Occasionally mountstats reports a negative retransmission rate.
Ensure that two RPCs completing concurrently don't confuse the sums
in the transport's op_metrics array.

Since pNFS filelayout can invoke rpc_count_iostats() on another
transport from xprt_release(), we can't rely on simply holding the
transport_lock in xprt_release(). There's nothing for it but hard
serialization. One spin lock per RPC operation should make this as
painless as it can be.
Signed-off-by: NChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: NAnna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>

Commit c3ae62af ("tcp: should drop incoming frames without ACK
flag set") was created to mitigate a security vulnerability in which a
local attacker is able to inject data into locally-opened sockets by
using TCP protocol statistics in procfs to quickly find the correct
sequence number.

This broke the RFC5961 requirement to send a challenge ACK in response
to spurious RST packets, which was subsequently fixed by commit
7b514a88 ("tcp: accept RST without ACK flag").

Unfortunately, the RFC5961 requirement that spurious SYN packets be
handled in a similar manner remains broken.

RFC5961 section 4 states that:

   ... the handling of the SYN in the synchronized state SHOULD be
   performed as follows:

   1) If the SYN bit is set, irrespective of the sequence number, TCP
      MUST send an ACK (also referred to as challenge ACK) to the remote
      peer:

      <SEQ=SND.NXT><ACK=RCV.NXT><CTL=ACK>

      After sending the acknowledgment, TCP MUST drop the unacceptable
      segment and stop processing further.

   By sending an ACK, the remote peer is challenged to confirm the loss
   of the previous connection and the request to start a new connection.
   A legitimate peer, after restart, would not have a TCB in the
   synchronized state.  Thus, when the ACK arrives, the peer should send
   a RST segment back with the sequence number derived from the ACK
   field that caused the RST.

   This RST will confirm that the remote peer has indeed closed the
   previous connection.  Upon receipt of a valid RST, the local TCP
   endpoint MUST terminate its connection.  The local TCP endpoint
   should then rely on SYN retransmission from the remote end to
   re-establish the connection.

This patch lets SYN packets through the discard added in c3ae62af,
so that spurious SYN packets are properly dealt with as per the RFC.

The challenge ACK is sent unconditionally and is rate-limited, so the
original vulnerability is not reintroduced by this patch.
Signed-off-by: NCalvin Owens <calvinowens@fb.com>
Acked-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: NNeal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Not sure what I was thinking, but doing anything after
releasing a refcount is suicidal or/and embarrassing.

By the time we set skb->fclone to SKB_FCLONE_FREE, another cpu
could have released last reference and freed whole skb.

We potentially corrupt memory or trap if CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC is set.
Reported-by: NChris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Fixes: ce1a4ea3 ("net: avoid one atomic operation in skb_clone()")
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This fixes an old regression introduced by commit
b0d0d915 (ipx: remove the BKL).

When a recvmsg syscall blocks waiting for new data, no data can be sent on the
same socket with sendmsg because ipx_recvmsg() sleeps with the socket locked.

This breaks mars-nwe (NetWare emulator):
- the ncpserv process reads the request using recvmsg
- ncpserv forks and spawns nwconn
- ncpserv calls a (blocking) recvmsg and waits for new requests
- nwconn deadlocks in sendmsg on the same socket

Commit b0d0d915 has simply replaced BKL locking with
lock_sock/release_sock. Unlike now, BKL got unlocked while
sleeping, so a blocking recvmsg did not block a concurrent
sendmsg.

Only keep the socket locked while actually working with the socket data and
release it prior to calling skb_recv_datagram().
Signed-off-by: NJiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: NArnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

When userspace doesn't provide a mask, OVS datapath generates a fully
unwildcarded mask for the flow by copying the flow and setting all bits
in all fields. For IPv6 label, this creates a mask that matches on the
upper 12 bits, causing the following error:

openvswitch: netlink: Invalid IPv6 flow label value (value=ffffffff, max=fffff)

This patch ignores the label validation check for masks, avoiding this
error.
Signed-off-by: NJoe Stringer <joestringer@nicira.com>
Acked-by: NPravin B Shelar <pshelar@nicira.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

pim6_protocol was added when initiation, but it not deleted.
Similarly, unregister RTNL_FAMILY_IP6MR rtnetlink.
Signed-off-by: NDuan Jiong <duanj.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: NCong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

The commit 5935839a
"mac80211: improve minstrel_ht rate sorting by throughput & probability"

introduced a crash on rate sorting that occurs when the rate added to
the sorting array is faster than all the previous rates. Due to an
off-by-one error, it reads the rate index from tp_list[-1], which
contains uninitialized stack garbage, and then uses the resulting index
for accessing the group rate stats, leading to a crash if the garbage
value is big enough.

