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  1. 26 7月, 2013 4 次提交
  3. 01 6月, 2013 1 次提交
  5. 08 5月, 2013 1 次提交
  7. 01 5月, 2013 1 次提交
  9. 30 4月, 2013 1 次提交
  11. 19 4月, 2013 1 次提交
  13. 18 4月, 2013 1 次提交
  15. 10 4月, 2013 1 次提交
  17. 08 4月, 2013 1 次提交
  19. 03 4月, 2013 1 次提交
  21. 02 4月, 2013 1 次提交
    • J
      selinux: make security_sb_clone_mnt_opts return an error on context mismatch · 094f7b69
      由 Jeff Layton 提交于 
      I had the following problem reported a while back. If you mount the
same filesystem twice using NFSv4 with different contexts, then the
second context= option is ignored. For instance:

    # mount server:/export /mnt/test1
    # mount server:/export /mnt/test2 -o context=system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0
    # ls -dZ /mnt/test1
    drwxrwxrwt. root root system_u:object_r:nfs_t:s0       /mnt/test1
    # ls -dZ /mnt/test2
    drwxrwxrwt. root root system_u:object_r:nfs_t:s0       /mnt/test2

When we call into SELinux to set the context of a "cloned" superblock,
it will currently just bail out when it notices that we're reusing an
existing superblock. Since the existing superblock is already set up and
presumably in use, we can't go overwriting its context with the one from
the "original" sb. Because of this, the second context= option in this
case cannot take effect.

This patch fixes this by turning security_sb_clone_mnt_opts into an int
return operation. When it finds that the "new" superblock that it has
been handed is already set up, it checks to see whether the contexts on
the old superblock match it. If it does, then it will just return
success, otherwise it'll return -EBUSY and emit a printk to tell the
admin why the second mount failed.

Note that this patch may cause casualties. The NFSv4 code relies on
being able to walk down to an export from the pseudoroot. If you mount
filesystems that are nested within one another with different contexts,
then this patch will make those mounts fail in new and "exciting" ways.

For instance, suppose that /export is a separate filesystem on the
server:

    # mount server:/ /mnt/test1
    # mount salusa:/export /mnt/test2 -o context=system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0
    mount.nfs: an incorrect mount option was specified

...with the printk in the ring buffer. Because we *might* eventually
walk down to /mnt/test1/export, the mount is denied due to this patch.
The second mount needs the pseudoroot superblock, but that's already
present with the wrong context.

OTOH, if we mount these in the reverse order, then both mounts work,
because the pseudoroot superblock created when mounting /export is
discarded once that mount is done. If we then however try to walk into
that directory, the automount fails for the similar reasons:

    # cd /mnt/test1/scratch/
    -bash: cd: /mnt/test1/scratch: Device or resource busy

The story I've gotten from the SELinux folks that I've talked to is that
this is desirable behavior. In SELinux-land, mounting the same data
under different contexts is wrong -- there can be only one.

Cc: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
      094f7b69
  23. 29 3月, 2013 1 次提交
  25. 27 3月, 2013 1 次提交
  27. 20 3月, 2013 9 次提交
    • A
      devcg: propagate local changes down the hierarchy · bd2953eb
      由 Aristeu Rozanski 提交于 
      This patch makes exception changes to propagate down in hierarchy respecting
when possible local exceptions.

New exceptions allowing additional access to devices won't be propagated, but
it'll be possible to add an exception to access all of part of the newly
allowed device(s).

New exceptions disallowing access to devices will be propagated down and the
local group's exceptions will be revalidated for the new situation.
Example:
      A
     / \
        B

    group        behavior          exceptions
    A            allow             "b 8:* rwm", "c 116:1 rw"
    B            deny              "c 1:3 rwm", "c 116:2 rwm", "b 3:* rwm"

If a new exception is added to group A:
	# echo "c 116:* r" > A/devices.deny
it'll propagate down and after revalidating B's local exceptions, the exception
"c 116:2 rwm" will be removed.

