Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>

asm/system.h is a cause of circular dependency problems because it contains
commonly used primitive stuff like barrier definitions and uncommonly used
stuff like switch_to() that might require MMU definitions.

asm/system.h has been disintegrated by this point on all arches into the
following common segments:

 (1) asm/barrier.h

     Moved memory barrier definitions here.

 (2) asm/cmpxchg.h

     Moved xchg() and cmpxchg() here.  #included in asm/atomic.h.

 (3) asm/bug.h

     Moved die() and similar here.

 (4) asm/exec.h

     Moved arch_align_stack() here.

 (5) asm/elf.h

     Moved AT_VECTOR_SIZE_ARCH here.

 (6) asm/switch_to.h

     Moved switch_to() here.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

Since we no longer need the VM_ALWAYSDUMP flag, let's use the freed bit
for 'VM_NODUMP' flag.  The idea is is to add a new madvise() flag:
MADV_DONTDUMP, which can be set by applications to specifically request
memory regions which should not dump core.

The specific application I have in mind is qemu: we can add a flag there
that wouldn't dump all of guest memory when qemu dumps core.  This flag
might also be useful for security sensitive apps that want to absolutely
make sure that parts of memory are not dumped.  To clear the flag use:
MADV_DODUMP.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: s/MADV_NODUMP/MADV_DONTDUMP/, s/MADV_CLEAR_NODUMP/MADV_DODUMP/, per Roland]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix up the architectures which broke]
Signed-off-by: NJason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NRoland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@tilera.com>
Cc: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@parisc-linux.org>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

The motivation for this patchset was that I was looking at a way for a
qemu-kvm process, to exclude the guest memory from its core dump, which
can be quite large.  There are already a number of filter flags in
/proc/<pid>/coredump_filter, however, these allow one to specify 'types'
of kernel memory, not specific address ranges (which is needed in this
case).

Since there are no more vma flags available, the first patch eliminates
the need for the 'VM_ALWAYSDUMP' flag.  The flag is used internally by
the kernel to mark vdso and vsyscall pages.  However, it is simple
enough to check if a vma covers a vdso or vsyscall page without the need
for this flag.

The second patch then replaces the 'VM_ALWAYSDUMP' flag with a new
'VM_NODUMP' flag, which can be set by userspace using new madvise flags:
'MADV_DONTDUMP', and unset via 'MADV_DODUMP'.  The core dump filters
continue to work the same as before unless 'MADV_DONTDUMP' is set on the
region.

The qemu code which implements this features is at:

  http://people.redhat.com/~jbaron/qemu-dump/qemu-dump.patch

In my testing the qemu core dump shrunk from 383MB -> 13MB with this
patch.

I also believe that the 'MADV_DONTDUMP' flag might be useful for
security sensitive apps, which might want to select which areas are
dumped.

This patch:

The VM_ALWAYSDUMP flag is currently used by the coredump code to
indicate that a vma is part of a vsyscall or vdso section.  However, we
can determine if a vma is in one these sections by checking it against
the gate_vma and checking for a non-NULL return value from
arch_vma_name().  Thus, freeing a valuable vma bit.
Signed-off-by: NJason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NRoland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@tilera.com>
Cc: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Just don't pass NULL to it - nobody does, anyway.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

The regset common infrastructure assumed that regsets would always
have .get and .set methods, but not necessarily .active methods.
Unfortunately people have since written regsets without .set methods.

Rather than putting in stub functions everywhere, handle regsets with
null .get or .set methods explicitly.
Signed-off-by: NH. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Reviewed-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NRoland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Allow some core dump-related fields to be overridden.  This allows
core dumps to work correctly for x32.
Signed-off-by: NH. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>

Randomization of PIE load address is hard coded in binfmt_elf.c for X86
and ARM.  Create a new Kconfig variable
(CONFIG_ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_RANDOMIZE_PIE) for this and use it instead.  Thus
architecture specific policy is pushed out of the generic binfmt_elf.c and
into the architecture Kconfig files.

X86 and ARM Kconfigs are modified to select the new variable so there is
no change in behavior.  A follow on patch will select it for MIPS too.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Daney <david.daney@cavium.com>
Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Acked-by: NH. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

The case of address space randomization being disabled in runtime through
randomize_va_space sysctl is not treated properly in load_elf_binary(),
resulting in SIGKILL coming at exec() time for certain PIE-linked binaries
in case the randomization has been disabled at runtime prior to calling
exec().

Handle the randomize_va_space == 0 case the same way as if we were not
supporting .text randomization at all.