Cc: Thomas Huehn <thomas@net.t-labs.tu-berlin.de>
Reported-by: NJouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Signed-off-by: NFelix Fietkau <nbd@openwrt.org>
Signed-off-by: NJohannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>

Ebtables on the OUTPUT chain (NF_BR_LOCAL_OUT) would not work as expected
for both locally generated IGMP and MLD queries. The IP header specific
filter options are off by 14 Bytes for netfilter (actual output on
interfaces is fine).

NF_HOOK() expects the skb->data to point to the IP header, not the
ethernet one (while dev_queue_xmit() does not). Luckily there is an
br_dev_queue_push_xmit() helper function already - let's just use that.

Introduced by eb1d1641
("bridge: Add core IGMP snooping support")

Ebtables example:

$ ebtables -I OUTPUT -p IPv6 -o eth1 --logical-out br0 \
	--log --log-level 6 --log-ip6 --log-prefix="~EBT: " -j DROP

before (broken):

~EBT:  IN= OUT=eth1 MAC source = 02:04:64:a4:39:c2 \
	MAC dest = 33:33:00:00:00:01 proto = 0x86dd IPv6 \
	SRC=64a4:39c2:86dd:6000:0000:0020:0001:fe80 IPv6 \
	DST=0000:0000:0000:0004:64ff:fea4:39c2:ff02, \
	IPv6 priority=0x3, Next Header=2

after (working):

~EBT:  IN= OUT=eth1 MAC source = 02:04:64:a4:39:c2 \
	MAC dest = 33:33:00:00:00:01 proto = 0x86dd IPv6 \
	SRC=fe80:0000:0000:0000:0004:64ff:fea4:39c2 IPv6 \
	DST=ff02:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0001, \
	IPv6 priority=0x0, Next Header=0
Signed-off-by: NLinus Lüssing <linus.luessing@web.de>
Acked-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: NPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>

Make sure the netlink group exists, otherwise you can trigger an out
of bound array memory access from the netlink_bind() path. This splat
can only be triggered only by superuser.

[  180.203600] UBSan: Undefined behaviour in ../net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:467:28
[  180.204249] index 9 is out of range for type 'int [9]'
[  180.204697] CPU: 0 PID: 1771 Comm: trinity-main Not tainted 3.18.0-rc4-mm1+ #122
[  180.205365] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.7.5-0-ge51488c-20140602_164612-nilsson.home.kraxel.org
+04/01/2014
[  180.206498]  0000000000000018 0000000000000000 0000000000000009 ffff88007bdf7da8
[  180.207220]  ffffffff82b0ef5f 0000000000000092 ffffffff845ae2e0 ffff88007bdf7db8
[  180.207887]  ffffffff8199e489 ffff88007bdf7e18 ffffffff8199ea22 0000003900000000
[  180.208639] Call Trace:
[  180.208857] dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:52)
[  180.209370] ubsan_epilogue (lib/ubsan.c:174)
[  180.209849] __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds (lib/ubsan.c:400)
[  180.210512] nfnetlink_bind (net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:467)
[  180.210986] netlink_bind (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1483)
[  180.211495] SYSC_bind (net/socket.c:1541)

Moreover, define the missing nf_tables and nf_acct multicast groups too.
Reported-by: NAndrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: NPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>

It has been reported that generating an MLD listener report on
devices with large MTUs (e.g. 9000) and a high number of IPv6
addresses can trigger a skb_over_panic():

skbuff: skb_over_panic: text:ffffffff80612a5d len:3776 put:20
head:ffff88046d751000 data:ffff88046d751010 tail:0xed0 end:0xec0
dev:port1
 ------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:100!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: ixgbe(O)
CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Tainted: G O 3.14.23+ #4
[...]
Call Trace:
 <IRQ>
 [<ffffffff80578226>] ? skb_put+0x3a/0x3b
 [<ffffffff80612a5d>] ? add_grhead+0x45/0x8e
 [<ffffffff80612e3a>] ? add_grec+0x394/0x3d4
 [<ffffffff80613222>] ? mld_ifc_timer_expire+0x195/0x20d
 [<ffffffff8061308d>] ? mld_dad_timer_expire+0x45/0x45
 [<ffffffff80255b5d>] ? call_timer_fn.isra.29+0x12/0x68
 [<ffffffff80255d16>] ? run_timer_softirq+0x163/0x182
 [<ffffffff80250e6f>] ? __do_softirq+0xe0/0x21d
 [<ffffffff8025112b>] ? irq_exit+0x4e/0xd3
 [<ffffffff802214bb>] ? smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x3b/0x46
 [<ffffffff8063f10a>] ? apic_timer_interrupt+0x6a/0x70

mld_newpack() skb allocations are usually requested with dev->mtu
in size, since commit 72e09ad1 ("ipv6: avoid high order allocations")
we have changed the limit in order to be less likely to fail.