In case parent's exceptions change and local exceptions are not allowed anymore,
they'll be deleted.

v7:
- do not allow behavior change when the cgroup has children
- update documentation

v6: fixed issues pointed by Serge Hallyn
- only copy parent's exceptions while propagating behavior if the local
  behavior is different
- while propagating exceptions, do not clear and copy parent's: it'd be against
  the premise we don't propagate access to more devices

v5: fixed issues pointed by Serge Hallyn
- updated documentation
- not propagating when an exception is written to devices.allow
- when propagating a new behavior, clean the local exceptions list if they're
  for a different behavior

v4: fixed issues pointed by Tejun Heo
- separated function to walk the tree and collect valid propagation targets

v3: fixed issues pointed by Tejun Heo
- update documentation
- move css_online/css_offline changes to a new patch
- use cgroup_for_each_descendant_pre() instead of own descendant walk
- move exception_copy rework to a separared patch
- move exception_clean rework to a separated patch

v2: fixed issues pointed by Tejun Heo
- instead of keeping the local settings that won't apply anymore, remove them

Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: NAristeu Rozanski <aris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NTejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
      bd2953eb
    • A
      devcg: use css_online and css_offline · 1909554c
      由 Aristeu Rozanski 提交于 
      Allocate resources and change behavior only when online. This is needed in
order to determine if a node is suitable for hierarchy propagation or if it's
being removed.

Locking:
Both functions take devcgroup_mutex to make changes to device_cgroup structure.
Hierarchy propagation will also take devcgroup_mutex before walking the
tree while walking the tree itself is protected by rcu lock.
Acked-by: NTejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: NAristeu Rozanski <aris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NTejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
      1909554c
    • A
      devcg: prepare may_access() for hierarchy support · c39a2a30
      由 Aristeu Rozanski 提交于 
      Currently may_access() is only able to verify if an exception is valid for the
current cgroup, which has the same behavior. With hierarchy, it'll be also used
to verify if a cgroup local exception is valid towards its cgroup parent, which
might have different behavior.

v2:
- updated patch description
- rebased on top of a new patch to expand the may_access() logic to make it
  more clear
- fixed argument description order in may_access()
Acked-by: NTejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: NAristeu Rozanski <aris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NTejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
      c39a2a30
    • A
      devcg: expand may_access() logic · 26898fdf
      由 Aristeu Rozanski 提交于 
      In order to make the next patch more clear, expand may_access() logic.

v2: may_access() returns bool now
Acked-by: NTejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: NAristeu Rozanski <aris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NTejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
      26898fdf
    • I
      Fix NULL pointer dereference in smack_inode_unlink() and smack_inode_rmdir() · cdb56b60
      由 Igor Zhbanov 提交于 
      This patch fixes kernel Oops because of wrong common_audit_data type
in smack_inode_unlink() and smack_inode_rmdir().

When SMACK security module is enabled and SMACK logging is on (/smack/logging
is not zero) and you try to delete the file which
1) you cannot delete due to SMACK rules and logging of failures is on
or
2) you can delete and logging of success is on,

you will see following:

	Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 000002d7

	[<...>] (strlen+0x0/0x28)
	[<...>] (audit_log_untrustedstring+0x14/0x28)
	[<...>] (common_lsm_audit+0x108/0x6ac)
	[<...>] (smack_log+0xc4/0xe4)
	[<...>] (smk_curacc+0x80/0x10c)
	[<...>] (smack_inode_unlink+0x74/0x80)
	[<...>] (security_inode_unlink+0x2c/0x30)
	[<...>] (vfs_unlink+0x7c/0x100)
	[<...>] (do_unlinkat+0x144/0x16c)

The function smack_inode_unlink() (and smack_inode_rmdir()) need
to log two structures of different types. First of all it does:

	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);

This will set common audit data type to LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY
and store dentry for auditing (by function smk_curacc(), which in turn calls
dump_common_audit_data(), which is actually uses provided data and logs it).

	/*
	 * You need write access to the thing you're unlinking
	 */
	rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(ip), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
	if (rc == 0) {
		/*
		 * You also need write access to the containing directory
		 */

Then this function wants to log anoter data:

		smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, NULL);
		smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, dir);

The function sets inode field, but don't change common_audit_data type.

		rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
	}

So the dump_common_audit() function incorrectly interprets inode structure
as dentry, and Oops will happen.