Based on original patch by H.J. Lu and Josh Boyer.
Signed-off-by: NJiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Russell King <rmk@arm.linux.org.uk>
Cc: H.J. Lu <hongjiu.lu@intel.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Tested-by: NJosh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NNicolas Pitre <nicolas.pitre@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

new helper: would_dump(bprm, file).  Checks if we are allowed to
read the file and if we are not - sets ENFORCE_NODUMP.  Exported,
used in places that previously open-coded the same logics.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

5520e894 ("brk: fix min_brk lower bound computation for COMPAT_BRK")
tried to get the whole logic of brk randomization for legacy
(libc5-based) applications finally right.

It turns out that the way to detect whether brk has actually been
randomized in the end or not introduced by that patch still doesn't work
for those binaries, as reported by Geert:

: /sbin/init from my old m68k ramdisk exists prematurely.
:
: Before the patch:
:
: | brk(0x80005c8e)                         = 0x80006000
:
: After the patch:
:
: | brk(0x80005c8e)                         = 0x80005c8e
:
: Old libc5 considers brk() to have failed if the return value is not
: identical to the requested value.

I don't like it, but currently see no better option than a bit flag in
task_struct to catch the CONFIG_COMPAT_BRK && randomize_va_space == 2
case.
Signed-off-by: NJiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Tested-by: NGeert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Reported-by: NGeert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Morally, the presence of a gate vma is more an attribute of a particular mm than
a particular task.  Moreover, dropping the dependency on task_struct will help
make both existing and future operations on mm's more flexible and convenient.
Signed-off-by: NStephen Wilson <wilsons@start.ca>
Reviewed-by: NMichel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

With GCC-4.6 we get warnings about things being 'set but not used'.

In load_elf_binary() this can happen with reloc_func_desc if ELF_PLAT_INIT
is defined, but doesn't use the reloc_func_desc argument.

Quiet the warning/error by marking reloc_func_desc as __maybe_unused.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Daney <ddaney@caviumnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

This cleans up a few bits in binfmt_elf.c and binfmts.h:

- the hasvdso field in struct linux_binfmt is unused, so remove it and
  the only initialization of it

- the elf_map CPP symbol is not defined anywhere in the kernel, so
  remove an unnecessary #ifndef elf_map

- reduce excessive indentation in elf_format's initializer

- add missing spaces, remove extraneous spaces

No functional changes, but tested on x86 (32 and 64 bit), powerpc (32 and
64 bit), sparc64, arm, and alpha.
Signed-off-by: NMikael Pettersson <mikpe@it.uu.se>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Since commits 990cb8ac and cc92c28b, it is possible to have full
address space layout randomization (ASLR) on ARM.  Except that one small
change was missing for ASLR of PIE executables.
Signed-off-by: NNicolas Pitre <nicolas.pitre@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: NRussell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>

Pass mm->flags as a coredump parameter for consistency.

 ---
1787         if (mm->core_state || !get_dumpable(mm)) {  <- (1)
1788                 up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
1789                 put_cred(cred);
1790                 goto fail;
1791         }
1792
[...]
1798         if (get_dumpable(mm) == 2) {    /* Setuid core dump mode */ <-(2)
1799                 flag = O_EXCL;          /* Stop rewrite attacks */
1800                 cred->fsuid = 0;        /* Dump root private */
1801         }
 ---

Since dumpable bits are not protected by lock, there is a chance to change
these bits between (1) and (2).

To solve this issue, this patch copies mm->flags to
coredump_params.mm_flags at the beginning of do_coredump() and uses it
instead of get_dumpable() while dumping core.

This copy is also passed to binfmt->core_dump, since elf*_core_dump() uses
dump_filter bits in mm->flags.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix merge]
Signed-off-by: NMasami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NRoland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Reviewed-by: NKOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

The current ELF dumper implementation can produce broken corefiles if
program headers exceed 65535.  This number is determined by the number of
vmas which the process have.  In particular, some extreme programs may use
more than 65535 vmas.  (If you google max_map_count, you can find some
users facing this problem.) This kind of program never be able to generate
correct coredumps.

This patch implements ``extended numbering'' that uses sh_info field of
the first section header instead of e_phnum field in order to represent
upto 4294967295 vmas.

This is supported by
AMD64-ABI(http://www.x86-64.org/documentation.html) and
Solaris(http://docs.sun.com/app/docs/doc/817-1984/).
Of course, we are preparing patches for gdb and binutils.
Signed-off-by: NDaisuke HATAYAMA <d.hatayama@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Greg Ungerer <gerg@snapgear.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

By the next patch, elf_core_dump() and elf_fdpic_core_dump() will support
extended numbering and so will produce the corefiles with section header
table in a special case.