However, in MLD/IGMP code, we have some rather ugly AVAILABLE(skb)
macros, which determine if we may end up doing an skb_put() for
adding another record. To avoid possible fragmentation, we check
the skb's tailroom as skb->dev->mtu - skb->len, which is a wrong
assumption as the actual max allocation size can be much smaller.

The IGMP case doesn't have this issue as commit 57e1ab6e
("igmp: refine skb allocations") stores the allocation size in
the cb[].

Set a reserved_tailroom to make it fit into the MTU and use
skb_availroom() helper instead. This also allows to get rid of
igmp_skb_size().
Reported-by: NWei Liu <lw1a2.jing@gmail.com>
Fixes: 72e09ad1 ("ipv6: avoid high order allocations")
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Cc: David L Stevens <david.stevens@oracle.com>
Acked-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: NHannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Solves possible lockup issues that can be seen from firmware DCB agents calling
into the DCB app api.

DCB firmware event queues can be tied in with NAPI so that dcb events are
generated in softIRQ context. This can results in calls to dcb_*app()
functions which try to take the dcb_lock.

If the the event triggers while we also have the dcb_lock because lldpad or
some other agent happened to be issuing a  get/set command we could see a cpu
lockup.

This code was not originally written with firmware agents in mind, hence
grabbing dcb_lock from softIRQ context was not considered.
Signed-off-by: NAnish Bhatt <anish@chelsio.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Trying to add an unreachable route incorrectly returns -ESRCH if
if custom FIB rules are present:

[root@localhost ~]# ip route add 74.125.31.199 dev eth0 via 1.2.3.4
RTNETLINK answers: Network is unreachable
[root@localhost ~]# ip rule add to 55.66.77.88 table 200
[root@localhost ~]# ip route add 74.125.31.199 dev eth0 via 1.2.3.4
RTNETLINK answers: No such process
[root@localhost ~]#

Commit 83886b6b ("[NET]: Change "not found"
return value for rule lookup") changed fib_rules_lookup()
to use -ESRCH as a "not found" code internally, but for user space it
should be translated into -ENETUNREACH. Handle the translation centrally in
ipv4-specific fib_lookup(), leaving the DECnet case alone.

On a related note, commit b7a71b51
("ipv4: removed redundant conditional") removed a similar translation from
ip_route_input_slow() prematurely AIUI.

Fixes: b7a71b51 ("ipv4: removed redundant conditional")
Signed-off-by: NPanu Matilainen <pmatilai@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Reject flow label key and mask values with invalid bits set.
Introduced by commit 3fdbd1ce ("openvswitch: add ipv6 'set'
action").
Signed-off-by: NJarno Rajahalme <jrajahalme@nicira.com>
Acked-by: NJesse Gross <jesse@nicira.com>
Signed-off-by: NPravin B Shelar <pshelar@nicira.com>

dp read operations depends on ovs_dp_cmd_fill_info(). This API
needs to looup vport to find dp name, but vport lookup can
fail. Therefore to keep vport reference alive we need to
take ovs lock.

Introduced by commit 6093ae9a ("openvswitch: Minimize
dp and vport critical sections").
Signed-off-by: NPravin B Shelar <pshelar@nicira.com>
Acked-by: NAndy Zhou <azhou@nicira.com>

match_validate() enforce that a mask matching on NDP attributes has also an
exact match on ICMPv6 type.
The ICMPv6 type, which is 8-bit wide, is stored in the 'tp.src' field of
'struct sw_flow_key', which is 16-bit wide.
Therefore, an exact match on ICMPv6 type should only check the first 8 bits.

This commit fixes a bug that prevented flows with an exact match on NDP field
from being installed
Introduced by commit 03f0d916 ("openvswitch: Mega flow implementation").
Signed-off-by: NDaniele Di Proietto <ddiproietto@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: NPravin B Shelar <pshelar@nicira.com>

The checksum of ICMPv6 packets uses the IP pseudoheader as part of
the calculation, unlike ICMP in IPv4. This was not implemented,
which means that modifying the IP addresses of an ICMPv6 packet
would cause the checksum to no longer be correct as the psuedoheader
did not match.
Introduced by commit 3fdbd1ce ("openvswitch: add ipv6 'set' action").
Reported-by: NNeal Shrader <icosahedral@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NJesse Gross <jesse@nicira.com>
Signed-off-by: NPravin B Shelar <pshelar@nicira.com>

Need to free memory in case of sample action error.