This patch reinitializes common_audit_data structures with correct type.
Also I removed unneeded
	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, NULL);
initialization, because both dentry and inode pointers are stored
in the same union.
Signed-off-by: NIgor Zhbanov <i.zhbanov@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: NKyungmin Park <kyungmin.park@samsung.com>
      cdb56b60
    • R
      Smack: add support for modification of existing rules · e05b6f98
      由 Rafal Krypa 提交于 
      Rule modifications are enabled via /smack/change-rule. Format is as follows:
"Subject Object rwaxt rwaxt"

First two strings are subject and object labels up to 255 characters.
Third string contains permissions to enable.
Fourth string contains permissions to disable.

All unmentioned permissions will be left unchanged.
If no rule previously existed, it will be created.

Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.gitSigned-off-by: NRafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
      e05b6f98
    • J
      smack: SMACK_MAGIC to include/uapi/linux/magic.h · cee7e443
      由 Jarkko Sakkinen 提交于 
      SMACK_MAGIC moved to a proper place for easy user space access
(i.e. libsmack).
Signed-off-by: NJarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@iki.fi>
      cee7e443
    • R
      Smack: add missing support for transmute bit in smack_str_from_perm() · a87d79ad
      由 Rafal Krypa 提交于 
      This fixes audit logs for granting or denial of permissions to show
information about transmute bit.

Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.gitSigned-off-by: NRafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
      a87d79ad
    • R
      Smack: prevent revoke-subject from failing when unseen label is written to it · d15d9fad
      由 Rafal Krypa 提交于 
      Special file /smack/revoke-subject will silently accept labels that are not
present on the subject label list. Nothing has to be done for such labels,
as there are no rules for them to revoke.

Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.gitSigned-off-by: NRafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
      d15d9fad
  29. 18 3月, 2013 3 次提交
  31. 13 3月, 2013 1 次提交
    • M
      Fix: compat_rw_copy_check_uvector() misuse in aio, readv, writev, and security keys · 8aec0f5d
      由 Mathieu Desnoyers 提交于 
      Looking at mm/process_vm_access.c:process_vm_rw() and comparing it to
compat_process_vm_rw() shows that the compatibility code requires an
explicit "access_ok()" check before calling
compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(). The same difference seems to appear when
we compare fs/read_write.c:do_readv_writev() to
fs/compat.c:compat_do_readv_writev().

This subtle difference between the compat and non-compat requirements
should probably be debated, as it seems to be error-prone. In fact,
there are two others sites that use this function in the Linux kernel,
and they both seem to get it wrong:

Now shifting our attention to fs/aio.c, we see that aio_setup_iocb()
also ends up calling compat_rw_copy_check_uvector() through
aio_setup_vectored_rw(). Unfortunately, the access_ok() check appears to
be missing. Same situation for
security/keys/compat.c:compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov().

I propose that we add the access_ok() check directly into
compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(), so callers don't have to worry about it,
and it therefore makes the compat call code similar to its non-compat
counterpart. Place the access_ok() check in the same location where
copy_from_user() can trigger a -EFAULT error in the non-compat code, so
the ABI behaviors are alike on both compat and non-compat.

While we are here, fix compat_do_readv_writev() so it checks for
compat_rw_copy_check_uvector() negative return values.

And also, fix a memory leak in compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov() error
handling.
Acked-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: NAl Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NMathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      8aec0f5d
  33. 12 3月, 2013 1 次提交
    • D
      keys: fix race with concurrent install_user_keyrings() · 0da9dfdd
      由 David Howells 提交于 
      This fixes CVE-2013-1792.

There is a race in install_user_keyrings() that can cause a NULL pointer
dereference when called concurrently for the same user if the uid and
uid-session keyrings are not yet created.  It might be possible for an
unprivileged user to trigger this by calling keyctl() from userspace in
parallel immediately after logging in.

Assume that we have two threads both executing lookup_user_key(), both
looking for KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING.

