-by: NDuan Jiong <duanj.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
Reported-by: NHannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Suggested-by: NVlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

IFLA_IPTUN_LOCAL and IFLA_IPTUN_REMOTE were inverted.

Introduced by c075b130 (ip6tnl: advertise tunnel param via rtnl).
Signed-off-by: NDing Zhi <zhi.ding@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: NNicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This fixes a serious bug affecting all hash types with a net element -
specifically, if a CIDR value is deleted such that none of the same size
exist any more, all larger (less-specific) values will then fail to
match. Adding back any prefix with a CIDR equal to or more specific than
the one deleted will fix it.

Steps to reproduce:
ipset -N test hash:net
ipset -A test 1.1.0.0/16
ipset -A test 2.2.2.0/24
ipset -T test 1.1.1.1           #1.1.1.1 IS in set
ipset -D test 2.2.2.0/24
ipset -T test 1.1.1.1           #1.1.1.1 IS NOT in set

This is due to the fact that the nets counter was unconditionally
decremented prior to the iteration that shifts up the entries. Now, we
first check if there is a proceeding entry and if not, decrement it and
return. Otherwise, we proceed to iterate and then zero the last element,
which, in most cases, will already be zero.
Signed-off-by: NOliver Smith <oliver@8.c.9.b.0.7.4.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa>
Signed-off-by: NJozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@blackhole.kfki.hu>

This closes netfilter bugzilla #843, reported by Quentin Armitage.
Signed-off-by: NJozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@blackhole.kfki.hu>

The "nomatch" commandline flag should invert the matching at testing,
similarly to the --return-nomatch flag of the "set" match of iptables.
Until now it worked with the elements with "nomatch" flag only. From
now on it works with elements without the flag too, i.e:

 # ipset n test hash:net
 # ipset a test 10.0.0.0/24 nomatch
 # ipset t test 10.0.0.1
 10.0.0.1 is NOT in set test.
 # ipset t test 10.0.0.1 nomatch
 10.0.0.1 is in set test.

 # ipset a test 192.168.0.0/24
 # ipset t test 192.168.0.1
 192.168.0.1 is in set test.
 # ipset t test 192.168.0.1 nomatch
 192.168.0.1 is NOT in set test.

 Before the patch the results were

 ...
 # ipset t test 192.168.0.1
 192.168.0.1 is in set test.
 # ipset t test 192.168.0.1 nomatch
 192.168.0.1 is in set test.
Signed-off-by: NJozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@blackhole.kfki.hu>

Signed-off-by: NJozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@blackhole.kfki.hu>

The NULL deref happens when br_handle_frame is called between these
2 lines of del_nbp:
	dev->priv_flags &= ~IFF_BRIDGE_PORT;
	/* --> br_handle_frame is called at this time */
	netdev_rx_handler_unregister(dev);

In br_handle_frame the return of br_port_get_rcu(dev) is dereferenced
without check but br_port_get_rcu(dev) returns NULL if:
	!(dev->priv_flags & IFF_BRIDGE_PORT)

Eric Dumazet pointed out the testing of IFF_BRIDGE_PORT is not necessary
here since we're in rcu_read_lock and we have synchronize_net() in
netdev_rx_handler_unregister. So remove the testing of IFF_BRIDGE_PORT
and by the previous patch, make sure br_port_get_rcu is called in
bridging code.
Signed-off-by: NHong Zhiguo <zhiguohong@tencent.com>
Acked-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

current br_port_get_rcu is problematic in bridging path
(NULL deref). Change these calls in netlink path first.
Signed-off-by: NHong Zhiguo <zhiguohong@tencent.com>
Acked-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

After the last architecture switched to generic hard irqs the config
options HAVE_GENERIC_HARDIRQS & GENERIC_HARDIRQS and the related code
for !CONFIG_GENERIC_HARDIRQS can be removed.
Signed-off-by: NMartin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>

In commit 58a317f1 (netfilter: ipv6: add IPv6 NAT support), icmpv6_manip_pkt
was added with an incorrect comparison of ICMP codes to types.  This causes
problems when using NAT rules with the --random option.  Correct the
comparison.

This closes netfilter bugzilla #851, reported by Alexander Neumann.
Signed-off-by: NPhil Oester <kernel@linuxace.com>
Signed-off-by: NPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>

At some point limits were added to forward_delay.  However, the
limits are only enforced when STP is enabled.  This created a
scenario where you could have a value outside the allowed range
while STP is disabled, which then stuck around even after STP
is enabled.