Introduced by commit 651887b0 ("openvswitch: Sample
action without side effects").
Signed-off-by: NPravin B Shelar <pshelar@nicira.com>

After removal of the central spinlock nf_conntrack_lock, in
commit 93bb0ceb ("netfilter: conntrack: remove central
spinlock nf_conntrack_lock"), it is possible to race against
get_next_corpse().

The race is against the get_next_corpse() cleanup on
the "unconfirmed" list (a per-cpu list with seperate locking),
which set the DYING bit.

Fix this race, in __nf_conntrack_confirm(), by removing the CT
from unconfirmed list before checking the DYING bit.  In case
race occured, re-add the CT to the dying list.

While at this, fix coding style of the comment that has been
updated.

Fixes: 93bb0ceb ("netfilter: conntrack: remove central spinlock nf_conntrack_lock")
Reported-by: Nbill bonaparte <programme110@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Nbill bonaparte <programme110@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NJesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>

No reason to use BUG_ON for osd request list assertions.
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NAlex Elder <elder@linaro.org>

kick_requests() can put linger requests on the notarget list.  This
means we need to clear the much-overloaded req->r_req_lru_item in
__unregister_linger_request() as well, or we get an assertion failure
in ceph_osdc_release_request() - !list_empty(&req->r_req_lru_item).

AFAICT the assumption was that registered linger requests cannot be on
any of req->r_req_lru_item lists, but that's clearly not the case.
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NAlex Elder <elder@linaro.org>

Requests have to be unlinked from both osd->o_requests (normal
requests) and osd->o_linger_requests (linger requests) lists when
clearing req->r_osd.  Otherwise __unregister_linger_request() gets
confused and we trip over a !list_empty(&osd->o_linger_requests)
assert in __remove_osd().

MON=1 OSD=1:

    # cat remove-osd.sh
    #!/bin/bash
    rbd create --size 1 test
    DEV=$(rbd map test)
    ceph osd out 0
    sleep 3
    rbd map dne/dne # obtain a new osdmap as a side effect
    rbd unmap $DEV & # will block
    sleep 3
    ceph osd in 0
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NAlex Elder <elder@linaro.org>

Large (greater than 32k, the value of PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER) auth
tickets will have their buffers vmalloc'ed, which leads to the
following crash in crypto:

[   28.685082] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffeb04000032c0
[   28.686032] IP: [<ffffffff81392b42>] scatterwalk_pagedone+0x22/0x80
[   28.686032] PGD 0
[   28.688088] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[   28.688088] Modules linked in:
[   28.688088] CPU: 0 PID: 878 Comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 3.17.0-vm+ #305
[   28.688088] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2007
[   28.688088] Workqueue: ceph-msgr con_work
[   28.688088] task: ffff88011a7f9030 ti: ffff8800d903c000 task.ti: ffff8800d903c000
[   28.688088] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81392b42>]  [<ffffffff81392b42>] scatterwalk_pagedone+0x22/0x80
[   28.688088] RSP: 0018:ffff8800d903f688  EFLAGS: 00010286
[   28.688088] RAX: ffffeb04000032c0 RBX: ffff8800d903f718 RCX: ffffeb04000032c0
[   28.688088] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff8800d903f750
[   28.688088] RBP: ffff8800d903f688 R08: 00000000000007de R09: ffff8800d903f880
[   28.688088] R10: 18df467c72d6257b R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000010
[   28.688088] R13: ffff8800d903f750 R14: ffff8800d903f8a0 R15: 0000000000000000
[   28.688088] FS:  00007f50a41c7700(0000) GS:ffff88011fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   28.688088] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[   28.688088] CR2: ffffeb04000032c0 CR3: 00000000da3f3000 CR4: 00000000000006b0
[   28.688088] Stack:
[   28.688088]  ffff8800d903f698 ffffffff81392ca8 ffff8800d903f6e8 ffffffff81395d32
[   28.688088]  ffff8800dac96000 ffff880000000000 ffff8800d903f980 ffff880119b7e020
[   28.688088]  ffff880119b7e010 0000000000000000 0000000000000010 0000000000000010
[   28.688088] Call Trace:
[   28.688088]  [<ffffffff81392ca8>] scatterwalk_done+0x38/0x40
[   28.688088]  [<ffffffff81392ca8>] scatterwalk_done+0x38/0x40
[   28.688088]  [<ffffffff81395d32>] blkcipher_walk_done+0x182/0x220
[   28.688088]  [<ffffffff813990bf>] crypto_cbc_encrypt+0x15f/0x180
[   28.688088]  [<ffffffff81399780>] ? crypto_aes_set_key+0x30/0x30
[   28.688088]  [<ffffffff8156c40c>] ceph_aes_encrypt2+0x29c/0x2e0
[   28.688088]  [<ffffffff8156d2a3>] ceph_encrypt2+0x93/0xb0
[   28.688088]  [<ffffffff8156d7da>] ceph_x_encrypt+0x4a/0x60
[   28.688088]  [<ffffffff8155b39d>] ? ceph_buffer_new+0x5d/0xf0
[   28.688088]  [<ffffffff8156e837>] ceph_x_build_authorizer.isra.6+0x297/0x360
[   28.688088]  [<ffffffff8112089b>] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x11b/0x1c0
[   28.688088]  [<ffffffff8156b496>] ? ceph_auth_create_authorizer+0x36/0x80
[   28.688088]  [<ffffffff8156ed83>] ceph_x_create_authorizer+0x63/0xd0
[   28.688088]  [<ffffffff8156b4b4>] ceph_auth_create_authorizer+0x54/0x80
[   28.688088]  [<ffffffff8155f7c0>] get_authorizer+0x80/0xd0
[   28.688088]  [<ffffffff81555a8b>] prepare_write_connect+0x18b/0x2b0
[   28.688088]  [<ffffffff81559289>] try_read+0x1e59/0x1f10