	THREAD A			THREAD B
	===============================	===============================
					==>call install_user_keyrings();
	if (!cred->user->session_keyring)
	==>call install_user_keyrings()
					...
					user->uid_keyring = uid_keyring;
	if (user->uid_keyring)
		return 0;
	<==
	key = cred->user->session_keyring [== NULL]
					user->session_keyring = session_keyring;
	atomic_inc(&key->usage); [oops]

At the point thread A dereferences cred->user->session_keyring, thread B
hasn't updated user->session_keyring yet, but thread A assumes it is
populated because install_user_keyrings() returned ok.

The race window is really small but can be exploited if, for example,
thread B is interrupted or preempted after initializing uid_keyring, but
before doing setting session_keyring.

This couldn't be reproduced on a stock kernel.  However, after placing
systemtap probe on 'user->session_keyring = session_keyring;' that
introduced some delay, the kernel could be crashed reliably.

Fix this by checking both pointers before deciding whether to return.
Alternatively, the test could be done away with entirely as it is checked
inside the mutex - but since the mutex is global, that may not be the best
way.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reported-by: NMateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
      0da9dfdd
  35. 04 3月, 2013 1 次提交
    • E
      userns: Stop oopsing in key_change_session_keyring · ba0e3427
      由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于 
      Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> writes:
> Just hit this on Linus' current tree.
>
> [   89.621770] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000000c8
> [   89.623111] IP: [<ffffffff810784b0>] commit_creds+0x250/0x2f0
> [   89.624062] PGD 122bfd067 PUD 122bfe067 PMD 0
> [   89.624901] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
> [   89.625678] Modules linked in: caif_socket caif netrom bridge hidp 8021q garp stp mrp rose llc2 af_rxrpc phonet af_key binfmt_misc bnep l2tp_ppp can_bcm l2tp_core pppoe pppox can_raw scsi_transport_iscsi ppp_generic slhc nfnetlink can ipt_ULOG ax25 decnet irda nfc rds x25 crc_ccitt appletalk atm ipx p8023 psnap p8022 llc lockd sunrpc ip6t_REJECT nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 xt_conntrack nf_conntrack ip6table_filter ip6_tables btusb bluetooth snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_pcm vhost_net snd_page_alloc snd_timer tun macvtap usb_debug snd rfkill microcode macvlan edac_core pcspkr serio_raw kvm_amd soundcore kvm r8169 mii
> [   89.637846] CPU 2
> [   89.638175] Pid: 782, comm: trinity-main Not tainted 3.8.0+ #63 Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. GA-MA78GM-S2H/GA-MA78GM-S2H
> [   89.639850] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810784b0>]  [<ffffffff810784b0>] commit_creds+0x250/0x2f0
> [   89.641161] RSP: 0018:ffff880115657eb8  EFLAGS: 00010207
> [   89.641984] RAX: 00000000000003e8 RBX: ffff88012688b000 RCX: 0000000000000000
> [   89.643069] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff81c32960 RDI: ffff880105839600
> [   89.644167] RBP: ffff880115657ed8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
> [   89.645254] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: ffff880105839600
> [   89.646340] R13: ffff88011beea490 R14: ffff88011beea490 R15: 0000000000000000
> [   89.647431] FS:  00007f3ac063b740(0000) GS:ffff88012b200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
> [   89.648660] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
> [   89.649548] CR2: 00000000000000c8 CR3: 0000000122bfc000 CR4: 00000000000007e0
> [   89.650635] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
> [   89.651723] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
> [   89.652812] Process trinity-main (pid: 782, threadinfo ffff880115656000, task ffff88011beea490)
> [   89.654128] Stack:
> [   89.654433]  0000000000000000 ffff8801058396a0 ffff880105839600 ffff88011beeaa78
> [   89.655769]  ffff880115657ef8 ffffffff812c7d9b ffffffff82079be0 0000000000000000
> [   89.657073]  ffff880115657f28 ffffffff8106c665 0000000000000002 ffff880115657f58
> [   89.658399] Call Trace:
> [   89.658822]  [<ffffffff812c7d9b>] key_change_session_keyring+0xfb/0x140
> [   89.659845]  [<ffffffff8106c665>] task_work_run+0xa5/0xd0
> [   89.660698]  [<ffffffff81002911>] do_notify_resume+0x71/0xb0
> [   89.661581]  [<ffffffff816c9a4a>] int_signal+0x12/0x17
> [   89.662385] Code: 24 90 00 00 00 48 8b b3 90 00 00 00 49 8b 4c 24 40 48 39 f2 75 08 e9 83 00 00 00 48 89 ca 48 81 fa 60 29 c3 81 0f 84 41 fe ff ff <48> 8b 8a c8 00 00 00 48 39 ce 75 e4 3b 82 d0 00 00 00 0f 84 4b
> [   89.667778] RIP  [<ffffffff810784b0>] commit_creds+0x250/0x2f0
> [   89.668733]  RSP <ffff880115657eb8>
> [   89.669301] CR2: 00000000000000c8
>
> My fastest trinity induced oops yet!
>
>
> Appears to be..
>
>                 if ((set_ns == subset_ns->parent)  &&
>      850:       48 8b 8a c8 00 00 00    mov    0xc8(%rdx),%rcx
>
> from the inlined cred_cap_issubset