The problem is the process of writing a file header offset of the section
header table into e_shoff field of the ELF header.  ELF header is
positioned at the beginning of the corefile, while section header at the
end.  So, we need to take which of the following ways:

 1. Seek backward to retry writing operation for ELF header
    after writing process for a whole part

 2. Make offset calculation process and writing process
    totally sequential

The clause 1.  is not always possible: one cannot assume that file system
supports seek function.  Consider the no_llseek case.

Therefore, this patch adopts the clause 2.
Signed-off-by: NDaisuke HATAYAMA <d.hatayama@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Greg Ungerer <gerg@snapgear.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

elf_core_dump() and elf_fdpic_core_dump() use #ifdef and the corresponding
macro for hiding _multiline_ logics in functions.  This patch removes
#ifdef and replaces ELF_CORE_EXTRA_* by corresponding functions.  For
architectures not implemeonting ELF_CORE_EXTRA_*, we use weak functions in
order to reduce a range of modification.

This cleanup is for my next patches, but I think this cleanup itself is
worth doing regardless of my firnal purpose.
Signed-off-by: NDaisuke HATAYAMA <d.hatayama@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Greg Ungerer <gerg@snapgear.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

My next patch will replace ELF_CORE_EXTRA_* macros by functions, putting
them into other newly created *.c files.  Then, each files will contain
dump_write(), where each pair of binfmt_*.c and elfcore.c should be the
same.  So, this patch moves them into a header file with dump_seek().
Also, the patch deletes confusing DUMP_WRITE macros in each files.
Signed-off-by: NDaisuke HATAYAMA <d.hatayama@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Greg Ungerer <gerg@snapgear.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

'flush_old_exec()' is the point of no return when doing an execve(), and
it is pretty badly misnamed.  It doesn't just flush the old executable
environment, it also starts up the new one.

Which is very inconvenient for things like setting up the new
personality, because we want the new personality to affect the starting
of the new environment, but at the same time we do _not_ want the new
personality to take effect if flushing the old one fails.

As a result, the x86-64 '32-bit' personality is actually done using this
insane "I'm going to change the ABI, but I haven't done it yet" bit
(TIF_ABI_PENDING), with SET_PERSONALITY() not actually setting the
personality, but just the "pending" bit, so that "flush_thread()" can do
the actual personality magic.

This patch in no way changes any of that insanity, but it does split the
'flush_old_exec()' function up into a preparatory part that can fail
(still called flush_old_exec()), and a new part that will actually set
up the new exec environment (setup_new_exec()).  All callers are changed
to trivially comply with the new world order.
Signed-off-by: NH. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Introduce coredump parameter data structure (struct coredump_params) to
simplify binfmt->core_dump() arguments.
Signed-off-by: NMasami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Currently all architectures but microblaze unconditionally define
USE_ELF_CORE_DUMP.  The microblaze omission seems like an error to me, so
let's kill this ifdef and make sure we are the same everywhere.
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: NHugh Dickins <hugh.dickins@tiscali.co.uk>
Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Michal Simek <michal.simek@petalogix.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

That is "success", "unknown", "through", "performance", "[re|un]mapping"
, "access", "default", "reasonable", "[con]currently", "temperature"
, "channel", "[un]used", "application", "example","hierarchy", "therefore"
, "[over|under]flow", "contiguous", "threshold", "enough" and others.
Signed-off-by: NAndré Goddard Rosa <andre.goddard@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NJiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>

Introduce a helper function elf_note_info_init() to help fill_note_info()
to do initializations, also fix the potential memory leaks.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: remove NUM_NOTES]
Signed-off-by: NWANG Cong <amwang@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

In preparation for the next patch, add a simple get_dump_page(addr)
interface for the CONFIG_ELF_CORE dumpers to use, instead of calling
get_user_pages() directly.  They're not interested in errors: they
just want to use holes as much as possible, to save space and make
sure that the data is aligned where the headers said it would be.

Oh, and don't use that horrid DUMP_SEEK(off) macro!
Signed-off-by: NHugh Dickins <hugh.dickins@tiscali.co.uk>
Acked-by: NRik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan.kim@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

In fs/binfmt_elf.c, load_elf_interp() calls padzero() for .bss even if
the PT_LOAD has no PROT_WRITE and no .bss.  This generates EFAULT.