This is because we set up crypto scatterlists as if all buffers were
kmalloc'ed.  Fix it.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NIlya Dryomov <idryomov@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NSage Weil <sage@redhat.com>

Bruce reported that he was seeing the following BUG pop:

    BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/slab.c:2846
    in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 4539, name: mount.nfs
    2 locks held by mount.nfs/4539:
    #0:  (nfs_clid_init_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa01c0a9a>] nfs4_discover_server_trunking+0x4a/0x2f0 [nfsv4]
    #1:  (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffffa00e3185>] gss_stringify_acceptor+0x5/0xb0 [auth_rpcgss]
    Preemption disabled at:[<ffffffff81a4f082>] printk+0x4d/0x4f

    CPU: 3 PID: 4539 Comm: mount.nfs Not tainted 3.18.0-rc1-00013-g5b095e99 #3393
    Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
    ffff880021499390 ffff8800381476a8 ffffffff81a534cf 0000000000000001
    0000000000000000 ffff8800381476c8 ffffffff81097854 00000000000000d0
    0000000000000018 ffff880038147718 ffffffff8118e4f3 0000000020479f00
    Call Trace:
    [<ffffffff81a534cf>] dump_stack+0x4f/0x7c
    [<ffffffff81097854>] __might_sleep+0x114/0x180
    [<ffffffff8118e4f3>] __kmalloc+0x1a3/0x280
    [<ffffffffa00e31d8>] gss_stringify_acceptor+0x58/0xb0 [auth_rpcgss]
    [<ffffffffa00e3185>] ? gss_stringify_acceptor+0x5/0xb0 [auth_rpcgss]
    [<ffffffffa006b438>] rpcauth_stringify_acceptor+0x18/0x30 [sunrpc]
    [<ffffffffa01b0469>] nfs4_proc_setclientid+0x199/0x380 [nfsv4]
    [<ffffffffa01b04d0>] ? nfs4_proc_setclientid+0x200/0x380 [nfsv4]
    [<ffffffffa01bdf1a>] nfs40_discover_server_trunking+0xda/0x150 [nfsv4]
    [<ffffffffa01bde45>] ? nfs40_discover_server_trunking+0x5/0x150 [nfsv4]
    [<ffffffffa01c0acf>] nfs4_discover_server_trunking+0x7f/0x2f0 [nfsv4]
    [<ffffffffa01c8e24>] nfs4_init_client+0x104/0x2f0 [nfsv4]
    [<ffffffffa01539b4>] nfs_get_client+0x314/0x3f0 [nfs]
    [<ffffffffa0153780>] ? nfs_get_client+0xe0/0x3f0 [nfs]
    [<ffffffffa01c83aa>] nfs4_set_client+0x8a/0x110 [nfsv4]
    [<ffffffffa0069708>] ? __rpc_init_priority_wait_queue+0xa8/0xf0 [sunrpc]
    [<ffffffffa01c9b2f>] nfs4_create_server+0x12f/0x390 [nfsv4]
    [<ffffffffa01c1472>] nfs4_remote_mount+0x32/0x60 [nfsv4]
    [<ffffffff81196489>] mount_fs+0x39/0x1b0
    [<ffffffff81166145>] ? __alloc_percpu+0x15/0x20
    [<ffffffff811b276b>] vfs_kern_mount+0x6b/0x150
    [<ffffffffa01c1396>] nfs_do_root_mount+0x86/0xc0 [nfsv4]
    [<ffffffffa01c1784>] nfs4_try_mount+0x44/0xc0 [nfsv4]
    [<ffffffffa01549b7>] ? get_nfs_version+0x27/0x90 [nfs]
    [<ffffffffa0161a2d>] nfs_fs_mount+0x47d/0xd60 [nfs]
    [<ffffffff81a59c5e>] ? mutex_unlock+0xe/0x10
    [<ffffffffa01606a0>] ? nfs_remount+0x430/0x430 [nfs]
    [<ffffffffa01609c0>] ? nfs_clone_super+0x140/0x140 [nfs]
    [<ffffffff81196489>] mount_fs+0x39/0x1b0
    [<ffffffff81166145>] ? __alloc_percpu+0x15/0x20
    [<ffffffff811b276b>] vfs_kern_mount+0x6b/0x150
    [<ffffffff811b5830>] do_mount+0x210/0xbe0
    [<ffffffff811b54ca>] ? copy_mount_options+0x3a/0x160
    [<ffffffff811b651f>] SyS_mount+0x6f/0xb0
    [<ffffffff81a5c852>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x17