This patch fixes this by clamping the value when we enable STP.

I had to move the locking around a bit to ensure that there is
no window where someone could insert a value outside the range
while we're in the middle of enabling STP.
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Cheers,
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This changes the message_age_timer calculation to use the BPDU's max age as
opposed to the local bridge's max age.  This is in accordance with section
8.6.2.3.2 Step 2 of the 802.1D-1998 sprecification.

With the current implementation, when running with very large bridge
diameters, convergance will not always occur even if a root bridge is
configured to have a longer max age.

Tested successfully on bridge diameters of ~200.
Signed-off-by: NChris Healy <cphealy@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

RESOURCE_MAX is far too general name, change it to RES_COUNTER_MAX.
Signed-off-by: NSha Zhengju <handai.szj@taobao.com>
Signed-off-by: NQiang Huang <h.huangqiang@huawei.com>
Acked-by: NMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Daisuke Nishimura <nishimura@mxp.nes.nec.co.jp>
Cc: Jeff Liu <jeff.liu@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Alan Chester reported an issue with IPv6 on SCTP that IPsec traffic is not
being encrypted, whereas on IPv4 it is. Setting up an AH + ESP transport
does not seem to have the desired effect:

SCTP + IPv4:

  22:14:20.809645 IP (tos 0x2,ECT(0), ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto AH (51), length 116)
    192.168.0.2 > 192.168.0.5: AH(spi=0x00000042,sumlen=16,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00000044,seq=0x1), length 72
  22:14:20.813270 IP (tos 0x2,ECT(0), ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto AH (51), length 340)
    192.168.0.5 > 192.168.0.2: AH(spi=0x00000043,sumlen=16,seq=0x1):

SCTP + IPv6:

  22:31:19.215029 IP6 (class 0x02, hlim 64, next-header SCTP (132) payload length: 364)
    fe80::222:15ff:fe87:7fc.3333 > fe80::92e6:baff:fe0d:5a54.36767: sctp
    1) [INIT ACK] [init tag: 747759530] [rwnd: 62464] [OS: 10] [MIS: 10]

Moreover, Alan says:

  This problem was seen with both Racoon and Racoon2. Other people have seen
  this with OpenSwan. When IPsec is configured to encrypt all upper layer
  protocols the SCTP connection does not initialize. After using Wireshark to
  follow packets, this is because the SCTP packet leaves Box A unencrypted and
  Box B believes all upper layer protocols are to be encrypted so it drops
  this packet, causing the SCTP connection to fail to initialize. When IPsec
  is configured to encrypt just SCTP, the SCTP packets are observed unencrypted.

In fact, using `socat sctp6-listen:3333 -` on one end and transferring "plaintext"
string on the other end, results in cleartext on the wire where SCTP eventually
does not report any errors, thus in the latter case that Alan reports, the
non-paranoid user might think he's communicating over an encrypted transport on
SCTP although he's not (tcpdump ... -X):

  ...
  0x0030: 5d70 8e1a 0003 001a 177d eb6c 0000 0000  ]p.......}.l....
  0x0040: 0000 0000 706c 6169 6e74 6578 740a 0000  ....plaintext...

Only in /proc/net/xfrm_stat we can see XfrmInTmplMismatch increasing on the
receiver side. Initial follow-up analysis from Alan's bug report was done by
Alexey Dobriyan. Also thanks to Vlad Yasevich for feedback on this.

SCTP has its own implementation of sctp_v6_xmit() not calling inet6_csk_xmit().
This has the implication that it probably never really got updated along with
changes in inet6_csk_xmit() and therefore does not seem to invoke xfrm handlers.

SCTP's IPv4 xmit however, properly calls ip_queue_xmit() to do the work. Since
a call to inet6_csk_xmit() would solve this problem, but result in unecessary
route lookups, let us just use the cached flowi6 instead that we got through
sctp_v6_get_dst(). Since all SCTP packets are being sent through sctp_packet_transmit(),
we do the route lookup / flow caching in sctp_transport_route(), hold it in
tp->dst and skb_dst_set() right after that. If we would alter fl6->daddr in
sctp_v6_xmit() to np->opt->srcrt, we possibly could run into the same effect
of not having xfrm layer pick it up, hence, use fl6_update_dst() in sctp_v6_get_dst()
instead to get the correct source routed dst entry, which we assign to the skb.