Here is a small test case.  (Yes, there are other, useful PT_INTERP
which have only .text and no .data/.bss.)

	----- ptinterp.S
	_start: .globl _start
		 nop
		 int3
	-----
	$ gcc -m32 -nostartfiles -nostdlib -o ptinterp ptinterp.S
	$ gcc -m32 -Wl,--dynamic-linker=ptinterp -o hello hello.c
	$ ./hello
	Segmentation fault  # during execve() itself

	After applying the patch:
	$ ./hello
	Trace trap  # user-mode execution after execve() finishes

If the ELF headers are actually self-inconsistent, then dying is fine.
But having no PROT_WRITE segment is perfectly normal and correct if
there is no segment with p_memsz > p_filesz (i.e. bss).  John Reiser
suggested checking for PROT_WRITE in the bss logic.  I think it makes
most sense to simply apply the bss logic only when there is bss.

This patch looks less trivial than it is due to some reindentation.
It just moves the "if (last_bss > elf_bss) {" test up to include the
partial-page bss logic as well as the more-pages bss logic.
Reported-by: NJohn Reiser <jreiser@bitwagon.com>
Signed-off-by: NRoland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

In fs/binfmt_elf.c, load_elf_interp() calls padzero() for .bss even if
the PT_LOAD has no PROT_WRITE and no .bss.  This generates EFAULT.

Here is a small test case.  (Yes, there are other, useful PT_INTERP
which have only .text and no .data/.bss.)

	----- ptinterp.S
	_start: .globl _start
		 nop
		 int3
	-----
	$ gcc -m32 -nostartfiles -nostdlib -o ptinterp ptinterp.S
	$ gcc -m32 -Wl,--dynamic-linker=ptinterp -o hello hello.c
	$ ./hello
	Segmentation fault  # during execve() itself

	After applying the patch:
	$ ./hello
	Trace trap  # user-mode execution after execve() finishes

If the ELF headers are actually self-inconsistent, then dying is fine.
But having no PROT_WRITE segment is perfectly normal and correct if
there is no segment with p_memsz > p_filesz (i.e. bss).  John Reiser
suggested checking for PROT_WRITE in the bss logic.  I think it makes
most sense to simply apply the bss logic only when there is bss.

This patch looks less trivial than it is due to some reindentation.
It just moves the "if (last_bss > elf_bss) {" test up to include the
partial-page bss logic as well as the more-pages bss logic.
Reported-by: NJohn Reiser <jreiser@bitwagon.com>
Signed-off-by: NRoland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Check before use it.
Signed-off-by: NWANG Cong <amwang@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NRoland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

With ELF, at generating coredump, some more headers other than used
vmas are added.

When max_map_count == 65536, a core generated by following kinds of
code can be unreadable because the number of ELF's program header is
written in 16bit in Ehdr (please see elf.h) and the number overflows.

==
	... = mmap(); (munmap, mprotect, etc...)
	if (failed)
		abort();
==

This can happen in mmap/munmap/mprotect/etc...which calls split_vma().

I think 65536 is not safe as _default_ and reduce it to 65530 is good
for avoiding unexpected corrupted core.

Anyway, max_map_count can be enlarged by sysctl if a user is brave..
Signed-off-by: NKAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh.dickins@tiscali.co.uk>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NRoland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

In theory it is not safe to dereference ->parent/real_parent without
tasklist or rcu lock, we can race with re-parenting.
Signed-off-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NRoland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

... since we don't tell anyone which descriptor does the file get.
We used to, but only in case of ELF binary with a.out loader and
that stuff has been gone for a while.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

The elf_core_dump() code does its work with set_fs(KERNEL_DS) in force,
so vma_dump_size() needs to switch back with set_fs(USER_DS) to safely
use get_user() for a normal user-space address.

Checking for VM_READ optimizes out the case where get_user() would fail
anyway.  The vm_file check here was already superfluous given the control
flow earlier in the function, so that is a cleanup/optimization unrelated
to other changes but an obvious and trivial one.
Reported-by: NGerald Schaefer <gerald.schaefer@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NRoland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>

While discussing[1] the need for glibc to have access to random bytes
during program load, it seems that an earlier attempt to implement
AT_RANDOM got stalled.  This implements a random 16 byte string, available
to every ELF program via a new auxv AT_RANDOM vector.

[1] http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2008-10/msg00006.html

Ulrich said:

glibc needs right after startup a bit of random data for internal
protections (stack canary etc).  What is now in upstream glibc is that we
always unconditionally open /dev/urandom, read some data, and use it.  For
every process startup.  That's slow.