Sleeping under the rcu_read_lock is bad. This patch fixes it by dropping
the rcu_read_lock before doing the allocation and then reacquiring it
and redoing the dereference before doing the copy. If we find that the
string has somehow grown in the meantime, we'll reallocate and try again.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.17+
Reported-by: N"J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Signed-off-by: NJeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: NTrond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>

Even if netlink_kernel_cfg::unbind is implemented the unbind() method is
not called, because cfg->unbind is omitted in __netlink_kernel_create().
And fix wrong argument of test_bit() and off by one problem.

At this point, no unbind() method is implemented, so there is no real
issue.

Fixes: 4f520900 ("netlink: have netlink per-protocol bind function return an error code.")
Signed-off-by: NHiroaki SHIMODA <shimoda.hiroaki@gmail.com>
Cc: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NRichard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

The existing xtables matches and targets, when used from nft_compat, may
sleep from the destroy path, ie. when removing rules. Since the objects
are released via call_rcu from softirq context, this results in lockdep
splats and possible lockups that may be hard to reproduce.

Patrick also indicated that delayed object release via call_rcu can
cause us problems in the ordering of event notifications when anonymous
sets are in place.

So, this patch restores the synchronous object release from the commit
and abort paths. This includes a call to synchronize_rcu() to make sure
that no packets are walking on the objects that are going to be
released. This is slowier though, but it's simple and it resolves the
aforementioned problems.

This is a partial revert of c7c32e72 ("netfilter: nf_tables: defer all
object release via rcu") that was introduced in 3.16 to speed up
interaction with userspace.
Signed-off-by: NPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>

Instead of the match->name, which is of course not relevant.

Fixes: f3f5dded ("netfilter: nft_compat: validate chain type in match/target")
Signed-off-by: NPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>

Check for nat chain dependency only, which is the one that can
actually crash the kernel. Don't care if mangle, filter and security
specific match and targets are used out of their scope, they are
harmless.

This restores iptables-compat with mangle specific match/target when
used out of the OUTPUT chain, that are actually emulated through filter
chains, which broke when performing strict validation.

Fixes: f3f5dded ("netfilter: nft_compat: validate chain type in match/target")
Signed-off-by: NPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>

Instead of init_net when using xtables over nftables compat.
Signed-off-by: NPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>

ip_vs_prepare_tunneled_skb() ignores ->sk when allocating a new
skb, either unconditionally setting ->sk to NULL or allowing
the uninitialized ->sk from a newly allocated skb to leak through
to the caller.

This patch properly copies ->sk and increments its reference count.
Signed-off-by: NCalvin Owens <calvinowens@fb.com>
Acked-by: NJulian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: NSimon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>

Use IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6), to enable this code if IPv6 is
a module.
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Fixes: c8e6ad08 ("ipv6: honor IPV6_PKTINFO with v4 mapped addresses on sendmsg")
Acked-by: NHannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