Also source address routing example from 62503411 ("sctp: fix sctp to work with
ipv6 source address routing") still works with this patch! Nevertheless, in RFC5095
it is actually 'recommended' to not use that anyway due to traffic amplification [1].
So it seems we're not supposed to do that anyway in sctp_v6_xmit(). Moreover, if
we overwrite the flow destination here, the lower IPv6 layer will be unable to
put the correct destination address into IP header, as routing header is added in
ipv6_push_nfrag_opts() but then probably with wrong final destination. Things aside,
result of this patch is that we do not have any XfrmInTmplMismatch increase plus on
the wire with this patch it now looks like:

SCTP + IPv6:

  08:17:47.074080 IP6 2620:52:0:102f:7a2b:cbff:fe27:1b0a > 2620:52:0:102f:213:72ff:fe32:7eba:
    AH(spi=0x00005fb4,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00005fb5,seq=0x1), length 72
  08:17:47.074264 IP6 2620:52:0:102f:213:72ff:fe32:7eba > 2620:52:0:102f:7a2b:cbff:fe27:1b0a:
    AH(spi=0x00003d54,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00003d55,seq=0x1), length 296

This fixes Kernel Bugzilla 24412. This security issue seems to be present since
2.6.18 kernels. Lets just hope some big passive adversary in the wild didn't have
its fun with that. lksctp-tools IPv6 regression test suite passes as well with
this patch.

 [1] http://www.secdev.org/conf/IPv6_RH_security-csw07.pdfReported-by: NAlan Chester <alan.chester@tekelec.com>
Reported-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: NVlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

The received ARP request type in the Ethernet packet head is ETH_P_ARP other than ETH_P_IP.

[ Bug introduced by commit b7394d24
  ("netpoll: prepare for ipv6") ]
Signed-off-by: NSonic Zhang <sonic.zhang@analog.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Fix the declaration of the gss_auth_hash_table so that it creates
a 16 bucket hashtable, as I had intended.
Reported-by: NGeert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

m68k/allmodconfig:

net/sunrpc/auth_generic.c: In function ‘generic_key_timeout’:
net/sunrpc/auth_generic.c:241: warning: format ‘%d’ expects type ‘int’, but
argument 2 has type ‘kuid_t’

commit cdba321e ("sunrpc: Convert kuids and
kgids to uids and gids for printing") forgot to convert one instance.
Signed-off-by: NGeert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>

I found the following pattern that leads in to interesting findings:

  grep -r "ret.*|=.*__put_user" *
  grep -r "ret.*|=.*__get_user" *
  grep -r "ret.*|=.*__copy" *

The __put_user() calls in compat_ioctl.c, ptrace compat, signal compat,
since those appear in compat code, we could probably expect the kernel
addresses not to be reachable in the lower 32-bit range, so I think they
might not be exploitable.

For the "__get_user" cases, I don't think those are exploitable: the worse
that can happen is that the kernel will copy kernel memory into in-kernel
buffers, and will fail immediately afterward.

The alpha csum_partial_copy_from_user() seems to be missing the
access_ok() check entirely.  The fix is inspired from x86.  This could
lead to information leak on alpha.  I also noticed that many architectures
map csum_partial_copy_from_user() to csum_partial_copy_generic(), but I
wonder if the latter is performing the access checks on every
architectures.
Signed-off-by: NMathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Fix a typo added in commit 56b765b7 ("htb: improved accuracy at high
rates")

cbuffer should not be a copy of buffer.
Signed-off-by: NVimalkumar <j.vimal@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jpirko@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NJiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

When loading the ipv6 module, ndisc_init() is called before
ip6_route_init(). As the former registers a handler calling
fib6_run_gc(), this opens a window to run the garbage collector
before necessary data structures are initialized. If a network
device is initialized in this window, adding MAC address to it
triggers a NETDEV_CHANGEADDR event, leading to a crash in
fib6_clean_all().

Take the event handler registration out of ndisc_init() into a
separate function ndisc_late_init() and move it after
ip6_route_init().
Signed-off-by: NMichal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This change just removes two tabs from the source file.
Signed-off-by: NStefan Tomanek <stefan.tomanek@wertarbyte.de>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

commit 416186fb ("net: Split core bits of netdev_pick_tx
into __netdev_pick_tx") added a bug that disables caching of queue
index in the socket.

This is the source of packet reorders for TCP flows, and
again this is happening more often when using FQ pacing.