...

The solution is to provide a limited amount of random data to the
starting process in the aux vector.  I suggested 16 bytes and this is
what the patch implements.  If we need only 16 bytes or less we use the
data directly.  If we need more we'll use the 16 bytes to see a PRNG.
This avoids the costly /dev/urandom use and it allows the kernel to use
the most adequate source of random data for this purpose.  It might not
be the same pool as that for /dev/urandom.

Concerns were expressed about the depletion of the randomness pool.  But
this patch doesn't make the situation worse, it doesn't deplete entropy
more than happens now.
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

arch_setup_additional_pages currently gets two arguments, the binary
format descripton and an indication if the process uses an executable
stack or not. The second argument is not used by anybody, it could
be removed without replacement.

What actually does make sense is to pass an indication if the process
uses the elf interpreter or not. The glibc code will not use anything
from the vdso if the process does not use the dynamic linker, so for
statically linked binaries the architecture backend can choose not
to map the vdso.
Acked-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: NMartin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>

Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set
up the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point
of no return.

This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.

This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:

 (1) execve().

     The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part,
     replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm->cred).  This means that
     all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point
     of no return with no possibility of failure.

     I would like to replace bprm->cap_effective with:

	cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective)

     but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1
     (they always retain their parent's capability masks where normally they'd
     be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()).

     The following sequence of events now happens:

     (a) At the start of do_execve, the current task's cred_exec_mutex is
     	 locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of
     	 creds that we make.

     (a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current
     	 task's credentials and prepare it.  This copy is then assigned to
     	 bprm->cred.

  	 This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free()
     	 unnecessary, and so they've been removed.

     (b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately
     	 after (a) rather than later on in the code.  The result is stored in
     	 bprm->unsafe for future reference.

     (c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times.

     	 (i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds
     	     attached to bprm->cred.  Personality bit clearance is recorded,
     	     but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet
     	     fail.

         (ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds().  This should
	     calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm->cred.

	     This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of
	     security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed).
	     Anything that might fail must be done at this point.

         (iii) bprm->cred_prepared is set to 1.

	     bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security
	     calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes.  This allows SELinux
	     in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and
	     not on the interpreter.

     (d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution.  This
     	 performs the following steps with regard to credentials:

	 (i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that
	     may not be covered by commit_creds().

         (ii) Clear any bits in current->personality that were deferred from
             (c.i).

     (e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the
     	 new credentials.  This performs the following steps with regard to
     	 credentials:

         (i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security
             requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that
             must be done before the credentials are changed.

	     This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and
	     security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed.
	     This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail
	     must have been done in (c.ii).

         (ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single
             assignment (more or less).  Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable
             should be part of struct creds.

	 (iii) Unlocks the task's cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing
	     PTRACE_ATTACH to take place.

         (iv) Clears The bprm->cred pointer as the credentials it was holding
             are now immutable.

         (v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security
             alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed.
             SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers.

     (f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds()
     	 to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock
     	 cred_replace_mutex.  No changes to the credentials will have been
     	 made.

 (2) LSM interface.

     A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:

     (*) security_bprm_alloc(), ->bprm_alloc_security()
     (*) security_bprm_free(), ->bprm_free_security()

     	 Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those.

     (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
     (*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), ->bprm_post_apply_creds()

     	 Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(),
     	 security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds().

     (*) security_bprm_set(), ->bprm_set_security()

     	 Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds().

     (*) security_bprm_set_creds(), ->bprm_set_creds()

     	 New.  The new credentials in bprm->creds should be checked and set up
     	 as appropriate.  bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the
     	 second and subsequent calls.

     (*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), ->bprm_committing_creds()
     (*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), ->bprm_committed_creds()

     	 New.  Apply the security effects of the new credentials.  This
     	 includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux.  This function may not
     	 fail.  When the former is called, the creds haven't yet been applied
     	 to the process; when the latter is called, they have.

 	 The former may access bprm->cred, the latter may not.

 (3) SELinux.

     SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
     interface changes mentioned above:

     (a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using
     	 the credentials-under-construction approach.

     (c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on
     	 to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open().
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Use RCU to access another task's creds and to release a task's own creds.
This means that it will be possible for the credentials of a task to be
replaced without another task (a) requiring a full lock to read them, and (b)
seeing deallocated memory.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

Wrap current->cred and a few other accessors to hide their actual
implementation.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>