A very minimal and simple user space application allocating an SCTP
socket, setting SCTP_AUTH_KEY setsockopt(2) on it and then closing
the socket again will leak the memory containing the authentication
key from user space:

unreferenced object 0xffff8800837047c0 (size 16):
  comm "a.out", pid 2789, jiffies 4296954322 (age 192.258s)
  hex dump (first 16 bytes):
    01 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
  backtrace:
    [<ffffffff816d7e8e>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4e/0xb0
    [<ffffffff811c88d8>] __kmalloc+0xe8/0x270
    [<ffffffffa0870c23>] sctp_auth_create_key+0x23/0x50 [sctp]
    [<ffffffffa08718b1>] sctp_auth_set_key+0xa1/0x140 [sctp]
    [<ffffffffa086b383>] sctp_setsockopt+0xd03/0x1180 [sctp]
    [<ffffffff815bfd94>] sock_common_setsockopt+0x14/0x20
    [<ffffffff815beb61>] SyS_setsockopt+0x71/0xd0
    [<ffffffff816e58a9>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x17
    [<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff

This is bad because of two things, we can bring down a machine from
user space when auth_enable=1, but also we would leave security sensitive
keying material in memory without clearing it after use. The issue is
that sctp_auth_create_key() already sets the refcount to 1, but after
allocation sctp_auth_set_key() does an additional refcount on it, and
thus leaving it around when we free the socket.

Fixes: 65b07e5d ("[SCTP]: API updates to suport SCTP-AUTH extensions.")
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NNeil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

An SCTP server doing ASCONF will panic on malformed INIT ping-of-death
in the form of:

  ------------ INIT[PARAM: SET_PRIMARY_IP] ------------>

While the INIT chunk parameter verification dissects through many things
in order to detect malformed input, it misses to actually check parameters
inside of parameters. E.g. RFC5061, section 4.2.4 proposes a 'set primary
IP address' parameter in ASCONF, which has as a subparameter an address
parameter.

So an attacker may send a parameter type other than SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS
or SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS, param_type2af() will subsequently return 0
and thus sctp_get_af_specific() returns NULL, too, which we then happily
dereference unconditionally through af->from_addr_param().

The trace for the log:

BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000078
IP: [<ffffffffa01e9c62>] sctp_process_init+0x492/0x990 [sctp]
PGD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[...]
Pid: 0, comm: swapper Not tainted 2.6.32-504.el6.x86_64 #1 Bochs Bochs
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa01e9c62>]  [<ffffffffa01e9c62>] sctp_process_init+0x492/0x990 [sctp]
[...]
Call Trace:
 <IRQ>
 [<ffffffffa01f2add>] ? sctp_bind_addr_copy+0x5d/0xe0 [sctp]
 [<ffffffffa01e1fcb>] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x21b/0x340 [sctp]
 [<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp]
 [<ffffffffa01e5c09>] ? sctp_endpoint_lookup_assoc+0xc9/0xf0 [sctp]
 [<ffffffffa01e61f6>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x116/0x230 [sctp]
 [<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp]
 [<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp]
 [<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter]
 [<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
 [<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[...]

A minimal way to address this is to check for NULL as we do on all
other such occasions where we know sctp_get_af_specific() could
possibly return with NULL.

Fixes: d6de3097 ("[SCTP]: Add the handling of "Set Primary IP Address" parameter to INIT")
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NNeil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

We could be reading 8 bytes into a 4 byte buffer here.  It seems
harmless but adding a check is the right thing to do and it silences a
static checker warning.
Signed-off-by: NDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: NJozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@blackhole.kfki.hu>
Signed-off-by: NPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>

When doing GRO processing for UDP tunnels, we never add
SKB_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL to gso_type - only the type of the inner protocol
is added (such as SKB_GSO_TCPV4). The result is that if the packet is
later resegmented we will do GSO but not treat it as a tunnel. This
results in UDP fragmentation of the outer header instead of (i.e.) TCP
segmentation of the inner header as was originally on the wire.
Signed-off-by: NJesse Gross <jesse@nicira.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

When transferring from the original range in nf_nat_masquerade_{ipv4,ipv6}()
we copy over values from stack in from min_proto/max_proto due to uninitialized
range variable in both, nft_masq_{ipv4,ipv6}_eval. As we only initialize
flags at this time from nft_masq struct, just zero out the rest.

Fixes: 9ba1f726 ("netfilter: nf_tables: add new nft_masq expression")
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NArturo Borrero Gonzalez <arturo.borrero.glez@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>

When the ports phys are connected to the switches internal MDIO bus,
we need to connect the phy to the slave netdev, otherwise
auto-negotiation etc, does not work.
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Commit 7ec7c4a9 (mac80211: port CCMP to
cryptoapi's CCM driver) introduced a regression when decrypting empty
packets (data_len == 0). This will lead to backtraces like:

(scatterwalk_start) from [<c01312f4>] (scatterwalk_map_and_copy+0x2c/0xa8)
(scatterwalk_map_and_copy) from [<c013a5a0>] (crypto_ccm_decrypt+0x7c/0x25c)
(crypto_ccm_decrypt) from [<c032886c>] (ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt+0x160/0x170)
(ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt) from [<c031c628>] (ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt+0x1ac/0x238)
(ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt) from [<c032ef28>] (ieee80211_rx_handlers+0x870/0x1d24)
(ieee80211_rx_handlers) from [<c0330c7c>] (ieee80211_prepare_and_rx_handle+0x8a0/0x91c)
(ieee80211_prepare_and_rx_handle) from [<c0331260>] (ieee80211_rx+0x568/0x730)
(ieee80211_rx) from [<c01d3054>] (__carl9170_rx+0x94c/0xa20)
(__carl9170_rx) from [<c01d3324>] (carl9170_rx_stream+0x1fc/0x320)
(carl9170_rx_stream) from [<c01cbccc>] (carl9170_usb_tasklet+0x80/0xc8)
(carl9170_usb_tasklet) from [<c00199dc>] (tasklet_hi_action+0x88/0xcc)
(tasklet_hi_action) from [<c00193c8>] (__do_softirq+0xcc/0x200)
(__do_softirq) from [<c0019734>] (irq_exit+0x80/0xe0)
(irq_exit) from [<c0009c10>] (handle_IRQ+0x64/0x80)
(handle_IRQ) from [<c000c3a0>] (__irq_svc+0x40/0x4c)
(__irq_svc) from [<c0009d44>] (arch_cpu_idle+0x2c/0x34)

Such packets can appear for example when using the carl9170 wireless driver
because hardware sometimes generates garbage when the internal FIFO overruns.

This patch adds an additional length check.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 7ec7c4a9 ("mac80211: port CCMP to cryptoapi's CCM driver")
Acked-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: NRonald Wahl <ronald.wahl@raritan.com>
Signed-off-by: NJohannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>

Ueki Kohei reported that when we are using NewReno with connections that
have a very low traffic, we may timeout the connection too early if a
second loss occurs after the first one was successfully acked but no
data was transfered later. Below is his description of it:

When SACK is disabled, and a socket suffers multiple separate TCP
retransmissions, that socket's ETIMEDOUT value is calculated from the
time of the *first* retransmission instead of the *latest*
retransmission.

This happens because the tcp_sock's retrans_stamp is set once then never
cleared.

Take the following connection:

                      Linux                    remote-machine
                        |                           |
         send#1---->(*1)|--------> data#1 --------->|
                  |     |                           |
                 RTO    :                           :
                  |     |                           |
                 ---(*2)|----> data#1(retrans) ---->|
                  | (*3)|<---------- ACK <----------|
                  |     |                           |
                  |     :                           :
                  |     :                           :
                  |     :                           :
                16 minutes (or more)                :
                  |     :                           :
                  |     :                           :
                  |     :                           :
                  |     |                           |
         send#2---->(*4)|--------> data#2 --------->|
                  |     |                           |
                 RTO    :                           :
                  |     |                           |
                 ---(*5)|----> data#2(retrans) ---->|
                  |     |                           |
                  |     |                           |
                RTO*2   :                           :
                  |     |                           |
                  |     |                           |
      ETIMEDOUT<----(*6)|                           |

(*1) One data packet sent.
(*2) Because no ACK packet is received, the packet is retransmitted.
(*3) The ACK packet is received. The transmitted packet is acknowledged.

At this point the first "retransmission event" has passed and been
recovered from. Any future retransmission is a completely new "event".

(*4) After 16 minutes (to correspond with retries2=15), a new data
packet is sent. Note: No data is transmitted between (*3) and (*4).

The socket's timeout SHOULD be calculated from this point in time, but
instead it's calculated from the prior "event" 16 minutes ago.

(*5) Because no ACK packet is received, the packet is retransmitted.
(*6) At the time of the 2nd retransmission, the socket returns
ETIMEDOUT.

Therefore, now we clear retrans_stamp as soon as all data during the
loss window is fully acked.

Reported-by: Ueki Kohei
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NMarcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NNeal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Tested-by: NNeal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

The pernet ops aren't ever unregistered, which causes a memory
leak and an OOPs if the module is ever reinserted.

Fixes: 0b5e8b8e ("net: Add Geneve tunneling protocol driver")
CC: Andy Zhou <azhou@nicira.com>
Signed-off-by: NJesse Gross <jesse@nicira.com>
Acked-by: NNicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Geneve does not currently set the inner protocol type when
transmitting packets. This causes GSO segmentation to fail on NICs
that do not support Geneve offloading.

CC: Andy Zhou <azhou@nicira.com>
Signed-off-by: NJesse Gross <jesse@nicira.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>