By historical accident we have been reading trying to set new->user_ns
from new->user_ns.  Which is totally silly as new->user_ns is NULL (as
is every other field in new except session_keyring at that point).

The intent is clearly to copy all of the fields from old to new so copy
old->user_ns into  into new->user_ns.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: NDave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Tested-by: NDave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: N"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      ba0e3427
  37. 28 2月, 2013 2 次提交
    • S
      hlist: drop the node parameter from iterators · b67bfe0d
      由 Sasha Levin 提交于 
      I'm not sure why, but the hlist for each entry iterators were conceived

        list_for_each_entry(pos, head, member)

The hlist ones were greedy and wanted an extra parameter:

        hlist_for_each_entry(tpos, pos, head, member)

Why did they need an extra pos parameter? I'm not quite sure. Not only
they don't really need it, it also prevents the iterator from looking
exactly like the list iterator, which is unfortunate.

Besides the semantic patch, there was some manual work required:

 - Fix up the actual hlist iterators in linux/list.h
 - Fix up the declaration of other iterators based on the hlist ones.
 - A very small amount of places were using the 'node' parameter, this
 was modified to use 'obj->member' instead.
 - Coccinelle didn't handle the hlist_for_each_entry_safe iterator
 properly, so those had to be fixed up manually.

The semantic patch which is mostly the work of Peter Senna Tschudin is here:

@@
iterator name hlist_for_each_entry, hlist_for_each_entry_continue, hlist_for_each_entry_from, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh, for_each_busy_worker, ax25_uid_for_each, ax25_for_each, inet_bind_bucket_for_each, sctp_for_each_hentry, sk_for_each, sk_for_each_rcu, sk_for_each_from, sk_for_each_safe, sk_for_each_bound, hlist_for_each_entry_safe, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu, nr_neigh_for_each, nr_neigh_for_each_safe, nr_node_for_each, nr_node_for_each_safe, for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp, for_each_gfn_sp, for_each_host;

type T;
expression a,c,d,e;
identifier b;
statement S;
@@

-T b;
    <+... when != b
(
hlist_for_each_entry(a,
- b,
c, d) S
|
hlist_for_each_entry_continue(a,
- b,
c) S
|
hlist_for_each_entry_from(a,
- b,
c) S
|
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(a,
- b,
c, d) S
|
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh(a,
- b,
c, d) S
|
hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh(a,
- b,
c) S
|
for_each_busy_worker(a, c,
- b,
d) S
|
ax25_uid_for_each(a,
- b,
c) S
|
ax25_for_each(a,
- b,
c) S
|
inet_bind_bucket_for_each(a,
- b,
c) S
|
sctp_for_each_hentry(a,
- b,
c) S
|
sk_for_each(a,
- b,
c) S
|
sk_for_each_rcu(a,
- b,
c) S
|
sk_for_each_from
-(a, b)
+(a)
S
+ sk_for_each_from(a) S
|
sk_for_each_safe(a,
- b,
c, d) S
|
sk_for_each_bound(a,
- b,
c) S
|
hlist_for_each_entry_safe(a,
- b,
c, d, e) S
|
hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu(a,
- b,
c) S
|
nr_neigh_for_each(a,
- b,
c) S
|
nr_neigh_for_each_safe(a,
- b,
c, d) S
|
nr_node_for_each(a,
- b,
c) S
|
nr_node_for_each_safe(a,
- b,
c, d) S
|
- for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d, b) S
+ for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d) S
|
- for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d, b) S
+ for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d) S
|
for_each_host(a,
- b,
c) S
|
for_each_host_safe(a,
- b,
c, d) S
|
for_each_mesh_entry(a,
- b,
c, d) S
)
    ...+>