Old code was doing

if (queue_index != old_index)
	sk_tx_queue_set(sk, queue_index);

Alexander renamed the variables but forgot to change sk_tx_queue_set()
2nd parameter.

if (queue_index != new_index)
	sk_tx_queue_set(sk, queue_index);

This means we store -1 over and over in sk->sk_tx_queue_mapping
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@intel.com>
Acked-by: NAlexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This was originally reported in [1] and posted by Neil Horman [2], he said:

  Fix up a missed null pointer check in the asconf code. If we don't find
  a local address, but we pass in an address length of more than 1, we may
  dereference a NULL laddr pointer. Currently this can't happen, as the only
  users of the function pass in the value 1 as the addrcnt parameter, but
  its not hot path, and it doesn't hurt to check for NULL should that ever
  be the case.

The callpath from sctp_asconf_mgmt() looks okay. But this could be triggered
from sctp_setsockopt_bindx() call with SCTP_BINDX_REM_ADDR and addrcnt > 1
while passing all possible addresses from the bind list to SCTP_BINDX_REM_ADDR
so that we do *not* find a single address in the association's bind address
list that is not in the packed array of addresses. If this happens when we
have an established association with ASCONF-capable peers, then we could get
a NULL pointer dereference as we only check for laddr == NULL && addrcnt == 1
and call later sctp_make_asconf_update_ip() with NULL laddr.

BUT: this actually won't happen as sctp_bindx_rem() will catch such a case
and return with an error earlier. As this is incredably unintuitive and error
prone, add a check to catch at least future bugs here. As Neil says, its not
hot path. Introduced by 8a07eb0a ("sctp: Add ASCONF operation on the
single-homed host").

 [1] http://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-sctp/msg02132.html
 [2] http://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-sctp/msg02133.htmlReported-by: NDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NNeil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Michio Honda <micchie@sfc.wide.ad.jp>
Acked-By: NNeil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: NVlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

If we do not add braces around ...

  mask |= POLLERR |
          sock_flag(sk, SOCK_SELECT_ERR_QUEUE) ? POLLPRI : 0;

... then this condition always evaluates to true as POLLERR is
defined as 8 and binary or'd with whatever result comes out of
sock_flag(). Hence instead of (X | Y) ? A : B, transform it into
X | (Y ? A : B). Unfortunatelty, commit 8facd5fb ("net: fix
smatch warnings inside datagram_poll") forgot about SCTP. :-(

Introduced by 7d4c04fc ("net: add option to enable error queue
packets waking select").
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Acked-by: NNeil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: NVlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NJacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

When the kernel is compiled with CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES, and we return
with an error in fn = fib6_add_1(), then error codes are encoded into
the return pointer e.g. ERR_PTR(-ENOENT). In such an error case, we
write the error code into err and jump to out, hence enter the if(err)
condition. Now, if CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES is enabled, we check for:

  if (pn != fn && pn->leaf == rt)
    ...
  if (pn != fn && !pn->leaf && !(pn->fn_flags & RTN_RTINFO))
    ...

Since pn is NULL and fn is f.e. ERR_PTR(-ENOENT), then pn != fn
evaluates to true and causes a NULL-pointer dereference on further
checks on pn. Fix it, by setting both NULL in error case, so that
pn != fn already evaluates to false and no further dereference
takes place.

This was first correctly implemented in 4a287eba ("IPv6 routing,
NLM_F_* flag support: REPLACE and EXCL flags support, warn about
missing CREATE flag"), but the bug got later on introduced by
188c517a ("ipv6: return errno pointers consistently for fib6_add_1()").
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Lin Ming <mlin@ss.pku.edu.cn>
Cc: Matti Vaittinen <matti.vaittinen@nsn.com>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: NHannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: NMatti Vaittinen <matti.vaittinen@nsn.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

In function __parse_flow_nlattrs(), we check for condition
(type > OVS_KEY_ATTR_MAX) and if true, print an error, but we do
not return from this function as in other checks. It seems this
has been forgotten, as otherwise, we could access beyond the
memory of ovs_key_lens, which is of ovs_key_lens[OVS_KEY_ATTR_MAX + 1].
Hence, a maliciously prepared nla_type from user space could access
beyond this upper limit.

Introduced by 03f0d916 ("openvswitch: Mega flow implementation").
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Zhou <azhou@nicira.com>
Acked-by: NJesse Gross <jesse@nicira.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>