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus change from net/ipv4/raw.c]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus hunk from net/ipv6/raw.c]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warnings]
[akpm@linux-foudnation.org: redo intrusive kvm changes]
Tested-by: NPeter Senna Tschudin <peter.senna@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NPaul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      b67bfe0d
    • A
      selinux: opened file can't have NULL or negative ->f_path.dentry · 45e09bd5
      由 Al Viro 提交于 
      Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      45e09bd5
  39. 26 2月, 2013 2 次提交
  41. 25 2月, 2013 1 次提交
  43. 23 2月, 2013 1 次提交
  45. 22 2月, 2013 1 次提交
  47. 21 2月, 2013 1 次提交
    • D
      KEYS: Revert one application of "Fix unreachable code" patch · fe9453a1
      由 David Howells 提交于 
      A patch to fix some unreachable code in search_my_process_keyrings() got
applied twice by two different routes upstream as commits e67eab39
and b010520a (both "fix unreachable code").

Unfortunately, the second application removed something it shouldn't
have and this wasn't detected by GIT.  This is due to the patch not
having sufficient lines of context to distinguish the two places of
application.

The effect of this is relatively minor: inside the kernel, the keyring
search routines may search multiple keyrings and then prioritise the
errors if no keys or negative keys are found in any of them.  With the
extra deletion, the presence of a negative key in the thread keyring
(causing ENOKEY) is incorrectly overridden by an error searching the
process keyring.

So revert the second application of the patch.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      fe9453a1
  49. 07 2月, 2013 1 次提交
    • D
      ima: digital signature verification using asymmetric keys · e0751257
      由 Dmitry Kasatkin 提交于 
      Asymmetric keys were introduced in linux-3.7 to verify the signature on
signed kernel modules. The asymmetric keys infrastructure abstracts the
signature verification from the crypto details. This patch adds IMA/EVM
signature verification using asymmetric keys. Support for additional
signature verification methods can now be delegated to the asymmetric
key infrastructure.

Although the module signature header and the IMA/EVM signature header
could use the same format, to minimize the signature length and save
space in the extended attribute, this patch defines a new IMA/EVM
header format.  The main difference is that the key identifier is a
sha1[12 - 19] hash of the key modulus and exponent, similar to the
current implementation.  The only purpose of the key identifier is to
identify the corresponding key in the kernel keyring.  ima-evm-utils
was updated to support the new signature format.

While asymmetric signature verification functionality supports many
different hash algorithms, the hash used in this patch is calculated
during the IMA collection phase, based on the configured algorithm.
The default algorithm is sha1, but for backwards compatibility md5
is supported.  Due to this current limitation, signatures should be
generated using a sha1 hash algorithm.

Changes in this patch:
- Functionality has been moved to separate source file in order to get rid of
  in source #ifdefs.
- keyid is derived according to the RFC 3280. It does not require to assign
  IMA/EVM specific "description" when loading X509 certificate. Kernel
  asymmetric key subsystem automatically generate the description. Also
  loading a certificate does not require using of ima-evm-utils and can be
  done using keyctl only.
- keyid size is reduced to 32 bits to save xattr space.  Key search is done
  using partial match functionality of asymmetric_key_match().
- Kconfig option title was changed
Signed-off-by: NDmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Acked-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
      e0751257